【作者】 王淅勤；

【导师】 蔡根女；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 农村中小企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 自从Johnson等首次提出了“隧道”(Tunneling)或称“掏空”概念以来,我国学者也对此展开了广泛的研究,而从最近几年所曝光的公司违规事件来看,大部分都涉及到大股东的侵害行为。本文试图从公司内部治理的层面,研究现有的治理安排下,何种治理安排是有效的,以及为何有些治理安排会失去作用,进一步揭示我国大股东隧道行为发生的微观机理。本文的研究思路是采用规范与实证相结合的方法,研究了以下两方面的问题:其一是关于隧道行为的量质特征研究。通过对2003-2005年度的全部关联交易统计,弄清楚我国的隧道行为的行为主体、严重性、表现形式等;其二是关于隧道行为的因果研究。通过理论分析建立隧道行为与公司治理之间的关联,并确定解释变量,尔后通过实证研究检验其作用机理。以全部的沪市公司为样本,先分后总,分别对公司的控制结构、股权结构、治理安排与隧道行为关系展开研究,而后综合回归。本文取得了以下主要研究结论:(1)我国绝大部分的关联交易都发生于控股股东及其子公司之间,从交易频率来看,交易的主要形式为关联购销,但从影响大小来看,主要是担保与资金提供业务。依据行业分类的结果,制造与采掘业关联购销显然较其他行业更频繁、也更重要,其他行业关联交易更多地体现为关联担保;此外,公司的交易状况也对交易中的资金流向存在重大影响,ST公司关联购销业务弱于正常经营的公司,而资本往来活动却异常活跃;终极控制人性质不同,公司的关联交易也存在差异,国有性质的公司利用金融机融资能力强,民营公司则较多依赖关联方。期末的资金占用主要是历史累积的结果,且与非经营性交易关联更密切。(2)在我国的上市公司中,不同的实际控制人在构建控制结构上有不同的偏好,控制人为自然人的公司更偏好于较多的控制层次和多重股权控制,构建更为复杂的控制关系,由此导致了实际控制人所有权与控制权更大程度的分离。自然人控制的公司更容易发生隧道行为,也更容易发生终极控制人的资金占用行为,而终极控制人为非自然人的公司更容易发生直接股东的侵占,验证了金字塔理论。然而对隧道行为的考察结果却是非企业法人控制的公司两权分离程度与隧道行为严重程度显著更相关,而企业法人控制的公司和自然人控制的公司二者关系不明确。(3)我国上市公司的股权结构的总体特征是集中性、低制衡度股权,国有公司集中度大于非国有公司,且随着第一大股东持股的提高则其他股东持股比例更快下降,我国国有股与法人持股存在一定的替代性,国有股、第一股不影响股权流通性,影响股权流通性的主要因素是前若干大股东的持股比例。股权流通性、外部性对于隧道行为的影响在国有公司与非国有公司相同。而集中度存在不同影响,国有公司呈现显著的“协同效应”,而非国有则呈现出“壕沟效应”。集中的股权更利于直接股东的自利行为,分散的股权下更多呈现间接股东的侵害行为。(4)当前的股权结构下,中小股东在股东大会的各种法定权利都难以实际发挥作用,股东大会中中小股东的参与程度低,股东大会中控股股东的比例过高,削弱了中小股东的话语权。独立董事在上市公司的作用开始上升,体现为缺席次数的减少、发表不同意见的次数增加。审计委员会对于抑制隧道行为具有重要作用,此外独立董事的工作地点也对于独立董事监督作用的发挥具有重要影响,独立董事董事会的出席情况受到公司状况的影响,而与个人因素无关。随着公司治理的不断完善,大股东隧道行为空间逐渐缩小,其对管理层的直接控制和影响有增强的趋势。关于隧道行为程度的综合回归显示,第一大股东持股比例和独立董事的人数对隧道行为分别有正向和负向的影响。基于上述的研究本文提出了以下对策建议:(1)完善集团公司立法;(2)限制股权的交叉控制,对公司关联关系充分披露;(3)进一步促进中小股东的参与度;(4)建立类别股东表决制度;(5)逐步改进董事会结构,加强独立董事的责任;(6)建立健全有效的专业委员会,尤其是审计委员会,加强公司财务的事后监督;(7)司法救济上,以结果归责替代过错归责;(8)建立内部职工与治理层沟通的“秘密通道”。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since "Tunneling" or "Entrenchment" was put forward by Jonsohn in Last Century, scholars have begun to explore "Tunneling" in our country, on the other hand, some scandals revealed by the supervisor offered further evidences, "Tunneling" is even more severe in our country than in other countries. This paper try to tell how this happens in eye of inside company governance, therefore, set apart what are the valid and what are invalid.In the method of canonical and positive research, this paper focus on the two questions: First of all, the thesis explores the characters of "tunneling" of our country. Using date of all related transactions from 2003 to 2005, this paper disentangles who and how carry out "tunneling", and, how severe it is. By classification, some obvious characters of the companies relating to tunneling are found; Second, this paper keep eyes on the research of causes and consequences. the relations between "Tunneling" and company governance are set up by theoretical analyses, meanwhile, some variables are abstracted, and base on which positive research is finished. In all, the paper starts from parts, ends with the aggregation with the sample of shanghai stock exchange. There are several conclusions are drown as following:1. Most of the related transactions are between the listed companies and their controllers. Related purchase and sale is the most frequent method, while guarantee and fund-offering are most severe in quantity. According the classify of the industry, guarantee and related purchase and sale both are blossom in manufactory and excavating industry, while in the other industries, the former is outstanding; the condition is another crucial factor, in Special Treated companies, Related purchase and sale is less, but the transactions respecting fund are busy. The difference is also exposed in eye of the nature of the final controllers, the state-owned companies are more powerful in absorbing financial funds, while private companies relay on related parties even more. It prefers the prior period to the present period that incurs peculated fund.2. There are different preference between the different controllers, companies controlled by nature person prefer more complicated control structure by more layers and multiple shareholders, in turn, a bigger wedge of ownership and control is made. therefore, a severe tunneling action will be executed in this companies in theory, but the fact is that it happens in companies without nature person controllers. The conflict conclusion can be explained by the control ability. Reviewing the frequency of the tunneling, the companies with nature person controllers tends to incur the expropriation from final controller, while the companies without nature person controllers tend to incur the expropriation from immediate controllers.3. In all, the structure of shareholders in our country has a character of high centrality and low equilibrium, and the shares of other holders decline with a rapid speed while the share of the largest holder increase. There is a substituting-effect between the stated-owned shares and corporation-owned shares, It is several main shareholders who influence the liquidity instead of the largest holders and stated-owned holders. Exterior and liquidity have the same influence on both stated-owned and nonstate-owned companies. The external investors hold less shares in expropriated companies, and expropriated companies have higher liquidity. The concentrated hold has contrary effects on stated-owned and nonstate-owned companies, the former take on "incentive effects", the later present "entrenchment effect". The concentrated shareholder is convenient to immediate controllers to expropriate, and dispersive holders is convenient to indirect controllers to act.4. Under the present control structure, the rights of minority shareholders has little meanings in fact. The shareholder’s meeting is manipulated by controlling shareholders, few minority shareholders has no motivation to participate the meeting, the voice from minority shareholders is too weak. The institution to enhance the governance of the listed companies is becoming rounded, the space left for controlling shareholders is smaller and smaller, An incline to strengthen control on management directly begins to turn up. Independent director act a important role in those days, this can be seen in less absent and more disagree opinions. Besides, audit committee and the sites of the independent directors show the significant function too, both the date from 2004 and 2005 support the conclusion. The aggregated regression on tunneling or not shows that the development space, ability of payment and the industry also have significant influence. The results of regression on degree of tunneling reveals that the share of the largest shareholder and the members of independent each has negative and positive influence.At last chapter, this paper give some advices on keeping back expropriation from controlling shareholder, just as following: (1) Establish laws on group corporation; (2) Limit the cross-holdings and disclose the related shareholders completely; (3) Promote the participation of minority shareholders; (4) Practice the rule of dual-class shares; (5)Improve on the structure of board and enhance the liability of the independent directors further more; (6) Complete the institution of professional committee, especially the audit committee in order to strengthen the ex post facto monitor; (7) Adopt the duty principle of result instead of action in legal grievance. (8) Build secret channels between the employee and the governance layers.更多还原