【作者】 马磊；

【导师】 杨蕙馨；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 探讨高管更换与经营业绩的关系是观察公司治理机制有效性的一个“窗口”。文献指出,不称职的高层管理人员滞留在公司被认为是最严重的代理问题,因此良好的公司治理机制应该能够及时对业绩低劣公司的高管人员做出惩罚,并且良好的公司治理机制不但应该能够及时解聘不称职的高管,而且还应该能够重新选聘最适合的继任者。对于这一理论,市场发达国家的经验研究已经给予了充分的证实。而我国正处于计划经济向市场经济转型的过程中,企业所有制形式复杂多样,市场化程度也各不相同。证券市场在这个阶段建立,逐渐发展,形成了与西方国家不同的市场特征。在这个过程中,我国企业也涌现了大量高管人员更换的案例。问题是高管人员的大量频繁更换究竟是什么原因驱动,它与公司业绩呈现怎样一种关系?高管的更换是来自于外部接管的威胁,还是董事会监督控制职能有效作用的结果,抑或是来自于市场外的因素干扰?高管人员的频繁更换给上市公司带来了怎样的经济后果?他们又是如何选聘继任者的。通过对这些问题的探查,来观察我国公司治理机制的有效性,是本文的根本动机。针对以上问题,本文以我国上市公司为例,分三步对公司治理机制的有效性进行研究:首先通过考察控制权变更情况下的高管更换与经营业绩的相互关系,来探讨我国外部治理机制的有效性问题;其次,考察未发生控制权变更情况下的高管更换与经营业绩、董事会特征之间的关系,从而探讨内部治理机制的有效性问题;最后,进一步对高管更换后继任者的选择问题进行考察,以验证选聘制度的有效性和公司治理机制的完善程度。在实证研究过程中,本文分别构造了两个模型以验证公司治理机制的有效性:其一是高管人员更换、更换前企业业绩与公司治理的Probit模型,以考察低劣的企业业绩是否会引起经理人员的变更,以及继任模式的选择问题;其二是高管人员更换、更换后企业业绩与公司治理的OLS回归模型,以考察企业业绩是否在更换经理人员后有了显著改善。文章结构主要分为两大部分:第一部分是高管更换的相关治理理论及我国更换现状分析,第二部分是高管更换的实证研究。两部分研究结论如下:1、高管更换的现状分析对我国上市公司高管更换的现状分析表明,从1998年至2006年,上市公司的董事长和总经理发生了大量的更换。从对外披露的原因来看,辞职和工作调动是使用最多的托词。然而,从高管人员的年龄和任期来看,上市公司高管更换更多的是强制性离职。初步的影响因素分析表明,公司控制权的变更是导致高管人员更换的重要原因,另外经营业绩越差,公司高管被更换的可能性也越大。2、高管更换与经营业绩关系的实证结果发生控制权变更的公司其经营业绩明显低于市场平均水平,同时也低于未发生控制权变更的公司.而且在控制权变更的公司中,发生高管人员更换的公司其业绩水平又低于未发生高管更换的公司。这说明只有经营业绩不良的企业在变更了控股股东之后才会更换高管人员,而经营业绩良好的企业既使变更了控股股东,也不会更换高管人员。对未发生控制权转移情况下高管更换的实证研究表明,我国上市公司高管更换与公司业绩的低下有非常显著的关系,公司上一年业绩低更容易导致高管更换。但对于高管更换后公司业绩改变的实证结果却令人沮丧。高管更换对业绩的改善并没有显著的影响,经营业绩没有因为控制权的变更或高管的更换而有所提高。继任选择的实证研究也进一步证明,经营业绩对公司高管的继任模式的选择不具有显著性的影响。3、高管更换与董事会特征关系实证结果由于我国上市公司的董事会主要由股东代表构成,董事会成员之间的协调和沟通主要是基于各董事所代表股东权利的大小,而不是基于董事本人的能力和学识,所以董事会的规模对监督更换公司高层管理者基本没有显著的影响。董事会领导权结构影响了董事会在高管更换中有效性的发挥,在两职合一的条件下,董事会难以更换业绩不佳的高层管理者,既便更换了高层管理者,也更倾向于从内部选拔继任者。这是因为董事长和总经理事实上由一人承担,造成了董事会事实上成了总经理的附属机构,缺乏独立性,降低了治理效率。独立董事制度在2003年之后逐渐起到了监督经理人的作用,独立董事的比例越高,董事会越有可能解聘不称职的经理,但这一指标对于高管更换后业绩的改善却没有显著影响力,同时对于继任管理者的选择也不具有显著影响。这一方面与独立董事的职业背景有关,另一方面与独立董事的独立性有关。管理人员持股也没有起到提高企业业绩的作用。这是因为,我国上市公司的高级管理人员持股比例偏低,持股目标不明确,从而无法产生激励作用,另外高管人员持股体系封闭,不能通过二级市场进行买卖,导致管理者利益无法与股东利益紧密联系在一起。根据以上研究结果,本文对我国的公司治理机制的有效性做出这样几点评价:(1)外部治理机制对管理者形成一定的约束作用,控制权转移威胁在一定程度上激励着公司的管理者,经营业绩不佳的经理人更有可能在控制权转移过程中被更换掉。但就目前来看,由于处于非流通状态的国有股不能在市场上自由流通转让,削弱了代理权争夺和敌意并购等外部公司治理机制对管理者的监督约束作用,所以外部治理机制的力量还相对较弱。(2)以董事会为核心的内部治理机制的对管理者的监督约束作用在2003年后有所加强,董事会的各项特征在对经理人的监督上逐渐发挥了显著性的作用。但董事会制度形式化的特点依然十分严重。另外,高级管理人员持股比例过小和持股体系封闭也影响着董事会有效性的发挥。这些因素都对董事会选聘合适的继任者造成了阻碍,从而削弱了内部治理机制的效率。总体而言,我国的公司治理机制经历一个从无章可循到规则日趋完善的快速发展过程,可以说在形式上取得了巨大的进步,但在实践上的进展却相对滞后。为此本文认为,加强公司治理建设,要从改善内部治理结构和强化外部约束两方面同步入手,双管齐下。既要完善董事会功能,加强上市公司内部控制,又要加强公司控制权市场和经理人才市场的培育。同时,还要建立上市公司内部控制标准体系,完善信息披露机制,并在此基础上提高管理者持股水平。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is a "window" to observe the effectiveness of corporate governance system by examining the relation of top manager’s turnover and corporate performance. According to the literature, it is the most serious agency problem that the unqualified top manager staying in the company. So the effective corporate governance system should be able to timely punish the top manager performing poorly. The effective corporate governance is not only able to fire unqualified top manager timely but also able to choose and employ a better qualified successor. These points have been well proved in the developed countries.China is in the transition from planned economy to market economy. The ownership of the companies is diversiform. And their marketing processes are different. During the time, with China’s stock market created and increasingly developed, some characteristics formed in the stock market, which is different from western countries. During the period, there are many events of top managers’ turnover. The issue is what triggers the managers’ turnover, and what the relation between the turnover and performance is. Is the top manager’s turnover led by external takeover, or it is the consequence of boards’ doing their monitor duties or it is caused by other factors outside the market? And what is the consequence of the frequently turnover? How do the companies choose their successor? It is the paper’s basic motivation to observe the effectiveness of China’s corporate governance by answering above questions.To do this, three steps are considered. The first is examining the relation of top manager’s turnover and performance occurred under the takeover conditions to analyze the effectiveness of external system. The second is considering turnover that occurs in ongoing companies which haven’t been taken over during the study period to analyze the effectiveness of internal system. And the third is discussing the mode of top manager’s successor choice to examine the improvement degree of governance.To examine the effectiveness of corporate governance, two models are created. One of them is the probit model about turnover pre-turnover’s performance and governance, in which the board optimally decides when to replace the top manager and illustrate that the sensitivity of turnover to performance depends critically on the level of performance. The other is the OLS regression model about turnover post-turnover’s performance and governance to test if the performance is improved after changing top managers.This paper can be divided into two parts. The first part is about the governance theories and turnover’s facts and figures. The second part is the empirical studies about turnover. The conclusion is as follows:1. The facts and figures about turnoverIt shows, from 1998 to 2006 many top managers’ turnover events occurred in the listed companies. Quitting and work transfer were the most frequent claimed excuses. While judging from the manager’s age and tenure, turnover was more obliged action. The primary analysis shows control rights transfer is the important causes. And the performance more poorly, the top managers are more probably changed.2. The relation between turnover and performanceThe performance of the companies in which turnover occurred through control rights transfer is worse than the average market performance. Among the control-rights-transfer companies the performance of the turnover-companies is more poorly than the companies’ that keep the original top manager. It indicates that only the poor performance companies will change their top managers after the control rights being transferred, while the well performance companies will not even when their control rights are transferred. The empirical study on internal turnover demonstrates the turnover is significantly related to poor performance. The lower the performance is the higher the probability of the turnover. But it is disappointed that the performance was not improved after changing the top managers. And the probit regression result of successor choice also proves there is no significant relation between performance and successor choice.3. The relation between turnover and board characteristicsSince boards being composed of representatives of shareholders, the coordination between boards of directors is based on the shareholders’ right, not on their abilities and learning. So the size of boards is insignificantly related to internal turnover.Leadership structure of boards significantly affects internal turnover. Under the duality condition, it is difficult for boards to change the unfitted top managers. Even having changed the top managers, boards are more inclined to choose an insider as the successor. As the affiliation of CEO, boards are short of independence, which reduces the governance efficiency.The system of independent director has increasingly done its monitory work since 2003. The higher the ratio of independent director is, the higher the possibility of dismissing the unfitted top managers will be. But the indicator is irrelevant to the performance improvement or successor choice. This phenomenon associates to the occupation background and independence of independent directors. It also hasn’t improved the companies’ performance to have the managers holding stock shares. This because of the shares is too low, and can’t be traded in the second market, which impairs the incentive function.Upon the above empirical results, the paper forms the following opinions: (1) The external governance system has formed certain constraint to the top managers. The threats of control rights transfer stimulates the managers, during which the managers perform poorly are possibly changed. While by now, for the state-owned shares uncirculated in the market, the external governance mechanism is weakened. (2) The internal governance system has being working much better since 2003. The board has played his monitor role, but there are still many problems. Besides, too small shares held by top managers and incomplete circulations impair the effectiveness of boards. These factors hinder the process of successor choice.In general, China’s corporate governance goes through a rapid development, and makes great progress in formation. But it is relative lagged in practice. So this paper suggests some measures should be taken to improve external and internal governance, such as strengthening boards’ functions, building external markets, perfecting information disclosure system, raising the level of manager’s stock shares.更多还原