【作者】 赵军；

【导师】 张应强；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 高等教育学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本研究从民办高等教育制度变迁视野出发,以诱致性制度变迁作为切入点,以政府行为作为主题,其最终目的在于厘清民办高等教育发展过程中的政府行为逻辑,以及在此逻辑下政府可能还应该作出哪些转变。我国民办高等教育的生成和发展是典型的诱致性制度变迁。“诱致性制度变迁”这一概念对于认识政府行为,具有深刻的理论张力。它客观上要求政府应该以制度供给者的身份参与到民办高等教育制度变迁过程中。但政府有其自身的利益诉求和行为约束。通常只有在制度变迁的预期收益大于预期成本时,政府提供新的制度供给才有可能。因此政府基于自身的成本-收益判断,也并不总是积极响应民办高等教育的诱致性制度需求。出于自身的成本-收益判断,政府更倾向于加强对民办高等教育的控制与引导。政府及其内部的权力精英,通过“内输入”模式,运用国家垄断、政府管制以及政策不对等三种手段,自上而下地将自身的利益诉求结构化到民办高等教育制度安排中,从而完成了民办高等教育的政策建构。政府关于民办高等教育的支持和鼓励只是一种政策承诺,政策建构与民办高等教育的制度需求不仅不完全耦合,而且一定时期内还处于负相关状态,形成了民办高等教育生成和发展的制度环境。因此,诱致性制度变迁只是民办高等教育制度变迁的外在形式,而不是实质内容。民办高等教育制度变迁本质上是中央政府对诱致性制度变迁进行的“特殊赋值过程”,而这个“值”也就是政府的政策变量,它不断地努力引导民办高等教育向着政府利益诉求的方向发展。而在市场经济体制改革过程中,地方政府也已经具有相对独立的利益诉求和行为空间。陕西民办高等教育制度变迁的案例分析表明,地方政府基于自身的利益诉求和行为约束,其行为具有三重性。中央政府关于民办高等教育外围制度的软约束以及核心制度的硬约束,分别催生了地方政府的积极作为、消极作为和不作为。同时,外围制度的软约束也派生出“并非不合法”领域。地方政府在此领域内,出于自身的利益诉求,有可能通过非正式权力运作,运用“人格化交易”、“事前求助”、“事后追认”等策略方式,推进民办高等教育的发展。由于地方政府的非正式权力运作不仅具有技术层面的含义,而且具有政策变迁的含义,因此,中央政府关于民办高等教育的政策建构既是地方政府非正式权力运作的前提,也是其运作的结果。“并非不合法”领域实际上构成了中国民办高等教育发展的制度空间。在这里,本研究给出政府行为的一个框架性描述,从而打开了政府行为黑箱,揭示了民办高等教育制度变迁过程中的政府行为逻辑。政府行为逻辑的揭示,说明在民办高等教育制度变迁过程中,民办高等教育第一行动集团的利益诉求始终被边缘化了。于是,关系建构与结果博弈成为民办高等教育第一行动集团进行利益聚合与利益表达的主要渠道。因此,中国民办高等教育发展的特殊性就在于,以市场作为其生发根本动力的民办高等教育,其制度安排的生成和变更却不依赖于市场机制,而依赖于政府的利益聚合与利益表达,是政府制度供给的结果。民办高等教育的发展已经步入一个制度平台。目前迫切需要做的就是基于政府的行为逻辑以及民办高等教育的诱致性制度需求,对政府角色进行新的重构和调整。第一,进一步建立和完善经费充裕的政府管理民办高等教育的行政组织,并为之配备致力于民办高等教育改革的人才。第二,政府应该主动帮助和扶持民办高等教育中介组织的建立,尤其是那些价值取向倾斜于民办高等教育机构的中介组织。第三,建立教育听证制度,畅通民办高等教育第一行动集团的利益表达渠道,鼓励办学者的制度性政治参与。第四,积极审慎地推进民办高等教育产权制度、学历文凭认定制度改革,明晰民办高等教育投资者合法权益,适度扩大从事学历教育的民办高等教育机构数目。第五,加大对民办高等教育的财政扶持,逐渐缩小民办高等教育机构与公办高等教育机构在财政资助之间的差距。第六,政府应该为民办高校内部制度创新提供外部激励。但无论如何,在上述的诸多选择中,问题的核心仍然是,能否以及如何在政府不愿意的地方,使政府变得更加愿意。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of institutional change of private higher education, this paper explores the governmental behavior logic in the development of private higher education and shows how to change governmental behavior, taking induced institutional change as cuts into the spot and taking governmental behavior as the subject.The creation and development of China’s private higher education is in characteristic of typical induced institutional change. The concept of induced institutional change has profound theory tension, which is helpful to understand Chinese governmental behavior. Induced institutional change impersonally demands Chinese government to participate in the institutional change of the private higher education as institutional provider. However, government has its needs of interest and behavior restriction. Generally, government may supply institution only if anticipating profits of institutional change exceeds anticipating costs. So Chinese government does not always actively respond to induced institutional demands of the first action group of private higher education according to its estimation of its cost-profit.Considering the maximum political profits and the maximum higher education output, central government is inclined to controlling and leading private higher education. In order to complete the private higher education policy making, central government and the inner authority elites,which are making use of national monopoly, government regulation and policy discrimination, have structured the private higher education institution from above to below according to their endogenous needs of interest by“interior-input mode”. As a result, at the cost of private higher education walking with difficulty, central governmental support and encouragement is only a policy promise, and there is a negative correlation between central governmental policy making and the induced institutional demands of private higher education, which is the system environment of the creation and development of China’s private higher education. So induced institutional change isn’t essential content but extrinsic form of institutional change of private higher education. Institutional change of private higher education essentially is a special process of induced institutional change to which central government adds“numerical value”. The numerical value is a policy variable of central government, which continually leads private higher education to central governmental needs of interest.But in the course of market economy system reform, local government has possessed comparatively unattached needs of interest and behaviour roomage. Case analysis of institutional change of Shaanxi private higher education shows the three attributes of local governmental behaviour according to its needs of interest and behavior restriction. Local governmental active behavior and negative behavior derive from the soft constraints of peripheral institution of private higher education in the charge of central government, and behavior of omission derives from the hard constraints of private higher education in the charge of central government. At the same time, the soft constraints of peripheral institution results in the area of not illegality. According to its needs of interest, local government may make use of personalized trading, seeking help in anticipation, and subsequent confirming to advance the development of private higher education by operation of informal power. Because the operation of informal power of local government has not only the implications of technical aspect but also the implications of policy change, central governmental policy making of private higher education is not only the premise but also the result of operation of informal power. The area of not illegality constitutes system roomage of China’s private higher education. In here presenting a frame description of governmental behavior, the paper has opened the black box of governmental behavior and revealed the logic of governmental behavior in the institutional change of private higher education.The revealment of the logic of governmental behavior show that the needs of interest, which are from the first action group of private higher education, are always marginalized in the course of institutional change. And then relation making and result game are the main channels of aggregation and expression of interest for the first action group of private higher education. So institutional change of China’s private higher education is not independent of the market mechanism but depends on governmental aggregation and expression of interest and results from governmental system supplies, which is it is the particularity of China’s private higher education. Private higher education has gotten into the system platform. At present, it is suggested that the governmental role be reconstructed and adjusted in the light of the logic of governmental behavior and induced institutional demands of private higher education. Firstly, administrative organization with abundant funds should further be founded and supplied with persons committing themselves to the reform of private higher education. Secondly, government should initiatively help and support the erection of intermediary organizations of private higher education, especial the organizations partial to private higher education. Thirdly, educational hearing system should be established, and the channels of expression of interest should be unblocked for the first action group. What’s more, institutional political participation should be encouraged. Fourthly, property system and diploma cognizance systems of private higher education should be improved actively and prudently, and legal rights of investors of private higher education should be detailed. At the same time, the number of private higher education engage in diploma education should be enlarged within measure. Fifthly, financial support for private higher education should be increased, and the difference of financial imbursement between private higher education and governmental private higher education should also be reduced gradually. Sixth, government should supply the inner institutional innovation of private colleges with exterior encouragements. But whatever happens, it is the core of the question whether and how to make government do something that government is reluctant to do.更多还原