法律的模糊性分析

【作者】 周力；

【导师】 文正邦； 卓泽渊；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 法学理论， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 文章主要以分析法学的思路来探讨法律的模糊性问题。首先,我们需要面对的是法律的模糊性问题如何成为一个法理学问题。我们从法理学的两个基本问题出发,通过历史上对法理学基本问题的解决思路进行梳理,证成法律的模糊性问题是属于法律的发现和运用问题,这个问题与新分析法学相联系,也与逻辑哲学或语言哲学问题有联系,并且在很大程度上是一个经验主义的问题。文章的第一章论证由语言构成的法律是否存在根本性的模糊?我们将给予这个问题一个否定性的回答。我们通过列举关于法律存在根本性模糊的各家观点,并试图说明这些观点是非常偏激的,而且这些偏激的观点本身可能是自我矛盾的,这其间所采取的思路主要来源于哈特关于“阴影地带”的隐喻。极端性模糊的论点不仅可能出现自我矛盾,而且也会使得人们无所适从,我们认为,应当采取哈特所提出的核心与阴影的主张。“不确定性”的概念也在第一章提出:当对于一个法律问题没有一个正确答案之时或是对于某个案件之事实的法律适用没有一个正确答案之时,我们可以说法律是“不确定”的。但是,不确定并不意味着模糊,也不意味着不确定都是由于语言的模糊性所导致。在这一部分的论述中,我们将得出以下的论点:其一、存在确定性的法律,确定性是一种常态,而模糊性则是作为某种“临界性”的情况,但是“临界性”的情况并不说明这个问题不重要,在很多的案件当中,正是因为处于“边界”才引起人们广泛的关注;其二,语境主义的论证,并不必然导致法律的模糊性,语境在很大程度上可以使我们得到一个确定性的答案,所以我们应当接受语境这样一个概念;其三,正如沙维尔所指出的那样,维特根斯坦关于遵守规则的评论并非是一个极端性不确定的论证。第二章主要关注临界案件与容忍原则,并力图澄清这两者的关系。这一部分还将集中讨论法律不确定性的来源,并力图得出这样的结论:语言的模糊性是法律不确定性的特殊而且重要的来源。在这一部分的论述中,我们将提到的各种模糊的类型,分别是不精确、“开放结构”、不完备、无共同尺度、不可测、可竞争性、“家族类似”、虚设标准、实效模糊等等。这些不同的模糊类型并非相互独立;尽管我们力图做出区分,但并不意味着一个特定的表达能够归入到某种特定的模糊状况中。这部分内容中相对重要的是对临界情况的理解,以及了解模糊性是一种“持续”的观念。第三章将说明法学家们提出的各种各样尝试解决模糊性问题的思路,并论证这些思路可能都存在问题。在法理学中,解决模糊性问题不是通过对某个具体规则的模糊性消除,而是从法律的整体入手来看待这样一个问题。针对这个问题,存在两种截然相反的思路:第一种思路是接受法律模糊性的主张,认为语言的模糊性在某些情况下导致了法律的模糊性。这个思路的主要观点是:在某些情况下,模糊性表达的规则将导致一个具体的案件没有一个正确的答案。这种模糊性的主张被称为“传统型的表述”,即法律的模糊表达同语言表达一样在临界情况下处于“非真非假”。另外一种思路是反对法律模糊性的主张,这种思路反对模糊语言在临界情况下的运用是不确定的。这类拒绝语言的模糊性导致法律的模糊性的思潮,在法律思想家中流传甚广,很多法律家勉强承认法律的模糊性或者根本不理会这样的观点,并且宣称法律有一种特殊的办法来消除模糊性。我们将以逻辑哲学的进路研究二值模糊,并引出探讨二值模糊的两位重要的法学家,分别是汉斯·凯尔森(Hans Kelsen)和罗纳德·德沃金(RonaldDworkin)。他们都认为按照法律规则本身来判决,每一司法判决都存在“真”和“假”。我们以分析哲学的立场来说明仅仅在临界案件中才存在“非真非假”的情况。这里还将讨论法律实践的二值特征,也就是在法律实践中,人们运用法律之时总会遭遇的二值的境遇。这部分的主张有三:第一,法律家们还没有及时考虑高等模糊的观念,凯尔森和德沃金的理论就是明显的例证;第二,法律理论应当接受模糊性论题,法律不能通过抛弃的方式去消除模糊性;第三,认为一个模糊陈述在临界情况下意味着“非真非假”的主张,是一种误解,应当予以抛弃。第四章将细致考证高等模糊,探讨“语义学”中的“超赋值理论”,“真的程度理论”和“明确性论”。超赋值理论认为,就任何命题的一致集合x而言,由x引出的超赋值Vx是一种真值赋值,在此情况下一切“超真”可以为真;程度论认为,一个陈述能够或多或少的真;明确性论是怀特提出的用明确性的概念来准许模糊性但否认矛盾;在这三种理论之下,包含着一个问题,即语义学理论将面临认识论上的一种矛盾:对明确分界的拒绝将导致对明确分界的赞同。我们通过对语义学理论的审视,可以得到如下观点:第一,绝对的排除容忍原则是没有出路的,这就如同在描绘理想物体的运动中忽略摩擦力以及其它的阻力,事实上我们是不可能有这样的理想状态的。第二,只要我们采取了容忍原则,那么就不存在对容忍原则的某种特定的限制。语义学家通过假定一个精确的最大的容忍步骤,来抵抗连锁推论的悖论,这样的工作是没有意义的,所以,语言的模糊问题并没有一个所谓“真”的答案。这部分还将探讨模糊性与法律解释,这主要从一个规则的适用展开,我将论述的具体问题是:当一个规则的要求是模糊的时候,我们怎么遵守一个规则?并且,将进一步论证,法律解释并非解决模糊的工具,解释本身并不能给予我们一个确定的回答,而是某种选择。文章中将以合同法的45条作为模糊规则的一个探讨范例。在这部分主要应对的问题是看待逻辑哲学家们对临界问题的努力。我们基本判断是:尽管他们的创见给予了模糊性一定的限定,但他们都没有取得成功,他们甚至没有办法维护裁量的标准。我们在此可以理解,法律的模糊性是一个难以清除的问题,并且这个问题可以使具体案件中的权利与义务处于动荡之中。这里一个必要的态度是:我们应当接受法律的模糊性,而非试图通过模糊的规则去寻求一个正确的答案,模糊的规则在临界状况下必然面临不同的答案。最后将回归我们现实的法治问题,也就是规则的模糊性是否是对法治的破坏?这部分主要的目的在于认定法律的模糊性是法治必须承受的代价。我们需要重申前文已经反复论证的主张:存在确定性的法律,确定性是一种常态,而模糊性则是作为某种“临界性”的情况,但是“临界性”的情况并不说明这个问题不重要。既然如此,即便我们会遭遇不确定的威胁,我们关于确定性的追求仍然是值得的。文章的最重要的观念就在于展现法律的模糊性问题,而非去打破法治。就这篇文章的内容而言,涉及到法律的确定性问题,但是文章不会过多牵涉到这样一个话题。尽管这个话题和我们探讨的问题有联系,但若要展开这样一个问题,需要涉及到法律的方方面面。关于法律的客观性或法律解释的客观性的研究或许对于我们现实的状况会有所裨益,但不是文章的主旨所在,我们将尽量回避对客观性观点的重述。尽管文章一直在论证法律的模糊性问题,但是这里的模糊性不会牵涉到法律的竞合等问题。由于立法权限不清、法律文件修改不同步、或法律文件清理不及时,尽管也会导致法律适用的困难,但本文不进行这个意义上的论述。并且,由于法律条文之间可能存在的对于同一事件和行为有双重或以上规定的法律竟合,也不属于本文探讨的范围。文章中虽然牵涉到关于法律实证主义和反对法律实证主义的若干主张,但是由于探讨问题的局限,我并不准备对法律实证主义和自然法理论的论争作详尽的阐释。众所周知,在法律与司法,法律与道德等问题上,法律实证主义和自然法学存在严重的冲突,但是展现这样一个冲突并非文章的主旨。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper aims to analysis fuzziness of law through method of legal positivism. First of all, we need to know fuzziness of law is a problem of jurisprudence. As we know, there are two fundamental problems in jurisprudence, and there are many methods to solve these problems in the history. Through a survey of fundamental problems in jurisprudence, we will get to know fuzziness of law is either a problem of lawmaking or a problem of application, and the problem has connection with philosophy of logic and philosophy of language.Chapter 1 will demonstrate whether the application of language in law is radically indeterminate. We will give this question a negative answer. In this section, we will particularize some claims of radically indeterminate and illustrate these claims seem to be self-contradiction. We will get to know the point that the application of fuzzy language in law is indeterminate in some cases but not in all cases by grasping a metaphor which was credited to H. L. A. Hart. We must accept Hart’s proposition that pictures linguistic indeterminacy as a penumbra.The concept of indeterminacy of law will be mentioned in Chapter 1, which means there is no single right answer to a question of law, or to a question of the application of the law to the facts of a case. We need to know indeterminacy of law is not fuzziness of law and we only focus on linguistic indeterminacy.In this chapter, we will draw some conclusions. Firstly, we must accept the claims that law always has determinacy and the application of fuzzy expressions is sometimes indeterminate. Secondly, a response to the claims that the meaning of language is indeterminate because it depends on context need to show that meaning is not radically dependent on context. We should accept the concept of context because context could make meaning clearly to some extent. Thirdly, as Frederick had said, Wittgenstein’s remarks showed that formulated rules are not radically indeterminate. We mainly pay attention to borderline cases and tolerance principle in chapter 2nd and this section will concentrate on the source of fuzziness of law. The main purposes of this chapter are to explain what is meant by ’fuzziness’ for the purpose of this paper and to provide the groundwork for an argument that fuzziness of law leads to legal indeterminate.To examine fuzziness would be to examine various sorts of language that are well adapted to such use. We will start with imprecision and discuss ’open texture’, incompleteness, family resemblances and so on. Along with express grants of discretion giving judges’ power to develop the law, it is one of the most important sources of judicial discretion. We should know the potential scope of the problem is unlimited, so we cannot give a theory of everything and think one expression as one sort of fuzziness.Chapter 3 will discuss some solution to the problem of fuzziness in law. Although legal theorists have discuss problem of fuzziness now and then, but they have never come to grips with the paradox. There are two prominent approaches in the solution of fuzziness. One approach accepts the indeterminacy and claims that fuzziness of language lead to fuzziness of law in some case, and there is no right answer to the question of whether the expression applies. This claim says that a fuzzy statement is ’neither true nor false’ in a borderline case, which is named ’the traditional formulation’.The other approach is to refuse fuzziness and denies that fuzziness of language lead to fuzziness of law in borderline case. This approach has been popular with some legal theorists. They concede linguistic indeterminacy, but claim that law has special resources which could eliminate such fuzziness.We will also discuss bivalence fuzziness and try to understand two important legal theorists who had researched bivalence of law—Hans Kelsen and Ronald Dworkin. We can conclude that the feature of fuzzy language that is most difficult for them accommodate is higher order fuzziness, a legal theory should accept the fuzziness claim, and the claim that a fuzzy statement is ’neither true nor false’ in a borderline case is misconceived and should be abandoned.Chapter 4 examines higher order fuzziness from semanticist solutions which include supervaluation theory, degrees of truth and definiteness. Sepervaluation theory treats supertruth as truth, and superfalsity as falsity. It treats fuzzy statements in borderline cases as neither true nor false. Degrees of truth supports that a statements can be more or less true. Definiteness is proposed by Crispin Wright to allow indeterminacy and defuse paradox. Through our survey, we can say semanticist will face a form of paradox: the denial of sharp boundaries leads to the assertion of sharp boundaries.The point of this discussion is not to give a survey of proposed to the paradox, but brings into focus the importance of higher order fuzziness. This section also discusses fuzziness of law and legal interpretation, and try to get to know that how to obey a fuzzy rule. We will get to know that the methods of legal interpretation could not eliminate fuzziness of law. This discussion needs an example and we use article 45th in contract law of P.R.C as a paradigm.This section points out the problems for the logic philosophers who want to solve the borderline questions. We draw conclusions that although they had some methods to solve the problem, but they did not succeed. Fuzziness of law is an insurmountable problem. We should accept the fuzziness of law rather than try to look for a correct answer, and a fuzzy rule by all means faces different answers under the borderline condition.Finally, we will return to rule of law in our reality, and ask whether fuzziness of law is a breakage to rule of law. This part mainly purposes lying in fuzziness of law is necessary to the rule of law. We need to reiterate preceding sections had already shown which determinate rule is normal and linguistic indeterminacy is a penumbra, but we could not think a penumbra is a trivial. Since it is so, even if we will suffer threat of indeterminacy threat, our pursuing of determinacy is still worthy of. The most important idea of this paper lies in the Fuzziness of law rather than break the rule of law.Involved in problem objectivity of law, this paper will be not excessive to concern to this topic. Though this topic has connection with our problem, but it is not the subject of the paper. As we know, the research of the objectivity of the law and the legal interpretative objectivity probably will benefit for us, but we will as far as possible avoid rewording standpoints of objectivity. The paper can not solve the problems such as coincidence of law article, ambiguity of the power of lawmaking, lateness of sorting out legal document and so on.Although the paper concerns to some assertions between legal positivists and anti-positivists, we will not prepare to discuss the disputes between legal positivism and natural law. As we know, on the problems such as law and justice, law and morality etc, on the problems such as the law and the judicatory, law and morals etc., legal positivists and natural law theorist have different opinions, but the subject of paper is not to display these conflicts.更多还原