美国贸易保护主义的政治基础研究

【作者】 李淑俊；

【导师】 倪世雄；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际关系， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 贸易保护主义是二战后美国对外经济政策不可或缺的组成元素。本文主要探究两个议题:国际贸易的发展如何塑造了美国公众贸易保护主义偏好、公众贸易偏好又是如何通过美国政治制度的安排,使美国贸易政策分配部分地导向保护主义。为此,作者将社会力量与政治制度的分析方法结合,提出了公众-国会-政府的研究模式分析美国贸易保护主义。论文认为公众与官僚机构的利益诉求一致之处催生了美国贸易保护主义。美国公众的贸易偏好是推崇贸易限制,它的实现有赖于国会立法者谋求连任或竞选成功的利益目标,公众与国会二者之间利益互动的过程孕育了美国贸易保护主义的雏芽;国会与政府在美国贸易决策过程中关系特殊,这使国会可以借助快车道授权控制政府贸易权力,政府则须考虑国会的贸易倾向,最终政府输出了贸易保护主义。美国对华贸易保护主义亦是如此。美国产品生产要素流动水平的高低影响了美国公众贸易观。根据相关经济学理论,在要素流动的高位,劳动力要素持有者支持贸易保护主义;在要素流动的低位,特定产业的所有要素持有者皆反对自由贸易,这就形成了以产业为基础的保护主义者联盟。这些保护主义者诉求通过政治市场寻找摆脱进口竞争的压力,国会是这一方案的关键。进口竞争产业通过游说国会议员实现保护主义,议员回应的强度与该产业的地理广度和深度成正比。国会是公众贸易保护主义理念转化为政策的沟通行为体。这包含公众影响国会贸易观的路径与国会最终贸易保护主义的形成。公众塑造国会贸易观的主要路径是国会繁芜的政治结构和复杂且开放的决策程序,通过这些路径,公众在国会酝酿了氤氲的贸易保护主义气氛,这种气氛在经过国会否决票制和快车道授权稀释后,才能最终形成国会保护主义。政府是美国贸易保护主义的最终输出者。公众、国会通过美国贸易决策阶段输入保护主义偏好。美国贸易决策经过一个连续的、相互关联的决策阶段,伴随这个历程的是公众、国会的一个议题关注周期。贸易决策阶段与公众议题关注周期的互动过程也就是公众与国会倾向注入贸易政策的过程,行政保护主义产生。行政保护主义已成为美国限制贸易流量的主要手段。更多还原

【Abstract】 Protectionism is an indispensable part of the United States’ foreign trade policy. In this dissertation, two mechanisms are investigated, one is the impact of international trade development on the public preference for protectionism, and the other is the feedback of the America political institutions on the public standpoint. The methodology of this paper is the combination of societal interests’ perspective and the special American bureaucratic political decision-making procedure. Still the author develops a new public-congress-administration model to analyze these two questions theoretically, and demonstrates it with the latest cases in the Sino-US trade friction.The core argument is that the common interests among these three variablesengender American protectionism. The public support for protectionism has been wild since the end of the Cold War and the Congress is urged to take activities in this area. The Congress has to respond to such demands in order to ensure their political survival. Therefore, the interaction between the public and the Congress makes protectionism about to explode. Finally the Administration implements the protectionist trade policy because its trade power is endowed by the Congress. So does the American trade policy to China.The extent of inter-industry factor’s mobility influences the public trade preferences. According to the economic models that focus on inter-industry factor mobility appropriate, when the factor mobility is relatively high, the owners of the factor of labor will support to raise trade barriers. When the mobility is relatively low, the factors employed in import-competing industries lose in real terms, and hence arises the protectionism. They hope to resolve their problems through political institutions, and the Congress is the critical one. The import-competing industries lobby Congress to defend the U.S. industries. The Congress’s responsivity is based on the geographic reach and concentration of the industry.The Congress is the branch that transfers the public idea to the Administration. The complicated and complex structure of the Congress and the open policy-making process provide access for the public to influence the Congress and benefit protectionists. On these conditions, the level of protection in Congress is high. Although the veto points in Congress and the fast track authority lower the voice of Congress, yet the protectionism still comes out.The Administration is the final decisionmaker in the foreign trade policy-making. The preferences of the public and Congress incorporate the President’s foreign policy making by stage process together with periods of public attention. At the last stage, protectionism becomes one element of the American trade policy. Administered Protectionism is now prominently affecting trade flows.更多还原