【作者】 丁卫；

【导师】 吴毅；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 社会学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 基于对陕西关中地区秦窑人民法庭所作的实地调查,本文较为系统地考察了人民法庭在当代中国乡村治理中所占据的位置及其独具的功能。进一步,本文揭示了乡村治理与政法传统之间内在的关联。本文指出,自1990年代以来,国家治理方式由“基于政策的治理”转向“通过法律的治理”,与之相适应,人民法庭在乡村治理中的作用也日益凸显,它特殊的治理逻辑得到了强调,司法权力和行政权力之间的边界也被谨慎地区分开来,乡村治理中的混沌现象开始被澄清。国家通过加强人民法庭建设,鼓励法庭独立行使审判权以化解乡村社会的矛盾及纠纷,从而增强了其治理社会的合法性(legitimacy),并试图进一步巩固党政国家(party-state)的执政基础。本文的叙述建立在对人民法庭所进行的宏观历史考察,以及对渭水市古渡区人民法院秦窑人民法庭的司法运行过程所展开的实地调查工作的基础之上。通过对人民法庭治理功能变迁的分析,本文试图揭示出新中国的政法传统对于乡村治理目标及手段的根源性和决定性。本文从人民法庭的视角考察了乡村治理的社会环境与制度约束,着重分析了乡民的法律观与乡村精英在乡村法治中的作用,同时,对秦窑法庭推行“特邀协调员”制度的源起和绩效也作了考察,进而揭示了自上而下的普适性规则与自下而上的乡土性策略之间的内在紧张与相互调适。本文还细致描述了人民法庭的司法运作逻辑,指出人民法院(人民法庭)工作的总体目标自1990年代以来已经悄然发生了改变,即由过去的“人民司法”转向当下的“司法为民”,这种转变的实质在于党政国家意欲通过法院科层体系的合法律性(legality)运行来增强其治理国家的合法性基础。然而,由于资源硬约束与法律软约束并存,作为治理主体之一的基层法院(人民法庭)及其代理人(法院干警)遵循着一套自我利益极大化的政治经济学逻辑,而这套逻辑并不必然与国家的政治诉求相契合,因此,这种抵牾不仅在一定程度上削弱了国家谋求合法性的努力,而且对国家治理能力的提升也构成了潜在的障碍。本文认为,当代中国的乡村法治实际上遵循着一套“政治—法律”的逻辑,而不是单纯的司法的逻辑。在党政国家既定的宪政体制框架下,乡村法治在治理形式上的理性化和程序化并不能真正触动治理逻辑的根本转变,此所谓“新瓶装旧酒”。更多还原

【Abstract】 Basing on the field survey to Qinyao People’s Tribunal in Guanzhong Area, Shaanxi Province, the dissertation systematically investigates the position and unique function of people’s tribunal in contemporary rural China governance, furthermore, discloses the internal relation between rural governance and political-legal tradition.Since 1990, the national governance mode has transformed to“governance through laws”from“governance basing on policy”; accordingly, the effect of people’s tribunal has gradually increased and its special governance logic has been emphasized; judiciary power and administrative power has been differentiated carefully and chaotic phenomena in rural governance have been clarified. By strengthening construction of people’s tribunal, our country encourages the court to exert judicial power independently in order to solve conflicts and disputes in village, and thus increases legitimacy in social governance and tries to further consolidate the ruling foundation of the party-state. The dissertation bases on the macroscopic historical survey to people’s tribunal and on field survey to judiciary operation process of Qinyao People’s Tribunal, People’s Court of Gudu District, Weishui City, and discloses that political-legal tradition of new China has decisive effect on objectives and means of rural governance, by analyzing the changes of governance function of people’s tribunal.The dissertation explores the social environment and system restriction of rural governance from the angle of people’s tribunal, emphatically investigates law viewpoint of villagers and function of village elitists in village rule by law, inspects the origin and performance of implementing specially invited coordinator in Qinyao People’s Tribunal and then discloses the internal intension and mutual regulation between superincumbent generality and local-color strategy from bottom to top.The dissertation also depicts the judiciary operation logic of people’s tribunal from the point of party-state, points out that the overall job objective of people’s tribunal has changed quietly from“the people’s judiciary”in the past to“judiciary for the people”nowadays since 1990, and the substance of the change is that party-state wants to strengthen the legitimate basis of its state governance through the legitimate operation of court section-system. However, because the hard constraint of resource and soft constraint of law coexist, the grass-root tribunal (people’s tribunal), which is one of the governance organizations, and its deputy (court police) abide by a set of political economics logic of maximum self-interest, while this set of logic is not in conformity with the political demand of party-state sometimes; as a result, the contradiction not only offsets the effort of party-state to strive for legitimacy in a certain extent, but also forms potential hindrance for the improvement of state governance capacity. The dissertation indicates that the contemporary Chinese village rule by law follows a set of“political-legal”logic but not judiciary logic in fact. Under the established constitutionalism framework of party-state, the rational and programmed governance form could not really trigger the essential transformation of governance logic, thus it is the so-called“old wine in a new bottle”.更多还原