中国转型中的财政分权与公共品供给激励

【作者】 丁菊红；

【导师】 石磊；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 产业组织学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 今年是中国改革开放三十周年,毫无疑问,在经济领域中国已经取得了举世瞩目的成就,年均GDP增长率超过9%,人民生活水平得到显著提高,世界竞争力也在不断上升。然而,就公共品供给领域而言,却呈现出“软”“硬”不一致的局面:基础建设类的硬性公共品投资增长迅猛,各地高速公路、轨道、机场及城市公用事业改变惊人;而医疗、教育、卫生等软性公共品投资则显得相对不足且效率不高。要深刻理解这段历史给我们带来的影响,揭示经济现象背后的规律,把握实践发展的趋势,就需要从转型经济的实践出发。而中国这些年的转型经济最显著的特点莫过于从改革之初就采取了财政分权措施,且由于正处于特殊的发展过程中,分权的初始状态和政治支持条件都与别国有相当大的差异,使得其发生作用的机理极其复杂。简言之,中国前期经济取得的卓然成效和近期改革中出现的很多问题,在一定程度上都可以归功于财政分权。财政分权的核心问题就是解决中央和地方政府间的财政利益格局划分,它关系到经济生活的方方面面,最为突出的就是对地方公共品和服务供给的影响了。本文试图从经济学的角度解释中央和地方政府的行为方式及背后的偏好、结构,梳理中国财政分权体制变迁及公共品供给的演变轨迹,阐明其中蕴含的激励与约束机制,对下一步的财政分权改革提出有益的机制设计方案,这不仅有利于公共财政制度的完善和发展,提高公共品供给效率,改善人们的生活水平,而且对整个中国经济的和谐发展都具有重大意义。本文认为,中央和地方政府偏好上存在的差异会深刻影响财政分权的程度,同时改变着地方政府的激励结构,对公共品供给带来不同的效果,并深入考察了这种偏好差异的形成过程,构造了符合中国这样区域经济发展不平衡的转型大国的理论模型,证明了:经济发达地区分权程度的增加对公共品投资及经济增长有正向激励作用;经济落后地区,分权程度的增加很难激励有效的公共品投资和经济增长,政府的职务消费反而会增加。因此,分权程度的增加很可能会导致经济发达地区与不发达地区的差距加大。同时,本文还建立了中央与地方政府的动态博弈模型,解释了中国分权改革进程及最优分权程度的决定问题。证明了:在经济发展初期,分权程度经常不足,地方政府会要求中央政府加大分权程度;随着经济增长,分权程度容易出现过度,各级政府间的博弈会使得分权程度减小;但如果经济能够进一步增长,中央政府和地方政府要求的分权程度可能会达到一个较好的均衡。研究还表明:人口较多、经济较差的地区分权程度会增强;反之,分权程度则会减弱。而人口较多、经济较好的地区分权程度可能不变。此外,为了证实理论模型的合理性,找到准确的解释,本文还结合中国分权改革变迁实践,利用省级层面的面板数据,构建了动态结构模型,在控制住财政分权与公共品供给内生关系的基础上,运用系统广义矩估计方法(SYS GMM)检验证实了理论分析的推论,即:分权对“硬”公共品供给有明显加速作用,对“软”公共品供给有明显抑制作用;经济较差地区,分权速度会加快,其中人口密度较高的地区增长速度要比人口密度低的地区快;人口密度较高、经济较好的地区分权速度会减弱;且分权程度变化与政府行政效率间存在显著正相关关系。因此,在中国今后的财政体制改革中,明确中央对不同地方政府的分权度,改进公共部门尤其是地方政府的政绩考核机制具有积极意义。此外,在公共财政制度的改革上也需要向“责”“权”相匹配的方向发展,在财政收入、财政支出、转移支付及预算体制等方面,建立起符合转型经济的公共财政体制,提高公共品供给效率,更加符合公众的需求及偏好,更好地配合经济建设,迈向建设社会主义和谐社会的伟大目标。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is thirty years since China has carried out reform opening policy. Without question China has made great achievements in economy, such as the average annual rate of GDP excesses 9%, the standard of living has been remarkably improved and the world competition power has also continuously been rising. However, as for the supply of public goods, it presents disaccord between "soft" and "hard" public goods. The latter such as infrastructural investment is greatly increased, but the former such as medical treatment and education investment looks relatively undercapitalized and lacks of efficiency.In transitional countries, there is deep and intrinsic relation between fiscal decentralization and public goods supply, which is relating to successful transition. It is important to understand the effects of the history of transition and post the law of the economy phenomena. The most distinct characteristic of Chinese transition economy is implementing the policy of fiscal decentralization since the beginning of reform. Because the beginning state and political supply condition of fiscal decentralization are different form the other countries. Thus the mechanism of decentralization is very complicated in China. It is said the outstanding achivement and the problems in the near future both owed to the fiscal decentralization to a certain extent. The key issue of fiscal decentralization is how to divide fiscal interest between central and local governments. And it matters all aspects of economy, especially the effect of local public goods and services.This paper tries to explain the behaviors and preferences of central and local governments in the point of economic view. It also analyses the evolvement of fiscal decentralization and public goods supply in China. And it clarifies the incentive and restriction mechanism. The paper also puts forward some helpful mechanism design scheme to perfect and develop the public fiscal system. It is not only helpful to increase the efficiency of public goods supply but also significant to the harmonious development in China.In economic transition the difference preferences between the centre and local governments deeply affect fiscal decentralization and the incentive structure. This paper analyses the course of the difference preferences and designs a theoretic model according to Chinese transition economic. It proves the degree of decentralization in develop region has positive incentive effects on economic growth; but in less develop region the degree of decentralization is hard to incentive effective public goods supply and economic growth, the private benefits will be increased. So the degree of decentralization perhaps increases the distance between different regions.The paper also contracts a model of centre and local government. It explains the decision of decentralization in China and proves that in the early development of economy because of under-decentralization the local government asks for centre government to increase the degree of decentralization. But with the development of economy, it will be over-decentralization and the local government will ask for centre government to decreases the degree of decentralization. However, if the economy goes a step further, the decentralization will achieve equilibrium. The paper also discusses that with more people and worse economy, the degree of decentralization will increase; while with less people and better economy the degree will decrease.At the same time, this paper sets up a dynamic structure model to control the intrinsic relation between fiscal decentralization and public goods supply, and then using panel data on provincial level, proves the theoretical conclusions through System GMM. It finds the ffiscal decentralization has positive effect on the increase of hard public goods and negative effects on the increase of soft public goods. The speed of decentralization in less-developed regions is increasing, while higher-population density means higher increasing speed in these regions. The speed of decentralization in more-developed and higher-population density regions is decreasing. It also proves the developing government prefers hard public goods and high degree of decentralization.Therefore, it is very significant to make sure the extent of fiscal decentralization between central and local governments and improve the examination of achievement in local government. In addition, it needs a reform in public fiscal institution to suit responsibilities with rights, such as on fiscal revenue and expenditure and budget system. Consequently, it can improve the efficiency of public goods and satisfy the public needs to construct socialistic harmonious society.更多还原