【作者】 程才良；

【导师】 刘少波；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 金融学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 管理层收购(MBO)的主流理论——财富创造假说未能充分揭示MBO提升公司价值和绩效的作用过程与机制,缺乏对MBO的普遍解释力和指导性。本文从MBO与公司治理在理论和实践方面的逻辑联系入手,提出MBO的公司治理重构假说,并进行深入的理论分析和实证研究,认为:MBO所导致的公司治理重新构造及公司治理的改进,正是提升公司价值和绩效的主要推动力量。分析表明,MBO所导致的现代公司制企业股权结构变动及其对股权激励和股权约束机制的重新构造,对改进公司治理具有积极作用。特别是由于MBO具有明晰产权、塑造人格化的产权主体,强化对管理层的股权激励,强化管理层对“外部人控制”以及大股东侵害公司利益行为的股权约束,降低代理成本等积极作用,因此,它对于有效地解决我国国有控股上市公司治理面临的突出矛盾,具有十分积极的意义。但实证研究也表明,国有控股上市公司实施MBO后,公司绩效指标虽有所改善,但并不是十分显著。进一步分析原因发现,这主要是由我国资本市场制度性缺陷、MBO制度约束和现行部分MBO模式所造成的,并由此导致我国MBO的动因和行为扭曲,其中的关键在于我国现行MBO无法对管理层“内部人控制”进行有效制衡。而通过引入战略投资者与管理层共同实施收购——即采用混合型MBO模式,同时合理确定MBO有效边界,可以对管理层“内部人控制”实施有效的股权约束,从而使MBO真正成为改进公司治理、进而推动公司价值提升和绩效提高的有效方式。更多还原

【Abstract】 Wealth Creation theory, main stream management buyout (MBO) theory, does not fully disclose the process and mechanism of how MBO improve the value and efficiency of a corporate, and lack of general explaination and guidance to the MBO activities. This paper starts from the study of logical relationship between MBO and the corporate governance, proposes the corporate governance restructure theorm of MBO, performs in depth theoretical and practical analysis, and points out that corporate governance restructure and improvement led by the MBO is the major power that improve the corporate value and efficiency.Research finds out that the change of the shareholder structure in modern corporate lead by the MBO, and the subsequent restructuring of the share incentive and constrain mechanism have active impact on the improvement of corporate governace. Because MBO has active effects on property rights clearance, human-like property rights subject establishment, management share incentive and restriction strengthen, etc., it has active meaning on effectively resolve significant problems faced by state-owned listed companies in China.But practical research also find out that after the implementation of MBOs in the state-owned listed companies, the improvement of the financial ratio is not so significant. Further research find out that the phenomenent is caused by the systematic limitation of China’s capital market, the restrain of MBO system and some of the recent MBO mode. They also cause the distortion of incentive and conduction in China’s MBO. The key point is that it is hard to effective control the management "insider control" phenomenent after the MBO. By introducing the strategy investors to perform co-buyout with the management, the so-call mixed MBO mode, and reasonably define the effective edge of MBO, the management "insider control" phenomenent can be effectively restrained, and so the MBO can really become the effective method to improve the corporate governance, to increase the corporate value, and to improve efficiency.更多还原