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政府监管与股权再融资效率

Government Regulation and Seasoned Equity Offerings Efficiency

【作者】 徐军辉

【导师】 王华;

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 , 会计学, 2007, 博士

【副题名】基于中国配股政策变迁的研究

【摘要】 二十世纪九十年代以来,企业再融资后的业绩下滑问题引起了学术界的广泛关注,研究者从盈余管理、自由现金流假说、信息不对称等角度对业绩下滑的原因进行了分析。本文以中国上市公司配股为研究对象,考虑到中国市场背景下企业需要满足政策要求才能顺利融资的特点,沿着配股政策—→企业行为特点—→融资后业绩的思路,试图从政府监管的角度为上市公司再融资后业绩下滑寻求新的解释。本文将配股事前、事中监管分为盈利要求、时间间隔、产业政策、大股东配股比例、配股比例、治理结构、股利政策、投资政策八个方面,分析了政策对企业相关行为的影响;采用OLS模型、Logistic模型、参数检验分别检验各类行为特征对融资效率的影响。八个方面的结论从企业业绩角度基本支持了政府监管措施的变迁:盈余门槛越高,再融资后业绩下滑越快;产业政策支持的行业发展速度慢,较难通过负债的形式获得急需的资金;配股比例高的企业融资后业绩更差,配股比例大于30%和小于30%的企业业绩存在显著差异;大股东配股可以明显减少企业的业绩下滑,是否采用实物配股对企业的业绩没有显著的影响;无论什么原因造成的资金用途变更,均会造成企业业绩的显著下滑;配股前发放现金股利对配股当年业绩产生正面影响,配股后每一年是否发放现金股利与该年的业绩正相关,且发放股利的企业比不发放股利的企业业绩好;关联交易、大股东资金侵占对企业产生负面影响;融资时间间隔为1年的企业业绩劣于时间间隔为2年、3年的企业业绩。对配股的事后监管措施的市场反应进行检验的结果表明事后监管没有发挥作用,违规企业具有一定的行为特点,和配股政策要求密不可分。

【Abstract】 Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offering(SEO) has been the attention focus of academic circles from the 90’s of twenty centuries and it has been explained by researchers on the basis of Earning management,Free Cash Flow Hypothesis,Asymmetry Information. Considering the fact that listed companies have to meet the governmental rules under market background of China,this article lays research on companies of rights offering and goes down the thread of policie→characters of companies action→performance of SEO,and then tries to find new explanations for underperformance of SEO from the perspective of government supervision.By partitioning off pre-SEO and pro-SEO regulations to eight aspects:earning demand, interval,industry policy,subscribing rate for dominant stakeholders,issuing rate,corporate governance structure,dividend policy and investment policy,this paper analysis the effect of rules on companies actions and tests those actions’ influence on SEO performance by referring to OLS Models,Logistic Models,parameter tests.All of the empirical results support alternation of government regulation policy in view of enterprises performance,that is to say,the higher earning threshold is,the more quickly performance drops.Industries supported by policies have a slow progress and it is hard for them to be financed by credit.Companies with high issue rate have a worse performance.Distinctive differences exist in performance between enterprises with an issue rate of more than 30%and those of fewer than 30%.Underperformance can be lessened if dominant stakeholders subscript shares,while no marked effect concerning shares taken by goods or not has been observed.All investment alternations lead to performance drop no matter what cause it.Cash dividend before rights offering has positive effect on performance of the same year of offering,and cash dividend is positively relative to performance in every year after SEO. Furthermore,those companies that pay cash dividend have better performance.Affiliated business and entrenchment effect by dominant stakeholders have negative effect on corporations. Performance of those re-offerings with an interval of more than 1 year outgoes those with an interval of 1 year.By testing the market reaction of public enforcement after SEO,the paper comes to the conclusion that enforcement has no effect,and corporations that fall in deregulation act have certain characteristics,which has a close relationship with rules of offerings.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 暨南大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2009年 03期
  • 【分类号】F832.51;F224
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】877
  • 攻读期成果
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