【作者】 张功富；

【导师】 宋献中；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 财务管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 鉴于现有研究大多只是孤立、零星地考察产品市场竞争、公司治理、信息不对称和企业投资两两之间的关系,本文基于中国转型时期在这四个方面的制度背景,以产品市场竞争为起点,以非效率投资为终点,以公司治理和信息不对称为联结点,将产品市场竞争、公司治理和信息不对称对企业投资决策的影响纳入一个统一的分析框架,探讨了产品市场竞争影响上市公司过度投资和投资不足的路径,并以2000-2006年间中国工业类上市公司为样本对这些路径进行了实证检验。本文的研究表明,产品市场竞争通过促进公司治理和信息不对称的改善降低了企业的非效率投资。产品市场竞争的清算威胁对于中国上市公司经理的负面影响较小且可置信度低,因此本文发现,随着产品市场竞争的加剧,第一大股东将增加其持股比例,自动约束其“掏空”行为,企业将聘请更多的独立董事,组建更大规模的董事会,加大对非管理层董事的持股激励,这些措施均可以有效地抑制经理层的过度投资。但是本文未发现经理层薪酬和持股激励在产品市场竞争与过度投资关系中的中介效应。产品市场竞争可以有效地降低经营者与投资者之间的信息不对称,而信息不对称程度的降低有利于缓解企业的投资不足程度。产品市场竞争提供了一个可比性较强的平均利润,从而缩小了企业可盈余管理的空间。而盈余管理程度的下降减轻了经营者与股东之间的信息不对称,从而缓解了企业的投资不足。产品市场竞争虽然会给上市公司的自愿披露带来专有成本,但自愿披露改善了企业的信息不对称,降低了外部筹资成本,因此,产品市场竞争将鼓励企业增加自愿披露降低筹资成本从而缓解其投资不足。本文的研究表明,要改善中国上市公司的非效率投资状况,继续强化市场竞争、进一步优化公司治理结构、加强信息披露质量的监管和鼓励上市公司增加自愿信息披露是我们面临的必然选择。更多还原

【Abstract】 While the mutual relationships among product market competition (hereafter referred to as PMC), corporate governance, information asymmetry and firm investment are widely investigated in extant literature, they have not been investigated systematically. Based on the backgrounds of China’s transition economy, this study develops an integrated theoretical framework incorporating above four topics, which starts from PMC and ends on inefficient investment by treating corporate governance and information asymmetry as two important mediators. By using this framework, this study analyzes the paths from PMC to over-investment or under-investment, and empirically examines those paths using a sample data of industrial companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.This study provides evidence that PMC reduces inefficient investment by improving corporate governance and reducing information asymmetry. Because the threat of liquidation induced by PMC is not so serious and credible to the managers, the largest shareholder increases his shareholdings and constrains his behavior of tunneling while PMC becomes more severe. By taking measures like employing more independent directors, expanding the boards, and increasing equity incentive to the non-manager directors, the firms can suppress the managerial over-investment behavior effectively. However, this study finds no mediating effect of managerial compensation and ownership on the relationship between PMC and over-investment.Furthermore, this study finds that PMC reduces under-investment by decreasing information asymmetries between managers and shareholders. By providing shareholders with a comparable average profit, PMC increases the difficulties in earning management which results in less information asymmetry and then less under-investment. While voluntary disclosure results in proprietary cost, it reduces information asymmetries and the external financing cost. Therefore, PMC will encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure which in return will reduce under-investment.Taking together, this study suggests that to reduce inefficient investment, it is necessary to continue the effort to strengthen PMC, to improve corporate governance structure, to intensify the monitoring of firms’ mandatory information disclosure, and to encourage firms’ voluntary disclosure.更多还原