【作者】 赵兴楣；

【导师】 刘国常；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本研究主要从审计契约的本质和结构、非正式契约的执行机制、市场力量以及政府角色四个层次提出核心观点:独立性反映了审计者在不同力量制衡下的利益倾向性,审计的契约安排为独立性提供了制度保障,声誉机制和独立性的互动效应蕴含着审计制度的生机。以此为基础,构建了一个以审计者为中心、基于审计契约安排的独立性互动分析框架。从本质上看,契约的不完备性引发了对审计的需求,而利益主体在人格化上的分化则使得外部审计契约采用了正式契约和非正式契约两种形式。正式契约影响着审计者的即时经济收益,决定了审计者不可能超然独立于特定的相对人;非正式契约影响着审计者的未来经济收益,它为审计者的独立性在制度安排上提供了一种救济。审计契约的本质就是不同利益主体对利益协调机制进行集体选择的结果,利益主体的力量对比必然会通过审计契约规定的秩序影响到审计结果,审计者的独立性就反映了他在各方利益主体力量制衡下的利益倾向性。声誉是非正式契约的自履行机制,也是审计者独立性的重要保障。从表面上看,审计者的即时经济利益来源于他与特定相对人的正式契约规定,实际上则是来源于他所承诺的独立性;同样,审计者的未来经济利益表面上来源于他与不特定相对人之间的非正式契约安排,实际上则是来源于他实质上的独立性。独立性带来的声誉能为审计者带来即时的经济回报;良好声誉带来的持续收益,也促使审计者不仅有对他的独立性作出承诺的激励,而且还有保持实质上独立性的激励。由此形成了审计者声誉与独立性相互作用的互动机制。市场力量在这种互动机制中的作用方式就是通过声誉机制来约束审计者的行为、提高独立性,帮助利益主体通过契约安排来选择审计者、提高交易效率;一个良好的声誉机制包括信誉体系和司法救济两个方面,政府的作用就是推动信誉体系的建设和提供完善的司法救济,使得个人从中获取的收益大于他们付出的成本,从而建立起一个稳定的秩序构架。根据理论分析的结论,本研究构建了独立性和声誉互动的递归分析模型和审计者声誉的市场反应模型,利用非线性混合方程法和混合线性方程法,从不同的方面得到了以下相似的结论:(1)审计者的独立性受到来自包括上市公司、中小股东和市场力量等外界各方压力的系统性影响,只要契约各方的力量对比发生了变化,独立性就会改变。这就是审计者与上市公司之间的关系表现出强势、弱势和势均力敌三种形态,并且时时变化的原因。由此证明:独立性就是审计者利益倾向的状态。(2)声誉机制对独立性的促进作用在实证结果中得到了证实,优质客户有优质审计的需求。不仅是审计者在选择客户,客户也在选择审计者,这就形成了审计者保持高质量和高独立性的一种动力。但是这种需求在不同的客户中表现出差异。虽然独立性对声誉的作用被证明是积极性的,但是在当前的制度背景下,它没有能够发挥显著的影响。原因是声誉的传递渠道是不畅通的,投资者没有接收到关于审计者声誉变化的确切信息,这些信息也就不足以改变他们的投资预期。统计结果显示出投资者更认同国际四大的品牌,信赖它们的审计质量。投资者更直接感触到的不是审计者声誉的改变,而是审计者长期累积的声誉——品牌。(3)本研究也证实了非标准审计意见的信息含量,这至少说明了投资市场仍然对审计质量存在期望。优质客户需要优质审计的部分原因就是因为非标准审计意见会带来异常回报的经济后果,而且优质客户优质审计的组合在市场上确实被观察到获得了更高的市场回报。但是,有关证据并不支持将这一结论推广到所有的审计意见类型。(4)市场力量的作用表现为信息披露的程度。市场发育程度越高,越有利于审计者声誉的累积;政府的干预程度越小、与市场的协调性越好,它的监管作用就越能取得良好的效果;法制的约束力加大了审计者的风险意识,使他们不仅要挑选客户,同时也要被客户挑选。中国证监会的意见在投资者心目中是非常有威信的,处罚公告除了引起投资者的强烈反应之外,还使得被处罚公司的个股回报显著地低于市场平均水平。但是由于监管机构对上市公司和审计者的指责存在不及时和披露不充分的现象,因此没有能够对审计者的声誉造成显著影响,再次说明了声誉形成的信息传递渠道不畅通。更多还原

【Abstract】 This Research put forward a key point that audit’s contractual arrangement guarantees the auditors’ independence against outside pressure while the independence reflects their interested tendency to the auditee, and the interactive mechanism between independence and reputation implicates validity of the audit institution. Around this point, an interactive auditor-centered frame based on the contractual arrangement has been constructed which contains four levels as: i) nature and structure of the audit’s contracts, ii) executive mechanism of the informal contract, iii) market forces, and iv) government role.The need of audit should attribute to incomplete contracts, and the personal identity of individuals should account for the separation of outside auditing contracts which are composed of two parts as formal and informal ones. The formal contracts between the auditor and identified party are bound by law while the informal ones between the auditor and non-identified party can only be guaranteed by auditors’ social responsibility. Auditors cannot be completely independent because they benefit directly from the formal contracts, but the informal ones will be a relief to this defect because they affect auditors’ future return. The nature of audit contracts is the result of games played among stakeholders with different powers. The contrast between their powers affects the auditing result through the order stipulated in the contracts. So independence is just a characteristic of auditors’ interested tendency to the auditee under the pressure of different stakeholders.Reputation is not only the self-enforcing mechanism of informal contracts, but also the security of auditors’ independence. It seems that the auditors’ current income is stipulated in the formal contracts, but in fact it originates from auditors’ promised independence. It is the same with auditors’ future return stipulated in the informal contracts but originated from their essential independence. Auditors earn their reputation from keeping independent which implies current income and future return as well. So they are excited in return to promise independence and to protect it. That is the interactive mechanism between independence and reputation. In this mechanism, market force is to discipline auditors’ independence, and to guide different parties to choose auditors collectively. At the same time, Government’s role is to promote constructing of a reputation system and to provide judicial relief to impersonal individuals. A stable frame of transaction order can be created then, so that all parties can reap more benefit than what they should pay for themselves.According to the conclusion above mentioned, this research builds a simultaneous equation as recursive implementation and a market reaction model of auditors’ reputation. From different aspects, this research gets similar results as follow:(1) Independence which is variable according to the balance of different pressure is affected systematically by the pressure exerted by all parties, such as listed companies, minor stakeholders and market forces. It is the reason why the relationship between auditors and their auditee alters frequently as powerful auditor, powerful auditee or well-matched each other. It is proved that independence is just characteristics of auditors’ interested tendency to the auditee under the pressure of different stakeholders’ powers.(2) It is proved that reputation can promote auditors to keep their independence actively. There is a need for high-quality audit among high-quality clients. Not only will auditors choose clients, but also clients will choose auditors. That is the incentive which promotes auditors to keep their quality and independence. Though the influence of independence on reputation is certified to be positive, but it is not statistically significant under current condition of government policies in this respect. Information on the alteration in auditors’ reputation cannot be passed smoothly to investors so that investors cannot make change to their investment expectation. Conclusions show that investors believe in Big4’s quality much more than other audit firms. Perceived audit quality is closed connected to the brand of auditors rather than the improvement in reputation.(3) Value connotations in modified audit opinion are certified which implies an expectation of auditors’ quality in investment market. Because of the economic consequence of modified audit opinion, high-quality clients need high-quality audit. It takes the combined efforts of both high-quality audit and the high-quality clients to bring in the high return. But this conclusion is limited to modified audit opinion and is valid no longer to non-modified audit opinion.(4) Market forces take effect through information revealed, and the marketization conduces to accumulation of reputation. The less government intervenes in and the more it coheres with market, the better its supervision takes effect. The power of law is to excite auditors’ consciousness of risk so that not only must auditors choose clients but also have to be chosen by clients. The critical reports issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are widely accepted as a reference of making investment decisions. Those companies punished by CSRC have bad stock price performance due to lack of confidence among investors. Regretfully, information of punishments from CSRC can not be relayed to investors in time so that it has little influence on auditors’ reputation.更多还原