股东权的契约解释

【作者】 侯东德；

【导师】 赵万一；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 公司契约理论结合了经济学和公司法学的研究,不但丰富和发展了传统契约理论的契约内涵,而且为法学的研究提供了理论分析工具。本文以公司契约理论为分析工具,基于交易模型假设,对股东权的本质、股东权的内容、股东权转让权及表决权进行契约解释,探寻股东权的性质、内容、配置、行使和限制等法律规则背后的经济含义,丰富股东权基础理论研究,为检讨我国股东权制度提供理论基础,并就完善和发展提出改革建议。本文除引言和结论之外,分六章展开:第一章公司契约理论。本章首先回顾了公司契约理论的产生和发展,厘清了公司契约理论的渊源及其发展的主要范式——代理理论、交易成本理论及非完全契约理论,并对公司契约理论进行了评价。本文认为公司契约理论不但丰富了契约的内涵,而且更重要的是提供了一种理论分析的工具和视角——契约解释。本章接着疏理了公司契约理论对公司、公司法的主要观点。公司契约理论认为,公司是一组“契约的联结”,公司法的性质应该仅仅反映出公司作为一组自愿契约关系的事实,公司法应该是一组授权公司参与者自由缔结他们之间契约关系的赋权型规范。公司契约理论提倡契约自由。最后,本章运用公司契约理论对以股东为中心的契约关系进行了初步解释,认为股东与管理者之间、大股东与中小股东之间、股东与债权人等利益相关者之间存在利益冲突是股东契约关系的基本特质,是本文股东权契约解释的基础,因为本文的交易模型假设分析都是以理性的经济人、追求利益最大化的假设为基本前提。第二章股东权本质的契约解释。本章通过契约解释,分析了股东权的本质问题。本章首先解释了股东权的产生逻辑,认为股东权来源于股东财产权的让渡、企业所有权的安排以及契约行为,即产生于讨价还价的契约机制中,初步论证了股东权的契约性。接着,本章分析了股东权的形成基础——公司章程,从功能主义的视角解释了公司章程对股东权的界定、限制和规范,进一步论证了股东权的契约性。最后本章以代理理论、交易成本理论及不完全契约理论对股东权的本质进行了解释。本文认为股东权的契约性在于它是剩余索取权和剩余控制权的效率安排,它的经济属性在于节约交易成本、减少代理成本,促使股东利益最大化目标的实现。股东权应当是一组发展的、动态的、开放的契约权利束。强调股东权的契约性对于提倡契约自由、倡导股东导向型的公司治理模式具有重要意义。第三章股东权内容的契约解释。本章首先分析股东权配置的契约性质以及公司章程配置和公司法配置的关系,并对股东权内容的基本框架进行了厘定。本文认为,股东权的内容取决于权利的配置,而公司章程配置和公司法配置是两种相互补充的股东权配置途径。公司法的标准契约条款为公司章程配置提供选择菜单,节约股东的契约成本。同时,公司章程配置具有彰显个性的特点,对具体权利的分配又补充着公司法的规定。因此,股东权配置具有契约性。文章认为,在自由和强制之间,公司章程对于有关公司法的强制性规则原则上不得选出适用。毫无疑问,公司契约理论的契约自由精神要求减少公司法的强制性规则、增加任意性规则以扩大股东的意思自治空间,这应该作为我国公司法长期坚持的改革方向。但在现阶段,我国公司法的首要任务还在于正确区分任意性规则和强制性规则,在两者之间进行恰当地搭配,并找到合理的界限。本章接着对股东权行使规则和保障规则进行了契约解释,认为股东权的行使规则和保障规则从契约解释的经济意义上找到了正当性基础,它们的经济意义则在于通过效率安排节省公司参与者的交易成本。第四章股东权转让权的契约解释。本章首先就股东权转让权的理论基础从契约理论视角进行了分析,认为股东权转让权是股东退出公司契约的通道,它与表决权一起可以创造“公司控制权”市场、避免管理层的懒惰、降低代理成本,可以有效地保护股东利益和社会利益。接着本章对公众公司股份转让权的自由及其限制和封闭公司股权转让权的限制进行了契约解释,并考察了美国法上封闭公司股权转让限制制度。本文认为对股东权转让的限制取决于公众公司和封闭公司的经济结构,对于公众公司,应该坚持股份自由转让原则;对于封闭公司,应该充分尊重股东的契约自由,允许对股权转让进行限制。我国公司法应该完善封闭公司股权转让限制的任意性规范,为股东提供更多的选择空间。第五章表决权的契约解释。本章首先从不完全理论、交易方法论范式对表决权的归属进行了解释。文章认为表决权作为契约机制和风险承担机制的一个方面,将其单独授予股东是公司参与者之间为追求自身利益最大化而进行讨价还价的结果。接着本章分别对一股一权原则、资本多数决原则及集体行使原则的经济逻辑进行了分析,认为一股一权原则的经济逻辑在于使股东的表决权权重和剩余索取权权重相配比,防止股东投票时的机会主义行为和道德风险,使作为监督者的股东的监督更有效率。本章对资本多数决原则的契约解释表明,由于大小股东对公司投资的资产专用性程度不同,其承受的资金成本也不同,所以他们在面临公司重要决策时就会产生不同的动机和具有不同的选择偏好。这使所有股东不可能形成一致意见,多数资本的意见就成为了最佳选择。而集体行使原则的经济逻辑在于建立股东讨价还价的契约机制、减少信息不对称和降低代理成本。为此,这三大原则理应成为公司法的默认规则。对于封闭公司而言,应该设置为任意性规则;对于公众公司而言,则应该设置为强制性规则。第六章公司契约理论与我国股东权制度。本章首先就公司契约理论的契约自由的精神在我国新公司法中的体现进行了分析,认为对股东权制度而言,契约自由在我国新公司法中主要体现为股东在公司设立中的自由、公司治理中的自由、公司交易中的自由、利益分配中的自由、公司契约退出中的自由以及权利救济中的自由。这是我国股东权制度的一大进步。接着本章运用公司契约理论对我国股东权制度进行了检讨,提出了完善建议。文章认为我国股东权制度仍然存在以下问题:有些规范的强制性和任意性表达不明确、将某些本属于股东契约自由的事项规定为强制性规范、强制性规范所占比重过大、股权转让权规则存在缺失、表决权规则的设计存有瑕疵。对此,本文建议公司法用语应规范、强制性规范与任意性规范要正确区分、强制性规范须进一步减少、股权转让权制度有待完善以及表决权制度急需匡正。最后,本章进一步提出了对股东权制度未来的展望,认为市场、经济、技术的快速发展对股东权制度的完善和创新提出了更高的要求,现在问题的解决并不代表未来问题的解决。对此,文章提出了解决的根本之道,即保持公司法的高度适应性、建立公司法的动态适应机制.但如何保持公司法的高度适应性、建立公司法的动态适应机制呢?本文建议:公司法应积极回应公司法的全球化竞争、积极接受技术和市场的检验、提高创新能力、坚持股东本位,扩大意思自治空间以及建立长效的公司法修改机制。本文的创新之处:第一,研究方法的创新。本文导入经济学上的契约解释方法,对股东权进行研究,这是对传统研究方法的突破。以公司契约理论为指导,建立交易假设模型;基于经济人的假设,如果公司参与者能够就股东权进行讨价还价,那么他们最愿意达成的契约安排将是最优的股东权配置。本文通过契约解释,探寻股东权法律规定背后的经济含义,丰富股东权的基础理论研究,为检讨我国股东权制度提供理论支撑。第二,在新型权利本质观的基础上,本文强调股东权的契约性,提出了对股东权本质的全新认识,完善和发展了股东权基础理论。本文认为,股东权是一组发展的、动态的、开放式的契约权利束;它的产生逻辑在于财产权的让渡、企业所有权的安排和契约机制的运用;它的经济意义在于减少交易成本、降低代理成本。基于股东权的契约性,公司法应该高度尊重股东在权利配置、权利行使上的契约自由。第三,对于公司治理,本文认为我国应该提倡股东导向型模式,股东应该处于公司治理的基础地位。股东通过行使股东权来参与公司自治,因此,公司自治实际上是股东权自治,而股东权自治的根本在于契约自由。本文的研究对于我国公司治理的改革方向具有参考价值。第四,提出股东权配置的契约性。本文认为,股东权配置的契约性要求扩大股东权配置的自由空间,这是我国公司法长期坚持的改革方向。而现阶段,我国公司法的首要任务还在于正确区分任意性规则和强制性规则,在两者之间进行恰当的搭配,并找到合理的界限。第五,针对公司法现代化改革,本文提出建立公司法的动态适应机制,保持公司法的高度适应性,以适应市场、经济、技术的快速发展对公司法制度提出的随时进行完善和创新的要求。本文通过以契约理论对我国股东权制度进行检讨,一方面提出了完善建议,另一方面更重要的是提出了建立公司法动态适应机制、保持公司法高度适应性的建议。本文认为建立公司法动态适应机制需要公司法积极回应公司法的全球化竞争、积极接受技术和市场的检验、提高创新能力、坚持股东本位,扩大意思自治空间以及建立长效的公司法修改机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of economics and law, the contracting nature of company not only enrich and develop the traditional theory of contracting connotation, but also provide the theoretical analysis tool for legal study. On the hypothetic theory of trade model, the paper tent to study the nature and content of shareholder’s right and the right of transference and voting from the angle of the contracting theory, so as to explore the economic meaning of the corresponding rules concerning the nature, the content, the collocation and exertion of shareholder’s rights, to enrich the basic theory study of right thereof, to review the traditional theory and to perfect the relevant system to a considerable extent.The first part observes the basic theory hereof. The paper focuses on the history of contracting theory which developed from the agency theory, the theory of transaction costs to the under-developed contracting theory, and estimate the contracting theory which enrich the basic connotation of contract and provide a sort of theoretical tool and perspective as well.The theory thereof advances the fact that company is a "nexus of contracts", the company law should be a set of rules which empower partners to make contracts by their will. Moreover, the contracting theory should advocate the point of view of making contract by will.By the channel of the contracting theory, the part tends to make elementary explanation for the basic contracting relationships between shareholder and other people correlative. By the essential analysis of trade model with the hypothetic theory of rational economic person who pursues maximized benefit, the paper details on the beneficial conflicts between shareholder and governance, major shareholder and minor shareholder, shareholders and creditors etc., which would be the essential nature of contracting relationships of shareholders and the theoretic basis for contracting explanation of shareholding right.The second part focuses on the nature of shareholding right explained by theory thereof. From the history of its coming into being, the paper put forward to the viewpoint that the shareholding right comes from the transference of share capital and the contracting behavior, that is, the contracting mechanism of bargaining. Moreover, the paper tries to analyze how the company constitution defines, standardizes and limits the right hereof form the perspective of efficiency advocates, and tends to explain the nature of right by the agency theory, the theory of transaction costs and the under-developed contracting theory. Therefore, the paper advances the views that the contracting nature lies on the efficiency requirement of remaining right and controlling right, the economic nature lies on the aim of maximizing benefits. Furthermore, emphasizing the contracting nature especially would contribute to advocate contract-making by will, and construct the feasible governance mode oriented by shareholders’ benefit.The third part focuses on the contracting nature of right collocation, and the relationship between company constitution and company law so as to argue the basic structure of right. The paper brings forward to the argument that the content of shareholding right contributes to right collocation which owns the contracting contribute to some extent, and the collocations of company constitution and company law are mutually complementary for right collocation thereof actually. Therefore, the compelling rules would not be applicable for the company constitution. Moreover, the basic frame of right collocation comprises the right for benefit, the right for governance, the right for information, and the right for sue.The forth part talks on the transference right from the angle of contracting explanation. On the basis of theoretical element, the paper tries to argue that the transference right is a channel for shareholder to retreat from the company. Furthermore, the degree of transference limit depends on the economic configuration of companies. That is, open company should hold on the principle of transference without limit, and closed company would defer to shareholder’s will. So new company law should focuses on non-compelling rules concerning transference in order to provide more choice for shareholders of closed company.The fifth part observes that the right for vote is entitled to the shareholder is the bargain for the biggest self- benefit among the company joiners, as a aspect of the contract and while a aspect of the system for venture bared.The explanation to the principle of the capital majority vote approves that the opinion from the capital majority is to be the best choice. The basic economic logic of the collectivity function bases on three aspects: a contract system of the shareholder bargain, reduction of the no information- symmetry and the agency cost. Therefore, those principles should be the default rules for the company law, and they shall be set as the randomic rules for the close company while the compellent rules for the public company.The sixth part observes that the sprite of the contract freedom in the new company law of P.R.C includes the freedom for the shareholder setting up the company, governing the company, transacting, distributing the profit, retiring the company and the relieving rights. In China , the rights system of shareholder lies in the questions hereinafter such as prescribing the issues on the contract freedom of the shareholder as the compellent rules which account for large percents, without the rule of transference, the defaults of the rule of the voting. Therefore, the paper approves that compellent rules and randomic rules be differentiated rationally, compellent rules be reduced ulteriorly, and the transference right and voting rights should be completed to a considerable extent.Moreover, the part put forward to the outlook of the shareholding rights. To keep high flexibility and set up dynamic application mechanism, company law should face to the globe competition and the test from the technology and market actively. Furthermore, to improve the creative ability, hold on the shareholder-orient, develop the contracting principle by will and establish the effective reform mechanism for company law would be excellent measures.The theoretical innovations in the paper are sorts of issues as follows:First of all, by the channel of contracting elucidation in the economics, the paper tends to exercise a sort of novel research means to analyze the shareholding right exactly. That is, studying the economic meaning of relevant rules for the right herein aims to enrich basic theory concerning the shareholding right in company law.Then, the paper details on shareholding rights which is a set of contracting rights with developing, open and dynamic properties actually. The logistic sense of its coming into being lies in the transference of share, the management of ownership, and the contracting mechanism. Therefore, the economic meaning is to reduce trade cost and agency cost in a great degree.Thirdly, as for company governance, the paper advocates that the shareholder-oriental mode be followed actually because the core of company governance lies in shareholders’ autonomy and the contracting by will would contribute to shareholders’ autonomy.Fourthly, the requirement of contracting attribute enlarges the collocation of right. As for China, company law should differentiate the compellent and randomic rules clearly, and make appropriate arrangement between them.Finally, the paper puts forward that establishing a sort of dynamic application mechanism in company law needs the law hereof response to global competition and the test from the technology and market actively, so as to improve the innovative capability, to insist on shareholder-orient, to develop the contracting principle by will and to establish the effective reform mechanism for company law.更多还原