【作者】 马兆平；

【导师】 夏洪胜；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 为了有效管理上市公司治理结构冲突、发挥冲突的积极作用、达到提高上市公司绩效的目的,在文献综述的基础上,本文以公司治理理论(利益相关者理论和委托代理理论)和冲突管理理论(组织行为理论和博弈论)为基础;结合我国上市公司治理现状和相应数据,重点对我国上市公司治理中的大股东与小股东、独立董事与内部董事、股东与经理层间利益冲突进行理论分析和实证研究,最后研究了股权分置改革后上市公司治理结构中的冲突变化。首先,本文在提出相应理论假设基础上,运用上市公司的相关数据,对大股东与小股东的冲突进行实证研究,得出以下结论:我国上市公司第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效负相关;大股东与其他股东的利益冲突对企业绩效有负面影响;其他股东对大股东产生制衡时负面影响小;市场化程度越高大股东对小股东利益侵害越小、对企业绩效越有利益;第一大股东的持股比例越高,就越有可能发放高现金股利;但当其他股东能对第一大股东起制衡作用时,就有可能否决高现金股利政策;另外,民营控股企业则更不倾向于向股东派发现金红利。同时,本文研究了独立董事所代表的利益相关者,并得出独立董事与内部董事的冲突有利于提高公司绩效的结论;重点从董事会项目决策过程、独立董事与内部董事的薪酬互定、独立董事辞职三个方面分别建立了独立董事与内部董事的冲突博弈模型,在模型求解基础上提出了完善独立董事制度、发挥独立董事与内部董事冲突的正效应等相应的冲突管理策略。另外,本文对股东与经理层冲突的类型、成因及效果进行理论研究,建立了股东与经理层单阶博弈和重复博弈模型,并求出了混合策略的纳什均衡,在此基础上提出了目标趋同、调整经理人薪酬体系、实现剩余权与索取权有效配制、发挥经理市场作用等方式以改善和提高冲突效果的的冲突管理策略。最后,本文对比分析了股权分置改革前后公司内部冲突的变化,即股权分置改革后大股东与小股东、独立董事与内部董事、股东与经理层间冲突发展趋势,并从冲突管理角度提出了股权分置改革后有效管理公司内部冲突、加强公司治理的相应建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to manage and use conflicts in corporate governance for Chinese listed companies, realizing to improve corporate performance, the thesis integrating present situation and data of corporate governance for Chinese listed company, analyzes the conflicts between big shareholders and small shareholders, independent directors and internal directors, shareholders and managers, then studies the changes of conflict in corporate governance after share-reform.At first, the thesis is based on some theoretical hypothesis and using listed corporate data, and then draw the conclusion through the positive study of the conflict between big shareholders and small shareholders: It is negative relation between stocks ratio of the biggest shareholder and corporate performance", it is negative to corporate performance for the conflict between big shareholders and other shareholders; the negative effect will be small when other shareholders can confine big shareholders; bigger shareholders invade small shareholders, bigger marketing effect is; when biggest shareholder hold the bigger stock ration, it will be more possible for cash share interest; private manipulative listed corporation dislike cash share interest to shareholders.At the same time, the thesis studies the shareholds, whom the independent directors repress, and hold the idea that it is favorable to improve corporate performance with the conflict between independent directors and internal directors. The thesis constructs a mold of the conflict between independent directors and internal directors through three aspects: project decision process of the board of directors; the salary decision between independent directors and internal directors; independent directors’ resignation. Based on these models, the thesis brings conflict management strategies that improve and use the conflict between independent directors and internal directors.Meanwhile, the thesis studies the conflict styles, reasons and effects and sets up a game model between stockholders and managers. Based on the model, the thesis getss the Nash equilibrium, and bring several strategies: target convergence; revising managers’ salary system; realizing the distribution mechanism between the remaining right and the obtaining right; improving the conflict effect using managers market.Finally, the thesis compares the changes of conflict in corporate performance after share-reform, and then give some suggestion to manage conflicts and improve the corporate performance.更多还原