领袖权威与制度成长：毛泽东人民代表大会制度思想与实践研究

【作者】 杨建党；

【导师】 浦兴祖；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 中外政治制度， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 回溯当代中国政治发展历程,面对毛泽东1957年下半年前后关于人民代表大会制度思想与实践的巨大反差这一历史事实,我们不禁追问:为什么毛泽东晚年冲击了其早年亲手建构的人民代表大会制度呢?在深层次上,这可能关涉近代以来中国政治权威转型过程中合理的领袖与制度关系建构问题,蕴含着关于世界现代政治发展中领袖与制度关系建构实践的规律性认识。本文运用历史——逻辑法、考证法、个案分析法、比较法、新制度主义、政治生态分析法、政治心理分析法等,以前人关于人与制度关系的思想为基础,通过对韦伯权威转型理论的改造,力图建构关于毛泽东人民代表大会制度思想与实践的研究的解释框架,集中展示中国政治发展进程中法理统驭魅力的取向导致魅力消蚀法理的现实的政治图景。革命时期,魅力孕育法理。超凡革命党领袖孕育构思中人大制度,构思中人大制度巩固超凡革命党领袖;1948年“五一口号”发表至1957年上半年期间,中国政治发展于魅力与法理之间,魅力向法理变移。趋凡执政党领袖型构生长中人大制度,生长中人大制度合法化、制度化趋凡执政党领袖;1957年下半年以后,尤其是“文化大革命”期间,魅力支配法理。超凡执政党领袖消蚀异变中人大制度,异变中人大制度工具性地臣服于超凡执政党领袖;从环境、基因方面解析,革命与历史遗产的型塑、领袖个体的烙印与制度结构间的紧张等因素决定了毛泽东不能有效对接制度统驭下领袖权威,最终无法呈现领袖权威制度化的政治发展格局。中国政治发展进程中法理统驭魅力的取向导致魅力消蚀法理的现实的政治图景具有普适意义。在领袖集革命精英与统治精英于一身的前提下,包括中国在内的、经历从革命到后革命转型的国家的政治发展从超凡革命党领袖向法理执政党领袖的转型在很大程度上难以完成,领袖角色变异为超凡执政党领袖,这应成为一种“公共的知识”。解决之道在于:领袖之革命精英与统治精英身份的有效分离。包括超凡革命党领袖在内的革命精英在后革命时期尽可能快地采取任期、届期、退休等制度机制,实现领袖接班人的代际更替,这应是现实的可行之路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Tracing back the history of politics in contemporary China, there is no doubt that Mao Tse-Tung’s thought and practice about the System of People’s Congress were tremendously opposite before and after of the second half of 1957, which made us can not help thinking why Mao Tse-Tung distroyed the System of People’s Congress which he built in person in earlier years. The answer impacts the acessments of not only Mao Tse-Tung himself, but also the whole political system of contemporary China. Furthemore, the answer may also relate to the building of rational relationships between the top leader and the political system in the process of political authority transition in the modern times of China, which may knowledge us the disciplines of building relationships between the top leader and the political system in the process of political development in the world.This desertation concerns on the thought and practice of Mao Tse-Tung about the System of People’s Congress, with the analatic instruments of historical-logical analysis, evidential analysis, case analysis, comparative analysis, new-institutional analysis, political-ecological analysis and political psychoanalysis. Based on previous researches on relationships of man and system and rebuilding of Weber’s theory on the transition of authority, this disertation tries to build an explanatory frame about the thought and practice of Mao Tse-Tung about the System of People’s Congress and to show us a real political picture in which a good trend of charm controlled by legal-rationality results in an opposite trend of charm wearing down legal-rationality. At first, this disertation devides the whole studying period into three phases based on two time points: March 1^st 1948 and the second half of 1957. Then it discusses three types of totally different relationships respectively in the three above-mentioned periods of the top leader and the state political system. This disertation discribes the relationships between the top leader and the system respectively in revolutionary period which charicterized by charm forming legal-rationality, in a period that is from March 1^st 1948 to the first half of 1957 which charicterized by the interaction between charm and legal-rationality and in a period of after the second half of 1957 which charicterized by charm controlling legal-rationality, especially during the "Cultural Revolution". As we know, the charismatic leader of a revolutional party came up with and brought birth to the System of People’s Congress and the forming of the System of People’s Congress consolidated the authority of the top leader in turn during the first period. And then the secularizing leader of the ruling party bred the growing of the System of People’s Congress and the growing of the System of People’s Congress legitimized and institutionalized the secularizing leader of the ruling party in turn during the second period. However, the charismatic leader of a ruling party undermined the variation of the System of People’s Congress and the variation of the System of People’s Congress succumbed to the charismatic leader of a ruling party in turn during the last period. The disertation gives us its environmental and genetic explaination on the undermentioned phenomenon: the reasons that Mao Tse-Tung could not became a leader controlled by the system and accordingly that we could not expect the institutionalization of the top authoruty at that time are rooted in the legacies of revolution, the legacies of history and the tentions between the function of the top leader and the system frame.This disertation holds that a good trend of charm controlled by legal-rationality results in an opposite trend of charm wearing down legal-rationality in the process of political development in contemporary China has some universal significances. It should be a general and common knowledge that given the top leader simutaniously to be a revolutionary leader and a ruling leader, the transition from a charismatic leader of a revolutional party to a legal-rational leader of a ruling party can not be easily achieved in genaral and the charismatic leader of a revolutional party can posibbly slide into the charismatic leader of a ruling party in a country which is transformed from a revolutionary type to a post-revolutionary one. The solution to this problem can be found through the effective separation of roles as a revolutionary leader and as a ruling leader, ie. every revulutionary party should take as soon as possible the transitional systems including the term, sesssion and retirement of all revolutionary elites, espcially the charismatic leader of the revolutionary party in its post revolutionary period. In a word, to conduct the genaration turnover of the successor to the leaders as soon as possible should be the realistic solution to a better relationship of the leader and the system in a post-revolutionary society.更多还原