【作者】 葛禄青；

【导师】 刘仲英；

【作者基本信息】 同济大学 ， 信息管理与信息系统， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 多维拍卖作为物流公共信息平台(Logistics Public Information Platform,LPIP)一种重要的交易方式,可以有效的配置物流服务资源。LPIP的拍卖机制设计对平台的运营至关重要,LPIP需要有一套成熟的多维拍卖理论对其运营进行指导。本文综合运用管理学、经济学以及信息技术等相关学科的理论与方法,借鉴国内外的研究成果,采用理论研究与案例分析相结合的方法,从分析物流公共信息平台的服务需求和服务模式出发,研究物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制。本文的研究将提升物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖理论,提高物流公共信息平台的交易效率和效益,达到为用户创造价值,实现参与各方共赢的目的。本论文的研究将增强物流公共信息平台运作的生命力,达到扩大和获得物流公共信息平台用户数的目的。本文首先研究了物流公共信息平台的服务模式。根据交易方式和技术实现的难度,把物流公共信息平台的服务模式归结为信息资源共享、网上物流服务交易、价值链集成三种模式,并研究了各种服务模式的适用条件。在此基础上,分析了物流服务交易的特点,研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制设计的原则、内容与流程,为研究物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制奠定了基础。本文设计了物流公共信息平台的密封和英式多维拍卖机制。与传统单属性拍卖相比,多维拍卖的投标表现为最后的得分,把第一价格密封拍卖称为第一得分密封拍卖,第二价格密封拍卖称为第二得分密封拍卖,英式拍卖称为序列全信息显示英式拍卖。分别研究了第一得分密封拍卖机制、第二得分密封拍卖机制、序列全信息显示英式拍卖机制。设计了物流服务需求方(拍卖方)的效应函数,最优评分函数,并研究了物流服务供应商(投标方)的最优投标策略,以及第二得分密封拍卖和英式拍卖在多维条件下的等价性,同时确定了在英式多维拍卖中的最小投标增量的最优值。针对最后时刻投标问题,设计了一种多阶段多维拍卖模型。网上拍卖存在最后时刻投标现象(狙击者),表现为拍卖结束前的最后数分钟大量投标者集中出价,本文设计了一种多阶段多维英式拍卖模型,以解决最后时刻投标所带来的效率损失,以提高拍卖方期望收益。研究包括模型设计,拍卖协议的描述、评分函数的确定,同时分析了投标方的投标策略和拍卖方的期望收益。本文设计了多维拍卖中质量属性权重的调整模型。当物流服务供应商的投标,评分函数存在自身内在的缺陷,使物流服务需求方不能选出合适的供应商,拍卖双方不能达成一致时,需要重新调整投标质量属性权重。本文利用模糊数学的方法通过改良原有的评分函数,对买方(物流服务需求方)的询价请求(RFQ)和物流服务的属性权重进行调整,以提高交易成功的几率,并结合案例进行了分析。最后,本文研究了佣金对物流公共信息平台多维拍卖结果的影响。分析了佣金的收取对物流公共信息平台拍卖的影响,以及物流公共信息平台不同费用投入模式下,平台收益的变化。研究了佣金比例的高低对拍卖方(物流服务需求方)、投标方(物流服务供应方)收益的影响,以及佣金比例的高低对LPIP收益的影响,并分析了平台费用的支出对LPIP收益的影响。物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖是传统拍卖在网上物流服务交易的一个延伸,本质上是一种网上逆向物流服务采购拍卖。本文重点研究了物流公共信息平台的多维拍卖机制,而多维拍卖需要研究的内容还很多,其中,物流服务供应商(投标方)投标策略将是一个很有意义的研究主题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Being as an important kind of bargaining mode on LPIP, multidimensional auction can effectively allocate logistics service resources. The design of auction mechanism is critical to LPIP, and LPIP need perfect auction theory to regulate its operation. In this thesis, the theory and method of management, economics and IT will be used, and the existing study outcome will be used for reference, and service model of LPIP (logistics public information platform) will be analyzed. The methods of case study and theoretic study are used. The auction theory of LPIP will be extended to multidimensional field. The multidimensional auction mechanism will be showed. The study of this thesis makes for enriching the theory of auction, optimizing auction mechanism, improving the efficiency of transaction and value of LPIP, creating value for users, and realizing all the participants’ benefits. The study can also strengthen the vigor of LPIP operation and attract more users to be affiliated with LPIP. The main study as follow:Firstly, the integrative frame, and system structure, and service model of LPIP are studied. The classification, and the integrative frame, and system structure of LPIP are analyzed. The model of LPIP service includes sharing of information resource, and transaction of logistics service, and integration of value chain. The applicable conditions of three models are discussed.Secondly, the multidimensional auction characteristic and auction system are studied. The characteristic of auction on Internet, and its mechanism are analyzed. And multidimensional auction system is designed.Thirdly, the sealed-bid and English multidimensional auction mechanism is proposed. In contrast to the single-attribute auction, a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid, a variation of the second-price sealed-bid protocol termed second-score sealed-bid, and a variation of the English auction protocol termed sequential full information revelation. The second-score sealed bid auction is analyzed, and the equivalence between the second score sealed bid and the English auction for the case of multi-attribute items is demonstrated. In addition, it is proved that the buyer’s expected payoff in the English auction is equal to the buyer’s expected payoff from the first-score sealed-bid auction with the difference of the predefined constant D that represents the minimal bid increment allowed in the English protocol. The optimal value for the minimal increment which should be defined in the multi-attribute English auction is discussed. Fourthly, a kind of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism is designed in order to resolve the late-bidding. There is phenomenon of late-bidding on Internet auction, in another word, a number of bidders decide to bid in the last few minutes, who aim to beaten the other bidder, and make them have no time to counterattack. Late-bidding is always the optimal strategy for the bidders on Internet auction, although it will lead to the lost of efficiency. The study of multi-stage multidimensional auction mechanism includes design of the auction model, and description of auction rule, and establishment of the score function. In addition, the bidder’s bidding strategy and the buyer’s expect payoff are analyzed.Fifthly, modified model of the score function on multidimensional auction is designed. When logistics service suppliers’ bidding, and the score function exist internal defection, logistics service buyer cannot choose appropriate supplier, and the buyer and the supplier cannot come to agreement. So the logistics service buyer should adjust the score function. This paper use the method of fuzzy mathematics to modify the primary score function, in order to improve the probability of bargaining success, and the method of case study is used.Sixthly, the effects of rents to the results of LPIP multidimensional auction are studied. How the rate of rent impact the payoff of LPIP, and logistics service buyer, and logistics supplier, is studied. Finally, the relation between the payout of LPIP and the income of LPIP is analyzed.Multidimensional auction on LPIP is extension of the traditional auction on Internet, which is essentially reverse logistics service provide auction. Multidimensional auction mechanism on LPIP is mainly studied in this paper, in fact, there are many areas which should be studied on multidimensional auction, and the bidding strategy of logistics service suppliers will be a significant area of research.更多还原