【作者】 李国民；

【导师】 史晋川；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 自20世纪80年代以来,在全球大部分的国家和地区,电力行业陆续地进行着自由化和市场化的改革。电力市场化改革,一方面,促进了电力行业的迅速发展,另一方面,在大部分电力市场中却导致了输电网络普遍投资不足的困境。出现这种困境的一个重要原因,是因为改革设计者没有充分认识到市场化环境下的输电规制的特殊性和复杂性,忽略了对输电网络扩展进行有效激励,结果导致网络容量不足,由此引起一系列电力问题,如近年来我国的电力短缺、国外频繁的电力事故,甚至电力危机等。输电容量不足制约了电力行业的发展,因而,在市场化环境下如何有效地进行输电网络扩展,近年来成为电力改革关注的一个焦点。本论文主要研究市场化环境下输电公司的网络扩展问题,试图弄清楚:为什么在电力市场化环境下会出现输电网络扩展不足?如何有效地激励受规制的输电公司扩展输电网络?在受规制输电投资之外,是否可以和如何引入商业输电投资?受规制的输电投资和商业输电投资在典型的电力市场中如何运行和可能存在什么问题?本论文在考虑输电网络特殊的物理性质前提下,将输电网络扩展问题纳入一个经济学的分析框架,利用经济学中的规制、激励、网络经济等理论,采用数理与规范、理论与案例相结合的方法,对输电网络扩展进行深入分析。通过输电网络外部性的经济学分析,文章发现,输电网络环流现象所产生的输电网络的独特外部性是导致输电网络容量不足的一个重要因素;基于节点定价的输电价格机制能较好地反映输电网络的外部性影响。基于节点定价模型,本文分析了受规制的输电公司在不同的情况下网络扩展的问题,结果发现,社会最优输电网络扩展的条件是当输电网络每条线路的容量扩展的边际价值等其边际成本;如果对有预算约束的输电公司不进行补贴,其输电网络扩展容量将低于社会最优。同时,文章提出了网络扩展的一个补偿机制和拓展价格上限的激励性机制,使得输电公司的网络扩展将达到社会最优容量。基于长期输电权模型,我们分析了在受规制的输电公司模式下引入竞争性投资的可能性和一种商业输电投资的实现机制。文章发现,商业输电投资是一种高效率的市场投资方法,能够作为受规制输电投资的一种有益补充,促进输电扩展的竞争。但是,澳大利亚网络扩展的经验显示,商业输电投资的成功取决于两个方面,一是电力市场必须有一个独立和有效率的输电定价机制,电价要反映输电阻塞情况和线路损失成本;二是输电规制机制的设计,应该充分考虑到可能存在受规制网络投资挤出商业投资的情况,以便提高受规制输电投资和商业输电投资的兼容性。受规制的输电投资和商业输电投资是电力市场化环境下输电网络扩展的两种主要方法,两者各有优缺点。在输电扩展的实践中,受规制的输电投资仍然是最主要的网络扩展方式,大规模的输电扩展项目主要依靠某种受规制的输电投资来完成,而商业输电投资作为一种竞争性的方法,可以应用于小型的输电扩展项目上。为了改变我国电网滞后的状况,文章最后从短期、中期和长期方面对我国的输电网络扩展,提出了一些建议,如改变国有独资的单一投资主体,形成多元的输电网络投资主体;深化输电机制改革,建立有效输电规制机制;构建全国性电力市场,加强输电网络的总体规划;引入商业输电投资,促进输电网络投资竞争。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 1980s, various reforms in electricity sector have been gradually taking place all over the world, with the aim of marketization and liberalization. These reforms, on one hand, have yielded positive achievements. On the other hand, transmission underinvestment has increasingly become an obstacle to further reforms. Because the regulators didn’t adequately realize the particularity and complexity of transmission regulation in the liberalization markets, few incentives to expand transmission networks has been presented. As a result, it has caused some negative effects, such as electricity shortage, frequent blackouts, or even electricity crisis in some cases. Inadequacy of transmission capacity constrains electricity sector development. Therefore, great emphasis has been placed on how to efficiently expand the transmission networks in recent electricity reforms.This paper primarily investigates the transmission expansion in electricity market, and tries to figure out the following questions :(1) why transmission underinvestment has been taking place in electricity markets;(2) how to incentive the regulated transmission expansion;(3) whether and how the merchant transmission investment can be introduced beyond the regulated one;(4) what the typical experiences of foreign transmission expansions are.On the basis of a thorough analysis of the particular physical properties of electricity network, detailed approaches on how to efficiently expand the transmission network are presented in this paper, using the theories of regulatory, network economics and the methods of combinations of mathematical and positive ,theoretic and case study in the economics framework .We find that one of the important factors of inadequacy of transmission capacity is that the transmission externalities caused by power loop, and transmission pricing approaches based on nodal pricing can embody the externalities of network well.Based on the nodal pricing model, the paper analyses the optimal conditions of transmission expansion in different situations. The following conclusions are drawn:(l)the social optimal condition of transmission expansion is its marginal value equals marginal cost of every new expansion line;(2) the capacity of Transco’s transmission expansion will less than the social optimal capacity if Transco with hard budget constraints are not be subsided. At the same time, we give an appropriate revenue rate and an extended price cap incentive mechanism, which can incentive Transco to expand the social best capacity of transmission network.Using the long financial transmission right (LFTR) model, we find that merchant transmission investment is a high efficient market investment approach, which can increase the competition of transmission investment as the complementation of regulated transmission investment. But the Australia transmission expansion experiences show that the success of merchant transmission investment depends on two facts, one is that there must be an independent and efficient transmission pricing mechanism, in which power price should reflect the network congestion and line loss costs, the other one is that the design of transmission pricing mechanism should take the possible crowd out of the regulated transmission investment into account in order to enlarge the merchant investment’s compatibility with the regulated one.As the main approaches of transmission expansion, regulated transmission investment and merchant transmission investment both have merits and flaws. In practice, one of feasible choice is that the small scale transmission project can be expanded with merchant investment, and meanwhile large scale transmission projects should be expanded mainly with some regulated transmission investment.In order to change the current situation, we should increase the transmission expansion by absorbing the successful theories and experiences from other countries. According to our country’s specific situation, some development strategies are given, which include(l) to change the current single state-ownership to multi-ownership; (2) to further and deepen the reforms in transmission pricing to construct an effective transmission regulatory mechanism; (3) to build a national electricity market and to strengthen the overall planning for transmission expansion; (4) to introduce merchant transmission investment, and to enhance the competition in transmission networks.更多还原