【作者】 刘金涛；

【导师】 曲晓飞；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 财政分权与经济增长之间的关系问题由来已久,国内外相关学者和专家对此进行了大量的研究。然而对于转型国家的财政分权与经济增长的关系问题尚存在诸多争议,尤其是对中国这样处于转型期的发展中大国而言,资源配置、制度环境和经济发展等均具有明显的特殊性,因此对中国的财政分权进行研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文首先对财政分权与经济增长的文献作了综述,阐述了传统的财政分权理论及近些年发展起来的基于激励理论框架的的第二代财政分权理论。之后,系统地回顾了中国财政分权改革的历程,论述了中国财政分权改革的必要性。然后,基于经济增长对财政分权的中间需求效应论,本文以中国改革开放以来政府间财政权力关系博弈模型为分析框架,对中国财政分权改革的必要性进行了分阶段的实证检验。结果显示,在中央财政支出压力、国有企业财政负担过重、地方政府财政盈余、中央政府政策空间约束等因素的综合作用下,中国的财政分权改革是经济增长的内在要求。接着,本文对中国财政分权改革的历程及必要性进行了分析。对中国政治体制演变和财政分权改革的历程进行了较为全面的回顾,并对分别对改革开放以前、改革开放之后的财政包干制和分税制改革进行评价。然后,分析了财政分权对中国经济增长的作用机制,提出财政分权对中国经济增长的资源配置机制、制度环境机制和综合作用机制。从资源配置机制来看,财政分权促进了中国宏观经济的稳定和加速了市场化进程;从制度环境机制来看,财政分权转变了中国地方政府的角色,为地区市场分割和政府间竞争格局的形成创造了条件。在此基础上,本文对中国财政分权与经济增长之间关系进行了实证研究。格兰杰因果关系检验结果显示,1982年至2005年中国的经济增长是财政分权的格兰杰成因,这从一定程度上验证了中国经济增长对财政分权的中间需求效应;线性关系实证结果显示,1982年至2005年的财政分权对中国经济增长存在负作用;非线性关系实证结果显示,1982年至2005年财政分权与中国经济增长的非线性关系曲线呈反常的“U型”关系,“最低财政分权度”DCU为75.53%,而中国现行财政分权度恰在DCU的水平上徘徊,继续扩大财政分权程度将有助于中国经济增长,这显然与线性关系研究结论是相悖的。为了澄清财政分权与中国经济增长的非线性关系,本文将财政分权指标DC修正为“预算外”财政分权DCX。通过对DCX与经济增长之间非线性关系的实证研究,得出结论:1994年至2005年,中国“预算外”财政分权DCX与经济增长之间的非线性关系曲线呈“倒U型”,“最优财政分权度”为82.13%,而中国现行的财政分权DCX自1994年分税制改革以来(1996年除外)一直处于DCE之上。这样,按照“倒U型”曲线关系的逻辑,中国如果继续提高财政分权程度,尤其是提高地方政府预算外支出占全国的比重,将会对中国经济增长产生负面影响。最后,本文得出结论认为,中国财政分权由于制度供给失衡而超过了适度的界限,因而对经济增长产生了负面影响。为了使下一步的财政分权改革成为促进中国经济增长的一个积极因素,就要处理好财政分权适宜度、制度供给平衡与经济增长之间的关系等问题。这就需要确定合理的政府间财政权力博弈规则和消减地方政府的预算外资金,并进一步完善公共财政体制建设和财政支出管理体制,建立规范化的政府间财政转移支付制度。更多还原

【Abstract】 It has been a long time for the issue on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, which has brought out various theories. Although there is some classic theories and a general analysis framework so far, it is no doubt that different arguments exist concerning the same problem but in transitional countries, especially in China, a vast transitional and developing country. The important academic and realistic significance drives me to explore this topic.First of all, literature review concerning fiscal decentralization and economic growth involves the traditional western theory of fiscal decentralization and recent relative theory. Then this paper traces China’s fiscal decentralization reforms, and discusses the necessity of fiscal decentralization. Based on the theory of medium demand effect of economic growth with respect to fiscal decentralization, this paper models the inter-government fiscal relationship since 1978 as a benchmark, and provides a two-stage empirical research on China’s reforms of fiscal decentralization. The result shows that fiscal decentralization inevitably emerges with economic growth in China under the comprehensive effect of burden of central fiscal expenditure, fiscal overload of state-owned enterprises, finance surplus of local governments, and constraints of central government.Then, the necessity of China’s fiscal decentralization are discussed and analyzed. The evolution of China’s political system and the fiscal decentralization reform process are comprehensively reviewed. This paper also evaluated the tax distribution system and fiscal decentralization before and after the China’s opening-up.This paper also focuses on mechanisms of resource allocation and institutional environments of fiscal decentralization in the context of economic growth. With regard to the mechanisms of resource allocation, fiscal decentralization contributes to the stabilization of China’s economy and accelerates the process of approach to market economy. Concerning the mechanisms of institutional environments, it also advances the transformation of local governments in China, which causes market segmentation and inter-government competition to some extent.A positive research follows, which gets involved in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China. Granger Causality Test indicates that economic growth is Granger cause of fiscal decentralization in China from 1982 to 2005, which confirms medium demand effect to some extent. According to linear regression, fiscal decentralization during the period from 1982 to 2005 imposes negative effect on China’s economic growth, while nonlinear regression shows that the curve of fiscal decentralization wiht respect to economic growth from 1982 to 2005 takes an abnormal U shape with the lowest degree of fiscal decentralization, DCU, 75.53%. The current degree of fiscal decentralization in China is just around the DCU, which implies that increase in degree of fiscal decentralization will be conducive to China’s economic growth, obviously contradictory to the results of linear regression. To identify the nonlinear relationship further, fiscal decentralization index, DC, is adjusted to extra-budgetary fiscal decentralization index, DCX. Nonlinear regression of economic growth on DCX from 1994 to 2005 concludes that the nonlinear correlation curve between DCX and economic growth is an inverse U shape with the optimal fiscal decentralization degree as 82.13%. But China’s DCX has been above the optimal decentralization, DCE, since reforms of tax distribution system in 1994 except in 1996. Thus according to the inverse U shape curve, China increases fiscal decentralization degree, especially increasing the proportion of local government extra-budgetary expenditure to the whole expenditure of China, will influence negatively economic growth.This dissertation concludes that China’s fiscal decentralization goes far beyond the reasonable area due to lack of system, which in turn imposes negative effect on economic growth. If China attempts to impose positive effect on economic growth by way of fiscal decentralization, it is necessary to balance the degree of fiscal decentralization, system supply and economic growth. Furthermore, the possible solution would involve in setting specific game rules of inter-government, decreasing extra-budgetary fund of local governments, enhancing the institutions of public finance and fiscal expenditure, and standardizing inter-government transfer payment system.更多还原