【作者】 肖华芳；

【导师】 夏新平； 袁建国；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 自愿披露是指在强制披露的规则要求之外,公司管理层自主提供的关于公司财务和公司发展等其他方面的相关信息,是对公司整体会计信息的深化和补充。自愿披露有利于消除资本市场信息不对称和不完全,有利于实现资本市场的公平和效率,因而越来越受到人们的重视。公司治理与自愿披露之间存在密切的关系,对此国外学者进行了大量的实证研究,但由于经济环境、法律框架和传统文化的不同及我国上市公司治理结构的特性,国外的很多研究成果不能很好地适用于我国上市公司,而国内的研究相对较少,为此,本文着重从理论上系统分析了我国上市公司公司治理对自愿披露的影响,并运用上市公司的经验数据进行了实证分析,为完善公司治理,提高我国上市公司自愿披露水平提供理论支持和政策建议。论文首先分析了我国上市公司股权结构、董事会效率和管理层激励等内部治理机制对自愿披露的影响。然后选取2004年在上海证券交易所交易的401家上市公司作为研究样本,就股权结构和董事会效率对自愿披露的影响进行了实证研究,并将样本组分为低自愿披露组和高自愿披露组进行进一步分析。实证结果显示:(1)在全部样本组、高自愿披露组中,法人股比例、前十大股东中机构投资者个数、独立董事比例、董事会召开会议次数、审计委员会五个变量与自愿披露水平显著正相关;国有股比例、董事长总经理两职合一、独立董事会议缺席率、在多家公司担任独立董事的独立董事比例四个变量与自愿披露水平显著负相关;前五大股东持股比例、前十大股东持股比例均与自愿披露程度呈倒U型相关,而第一大股东持股比例与自愿披露程度无关;流通股比例、董事会规模、前三名董事报酬总额、独立董事津贴、董事持股比例、CEO变更六个变量与自愿披露水平无关。(2)在低自愿披露水平组里,仅仅只有董事会召开会议次数通过了显著性检验,且与自愿披露程度显著正相关。我们还发现,公司规模越大,自愿披露程度越高,有融资需求的公司倾向于提高自愿披露程度。然后阐述了产品市场、经理人市场、控制权市场和信息中介等外部治理机制对自愿披露的影响,并引入行为金融的相关理论,通过构建非对称信息下的古诺双寡头产量竞争模型,研究了信息中介的羊群行为对公司自愿披露行为的影响。结果表明:上市公司的信息披露行为与其持有的私人信息特征和所吸引的信息中介数目有关。随着关注该公司信息中介数目的增多,即使私人成本较高,公司也将自愿披露一些私人信息,来引导信息中介的羊群行为,达到控制流向竞争者的信息,保持竞争优势的目的。然后选取2004年在上海证券交易所交易的365家上市公司作为样本,检验了管理层股权激励和产品市场竞争对自愿披露的交互效应。我们发现:产品市场竞争程度较低时,管理层持股比例越高,公司的自愿披露程度越低;市场竞争程度越低且管理层持股比例越高的公司,其自愿披露的意愿越弱。最后在总结论文实证研究结论的基础上,从完善我国上市公司公司治理的角度,提出提高公司自愿披露水平的政策建议。这些建议包括:1)深化政企分开,明晰产权,进一步完善国有法人治理结构;2)大力发展机构投资者,平衡产权结构;3)适当增加董事会会议次数,完善董事会的议事程序;4)完善独立董事制度,充分发挥独立董事的监督作用;5)建立审计委员会制度,强化审计委员会职能;6)培育产品市场竞争体系;7)促进信息中介行业的发展,鼓励信息中介机构定期对我国上市公司自愿披露水平进行评级。更多还原

【Abstract】 Voluntary disclosure can be defined as disclosures in excess of requirements, representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual reports. There is a close relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Foreign scholars have done lots of empirical research on this relationship. Because of the unique economy environment, legal framework, traditional culture and unique feature of corporate governance of listed Chinese companies, many foreign research results on voluntary disclosure are not fit for listed Chinese companies effectively. While internal scholars have done a little on it, this paper analyzes the effects of corporate governance of listed Chinese compabies on voluntary disclosure systematically and examines this relationship empirically. Then provides support and policy suggestion on improving corporate voluntary disclosure.Firstly, this paper analyzes the influences of internal governance including ownership structure, board effectiveness and manager incentives on voluntary disclosure of listed Chinese companies. Then selecting 401 companies listed on the shanghai stock exchange in 2004 as our samples, we examine empirically the effects of ownership structure and board effectiveness on voluntary disclosure. And divide the samples into low-voluntary disclosure group and high-voluntary disclosure group to make further analysis. The results show that: (1) in the total sample group and high voluntary disclosure score sample group, proportion of legal person ownership, the quantity of institutional investors in the first ten shareholders, proportion of independent director, number of the board of directors’meeting and audit committee are positively associated with voluntary disclosure; while proportion of state ownership, CEO duality, the absence ratio of independent director participated in the board of directors’meeting, proportion of independent director who hold independent directorships of other listed companies are negatively related to voluntary disclosure; as for the concentration of ownership, proportion of the first five shareholders and the first ten shareholders are both inverse-U related to voluntary disclosure, while proportion of the first shareholders is not related to voluntary disclosure; proportion of liquid share, board size, total annual compensation of top three directors, annual compensation of independent director, proportion of director ownership and CEO change are not related to voluntary disclosure. (2) in the low voluntary disclosure score sample group, only number of the board of directors’meeting is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. Other variables are not related to voluntary disclosure. We also find that larger firms and firms with equity demand are more clines to voluntary disclosure.Secondly, this paper analyzes the effect of external governance including product market, executive market, control right market and information intermediaries on voluntary disclosure of listed Chinese companies. We introduce theory of behavior finance and investigate how information intermediaries influence corporate voluntary disclosure through establishing a game under asymmetrical information. The conclusion is: Along with the increase of information intermediary, listed companies will disclosure private information in order to lead the herding behavior of information intermediaries, control the information that would be transferred to competitor and keep competition superiority, even if this action will increase the proprietary cost. Finally, we test the joint effect of managerial ownership and product market competition on voluntary disclosure empirically. We select 365 companies listed on the shanghai stock exchange in 2004 as our samples. The results indicate that managerial ownership is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure when the degree of competition the company faces is low; this relationship does not exist when competition is high. In addition, firms with lower competition and higher managerial ownership are less likely to make additional disclosures.Thirdly, we bring forward policy suggestions on improving voluntary disclosure based on the empirical results of our empirical research. The propositions are: (1)deepening the description of government and corporate, clarifying ownership and further perfecting state-owner corporate governance structure; (2) encouraging institutional investors to balance the ownership structure; (3)increasing the number of the board of directors’meeting appropriately and perfecting the standing orders of directors’board; (4) perfecting the independent director system to exert the supervisory role adequately. (5) establishing the audit committee system to strengthen the functions of audit committee;(6) fostering product market competition system; (7)pushing the development of information intermediary industry and encouraging information intermediary organizations to rate the level of voluntary disclosure of listed Chinese companies regularly.更多还原