政策变迁中的中央与地方博弈

【作者】 容志；

【导师】 竺乾威；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 行政管理， 2008， 博士

【副题名】以中国土地调控政策为例（1978-2007）

【摘要】 中国目前的中央与地方关系为何种状态?为什么1990年代开始的财政集权并没有带来中央集权的加强?为什么最严格的土地管理制度不能控制住地方政府的经营行为?地方政府是在与中央政府博弈吗?其博弈的方式又是什么?这些问题是本文研究的主题。中国在改革开放以前,由于真正的国家所有制,或者说中央政府垄断制,中央与地方之间是一种典型的“委托——代理”关系,两者之间权力的动态调整表现为“一收就死,一放就乱”的零和博弈。资源和权力的高度凝聚性压缩了地方政府自主行为的空间,此时的中央地方的互动就如同一场拉锯战,呈现出“你多我就少,你少我就多”的局面。改革开放以后,分权让利使得地方成为独立的利益主体,由于产权的地方化和产权的消散,很多资源已经由中央掌控下放到地方,地方因此拥有更多权力去攫取财政收入,这个过程造成了严重的外部性和腐败问题。中国官僚体制的金字塔结构使得中央政府必须承担这些外部性和腐败带来的负面结果。由于中央政府在实际上拥有制定全国性规范和制度的权力,因此它为了获得政治稳定和历史评价这些收益,会对地方政府的行政程序、行政行为进行不断规范和界定,并推动现有管理制度向更完善的方向发展,为市场化改革提供制度性保障。对此,地方的反抗能力是极为有限的,因为地方主要官员的升迁都掌握在中央手中。但是,奇特之处在于,每当中央把某一领域的权力上收,或者制定更为严厉的政策来削弱地方的自由裁量权时,地方政府虽然不得不执行,它却可以通过掌控的资源开辟新的攫取领域。就目标而言,政策变迁达到了良好效果。但是从整体上看,地方政府的攫取行为并没有被扼制,只是转移了而已。这就逼迫中央进一步推动政策变迁,不过,这种变迁无疑是有时滞的,它经常滞后于地方政府的攫取行为。这就好像中央在不断驱赶地方政府寻找新的攫取领域。于是就形成这样一个局面:中央一直在推行制度化,打击地方政府的攫取行为和腐败行为,但是每次发出的重拳又好像打不在节骨眼上,能被地方所规避。在这种情况下,简单地说中央强还是地方强已经没有意义,因为权力不再是在中央和地方之间零和分配的。即使中央收权,地方还是利用信息优势和产权资源寻找新的攫取领域,而不会像计划经济时代那样,立即变得手足无措,丧失权力。中央政府迫于较高的代理成本,也不可能对地方所有行为进行监督。地方新选择的行为仍然能保证其收益,当然这也带来巨大的外部性和腐败行为。造成这种政策“挪移”现象的根本原因在于中国改革的渐进性,也就是制度变迁的渐变性。由于制度变迁有很强大的“路径依赖”,改革初期中央和地方关系的弹性和非制度化,赋予了地方在改革的整个过程中的机会主义的可能。这使得政策变迁的每一步之间在连续性上出现断裂。因此,制度变迁的绩效不仅根据单个制度来衡量,更需要从整体上予以判断。在这个意义上,中国的渐进改革需要一个整体性的思路和框架;解决中央和地方之间的纠葛,也亟需一个整体性的思维。就土地问题而言,1980年代以来,中国土地管理政策变迁的两个主题就是有限市场化和土地保护,前者力图通过土地使用权的有偿出让和土地市场的建立来盘活土地资产,不仅为政府提供财政收益,也运用市场调节手段合理配置土地资源,这个过程是一个分权化的过程,其中地方政府的利益和权力都在扩大;土地保护政策则意在控制耕地保有总量,控制农用地非农化的速度,防止因土地粗放型供应导致的宏观经济过热,实现土地资源的可持续利用。这两个主题之间是存在一定的张力的。有限市场化改革加以中国特定的土地产权结构,使得地方政府将土地视为发展经济和攫取财政收益、个人利益的来源,其行为日益异化,在很大程度上成为“经营型政府”,内生为土地市场的主体之一,并在粗放型供地过程中将部分成本外部化,转移给中央政府和社会公众。这就直接导致耕地存量资源的迅速下降、征地问题丛生、城市房价居高不下,土地腐败泛滥等严重后果。地方的“向上、向下卸责”行为逼迫中央政府承担所有的严重后果,因此从1990年代后期开始推行土地保护和调控政策,力图通过计划土地供应量、加强用途管制、上收征地审批权限、实行垂直领导等方式实行土地管理集权化,遏制地方政府的“攫取之手”。但是,这个过程本身就是充满了规制与反规制、博弈互动的过程。中央与地方之间行为互动的过程也是土地调控制度不断变迁的过程,控制和反控制成为推动制度变迁的主要动力。本文立足于组织经济学的视角,从土地政策的执行问题来窥探中国的中央政府和地方政府之间的关系,探讨地方主义的新变化。通过实证分析,本文认为,中国地方政府官员在发展经济和增加财政收入上有明显的机会主义行为,造成这种现状的原因既有任期短暂,也有预算软约束、攫取软约束和责任软约束等体制原因,土地资源正是被这种机会主义行为大量浪费并成为最为紧缺的资源。而且,地方政府逐渐走上依靠资源外向扩张型的工业化道路,这在短期内可以获得经济发展和财政增长,凸显经济政绩,但是从长远来看,必然因为国际竞争和资源瓶颈而不可能持续,这种危机不仅涉及能源方面,也直接关系金融、房地产等重要领域。虽然中央政府能够通过发布行政命令、主导制度变迁和人事控制的方式规制地方行为,但是地方政府能够借助信息优势、体制优势和产权优势规避中央控制,与之相互博弈。除导论部分就论文研究的问题、研究方法进行说明,并对相关研究文献进行综述以外,论文在结构上作如下的安排:第二章:分析框架和理论模型。本章主要是有关理论假设和分析模型的阐述。这一章在梳理国内外对中国地方政府行为的研究文献的基础上,进一步探讨地方政府的目标偏好、制度激励及其行为选择。由于地方政府有“在短期内最大显示经济政绩”的动力,而且地域性特征造成中央政策的“外溢效应”,使得地方政府在地方治理和经济发展中有明显的机会主义倾向,这种机会主义表现在土地管理上就是盲目圈地和土地的粗放型供应,其目的就是在短期内增加财政收入和拉动经济发展。第三章:市场化改革与土地管理制度变迁。这一章主要梳理了1949年到2005年之间中国土地管理制度的变迁轨迹,包括1978年以前形成的土地无偿使用、无流动、无限期制度,改革开放以后开始的土地有偿使用制度改革,土地出让市场化改革及其带来的三次土地利用高潮。同时,梳理了目前中国土地保护、调控的政策体系,包括各种政策、法规、法律等。最后,从耕地保有量、失地农民、城市房地产和腐败案件等方面评估了土地保护、调控政策的实施绩效。第四章:产权消散与攫取软约束。本章主要剖析了中国土地产权的制度安排,国务院是土地的所有者,但是只有宏观规划权,无法行使具体的供应权和收益权。地方政府能够直接决定土地的转让和利用方式,并获得“地租”,却又不是土地的真正所有者,不用担负其作为所有者的代际的、社会的责任,加上中国政府的多层级结构,使得这种土地产权在国务院、省级、地级市、县市、乡镇五级政府之间被割裂得体无完肤,拥有部分土地产权束的政府主体数量非常多,其结果就是“产权的消散”。产权消散的结果就是土地保护和调控行为立即陷入“集体行动”的困境。第五章:经营型政府与政策内生性均衡。中国地方政府在很大程度上是土地市场的一个内生参与者,而不是外在的管理者,地方政府作为一级市场的垄断者,直接从土地转让(包括出让和划拨)、房地产税收中获取经济利益,这导致地方政府角色发生严重异化,由公共资源的管理者演变成为“土地市场”的参与主体,并且完全按照收益最大化的逻辑进行土地开发和管理,已经具备“经营型”政府的特征。“经营型”政府的与民争利、攫取财政收益的行为,直接扭曲土地市场,造成资源浪费,因此,所谓的“政府失灵”在土地市场并不存在,而是彻底的“市场失灵”,而所谓的“政府管理”只能是更高层面的政府—中央政府或省级政府为主体对土地市场的管理。这一章主要分析这种土地市场体制变迁的过程,以及中央政府和地方政府在这个过程中的利益考量。第六章:组织困境:围绕土地市场的规制与反规制。这一章集中论述中央政府就土地市场化改革和土地保护政策对地方政府的控制手段,及地方政府对这些控制的应对方式。全章关注的是,中央政府会采取哪些方法克服信息难题、组织难题,控制地方政府的粗放型土地开发行为,而地方政府又会以什么方法逃避中央政府的宏观调控和土地规制。在这个分析中,我们可以清晰看到中央政府与地方政府围绕土地调控展开的博弈互动。第七章:结束语。作为全文的理论总结,在全文分析的基础上,就土地调控政策中的中央政府和地方政府的博弈关系进行总结性分析,从中探讨制度演变所形成的特定约束条件和激励因素在制约地方政府行为上的内在机制。将机会主义变量引入对中国央地关系的考察之中,进而就中国改革开放以后中央——地方政府之间的关系问题、大国治理的难题进行前瞻性思考。更多还原

【Abstract】 How to recognize the relationship between the Chinese central and local government? Why the local governments have incentives to defy the orders from central-government? Is the relationship the game? The writer will answer these questions in this dissertation.Before reform and opening up of China, the relationship between central and local government is a typical agent—principal because of the true state ownership system, or central government monopoly, and the dynamic adjustment of the power between the two shows as zero-sum game, which means no vigor when it is in tight control or in a mess if empowering to local government. The highly convergence of resources and power restrains independent act space of local government, in that way, the interaction between central and local government is like a seesaw battle, showing more for you and less to me or vice versa. After reform and opening up of China, because of localization and disappearance of property rights, most of the resources are delegated to local level, which makes local government using a new means in this game playing: "escaping". Decentralization of the power and surrender some of the profits make local government an independent benefit subject, which has more power to grab financial income and create severe externalities and corruption issues consequently.The pyramid organization of Chinese bureaucratic administration makes central government bear this negative effect caused by local level. Because central government has the power to constitute national system and regulation, it could define local government’s administration procedure and action constantly for stable political situation and historic evaluation; also improvement for current management system is pushed by central government for providing system security of marketing orientation.The strangest thing is that when central government constrains power in one area or use tighter policy to weaken local discretion power, local level has to execute it but it could pioneer a new grabbing area with resources on hand. Changing of the policies has good effect as far as targets concerned. However, if you look at it for a whole picture, this grabbing act is not been limited but transferred. Thus, this forced central government for further policy changing, although it is undoubtedly behind the time and the grabbing act of local level. This is like no one but central government urging local level to find new grabbing areas always. A situation is been formed as: central government is pushing institutionalization constantly, at the same time, beating grabbing act and corruption of local government; but every time, it could not punch in the key point and always been hedged by local level.There is no meaning to say which of the two (central or local government) is more powerful because power is not zero-sum assigned between central and local level anymore. Even central government takes the power back, local government still use objective reasons like, high deputy cost to look for new grabbling area but not becoming powerless as it in planned economy times. Newly chosen act will still secure benefit of local government and also bring enormous externality and corruption.The root cause of this kind of policy escaping is the gradualness of China reform, i.e. the gradualness of system changing. Because system changing has powerful route dependence, which makes central and local government have flexible and non-systematization relationship at early stage of the reform, the possibility of opportunism is given to the local government. This causes inconsistence between two steps of system changing. Therefore, the achievements of system changing can not only been evaluated by single system but from the whole. In this way, an integrated frame and thinking of China gradual reform is needed; so as to solve the conflict between central and local level.As far as land issues, since year 1980, there are two themes of China land management policy changing: limited marketing orientation and land protection. The former one tries to revitalize land resource through paid-use of the land and establishment of land market. This could not only provide financial benefit to the government but also rationalize the land assignment by marketing adjust. This is a decentralization process, during which both benefit and power of the local government are expanding. Land protection policy tries to control total cultivated land reserve, control the speed of non-agriculture use of the agriculture land, prohibit macro-economy overheat caused by rough land supply, and to realize sustainable use of land resource.There is a kind of paradox between these two topics. Limited market-oriented reform adding China special land ownership structure makes land being seen as sources of economy development and financial/personal benefit increase by local government. This also makes government become operation government gradually and a participant of land market. During this process, local government transfers some cost to central government and the public. This is also the direct cause of the rapid decrease of cultivated land reserve, plenty issues on land requisition, high pressure on housing price, land corruption etc. This up-downwards responsibility-shirking act by local government forces central government to bear all severe results. This makes the execution of land protection policy from late 1990, which tries to plan total land supply, control land use, centralize land requisition approval rights, start vertical lead etc. to centralize land management and restrict grabbing hand of local government.This dissertation is on the basis of theories of organizational economy, observing relationship between central and local government from execution of land policy, meanwhile, probing new change of localism. Through all evidence and analysis, the conclusion is been made, which is that local government and officials committed opportunism when developing economy and increasing financial income. This opportunism is caused by short tenure, loose budget control, soft benefit-grabbing restriction and loose control of liabilities etc. Land is the resource hugely wasted by this opportunism and becoming the scarcest resource.Furthermore, local government goes to an industrialized way gradually relying on its resources. The local government could gain economic development and financial increase in short term, but for the long term, this development is unsustainable due to international competition and lack of resources. This crisis will not only refer to energy, but also finance, real estate these vital areas. To solve these issues, central government needs a complete consideration from the system’s angle, and then conducts the reform accordingly. Traditional zero-sum playing relationship between central and local government is changing. The possibility of game playing is increasing and centralizing power by central government can not effectively control actions of local government that is why an integrated thinking about central and local government’s relationship is needed.In introduction part, illustration about 3 fields is been made: the problems been discussed in this dissertation, relevant research methods been used and literature review. The structure of this dissertation from chapter 2 to chapter 7 is as following:Chapter 2: analysis frame and theory model. It is mainly about theory hypothesis and illustration about analysis model. Further discussion about local government’s target preference, system incentive and action chose has been given on the basis of domestic and foreign literature review about China local governments’ action. Because of the motivation of showing achievements in short term, plus externality effect of central government’ s policy due to geographic characteristics, local government shows obvious opportunism when governing local region and developing economy. This opportunism shows as enclose land blindly and land rough supply for short-term financial increase and economic development.Chapter 3: market-oriented reform and system change of land management. This chapter shows a picture about China land management system change track from 1949 to 2005; including land free-use system formed before year 1978, paid-use system after China reform and opening-up, and market-oriented reform and the 3rd wave of land use. Meanwhile, current policy system about land protection has been observed, including different policies, regulations and laws. Lastly, the effectiveness of land protection policy has been examined from total cultivated land reserve, peasants with no land, urban real estate and corruption cases etc.Chapter 4: land ownership-dispersed and loose control of local government’s grabbing action. The system of China land ownership has been examined. State council is the owner of all land but it only has macro planning right without actual supply right and right of remuneration. Local government can decide transfer of the land and the way of using, been paid by rent, but it is not the real owner, which means it has no intergenerational and social responsibility as the owner. The multi-layer of Chinese government makes land ownership being fragmented among state council level, provincial level, deputy city level, county level and town level. Enormous government parties have part of land ownership, which causes land ownership-dispersed. Direct cause is the dilemma of collective action for land protection.Chapter 5: The operational government and policy inherently balance. Chinese local government is more acting as a participant of land market but not a outside controller. As the monopolist of the 1st land market, local government gains economical benefit directly from land transfer (lease and allocation included) and real estate taxes. This causes alienation of local government’s role, which is from controller of public resources to participant of land market; and develop and mange land according to the logic of benefit maximizing, which is the character of operational government. This grabbing action by operational government leads to distorted land market and wasted resources. Therefore, so-called government failure does not exist in land market but an absolute market failure. So-called government management can only realize in higher level—central or provincial government level. This chapter mainly analyzes the process of land market system change and benefits consideration of central and local government during this process.Chapter 6: organizational plight: the regulation and anti-regulation in the land market-building. The focus of this chapter in on the ways and tools used by central-government to control local government for market-oriented reform and land protection policy, and means used by local government responding the central government has been illustrated in this chapter. Ways to avoid information issue and control land rough supply of local government by central government. Ways to avoid central government’s macro-control and land regulation by local government.Chapter 7: conclusion. Based on literature review and analysis done in previous chapters, conclusion about game playing relationship of central and local government has been made. Some discussions have been made: Certain constrained conditions are formed during changing of system environment and he incentives constrained local government’s action. Furthermore, some thoughts about relationship between central and local government since China reform and opening up, and tough issues of governing powerful nations are presented at the end.更多还原