【作者】 何嗣江；

【导师】 史晋川；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 上个世纪80年代末以来,订单农业在解决“小生产、大市场”间的矛盾,减少农民决策的盲目性,降低农业产业化的运行成本与风险以及促进农民增收等方面显示出独特的功能。然而,随着我国经济国际化、市场化程度的日益深入,其运行过程中暴露出来的问题日益严重,突出表现为高违约行为。综观国内外学者关于订单农业高违约率的研究,主要集中在运用企业组织理论、契约理论、博弈论、交易费用理论探讨订单农业模式特征及由此产生高违约率的原因、解决方略等方面。值得关注的是:尽管众多学者对订单农业高约率成因及解决方略做了许多有益的研究,但多年来其高违约率状况仍鲜有改善。高违约现象的频繁出现,不仅会挫伤公司与农户参与订单农业的积极性,而且会阻碍我国农业市场化与现代化的进程。因此,基于金融创新视角研究新形势下订单农业发展过程中风险的化解与防范问题,不仅在理论上有意义,而且在实践上可以为我国订单农业发展提供指导。本文将订单农业置于现代金融架构中进行考察,从金融衍生工具演进的角度探求订单农业高违约率产生的根源以及提升订单农业履约率的根本路径。这一研究视角迥异于当前大多数研究者较多地关注订单农业的发展,却很少基于现代金融市场探索以怎样的方式对待订单农业发展背后的风险。目前化解订单农业发展障碍的措施中诸如“治理机制与合约的完善、加大资产专用性投资”等方法一定程度上确有助于提高农业订单履约率,但难以从根本上解决问题。这是因为上述措施的缺陷在于不能分散风险,订单农业所固有的风险只是在订单农业系统内有限交易主体间转移,从某种意义而言这种方法具有“堵”的特征。现代市场环境下,农业风险金融化特征越来越明显,中途缺乏退出机制且天然地具有风险积分机制的远期合约不具有分散和配置市场风险的功能。因此,具有远期合约性质的订单农业与新形势下金融化的农业风险交互作用势必造成订单农业交易中“两性”冲突频繁而激烈地发生,这便成为订单农业高违约率的主要诱因。金融衍生工具的演进蕴含着个人理性和集体理性从冲突走向协调的博弈过程且表明有效的外在制度安排是协调“两性”冲突的关键因素。因此新形势下提升订单农业履约率的根本途径不应仅仅采取“堵”的方法,更应该“疏”、“堵”并重,即在保留“堵”之有效的方法基础上,通过金融创新及有效的外在制度安排,使封闭的农业订单系统具有开放性,寻求风险外化通道使风险流量化。本论文高度重视新形势下农业风险金融化特征及现代金融市场价格发现与风险分散、配置功能对指导订单农业的启示。与即期交易和远期交易相比,期货交易具有更高的价格发现效率,能够较快地接近均衡价格,并且能够根据供求因素的变化灵活地作出调整。本文认为,农民可以根据期货市场价格来确定农业订单价格,然后作出生产和消费的决策,由此可以一改农户以往盲目生产导致的增产不增收的状况,为农户利益提供实质性保障;同时按照衍生品的演进规律来类推,期权定价理论对订单农业的发展同样具有指导意义。传统的期权定价模型并未反映出由经济中的不寻常情况带来的不正常变化,这与农业生产特征是不相符合的。利用Morton(1976)关于几何布朗——跳跃混合随机过程的欧式看涨期权定价公式来指导农业订单的定价,既考虑到了各种随机因素对农产品价格的影响,同时又考虑到了突发性因素的影响,有利于形成合理的订单价格和企业与农户间的利益分配机制。金融衍生品市场因其管理风险具有更高的准确性、时效性、开放性、灵活性和低成本优势正越来越多地改变众多行业的风险特征,也改变了整个金融体系的风险管理结构。基于期货、期权市场分散与配置风险机制的分析,本文构造并论证了期货订单、期权订单、期货期权订单等风险外化通道,从而可望实现订单农业风险的社会化、规范化与金融化管理。期货订单模式中公司和农户在签订农业订单的同时,各自再通过期货市场进行套期保值,中和各自农业订单的风险敞口,可以从根本上提高农业订单的履约率。但是,因期货合约风险和收益的线性性,以及期货交易的强制性交割制度使得期货订单交易主体在分散风险的同时也丧失获利的可能性,因而期货订单一定程度上仍存在违约的诱因;期权订单因其风险和收益的非线性性以及期货、期权、期货期权间可以构造多样化的组合可以使得农业订单、期货订单中农户与公司所遇到的线性性风险得以根本地改变从而达到较好的保值效果,公司、农户的盈亏状况均得以较稳定的控制,双方违约倾向得以根本解决。基于国外金融衍生品研究与发展现状本文还对订单农业风险管理前沿与发展趋势进行了展望,认为农业订单发展中所面临的信用风险、自然风险同样亟待金融化管理,将订单农业运行中信用风险进行剥离并标准化后借助信用衍生品市场进行分散与配置与将订单农业运行中所遭遇到的自然风险标准化并通过天气衍生品市场进行分散与配置势必成为未来研究与开发的重点工作。本文还对期货、期权订单等新型农产品流通模式有效实施的障碍进行了细致的探讨。认为基于我国家庭承包制仍将占主导的前提下,利用与创新现有农民专业合作经济组织是实现订单农业交易主体进入现代金融市场的有效手段。让现代金融市场来反哺农业,让社会游资来分担农产品市场风险,以形成合理的订单农业风险配置与利益分配机制既是农业订单发展内在演进的必然,更是我国农业突破小生产与大市场间根本予盾、实现农业风险金融化管理的必然选择。在现有研究的基础上,本文总结并设计了多种农业订单交易主体、专业组织、衍生品市场间的连接模式并对农民专业合作经济组织创新过程中存在的问题及未来创新的趋势进行了分析与展望。最后,本文根据我国目前市场运行的实际状况及订单农业可持续发展所需的条件,提出了若干完善衍生品市场、创新农民专业合作经济组织以及促进农业订单与衍生品市场有效连接的政策建议,旨在构建合理的风险配置与利益分配机制,推进订单农业健康有序可持续地发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 1980s’, contract agriculture has shown its unique function in alleviating the contradiction between "small production" and "large markets", reducing the blindness of farmers’ decision-making, reducing the operation costs and risks in agriculture industrialization, and increasing farmers’ income. However, with the development of internationalization and deepening of the market economy in China, more and more problems are uncovered, especially the high default rate. Generally, the research into the high default rate in contract agriculture focus on is forms, effects, obstacles in its development and solutions, using tools such as Corporation Organizing Theory, Contract Theory, Game theory and Transaction Cost Theory. It is noticeable that, although scholars have done a lot of helpful research into the causes and solutions to the high default rate, the situation is not ameliorated. The breach of contracts would not only harm companies and farmers’ enthusiasm of participating in the contract agriculture, but also impede the process of the modernization of Chinese agriculture markets. As a result, the research into the risk management in the development of contract agriculture from the perspective of financial innovation would not only be theoretically reasonable, but also provide instruction to the development of the contract agriculture in China.This paper puts contract agriculture into modern financial frame, and then seeks the sources of the high default rate in contract agriculture and upgrades the fundamental route of reducing the breach of contracts from the perspective of the evolution of financial derivatives. This perspective is different from the majority of current researches, which focus mostly on the development of contract agriculture, but not on the way to manage the risks implied in contract agriculture. For the moment, such solutions to remove the obstacles in the development of contract agriculture as to consummate the management mechanism and the contract forms, and to increase the investment of exclusive assets, are actually helpful to some extent. But they cannot solve the problem fundamentally. Because the solutions mentioned above cannot disperse risks, so that the risks implied in contract agriculture only transfers between the trading subjects inside the contract agriculture system. This technique, to some extent, is blocking the risk. However, in modern markets, the risks in agriculture can be magnified unlimitedly by the variety of financial derivatives used by investors or speculators. Thus, the financialization of agriculture risk is more and more apparent. The lack of withdrawal mechanism, the inherent risk accumulating mechanism, as well as the occlusion of the trading system, the limited amounts and information make it impossible for us to use forward contracts to avoid, transfer and disperse market risks. Thus, contract agriculture, with the properties of forward contracts, interacts with the new fmancialized agriculture risks. As a result, the conflicts will happen frequently and drastically. This in turn becomes the main inducement of the high default rate in contract agriculture. The evolvement of financial derivatives is the gaming process of individual interest and collective interest, is the way from confliction to harmony, and shows that the effective institutional arrangement is the key to the harmonization. Hence, to keep the fulfillment of the contracts fundamentally, the right way is not to block but to dredge, that is, on the basis of the traditional blocking methods, we should seek channels to externalize and fluidify the risks by financial innovation and effective institutional arrangements.This paper attaches great importance to the financialization of agriculture risks and the price finding, risk dispersing and distributing function of modern financial markets, as well as their inspiration to contract agriculture. Compared with spot contract and forward contract, futures is more efficient in price finding and more flexible. We deem that farmers can decide the contract price according to the futures’ price, and make decisions about production and consumption. So that the blindness in their production can be avoided, and the farmers’ interests can be protected practically. At the same time, inferring from the evolving law of financial derivatives, the option pricing theory also sheds lights upon the development of contract agriculture. Traditional option pricing models do not reflect the unusual movement in the economy; this does not match the farming production features. But Merton (1976)’s European call option pricing formula, concerning the geometric Brownian motion random process, involves not only the random factors but also the unusual factors. Thus, it is adaptive to prices of agriculture products and can help form reasonable contract prices and interest distributing systems between companies and farmers.The financial derivatives markets are changing the risk characteristic of a lot of industries and the risk management structure of the whole financial system, because of the accuracy, efficiency, openness, flexibility and low cost of the risk management on derivatives markets. Based on the analysis of risk distribution mechanism of futures and option markets, we structured the risk externalization channels, including futures contracts, option contracts, future option contracts, so that the socialization, standardization, and financialization of the contract agriculture risk management can be realized. Under the future contracts mode, the company and the farmer sign the contract, and at the same time hedge their own positions on futures market, in order to neutralize their risk exposure. This can improve the fulfillment of contracts fundamentally. However, because of the linearity in risk and profit, and the compulsory delivery system, future contract traders also lose the possibility of profit-making while transferring the risks, thus, the attraction of breach of faith is not completely eliminated. Option contracts, due to their non-linearity between risk and profit and the possibility of combination of kinds of derivatives, make the linear risk faced by companies and farmers changes fundamentally, so that they can better hedge, the profit can be managed steadily, and the tendency to break the contracts can be eliminated fundamentally. Based on the research and development of foreign financial derivatives, we also made some expectation to the prospect of risk management in contract agriculture. The credit risk and natural risk in contract agriculture also has to be managed in financial ways. The credit risk in contract agriculture can be peeled off and standardized, and then be distributed in credit derivatives market. Also, the natural risk can be standardized and distributed thought weather derivatives market. And this will be the focus of future research work. This paper also makes detailed discussion about the obstacles to the effective implement of the new future contracts and option contracts. We think that as long as the family contract system is dominant in China, specialized farmers’ cooperatives are a shortcut for the contract agriculture participants to enter the modern financial markets. Let the hot money share the farming risk, in order to form reasonable risk and profit distribution mechanism for contract agriculture. This method is a necessity of the evolvement of farming contracts, and the best choice in order to break through the contradiction between small production and large market, and to realize the financial management of farming risk. On the basis of researches in existence, we devised kinds of connection patterns between agriculture contract participants, cooperatives and derivatives markets, and analyzed the problems and the tendency of future innovations.Finanlly, based on the present market situation and the necessities to keep the sustainable development of contract agriculture, this paper raised some policy advices about consummating the derivatives market, inaugurating the specialized farmers’ cooperatives, and facilitating the effective connection between the agriculture contracts and derivative markets, so that the reasonable risk and profit allocation mechanisms can be structured, and contract agriculture can develop in a healthy, orderly, and sustainable way.更多还原