论政府证券监管权

【作者】 马洪雨；

【导师】 吴越；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 我国证券市场经过十余年的发展,取得了举世瞩目的成就。但是,仍然存在诸多问题,尤其集中在政府监管领域,核心问题是证监会对违法行为的查处效率低下,履行职权的不规范,侵害了被监管主体的合法权益。政府证券监管权究竟应该怎样运行,才能实现证券监管的目标,目前尚缺乏有力的理论支撑和系统研究。本选题以政府证券监管权作为研究对象,以政府证券监管权的概念作为研究的逻辑起点,指出政府证券监管权是能够代表国家履行证券监管职能的机构,为了既定的监管目标,依法律授权拥有的对证券市场各类主体及其行为进行监督和管理,制定相应的法规和政策并监督其执行,对违反者给予处罚的权力。政府证券监管权将自律监管权排除在外,属于狭义的证券监管权。这一概念可以将性质上不属于行政机构,但能够代表国家履行证券监管职能的各国不同类型的机构纳入政府证券监管权的研究范围,从而使概念具有普遍适用性。之后,通过历史分析和比较分析的方法,对比发达国家和新兴市场国家政府证券监管权的历史沿革,归纳出各国政府证券监管权的共性,即政府证券监管权作为一种国家权力,何时介入证券市场,介入的程度怎样由各国的政治、经济背景影响下的政府职能定位决定,也决定了设立单一或者多个监管机构。政府证券监管权必须与自律监管权配合,对新兴市场国家而言,还要界清不同政府证券监管机构之间的权力边界,以及政府证券监管机构内部的权力界限,以提高监管的效率;而为了防止政府证券监管权不断扩张带来的危害,必须制定公开、灵活、注重相对人保护的权力行使程序,同时建立起多层次的监督机制保证权力的规范行使。因此,实践中,完善各国政府证券监管最核心的目标应该是促进政府证券监管权的高效和规范行使,以保护投资者的利益,促进证券市场的发展。这一共性为我国政府证券监管权的完善提供了有益借鉴。共性的提出,不仅被各国的历史实践所证明,而且还得到“强化市场型”政府理论、“瘦身国家”理论和宪政理论的有力支撑。“强化市场型”政府理论从制度经济学的角度为发展中国家政府对于证券市场的形成和发展采取强制性制度安排的正当性提供了强有力的理论支持,并指出政府证券监管权的行使必须要尊重市场规律,在宪法和法律约束下行使。“瘦身国家”理论从公共行政学的角度指出政府证券监管机构与自律监管机构、其他政府监管机构之间合理配置权力的必要性。宪政理论从法学的角度论证了政府证券监管权既要受到宪法和法律的约束,也要保障权力的高效行使。三种理论分属不同学科,研究视角各异,但其共同目标都是探讨政府权力应该如何配置和行使,才能更为规范和高效,为政府证券监管权的制度设计提供了理论指导。在理论分析的基础上,本文的最终落脚点在于从现行法律规定的层面,结合我国政府监管的制度性背景,通过规范分析和实证分析的方法,针对我国政府证券监管权存在的问题,提出具体的法律制度设计。我国政府证券监管权配置不合理和运行不规范是目前存在的核心问题,导致了权力行使的低效。这是各国,尤其是新兴市场国家政府监管中普遍存在的问题。配置不合理表现为政府证券监管权在三个层级主体间的重叠配置——政府监管主体与自律监管主体,不同政府监管主体之间和政府监管主体内部缺乏清晰的权力界限;运行不规范则因为权力行使程序的不完备和缺乏有效的权力运行保障机制。导致上述问题的表层原因在于相关法律规定的不完善,深层原因在于我国政府证券监管权面临的制度背景,本文称之为制度性因素,这些因素决定了我国政府证券监管权配置和运行的现状,进而从根本上导致权力运行的低效。因此,仅靠法律研究无法彻底改变这一现状。法律研究能够做到的是,通过梳理现行法规,对典型案例进行类型化整理和数据分析,查找现行权力配置、权力运行程序和权力运行保障体系存在的问题,提出具体完善建议,在前述三种理论的指导下,以“促进我国政府证券监管权高效行使和规范行使”为目标,最终提出如下法律制度设计:第一,配置层面上权力高效运行之法律制度设计。为了实现证监会权力的高效行使,必须实现三个层级主体——证监会与自律监管机构、证监会与其他政府部门,以及证监会与其派出机构之间权力的合理配置。从未来的发展趋势上,证监会应该从宏观的层面上,作为法律和政策的支持者,逐渐还权于市场,通过对自律组织的监管实现对证券市场的监管,核心职能为对违法行为的查处,而自律组织则履行基础性的日常监管职能;对其他政府监管机构的权力进行整合,逐渐实现证监会集中统一的监管;证监会授权其派出机构——证监局与其“一线政府监管机构”地位匹配的监管权。针对目前的监管现实,证监会可以考虑在自律监管优先原则、政府宏观监管原则和监管效率原则的指导下,以部门规章的形式明确规定其与自律监管机构的监管权,增加证监会与自律机构间协调机制的规定,证券交易所在信息披露、上市公司治理方面应该发挥更为重要的作用,证券业协会重点在纠纷解决机制、证券公司监管、市场创新和场外市场监管方面有所突破;针对“多头监管”的局面,考虑在不同政府证券监管机构中引入监管功能的竞争机制,促进不同监管机构的互动,建立各部门长效合作机制是问题解决的关键;授权证监局必要的处罚权,增加相应的监管措施,并明确证监局工作人员的免责机制,促进其监管权的高效行使。第二,程序视角下权力规范运行之法律制度设计。从现有法律规定层面上,证监会监管程序公开性差、灵活性不足、缺乏公众参与和对相对人利益的关注:从价值取向的层面上,证监会的监管程序没有实现保护投资者利益与促进监管效率这一核心价值理念之间的平衡。为了保障证监会权力的规范行使,必须根据现代监管理念,在独立性原则、透明度和公众参与原则、效率原则、救济原则的指导下设计未来的监管程序。针对目前证监会监管程序规则本身的不足,应该在依法监管原则、基本权利保护原则、比例原则和信赖保护原则的指导下,保障监管行为的目的与手段相适应,不得违法撤销监管行为,尤其是授权性监管行为,保护被监管主体的利益,在此基础上,吸收美国和英国的有益经验,提出完善证监会规章制定程序、核准审批程序和调查处罚程序的具体建议。第三,保障机制维度下权力规范运行之法律制度设计。针对证监会监管体系内部的保障机制而言,必须促进证监会内部治理结构的完善,这是外部保障机制发挥作用的基础。同时,需要进一步纠正证监会行政复议的逻辑性错误,扩大对复议申请人范围的解释,取消国务院终极裁决的规定,充分发挥复议机制的保障作用。针对证监会监管体系外部的保障机制,需要建立人大对证监会的长效监督机制,防止证监会因事业单位的性质游离于人大监督之外,同时合理界定人大监督权与政府证券监管权的界限。就司法层面的保障机制而言,应该结合我国国情并借鉴国外的有益经验完善司法审查制度,并改变从法律规定中渗透出来的对司法审查的态度,在尊重证监会专业性判断的同时,不能抹杀法院监督的功能。为了应对媒体的利益冲突,应该取消证监会信息指定披露制度,在媒体之间引入高度的竞争,明确媒体新闻特许报道权与证监会名誉权之间的界限。总之,通过构建多层次、高效的保障体系约束证监会依法规范行使权力。政府证券监管权的高效运行是核心的目标,规范运行是高效运行的前提和保障。权力配置、权力运行程序和权力运行保障机制的研究共同围绕高效与规范的目标进行。本文的具体内容分为六章:第一章“政府证券监管权的界定”分为三节,主要目的在于通过廓清政府证券监管权概念的内涵和外延,明确本文的研究主题和范围,为后续研究提供清晰的逻辑前提。第一节对政府证券监管权的含义和特征进行界定。第二节探讨了政府证券监管权的内容和类型,指出政府证券监管权的内容包括法规制定权、核准审批权、日常监督管理权、调查处罚权、采取强制措施的权力等。其中法规制定权、核准审批权和调查处罚权是政府证券监管权的核心。并依据不同的标准,对政府证券监管权进行了类型划分。前两节对政府证券监管权内涵论述的基础上,第三节通过对与政府证券监管权邻近概念的比较,明确了政府证券监管权的外延——总体而言,政府证券监管权是金融监管权的一部分,是对微观证券市场监管的权力,与宏观调控权在干预目标、作用对象和运作机制方面具有重大的区别。第二章“政府证券监管权的历史沿革”分为两节,鉴于发达国家与新兴市场国家证券市场不同的发展轨迹和政府监管职能的差异,需要分别进行考察,第一节选取了美国、英国和德国作为研究范例,第二节对比韩国、印度、俄罗斯和我国政府证券监管权的历史,发现各国政府证券监管权的共性和差异,为我国政府证券监管权的制度设计提供了有益的启示。第三章“政府证券监管权制度设计的理论基础”分为五节,前三节分别介绍了三种不同的理论——“强化市场型”政府理论、“瘦身国家”理论和宪政理论,从不同学科的视角验证了第二章提出的政府证券监管权共性问题的合理性与正确性,并为政府证券监管权的制度设计提供了理论依据。第四节明确了三种理论之间互相印证、互为补充的关系,第五节综合运用三种理论,对我国政府证券监管权如何高效和规范行使提出了制度设计的思路,以统领后三章的论述。对政府证券监管权进行理论研究基础上,第四章、第五章和第六章重点从实践的层面对政府证券监管权进行研究。这三章主要运用规范分析和实证分析的方法,借鉴国外的有益经验,对我国政府证券监管权的设计思路进行了具体实施。总体而言,第四章从实体权力配置的角度论证了如何实现证监会监管权的高效运行,第五章从监管程序的层面,第六章从权力运行保障体系构建的视角共同探讨如何实现证监会监管权的规范运行。我国政府证券监管面临的制度背景是导致政府证券监管权运行中核心问题产生的根本原因,也是实施制度设计思路的基础,并为具体制度设计提供了方向性目标。因此,在进行具体规定的分析前,对影响政府证券监管权配置和运行的制度性因素进行探讨,将问题置于更为宏观的制度背景中,以期为我国证监会权力的高效和规范运行提出更具时代性和可操作性的制度设计。第四章“政府证券监管权高效运行之配置图景”分为五节,第一节对影响我国政府证券监管权配置的制度性因素进行分析,指出我国政府职能的定位是影响证监会与自律机构间权力配置状况的最根本原因,部门权力利益化是导致政府证券监管权分散于不同政府部门,权力重叠与冲突的决定性因素,这些因素是导致我国证监会监管权效率低下的最根本原因,同时决定了政府主导的监管状况短期内无法改变,政府监管主体多元化的局面也将持续相当长的时间。在这种背景下,借鉴世界各国政府证券监管权的共性,并在三种理论的指导下,提出权力配置的未来发展趋势。后四节通过对现行法规的整理和实际数据的实证分析,对三个层级主体——证监会与证券交易所、证券业协会、证监会与其他政府证券监管机构、证监会内部机构间权力配置的现状和问题进行了分析,指出目前法律规定不完善引发的监管主体间权力配置的高度重叠和冲突是导致证监会权力运行效率低下的重要原因之一,借鉴国外经验,提出了配置层面上权力高效运行之法律制度设计。第五章“政府证券监管权规范运行之程序映像”分为五节,第一节提出了我国政府证券监管权运行的指导原则及其具体应用,第二节至第四节分别探讨了证监会规章制定权、核准审批权和调查处罚权的行使程序,通过典型案例的类型化分析指出目前存在的问题——证监会的监管程序存在公开性差,灵活性不足、缺乏公众参与,对相对人,尤其是利害关系人的权利保护不力等缺陷,阻碍了公民合法权益的保护,降低了监管权行使的规范性和高效性,并在参考国外相关规定的基础上,提出完善建议。第五节从监管程序价值取向的视角对证监会监管程序的运行进行了整体的评价,描述了影响证监会监管程序运行效果的制度性因素,并根据监管程序理论和实践的发展趋势,提出证监会监管程序未来设计的原则。最后提出了程序视角下权力规范运行之法律制度设计。第六章“政府证券监管权规范运行之保障机制”分为四节,第一节研究了监管体系内部的保障机制,指出由于证监会行政复议制度存在逻辑性错误,即“自己充当自己案件的法官”,证监会缺乏有效的内部治理结构,无法实现内部风险的控制,导致监管体系内部的保障机制无法正常运作,必须有针对性地进行制度完善。后面四节研究了证监会监管体系外部的保障机制,其中第二节对立法层面保障机制的研究指出人大监督是所有保障机制中最薄弱的环节,表面原因在于证监会事业单位的性质使其游离于人大监督之外,根本原因在于人大监督体制本身的不足。同时指出,人大监督未来更加完善后必然要合理界定人大监督权与政府证券监管权之间的界限。第三节司法保障机制指出我国现有行政诉讼法律规定的不完善是造成司法审查作用无法正常发挥的客观原因,而法院对证监会特殊地位和作用的考量是司法审查不足的隐性原因。第四节就媒体监督而言,传媒产业化的趋势和证监会指定信息披露媒体的做法加剧了媒体的利益冲突,使媒体对证监会的监督作用大打折扣,为了促进媒体有效监督,还应该明确媒体新闻特许报道权与证监会名誉权之间的界限。最后提出了保障机制维度下权力规范运行之法律制度设计。本选题通过对政府证券监管权的系统研究,期望能为后续的相关研究提供相对完整的理论分析框架,而最终的目标在于从法律层面上对如何实现我国政府证券监管权的高效运行和规范运行提供制度设计,为我国政府监管机构提供参考和指导。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chinese securities market has achieved remarkable achievement after 10 years’ development in spite of the problems, such as the inefficiency to punish the wrongful acts by China Securities Regulatory Commission in the fields of government regulation. It is in need of theoretical support and systematic research on how the government carrying out its regulation to achieve the corresponding target.This thesis focuses on the government regulatory power on securities market, starting logically from the concept of government regulatory power on securities market, pointing out that the definition of government regulatory power in securities market refers to the power for certain government agencies on behalf of the state to supervise and govern all bodies and their acts in this market, to make corresponding regulations and policies and execute them, as well as the power to punish illegal acts in the process of fulfilling the function of regulation in security market for the purpose of meeting certain established goals. Government regulatory power is carried out in a narrow sense, which excludes self-discipline. This concept puts different agencies in every country performing state security regulatory function within the research fields on government regulatory power, which makes it more widely applied.Then, the author compares the evolution of government regulatory power in developed countries and newly-developing market countries via historical analysis and comparison analysis approaches, summarizes the common nature of government regulatory power in security market. When and how government regulatory power in securities market intervenes, and what is the degree of intervention is determined by government function orientation influenced by political and economic contexts in each country, which also determines to establish single or more regulatory agencies. Government regulation has to be combined with self-discipline. For newly developing market countries, the power limit between different government regulatory agencies and the different parts in one regulatory agency in the market should be made clear to achieve the efficiency. To prevent the harm caused by the extension of government regulatory power in securities market, public, flexible procedure putting more attention on the protection of the supervised should be made, as well as multi-level supervision system to guarantee the application of this power. Therefore, in practice, the core target to improve government security regulatory power is to help the application in a normative way efficiently to protect the investors and foster the development of the security market. The improvement of Chinese government regulatory power in securities market should learn from this.The common nature is not only proved by the practice in each country, but also supported by theories such as "Enhancing the market-type" government theory, "Lean state" theory and constitutional government. "Enhancing the market-type" government provides theoretical support for developing countries carrying out compelling systematic arrangement in forming and developing securities market from the institutional economics perspective, and pointing that this power should be carried out under the constitution and laws and market laws. "Lean state" theory points out the necessity to allocate powers among government security regulatory agency, self-disciplined agency and other government regulatory agency from the perspective of public administration. Constitution government theory proves that the government security regulatory power should be performed efficiently under the control of constitution and laws from judicial perspective. These three theories belongs to different disciplines with different perspectives, but their common purpose is to discuss how to carry allocate and perform government power in a efficient and normative way in the aim of providing theoretical guide for government security regulatory power design. These three theories propose the thought on institutional design to carry out government regulatory power in securities market effectively and normatively.Based on the theoretical analysis, the thesis sets its foot on proposing specific institutional design from the level of current laws and regulations targeting the problems in Chinese government regulatory power in securities market, via normative and empirical analysis approaches within Chinese government regulatory institutional context. The core issue in this aspect lies that the power allocation is not reasonable and its function is not normative, which lead to the low efficiency in execution. We can find from the practice in each country, this a common issue in each country especially in newly developing market countries. The unreasonable allocation is manifested by the overlapping of three levels supervision bodies, that is, there’s no clear power distinction between government regulatory body and self-disciplined body, between different government regulatory agencies, between inner parts of the same agency. That the performing of the regulatory power is not normative is caused by the lack procedure on power execution. The superficial reason to cause the above problems lies that the corresponding laws and regulations need to be improved, but the deep-rooted reason lies in the institutional context faced by Chinese government security regulatory power, which is called institutional factors here. These factors determines the current conditions on Chinese government regulatory power, thus causes the low efficiency in power performing. Therefore, this condition can not be changed in a through way via legal research only. Our research can only propose specific improving advices via reviewing current laws and regulations, analyzing typical cases, finding problems in power allocation, power performing procedure, and power performing safeguard systems. Under the guide of the above three theories, the thesis propose the following legal institutional design in the aim of "improving the performance of Chinese government security regulatory power in a more efficient and normative way".First is the legal institutional design on power performing in a more efficient way from the level of power allocation. To achieve this, power should be allocated reasonably in three levels, between securities regulatory commission and the self-disciplined agencies, between securities regulatory commission and other government agencies, between different parts in securities regulatory commission. From the future tendency, securities regulatory commission should perform its core function from a macro level, punish the illegal acts, gradually return the power back to the market, and let the self-disciplined body supervise the routine supervision. The power in other government regulatory agencies should be collected and rearranged to achieve the unified regulation by securities regulatory commission. The sending agencies, security regulatory bureaus should be endowed corresponding supervision power. To meet the regulatory reality, under the principles of putting self-discipline in priority, government regulation in a macro-way and regulation efficiency securities regulatory commission may consider stipulating the regulatory power of security regulatory bureau and other corresponding powers in the form of regulation.Second is the legal institutional design for the normative performance of regulatory power from the procedural perspective. From the legal stipulation level, the procedure applied by securities regulatory commission lacks publicity, flexibility, public participation and concerns on the supervised. From the value orientation level, the procedure applied by securities regulatory commission can not help to reach balance between the protection of the investors and the promotion of supervision efficiency. To guarantee the normative performance of the regulatory power by securities regulatory commission, the regulatory procedure has to be design in accordance with modern regulation concepts under the principles of independence, transparency and public participation, efficiency, and remedy. To deal with the deficiencies in the procedure itself, we should learn from the helpful experience from US and Britain. The thesis also proposes the specific advices on improving the corresponding procedures.The third is the legal institutional design to ensure the normative performance of regulatory power under protecting mechanism. Concerning the protecting mechanism in the securities regulatory commission, first, the improvement of the inner regulatory structure should be fostered, which is the base for the exterior mechanism to be in order. Second, the logical mistakes of the securities regulatory commission on administrative review should be corrected, the explanation on the fields of the appliers on administrative review should be extended, the terminal verdict by the state council should be eliminated. Concerning the exterior protecting mechanism, a long term supervision mechanism from the people’s congress is to be established with a reasonable definition on the border between the supervision from the congress and the government security regulation. As far as the protecting mechanism from the judicial level, the supervision from the court can not be neglected. In a word, multi-level and effective protecting mechanisms are to be established to limit the supervision from the securities regulatory commission in a normative way.The core target for government regulation is its effective performance with normative performance as its premise. Power allocation, power performance procedure and power performance protecting mechanism are to be carried out around the target of effective and normative performance. The thesis consists of six chapters specifically.ChapterⅠis the "definition on government regulatory power on securities market". It plays a role of defining the outer part and inner implications of government regulatory power on securities market, and providing logical premise for the following research. This chapter consists of 3 sections, Government regulatory power on security market refers to the power endowed to organizations on behalf of the state performing the function of supervising the security market for certain targets, which includes the power to supervise and control all the entities in this market, the power to make relative laws and institutions as well as the power to carry out them. In a narrower way, government supervision power on security market excludes self-discipline. This concept makes non-governmental organizations on behalf of government enter the fields of research. There are many aspects for government supervision power on securities market, of which, the power to make laws and institutions, the power to review before a stock become one part in the market, and the power to investigate unlawful acts and punish them are the core . With the help of the first two sections, the third section makes the outer sides of government regulatory power on securities market clear after the comparison with the neighboring concepts. In whole, government regulatory power on security market is part of financial regulatory power.ChapterⅡis "the evolution of government regulatory power on securities market". The first section selects developed countries as examples, while the second section selects some developing countries as examples. Then this chapter proposes the common nature for a government supervision power on securities market, which is also a problem to be settled. First, it is a problem to be settled to define reasonable power limitations for organization with government regulatory power on securities market and organizations of self-discipline, as well as the bound between other government regulatory organ and inner governmental regulatory organ. For newly marketing countries, before we go to the above problem, we have to solve the issue on how to make clear the legal position on self-discipline organization and helping these organizations functioning well. Second, it is many countries common sense to strengthen the regulion on securities market, to perform the regulation under legal procedure and to protect the legal rights of the supervisedChapterⅢis "the theoretical basis for the institutional design on government regulatory power in securities market". This chapter introduces three different theories, "Enhancing the market-type" government theory, "Lean state" theory and constitutional government theory, proving the rightness and reasonability for government regulatory power on securities market proposed in ChapterⅡ, which provides theoretical foundation for institutional design on government regulatory power on securities market. Section four applies the above three theories to propose the thought on how the government regulation in security market could perform effectively and normatively.Under the basis of theoretical research on government regulatory power on securities market, ChapterⅣ,Ⅴ,Ⅵcarries out it study on government regulatory power on securities market from the empirical level via analysis on regulation and experience. ChapterⅣreasons how to perform regulatory power on securities market for the regulatory commission efficiently from the view of allocating the specific power, with Chapter V from the regulation procedure and Chapter VI from the view of constructing the safeguard to help the regulatory power under control. For factors out of law influencing the allocation and performing of regulatory power on securities market, they are discussed under more macro institutional context to provide more practical advices.ChapterⅣis "the prospect of the allocation on government regulatory power on securities market". There are five sections here. In the first section, the author proposes the future trend on power allocation on the basis of analyzing the factors out of law influencing the allocation on government regulatory power on securities market. The following sections propose corresponding advices via data analysis. The position on Chinese government function is the core reason to influence the power allocation between regulatory commission on securities market and self discipline organization. The department interests’ competition makes government regulatory power on securities market dispersed in different government departments, which are the institutional context to allocate power faced by Chinese regulatory commission on security market. Therefore in a long time this condition will not be changed. To deal with the regulation reality, the regulatory commission on security market may play greater role in many fields with the direction of the disciplines of self-discipline first and governmental regulation macroscopically, while the security association may put emphasis on disputes solving, stock company supervision, and market innovation and so on. To solve the state of "too many supervisors", it may be considered to introduce competing mechanism, helping the mutual activities among different regulatory entities. Necessary power to punish wrongful acts is in great need for security market regulatory bodies.ChapterⅤis "the prospect of the procedure on the performance of government regulatory power in securities market". This chapter consists of five sections. First section proposed the principle for Chinese government to perform regulatory power on security market. The author discussed the performing procedures in the following sections, and proposes improving advices and the construction of performing procedure for the regulatory commission on security market. The regulatory procedure should find balance between the supervision body and the bodies being supervised. In whole, there are many problems for the performing procedure carried out by regulatory commission on security market. To solve these problems, regulatory commission on security market should learn from good examples, follow established principles, and performs its power efficiently under due procedure. The legal institutional design under the procedural perspective on the normative performance of the regulation is to be proposed in this chapter. ChapterⅥis "the protecting mechanisms on the normative performance of government regulatory power in securities market". Section I focuses on the inner supervision in securities regulatory commission, pointing its logical mistake, that is, "to be his own judge". The following four sections focus on the protecting exterior mechanisms of the supervision system. It is pointed in this part the superficial reason for the regulatory commission evading the supervision from the people’s congress is caused by the nature of the commission, while the ultimate reason lies in the deficiency in the supervision system from the people’s congress. This part also points out that the supervision from the people’s congress should reasonably define the border between supervision from the people’s congress and government regulation in securities market. The third section focuses on the judicial protecting mechanism, which points out that the deficiency in administrative lawsuit and the special consideration on the special position and role of the securities regulatory commission are the reasons for the judicial supervision not performing well. Section four focuses on media supervision. Conflicts come from the industrialization of media and information disclosure requirement from the securities regulatory commission makes the supervision from the media less effective. To foster the effective supervision from the media, the border between the media’s reporting rights and the honor rights of the security regulatory power is to be made clear. In the end, the thesis proposes legal institutions design on the normative performance of government regulatory power in securities market from the protecting mechanism dimension.This thesis hopes to provide theoretical analysis scheme on the coming corresponding research, the ultimate aim of this thesis is how to realize the effective and normative performance of Chinese government security regulatory power to provide reference and guide for Chinese government regulatory agencies.更多还原