【作者】 角雪岭；

【导师】 宋献中；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 现代公司的所有权与控制权发生分离,控制权在公司内部进行配置。所有权是控制权形成的基础,所有权结构不同,控制权配置模式也呈现出多元化。本文从终极所有权视角出发,研究金字塔持股结构下,完整意义上的终极控制权在上市公司股东大会、董事会和经理层三个层面的配置特征与模式,以及配置特征对上市公司绩效所产生的影响。在金字塔持股结构下,终极控制权配置与控制权配置的理论模式相背离,其总体特征表现为终极控制股东的权力发生膨胀,具体表现在两个方面:纵向来看,权力边界发生膨胀,由股东大会层面延伸至董事会和经理层,形成了终极控制权配置的多种组合模式;横向来看,终极控制股东对股东大会和董事会的终极控制权与终极现金流权背离一股一票原则,形成了超额控制。金字塔持股结构特征是影响终极控制权配置的重要因素:终极现金流权比例直接制约着终极控制股东对三个层面的终极控制权比例大小;层级则是金字塔内部权力配置的主要路径,并且对超额控制的形成及其程度具有重要影响;终极控制股东类型不同,其构建金字塔的动机存在差异,导致金字塔持股结构的其他特征存在差异,最终对终极控制权配置特征产生影响。终极控制股东权力的膨胀使其能够对上市公司实施一系列的控制行为以影响其经营决策和经营绩效,而超额控制的形成导致其选择利用控制权攫取私有收益,对公司绩效造成负面影响,即存在“堑壕防御效应”;如果终极控制股东持有的终极现金流权比例足够大,将会抑制其侵害动机,转而利用控制权监督上市公司经营管理,从而有利于公司绩效提高,即具有“利益趋同效应”。本文选取2004—2005年间1779家上市公司作为样本进行实证研究。首先根据终极控制股东类型不同,将样本区分为国有上市公司和私有上市公司,并进一步根究终极控制股东对股东大会是否形成超额控制,将国有上市公司划分为对股东大会形成超额控制的公司(即分离指数A＞1)和对股东大会未形成超额控制的公司(即分离指数A=1)。通过比较研究发现:不仅国有上市公司与私有上市公司之间,同时国有上市公司内部的两类公司之间,其金字塔持股结构特征都存在显著差异,并由此导致其终极控制权配置特征也存在显著差异。进一步的实证结果表明,“堑壕防御效应”显著存在于私有上市公司以及终极控制股东对股东大会形成了超额控制的国有上市公司中,并且终极控制股东对董事会的超额控制的“堑壕防御效应”更加显著,这说明,与对股东大会的超额控制相比,终极控制股东对董事会形成超额控制更容易导致其产生强烈的侵害动机,对公司绩效造成了更显著的负面影响;但是“堑壕防御效应”并不存在于终极控制股东对股东大会并未形成超额控制的国有上市公司中。实证结果还表明,“利益趋同效应”显著存在于私有上市公司以及终极控制股东对股东大会未形成超额控制的国有上市公司中,但在终极控制股东对股东大会形成超额控制的国有上市公司中,“利益趋同效应”并不显著。理论分析和实证研究说明,如何有效地进行终极控制权配置成为现代公司所面临的重要问题,其核心内容是限制终极控制股东权力过分膨胀,防止超额控制的形成。解决问题的基本原则是,在公司内部切实落实权力的合理分配与相互制衡,在公司外部则加强法律强监管的力度。更多还原

【Abstract】 In modern company,ownership and control rights take place separation and control rights carry on an allocation inside the company.Under different ownership structures, control rights allocation patterns are diversified.From the aspect of ultimate ownership,the study analyzes characteristics of ultimate control rights allocation among shareholders, board of directors and management of the listed companies and the effect on corporate performance.Under pyramidal ownership structure,the ultimate controlling shareholders ’ control rights to listed company take place an inflation,deviated from the theories model.The control rights inflation includes two sides.Firstly,the boundary of control rights is extended from layer of shareholders to board of directors and management and became various combination patterns of control rights allocation.Secondly,control rights to shareholders and board of directors exceed its cash flow rights.The characteristics of pyramidal ownership structure have importance influence to ultimate control rights allocation.The higher of ultimate cash flow rights,the greater of ultimate control rights. The higher of layer,the greater of excess control level.Based on the inflation of power,the ultimate controlling shareholders carry out control to the listed companies with influence on its management decision.The control rights exceeding cash flow rights promotes the ultimate controlling shareholders ’incentives to dig tunneling from the listed companies that will cause negative influence on corporation performance.Scholars call this phenomenon as Entrenchment effect.If the ultimate controlling shareholders hold ultimate cash flows rights big enough,the shareholders will use control rights to supervise the listed companies.This is helpful to improve the corporation performance.Scholars call this phenomenon as Alignment effect.The study chooses 1373 state-owned listed companies and 406 private listed companies from 2004 to 2005 as research objects and classifies them into the private listed companies, the state-owned listed companies with the index A(the ration of control rights to cash flow rights) greater than 1 and the state-owned listed companies with the index A equal 1. The research shows significant difference among the characteristics of pyramidal ownership structure of three sets of companies which results in statistically significant difference on characteristics of ultimate control rights allocation. The empirical evidence shows that entrenchment effect significantly exists in the private listed companies and the state-owned listed companies with the index A greater than 1. Especially,the ultimate controlling shareholders’ excess control to board of directors has more negative effect on corporation performance.But in the state-owned listed companies with the index A equal 1,entrenchment effect doesn’t exist.And alignment effect exists in the private listed companies and the index A equal 1 of state-owned listed companies,but not statistically significantly exist in the state-owned listed companies with the index A greater than 1.Theory analysis and empirical evidence indicates that how to effectively allocate control rights is becoming more and more important to modern companies.The key point is to limit the ultimate controlling shareholder’s power excessive inflations and prevent from excess control.In order to solve the problem,on the one hand we should carry out the reasonable allocation of power in the company with mutually check and balance,on the other hand we should enforce supervising regulations and laws.更多还原