中国上市公司控制权市场研究

【作者】 鹿小楠；

【导师】 张军；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 西方经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 自二十世纪九十年代以来,以控制权市场为核心内容的公司治理研究在金融学术界开始受到广泛的关注。这些研究从全球角度比较分析不同控制权市场的模式和格局对公司绩效和证券市场发展的影响,从而为各个国家提高公司治理水平、促进资本市场发展提供了大量有益的启示。中国证券市场是新兴加转轨的市场,上市公司在股份制改革并上市的过程中引入了国有股、法人股和公众流通股这一分割的股权结构,这一制度对公司控制权市场的健康发展以及公司治理机制的完善带来了一系列不利影响。因此,对国内上市公司控制权和控制权市场进行深入分析,可以揭示上市公司行为背后的深层次根源,并为提高公司治理水平和促进市场发展提供有价值的建议。本文以国内上市公司控制权市场为主要研究对象,从多个层面和角度系统分析了控制权市场的结构特点、公司控制权转让的动因、控制权转让目标公司特征、控制权转让溢价影响因素、控制权转让绩效、以及股权分置改革完成后控制权市场发展与监管等内容。论文的主要工作和结论如下:(1)系统分析和归纳了国内上市公司控制权市场的特点,对我国上市公司控制权市场形成的制度背景和控制权市场的主要特征进行了分析,对上市公司控制权形态与控制权结构进行了描述性统计分析,并探讨了全流通的上市公司控制权交易及其行为特点。(2)在对西方公司购并理论深入分析的基础上,利用信息经济学与博弈论等经济学理论,从控制权转让动力的核心是相关利益者的利益均衡这一研究视角出发,运用参与各方利益均衡分析,重点针对中国证券市场的上市公司控制权转让行为,对其动力机制进行分析,研究结果表明:相关利益者利益均衡是公司有效控制权转让的基本推动力量。(3)对上市公司控制权转让的动因以及财务效应进行了实证研究。从研究结论来看,财务绩效恶化和财务压力加重是公司转让控制权的主要原因,而股权集中度较低以及规模较小的公司更容易发生控制权转让。进一步的分析显示,控制权转让对公司财务绩效的改善主要来自资产置换,而不是资源整合,从而导致公司的绩效改善并不具有持续性。(4)沿袭并发展了唐宗明和蒋位的方法,对控制权转移的溢价决定因素进行了研究。研究结果显示,我国上市公司控制权转让溢价主要由所在地区法律完善程度、控股股东所有权性质、市倍率和可流通股份的比例等因素决定。具体来说,公司的市场认可程度即市倍率指标和公司流通股比例对控制权价值具有正向影响,公司其所在区域的法律保护程度对控制权转让溢价有负向影响,公司第一大股东的性质对控制权溢价也有显著影响,国有性质的股东控制权溢价显著高于非国有股东。(5)作为一种外部治理机制,关于控制权转让是否有利于改善公司绩效目前争论颇多。本文从两个方面研究了国内上市公司的控制权转让现象:一是控制权转让的短期市场反应;二是控制权转让的长期财富效应。分析显示,控制权转让事件披露前60个交易日到披露当天,累积超额收益率(CAR)为3%。实证研究结果还发现,目标公司连续持有超额收益(BHAR)在控制权转移发生后的6个月内的值就变为负数,在2年内就降为-20%以下,在第四年已经降到-26%,这一结论同当前大多数研究正好相反,也就是说,没有证据证明控制权转让在长期中导致收购公司的绩效上升,为股东创造财富。总的来说,由于中国上市公司治理的最大特点表现为“大股东控制”和“国有股东监督缺位”,因此中国上市公司控制权市场优化资源配置和作为公司治理的外部机制解决代理问题的作用大打折扣。在我国证券市场即将进入全流通的时代,必须将完善公司所有权和控制权结构作为公司治理进一步改革的核心政策;与此同时,应通过强化对投资者权益的法律保护,提高董事会独立性以及加强证券监管力度等途径,有效约束大股东通过控制公司来攫取私有收益,鼓励和引导创造公司价值和提高资本效率的控制权交易,以此促进公司治理水平和资本市场效率的提升。本文的主要创新点包括:(1)基于公司治理的角度,从财务绩效、股权结构和企业特征几个方面分析控制权转让目标公司的特征,从而揭示了在我国证券市场现有的制度背景下上市公司控制权转让的深刻原因。(2)通过独特的方法设计,并在国内控制权市场领域研究中首次引入了市场化程度这一新变量,对股权分割下的公司控制权转让的溢价因素进行了实证分析,揭示了在评估我国控制权私人收益时,必须考虑公司的所有权结构和地区市场化程度等因素。(3)从控制权短期市场反应和长期财富效应两个层面来分析我国控制权市场的绩效问题,完善和补充了目前只注重分析短期市场反应一个层面的研究方法,从而对我国控制权市场的绩效建立更全面的认识。(4)对国内控制权市场上协议转让、买壳上市等交易方式运用博奕论和资产套利平价模型等经济金融理论,从动态博奕的利益均衡角度,建立相应的分析模型,分析国内控制权交易发生的动因及深层次问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since thel990s, corporate governance studies with control market as its core contents have become a research focus in financial academy. All these studies compared and analyzed the influence of different control market modes to corporate performance and capital market development from a global aspect, thus providing beneficial enlightenment for countries to enhance corporate governance improvements and capital market developments.Chinese securities market is a newly emerging market developed in the process of a transitional economy. In the process of restructuring and listing, a divided share structure comprised by state-owned share, legal entity share and public exchange-traded share was introduced into the companies, which causing various adverse effects on the healthy development of control market and continuous improvement of corporate governance. Therefore, a deep and profound analysis on control and control market of domestic listed companies could tell the deep source of companies’ behavior and bring forward valuable suggestion to enhance corporate governance and promote market development.This article mainly focuses on control market of domestic listed companies, and analyzes all the following contents with a multi-level and multi-aspect way, including the structural characteristics of control market, the motivation of corporate control transfer, the characteristics of target company, the factors affecting premium, the performance of control transfer, as well as control market development & supervision after the complement of shareholder structure reform of listed companies.Conclusions include:(1) Systematically analyze and conclude characteristics of domestic listed companies’ control market, the regime background and major characteristics in particular. Provide a descriptive and statistical analysis on listed companies’ control formation and structure, and discuss control transfer and its behavioral characteristics of public company under total circulation.(2) Based on a profound analysis of western merger & acquisition theory, as well as Information Economy and Game Theory, this article focuses on control transfer behavior of listed companies in Chinese securities market and analyzes the motivation behind transfer, with a viewpoint that the core motivation of control transfer is the interest equilibrium among interest relevant parties. The research reveals that interest equilibrium among interest relevant parties is the fundamental force behind effective control transaction behavior.(3) This article conducts empirical research on the motivation and financial effects of listed companies’ control transaction behavior. Based on the conclusion, we think that financial performance deteriation and financial pressure aggravation are main motivation of control transaction behavior, and companies with a low concentration of share structure and smaller scale are inclined to conduct control transfer. Further analysis reveals that the improvement of control transfer to corporate financial efficiency is not from resource integration, but asset social resources allocation, thus resulting in the performance improvement is not sustainable.(4) This article comes along and further develops the research method of Tang Zongming and Jiang Wei, and conducts research on decisive factors of control transfer premium. The study reveals that decisive factors include mature level of law regime, ownership attribute of controlling shareholder, P/B value and the proportion of tradable shares. To be more specific, corporate recognition, or in other word, P/B value and the proportion of tradable shares have positive effects on control value, while the mature level of law regime and ownership attribute of controlling shareholder have negative effects, and the nature of No.1 shareholder also has a remarkable effect. Furthermore, the control premium of state-owned shareholders is obviously higher than that of non-state-owned shareholders.(5) There are a great deal arguments on whether control transfer is beneficial for the improvement of corporate performance, which is an external governance mechanism. This article analyzes control transfer behavior of listed companies from two aspects, one is short-term market reaction, and the other is long-term wealth effects. The empirical study discovers that CAR is around 3% from 60 days before the announcement of control transfer event till the announcement day. It also reveals that BHAR of target company reduces to minus within 6 month of such announcement, for example, below -20% in two years and -26% in the fourth year. The above conclusion disagrees with most of current researches. In other word, there is no proof that control transfer will, in the long term, cause the performance of the acquiring company enhance and create wealth for the shareholders.On the whole, the major characteristics of Chinese listed companies’ corporate governance are majority shareholder control and supervision absence of state-owned shareholder. Thus, optimal resource allocation function and delegation issue solving function (as an external mechanism of corporate governance) of control market have been greatly reduced. In such a particular period that Chinese securities market is entering into a Complete Tradable Period, it is necessary to regard the improvement of ownership and control as a core policy of further reform of corporate governance. In the meanwhile, it should emphasize protection for investors’ legal rights, enhance the independence operation of Board of Directors and strengthen securities supervision, thus effectively restricting such behavior that majority shareholders take their personal interest through the control of listed company and encouraging those control transfer to create corporate value and enhance capital efficiency.This paper is the first attempt to:Based on corporate governance, this article analyzes characteristics of target companies from aspects of financial performance, share structure and enterprise characteristics, thus telling the profound reason of listed companies’ control transfer under current Chinese security market regime.This paper introduces new variables through a special method and design, conducts empirical analysis on premium factors of company control transfer in the ownership separation background, and tells the truth that it must take into consideration of factors such as ownership structure and control allocation when assessing the value of non-tradable share such as state-owned share and legal entity share.This paper analyzes control market performance both from short-term market reaction aspect and long-term wealth effect aspect, and improves and makes up the one-way research method which only focuses on short-term market reaction analysis, thus forming an all-round understanding of domestic control market performance.By applying theories such as Game Theory and Asset Arbitrary Par Model, and based on domestic control market characteristics, this article establishes corresponding analysis mode and analyzes motivation behind and other deeper issues of domestic control transfer from an dynamic interest equilibrium aspect.更多还原