权利能力研究

【作者】 周清林；

【导师】 梁慧星； 李开国；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 一、研究方法权利能力是整个民法的基础。对它的深度透视将决定着民法典的精神气质。在德文里,权利能力这个词是“Rechtsfaeigkeit”。该词由“Recht”和“Faeigkeit”两部分组成。在中文的理解里,这个词又可被译为“权利义务能力”、“法律人格”、“权利主体”。看来,不但“Recht”有三种不同的理解,而且“Faeigkeit”也可分解为三个意思。显然,“权利”、“权利义务”以及“能力”、“人格”与“主体”的等同性,在我们的文化传统上并不存在,我们是否能够接纳这些舶来品?从“Rechtsfaeigkeit”一词的构词法而言,反映的应当是“Recht”和“Faeigkeit”之间的关系,并且从构形上而言“Recht”仅仅是修饰“Faeigkeit”的词汇而已,“Faeigkeit”理当是根基。我们在探讨时,主要集中于“Recht”一词的理解,很少触及到后面的“Faeigkeit”,几乎没有从“Recht”和“Faeigkeit”的关系角度进行阐释。本文以权利能力为题,旨在寻求西方文化根基上对法律的真正理解,尤其是对“私法”的了解。同时,最大限度地透过自清末以来一些关键法学术语的运用历史,尽力地在术语背后进行一个深层对话。基于此,本文主要是在哲学的维度上进行,夹杂了历史的和比较的研究方法。二、主要理论创新本文的主要理论创新表现在如下方面:第一,切入点的创新。从法律关系、生活关系与主体的关系出发,从而追溯出法学真正的基础是主体,这是本文在切入点上的创新;第二,哲学溯源上的创新。在文章的第二部分,本文探究了西方文化根基上的源流,进而导出了作为世界基础的主体其实就是一种超越性的主动性能力,从而使得主体、人格、能力这三个概念获得了同一的含义;第三,权利能力伦理意义的首次分析。第三章以探讨法律的起点开始,首次讨论了人和人格的区分以及探究出了人格作为法律基础的理论依据,并且认为权利能力作为法律人格而言一开始是永恒而自我相关,因而法律在对待人格上表现为伦理诫命;第四,在自然人权利能力的探讨里,首先对自然人的中西源流进行了分析,首次完整地分析了从霍布斯到黑格尔的自然法向理性法的转变史,进而翔实地将自然人观念从清末一直追溯到如今,在两相比较的基础上指出了应当把自然人理解为自然人格,而不是学界目前相反的倾向:将自然人格理解为“人的自然”。然后,第一次讨论了权利能力“开始”的意义,认定现在所谓的权利能力开始实际上只是“权利享有”的开始,是积极人格的开始,而不是支撑起人格伦理性的消极人格的开始。在充分论证的基础上,本文提出了应当将“开始”区分为两个方面:积极人格开始于出生;而消极人格开始于受精卵。在探讨权利能力的终止上,本文首次对“死亡”的意义及其法律意义进行了深入的分析,提出了在面对消极人格时,应当重新改造法律关系,以非对应型的法律关系理论去尊重这些无法作用于世界的消极人格;第五,从契约论传统入手讨论团体理论,是本文在这部分的创新点。立基于卢梭的社会契约论,本文从私法与公法二分的视角重新探讨了拟制说与实在说,认为拟制论在私法的范围内为维护伦理人格而否认了团体的人格实体性,而实在说则是在公法的角度以攀附国家为目的从而确认团体具有伦理人格,在这些基础上评价了这两种学说,进而将现今的“组织体说”改造为“技术人格实在理论”。根据“技术人格实在理论”,本文主张,我国的法人理论不应当是“组织体理论”,而是纯粹的拟制论,并因此提出以“技术人格实在理论”来构建法人与非法人制度。第六,从消极人格与积极人格二分法的视角重新评价了《德国民法典》的权利能力理论,指出德国民法典之所以缺少一般人格权理论,是因为在法典形式理性下只以积极人格的法律关系作为构架之故。同时追入我们对权利能力的理解史,本文最后认为,我们对权利能力始终是接而不受的。三、内容简介本文除引言外,由七部分构成。其主要脉络是以主体哲学的精神贯彻权利能力研究的始终。从制度构架上作为民法基础的法律关系始,追出主体就是民法的真正本原;以此为基础从哲学上探讨了主体就是一种能力;进而对这种法律能力的伦理意义进行了刨根;依据这种伦理意义梳理了西方和中国对自然人的理解;从根源上探讨了权利能力真正的开始与终止问题;立基于主体精神重新分析了法人理论的根源;最后在这种主体精神的指引下评价了《德国民法典》和我国语境下的权利能力理论。第一章首次探讨了法律关系与生活关系的关系。一般认为,法律关系的基础就是生活关系,是对生活关系的撷取。生活关系是什么,至少在民法学界几乎未被触及。由此,法律关系对我们而言仍然处于不明状态。本文立基于胡塞尔现象学,借鉴了他对生活世界的追问,通过生活世界追溯出了支撑起生活世界的本原——主体。亦即,真正地支撑起法律关系结构的是主体。通过对马克思经典理论——经济基础决定上层建筑的分析,认定马克思哲学实际上也是主张主体精神的。因此,这种精神与马克思主义有内在的相连性,是在西方骨子里起作用的东西。第二章从哲学上追溯了主体在西方文化根源深处的内涵。通过从古希腊一直到现代的探寻,本文认为,主体作为世界的基础,从古希腊与希伯来文明中超越性的实体观念发展而来。近代以来,彼岸的超越性观念移驾于“我思”后,“我思”就成了世界的主体。但“我思”不是一个静止的观念,而是一个能动的思维活动,是自我意识本身。这个能自我意识的“我思”,自身具有超越自身而指向客体的能力,因此,作为世界基础的“我思”,其实只不过是一种“能力”,它不可能超验性地存在,只是作为一种纯粹主动的立法能力存在而已。简短地说,主体就是一种绝对主动性的超出自身进行规范的能力。这种能力就是人格。第三章探讨了作为民法主体的权利能力。通过对法律开端的清理,认为不是人的生物意义,而是人的人格意义才是法律真正的起点。这个起点展现出来的是伦理意蕴。每一个个人之所以有人格,不在于我们能从这个生物事实上看到什么或者体验到什么,因为作为人格而言它只不过是一个纯粹消极性的关系,即抽象掉一切内容而成为单纯自我意识的纯粹意志。显然,作为生物事实意义上的人而言,我们不但要意识到自己有这种抽象的能力,而且也要尊重别人具有这种能力。由于没有任何内容,亦即实践还没有展开,还不可能进行任何表现,所以此时只存在一种伦理情感上的诫命。人格作为自由意志的单个意志,它仅仅自我相关。亦即,此时的人格只是一个没有内容的空洞思维本身,因而只是纯形式的一个单个意志。所以,法的命令就是“成为一个人(格),并尊敬他人为人格”。这就是法律人格(权利能力)全部的伦理意蕴。第四章探讨了自然人格。首先认定自然人与罗马法上的市民有很大区分,不能照搬罗马法的模式来理解经过自然法洗礼的自然人。要真正地理解自然人格概念,唯有从自然状况的预设开始才可能。经过自然状况到市民社会的转换,我们现在谈论的自然人,已经不是自然状况下的自然人,也不是罗马法上的市民,而是经过自然法向理性法转换的国家状况下处于市民社会中的市民。另外,本文在考察了自清末以来的自然人观念史后认为,自然人在中国的发展大致经历了三个阶段:从清末到民国时期,是在沿用翻译过来的术语上使用。对自然人的理解,停留在天赋人权这些类似政治口号的表层上。因而并未深入深层,但以公私分立为前提承认自然人是私法中的主体;新中国建国后,由于受到前苏联的影响,我们否认公私法之别,因而作为私主体的自然人被公民取代;第三次民法典起草中,自然人与公民的关系重新被讨论,作为结论的《民法通则》实际上是以公民为准来衡量自然人。1999年的《合同法》并没有在根本上更正观念,只不过是从适用范围这个外延上进行了修正;在学界里,无论是在清末还是在新中国建国后,自然人之本性都是奠基在人的身体上,即人的自然属性上。最终认为,自然人的自然,并不是人作为生物所具有的本能性的自然属性,而是自然在向人生成时人已经能脱离自然规律的控制能自由决定的人格性。第五章探讨了权利能力的开始与终止。本文首次探讨了“开始”的意义,认定“开始”就是人格与躯体的关系。进而通过人格的同化精神,物质性的躯体也就变成了身体,从而使得人格本身具有了神圣性。神圣的人格首先是消极的,即仅仅自我相关。这种自我关系的人格,就是单一意志、个体性。因此在实践中,个体何时成形是认定人格的标志。本文认为,从受孕时起,作为人格的个体就已经成形。但是,在出生之前,这种个体只具有消极的人格,即不能享有任何权利和承担任何义务,只是要求对它进行一个人格的尊重。如今我们所理解的开始,其实并不是权利能力这个人格的真正开始,而只是积极人格的开始,即权利享有的开始。基于此,讨论了对真正的未出生者的保护问题。在对权利能力终止的探讨上,本文也认为,死亡终止的不是人格。人格是永恒的,终止的只是积极人格,即享有权利和承担义务的能力。这就需要我们单方面地去理解法律关系,即一种尊重人格的义务关系。由此,本文讨论了真正的对死者人格的保护。第六章论述了法人的权利能力。立足于主体哲学的精神,从卢梭的社会契约论传统出发,透过自然人格的伦理意义探讨了团体成为人格的根基。首先认定,《法国民法典》之所以否认法人的存在,完全是基于自由主义的主体精神。萨维尼实际上沿袭了这个传统,但又出于适用的需要承认了确实存在于现实中的团体,不过这种团体只具有技术人格。基尔克从公法角度出发,从攀附国家伦理人格实在的视角,认定团体具有伦理人格。这些探讨都已经超出了法律实证主义的范围,都奠基在政治哲学观念上。本文改造了“组织体”理论,认为从契约论传统出发,这个理论应当是“技术人格实在”。基于此,认为我国《民法通则》看上去是技术人格实在,实际上截然不同,而是纯粹的拟制论。在这个基础上,提出了改造我国团体理论的建议。第七章是结局。本章对权利能力概念进行了反思。反思整体上分为两部分。第一部分是对《德国民法典》权利能力理念和制度的反思。本文认为,并不是学者们认为的由于权利能力这个概念的使用而使人格丧失了伦理意义从而难以设定出一般人格权,真正造成《德国民法典》伦理缺失的,只是支撑起形式理性的法律关系结构。权利能力和人格是同一个概念。通过法律关系结构的使用,权利能力只在积极意义上展现,而对于作为伦理根基的消极人格,却被法律关系抛却,由此才导致《德国民法典》伦理意义的缺失。第二部分是对我国权利能力概念的反思。首先,本文指出了我国对权利能力的理解观点,然后解释了对这些理解的原因,进而对诸如“权利能力”本身的翻译、“权利本位”的理解、“一般权利能力与特殊权利能力”的区分、“民事权利能力概念的创造”等理解进行了辨正。最终认为,我们对权利能力始终是接而不受的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Ⅰ.Research methodsCapacity for civil fights is the foundation of the civil law.It will determine the spirit of the Civil Code temperament by the deep perspective of this capacity.In German,the word capacity for civil rights is "Rechtsfaeigkeit".By the term "Recht" and "Faeigkeit" consists of two parts.In the understanding of Chinese,the word can be translated as "the rights and obligations of capacity","legal personality","the owner of right".It seems that not only there are three different interpretations of "Recht",and that "Faeigkeit" decomposed into three means.Clearly,there are no defferences between those words in our culture and traditions.Can we accept these exotics? As the word-building is concemed,"Recht" is used to modify "Faeigkeit",and "Faeigkeit" should be the foundation.When we discuss those words,we often focus on "Recht",but rarely touch on "Faeigkeit".Almost all those discuss ignore the the relation between "Recht" and "Faeigkeit".The topic of this paper is capacity for civil rights,and the author tries to seek the true understanding of the law on the foundation of Westem culture,in particular the "private law".At the same time,the maximum has been through since the end of the Qing dynasty,some of the key terms used law history,in terms behind to conduct a deeper dialogue.Based on this,this paper is in the dimension of the philosophy,a mixture of historical and comparative research methods.Ⅱ.Innovation of theoryThe theory innovation of this thesis as follow:first,the innovation of perspectives. From the relationship of legal relationship and subject,this thesis defines that the foundation of the law is the subject.The second is the innovation of the philosophy.The second part of this thesis traces the west cultures and concludes that the subject that is the foundation of the world is the positive capacity of beyond.Hence,the subject,the person and the capacity obtain the uniform meaning.The third is the ethics analyses of the capacity of civil rights.Chapter 3 discusses the start of the law and distinguishes the person and the man.This thesis finds that person is the theoretical foundation of the law and holds that the capacity of civil rights is perpetual and relates to ego,so the law shows the ethics order to the person.The fourth is the comparison of the history.In the discussion of the capacity of civil rights,this thesis analyzes the changes from the Hobbes’ natural law to the Hegel’rational law,and traces the concepts of the natural person from the Qing dynasty.Currently,the scholars define the person as the natural person.But,in fact,the natural person should be construed as the person.Then,this thesis studies the meaning of the start of the capacity of civil rights and defines the capacity of civil rights is the start of positive person not the start of the negative person.Based on that,this thesis put forwards that the start should be divided into two aspects:the positive person starts at born;the negative person starts at zygotes.This thesis analyzes the legal meaning of death and put forwards that legal relationship should be changed in the confronting the negative person to respect the negative person which can not have any impact to the world in corresponding legal relationship theories.The fifth is to discuss the body theory in the contract theory.Based on Rousseau’ social contract,this thesis discusses the Fiktionstheorie and Theorie Der Realen Verbandsperson from the view of private and public law,and holds that Fiktionstheorie denies the organization’ person to defend the ethics person in the private law’ scope.The Theorie Der Realen Verbandsperson ascertains that the organization has the ethics person to procure the recognition of nation in the perspective of public law.So,this thesis changes "organization entity" to "technical person esse" and insists that the theory of legal person in China should be "organization entity" and adopts the technical person esse to establish legal person system.The sixth is that from the distinguishing of positive and negative person,this thesis reevaluates the capacity of civil rights of German Civil Code,and points out that the lack of capacity of civil rights is because of the construction of the negative person relationship.Finally,this thesis holds that the civil law of China receives but not accepts the concepts of the capacity of civil rights.Ⅲ.AbstractIn addition to a brief introduction,this paper is composed of seven parts.The main thread is the subject philosophy of the implementation of the spirit of the capacity of rights study from start to finish.From the system of the legal relations as a framework before they draw the conclusion that the subject is the true origin of civil law.On this basis,the author point out that the subject is a kind of ability,and discuss this ability ethically. Carding based on such moral significance of the West and China natural understanding of the person.This paper also discussed the real beginning and end of the capacity for civil rights and re-analysis of the main spirit of legal theory about juridical person.At last,the auther evaluated of the BGB under the guidance of the spirit of the subject philosophy,and the theories of the capacity for civil rights in China.ChapterⅠprimarily discusses the relationship between jural relation and life relation. Generally speaking,the jural relation is the basis and abstraction of life relation.However, since "what is life relation" is still a hardly touched question in the civil law field,jural relation is in obscurity.This thesis is built on Husserl’s Phenomenology and his enquiry to the life-world,through which to find the originality of life-world"subject".Moreover,it is subject that basically upholds the structure of jural relation.Furthermore,by analyzing the Classical theory of Karl Marx—economic base determines the superstructure,it is held that the Philosophy of Marx also advocates the"subjective spirit",which is intrinsically linked with Marxism and plays a key role in the west.ChapterⅡtraces the connotation of subject in the Westem culture from the angle of philosophy.By inquiring into the history from ancient Greece to the modern times,this thesis is of the opinion that "subject",as the world basis,develops from the concept of transcendental substance in the ancient Greek civilization and Hebrew civilization.In modern times,transcendental concepts have been replaced by Cogito,which becomes the subject of the world.However,Cogito,being self-consciousness itself,is not a motionless concept but a dynamic thinking activity.It possesses the capability to transcend itself to achieve object.Therefore,Cogito,as the world basis,is just a kind of dynamic legislative capacity,which cannot exist transcendentally.In a word,"subject" is an absolutely dynamic capacity of regulation that transcends itself.This capacity is "person".ChapterⅢdiscusses the Capacity for civil right of a person.I think thatthe real starting point of the law,through the liquidation of which,is not the biological but the personal meaning of a man.At the starting point,what been show is the ethics meaning. The fact that every individual person owns the person is not because the seeing or feeling getting from the biological fact,which is just a completely negative relationship,and,it is to say,just a pure will of simply selfconscience,abstracting away all the content.By all appearances,we as a person in the biology item should not only recognize the capacity of abstract of ourselves but also respect the exactly capacity of other person.For the lacking of any content,and of any practice,there is no manifest yet,and just a imperative on ethic emotion.The person as a free and individual will,is merely relative to itself.That is,the person here is just a empty thought without any content,so,it is just a single will of pure form.Therefore,the order of the law is "be a person,and respect the person of other person".That is the total ethic meaning of person in law(Capacity for Rights).chapterⅣmainly studied natural personality.At first,it is concluded that there are many differences between "natural person" and "Citizen" of Roman law.So we cannot follow the model of Roman law to understand the meaning of natural person baptized by natural law.To exactly understand the conception of natural personality,it is the only way that we begin with preinstall in the state of nature.After the conversion from natural conditions to Civil Society,the natural person we talking about is not the person in the state of nature,nor the Citizen in Roman law,but the Citizen in Civil Society under national situation changed from natural law to rational law.Moreover,this chapter also examined the history of ideas of natural person since the Late Years of Qing Dynasty.It is considered that the evolution of natural person in China experienced three stages:1.From the Late Years of Qing Dynasty to the Period of the Republic of China.Natural person as a translated term was continued to use.The understanding of natural person did not penetrate further into deep layer,only remained in surface layer which is "natural rights" similar to political slogan.But in the separation of public law and private law circumstances,it is agreed that natural person is the subject in private law.After the foundation of New China,natural person as the subject of private law was replaced by Citizen,owning to the former Soviet Union’ influences,denying the distinctions between public law and private law.In the third drafting of the People’s Republic of China Civil Code,the connection between natural person and citizen was discussed once again. General Principles of the Civil Law as a verdict,in fact,it acts as a guide for citizen to measure Natural person.In 1999,Contract law had not fundamentally corrected concept, but only amended the extension of application.In the academic circles,whether in the late years of Qing Dynasty or after New China founded,natural person’s essentiality are all based on human body,namely,person’s natural attributes.Ultimately,natural person’s "nature" is not the instinct naturality possessed by human being,but personalistic attributes,as "human being" changed into person,person has broken away from the control of natural law,and can make free decision.ChapterⅤdiscusses the start and the termination of the capacity for civil rights.This thesis deals with the meaning of the "start" for the first time,defining it as the relationship between the person and the physical body.Through the assimilation of the person,the physical body becomes the body and has the sacredness of the person.The sacred person is negative,that’s to say,the person only relates to ego.The person related to ego is single will or individuality.So,in practice,defining the starting time of an individual is the symbol of defining the person.This thesis holds that an individual starts from pregnancy. But,before birth,the individual only has negative meaning,that’s to say,the individual can’t enjoy civil rights and assume civil obligations,only the respect to the person being required.Generally speaking,the start,is not the real start of the capacity for civil rights (the person),but the start of the positive person,namely the start of enjoying the civil rights.Based on this,this thesis discusses the protection of the pregnant.In the analysis of termination of capacity for civil rights,this thesis also holds that death doesn’t terminate the person but the negative person,namely the capacity of enjoying the civil rights and assuming the obligations,for person is eternal.That needs us to comprehend the legal relationship,which is the obligation relationship of respecting person.Furthermore,this thesis deals with the protection about the person of the dead.ChapterⅥdissertates legal person’s capacity for rights.It is mainly established in the spirit of subject philosophy,and from the tradition of Rousseau’s theory of social contract and through natural person’s ethical significance,it discusses the basis that the organization becomes person.Firstly,that the paper acknowledges that French Civil Code denies the existence of legal person is totally based upon subject spirit of liberalism.In fact,Savigny followed this tradition,while for the need of application,he admitted the organization’s existence indeed in real life,but have technical person only.From the point of public law and the perspective of dinging person esse of national ethic,Gierke acknowledged that organization has ethical person.All of these discussions had went beyond the field of legal positivism,and based on ideas of political philosophy.The paper makes over the theory of "organization entity" and argues that from the tradition of contract theory,this should be "technical person esse".As such,the paper considers that our nation’s General Principles of The Civil Law seems like technical person esse,but actually it is dramatically different,what it really lacks is the comprehension on ethic person which behind it.On this basis,the paper puts forward suggestions to reconstructing our nation’s organization theory.ChapterⅦis the conclusion of the paper.This chapter reflected upon the concept of capacity for rights,starting with the comprehension on the BGB and our nation’s academic community.In the BGB,the real cause to the loss of BGB’s ethic is not as what some scholars claim,who think the capacity for rights and the person is the same concept, the use of the concept of capacity for rights leads the BGB lost its ethical significance and therefore setuping of the general person rights is impossible,but the structure of legal relationship,which support the formal logos of law.Through the use of the structure of legal relationship,the capacity for fights display its positive sense only,while the negative person,which as the foundation of ethic,is discarded by legal relationship.Therefore the BGB lost its ethical significance.Through the reflection on the concept of capacity for rights in our nation,the paper firstly points out what types of comprehension on capacity for rights exist in our nation,then explains the causes of these comprehension,later discerns and corrects the translation to "capacity for rights" itself,the comprehension on "right standard",the distinguish between "general capacity for rights and special capacity for rights",eomprehension on "the creation of concept of capacity for civil rights"ete. Ultimately,the capacity for rights is not accepted to us all along.更多还原