【作者】 曹芳；

【导师】 隋广军；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 选择与企业战略相匹配的薪酬战略,从而有效推进公司经营战略的实施,是当今企业面临的新的时代要求。其中,多元化战略作为当前世界普遍采用的经营战略,其与管理层薪酬的关系研究受到了广泛关注。但是目前这方面的研究结论主要来自美国等西方国家数据,反映的是美国等西方国家的公司行为和制度背景。因此,本文试图探讨在中国的制度背景下多元化战略与管理层薪酬之间的关系。本文在代理理论和期望理论的基础上,结合传统管理层薪酬研究中采用的企业规模、企业绩效和股权结构等变量,建立了一个多元化与管理层薪酬的理论分析框架。研究区分并分析了产业多元化和地域多元化两种不同的多元化战略对管理层薪酬的影响,并提出了相关理论假设。在上述理论框架下,选取了633家2002—2004年在深沪两市上市的多元化经营上市公司,共1891个观测值作为本文的样本数据,利用面板数据(panal data)模型,对多元化战略对管理层薪酬的影响进行了实证检验,得出如下结论:产业多元化和地域多元化越高,企业规模越大,企业财务绩效越好,则管理层年度总报酬也越高,但实施地域多元化经营的企业的管理层报酬高于产业多元化经营的企业;股权激励严重滞后于企业发展,与企业当前经营战略不相适应;由于国有企业管理层激励不足,管理层进行多元化动机高于其他企业;完善的报酬激励机制可以降低管理层企图通过产业多元化和地域多元化经营提高自身私人收益的可能性;股权结构、企业规模、企业市场绩效和财务绩效对企业多元化战略(包括产业多元化和地域多元化)与管理层报酬的关系存在调节效应。此外,本文还运用多任务的委托—代理模型分析了在企业多元化经营环境下的管理层的最优激励合约设计。理论模型分析发现:管理层报酬的长期激励部分主要取决于多元化成本与多元化收益的大小,即只有当董事会监控管理层的监控成本增加超过多元化收益时,董事会才会通过管理层持股等不断增加经理人报酬合约中的激励部分,使其“利益趋同”。最后,本文提出了如下政策建议:优化和创新薪酬制度,实行战略性薪酬管理,使企业战略与薪酬战略相匹配;优化股权结构,加强股权制衡,防止国有企业管理层“内部人控制”,避免企业出现“强激励—弱约束”格局;加快国有企业的薪酬改革,提高管理层持股比例,有利于形成“利益趋同效应”;建立和健全中国的经理人市场,形成市场化的经理人薪酬体系,从而减少代理成本。更多还原

【Abstract】 In today’s world,companies are required to choose an appropriate compensation strategy that suits their goals,so as to promote the realization of their operation strategy.As a result,diversification,a commonly adopted operation strategy,and its relationship with executive compensation have drawn wide attention.However, relevant research results are mainly based on data from western countries,such as the United States,and thus can only reflect those countries’ corporate behaviour and institutional background.On the other hand,only a few study on this area has been carried out in developing countries,such as China.Therefore,the paper is going to investigate the relationship between the diversification strategy and executive compensation in China.This paper sets up a theoritical framework of diversification strategy and executive compensation by employing agency theory and expectancy theory and referring to the statistics such as corporate size,corporate performance and stock ownership.It studies the distinction between industrial diversification and geographical diversification and analyses their effects on executive compensation,and therefore makes some hypotheses.Under the framework,1891 observed values from 633 Chinese companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets during 2002-2004 have been selected as the sample data in the paper.The paper carries out an empirical test on the effect of diversification strategies on executive compensation by employing the panel data model.It thus concludes that the company with higher degree of industrial diversification and geographical diversification,larger size or higher accounting earning performance will realise a higher annal executive compensation;at same time,the company which adopts geographical diversification strategy will realise higher compensation than the one adopting industrial diversification strategy;that under the current situation,the Executive Stock Option incentives is not able to keep up with corporate development,and can not match corporate diversification strategy;the executive in state-owned enterprises has stronger motivation than that in other enterprises;and that a sound executive compensation incentive mechanism can reduce the possibility of the executive improving its personal income through industrial diversification and geographical diversification.The paper also draws a conclusion that stock ownership,corporate size,corporate performance and accounting earning performance can have an adjusting effect on the relationship between corporate diversification and executive compensation.Based on the multi-task principal-agent model,the paper also develops a incentive contracting model to examine the optimal incentive contract under the diversification operation.The results show that the long-term incentive portion of the contract depends on the cost and benefit of diversification,i.e.when the increase of monitor cost which the board of directors spends on monitoring the executive exceeds the benefit of diversification,the board would increase the incentive portion by continuously increasing the share hold by the executive to realize the alignment effect.The paper also gives following suggestions.Firstly,the company should optimize and innovate the compensation mechanism.In other words,the company should adjust and regulate the executive compensation mechanism to suit its operation strategies.Secondly,the company,especially the SOE,must optimize the stock-ownship structure in order to prevent the phenominon of"inner person control" and "strong incentive,weak restriction";At the same time,efforts must be made to reform the mechanism in SOEs and increase the shares hold by the executive to achieve the alignment effect.Finally,China’s executive personnel market should be established and continuously improved,which will help to build up the executive compensation mechanism in line with the market price and reduce the agent cost accordingly.更多还原