宪制的伦理生命

【作者】 苏婉儿；

【导师】 赵明；

【作者基本信息】 西南政法大学 ， 法学理论， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 黑格尔被公认为一个艰深的著述者,因而他的著作更需要诚实、严肃的阅读。黑格尔的法权哲学为国家合法性的论证提供了一种独特的探讨方式,是重建自然法——特别是现代自然权利论——的一次伟大的思想努力。本文旨在追踪和论述黑格尔国家观的主旨和意图,通过贴近文本的精细解读,展示黑格尔如何以及为何将国家、国家的根本构造(宪制)与伦理生活、民族精神相勾连,如何借助对法权和自由的理解协调了现代主体自由与国家的普遍性。本文的解读具有探源的性质,因此,在文本的选取上,不仅关注《法权哲学原理》这部集中了几乎全部政法问题讨论的体系化的成熟作品——这部正式出版的讲课提纲是对客观精神的具体展开、包含了国家本性的最充分论述;而且第一次深入、细致地直面迄今学界极少触及的两部耶拿时期的重要文本,即黑格尔于1802年前后写作的两篇长文:《德意志宪制》和《论探讨自然法的诸种科学方式》,这两部文本主题相同但行文侧重点不同,前者从国家和宪制的现状和弊病——特别是宪制私法化给民族造成的损害——中论证主权国家的必然性和必要性,后者则从哲学——特别是关于伦理生活的哲学——的角度批判现代自然权利论以及其契约化的国家论证模式,为国家的合法性重新奠基;为了更完整地把握和呈现黑格尔运思的全貌,本文还溯及黑格尔智识生涯伊始所写作的以宗教为研究主题的若干手稿和残篇,特别是冠名在“民众宗教与基督教”、“耶稣传”、“基督教的实定性”以及“基督教的精神与命运”下的诸文稿,为的是搜寻黑格尔思考国家问题的早期线索,宗教现象为黑格尔思考政治共同体的相关问题提供了初始场域,关注古希腊民众宗教实际上是对古典城邦、公民生活、民族精神的研究,而考察犹太-基督教时所剖析的律法与自由、个体与共同体、精神的主观性与客观性等要素,无一不与政治共同体密切相关,对古希腊异教、犹太-基督教的特征及发展史的研究暗示了黑格尔的思考重点,并非宗教本身,而是自由的不同表现以及如何在共同体中实现自由的问题。通过精研典型文本,本文认为,对古典世界的景仰和渴望以及对德意志“徒有国家之表而无国家之实”的宪制危机的担忧和反思,促使黑格尔批判和修正现代国家合法性的理论来源、从根本上颠覆国家的契约化论证模式;通过拨移现代自然权理论及国家契约论个体主义或原子式的出发点,黑格尔以关于伦理生活的哲学——也即自由的法权哲学——替代或重建了自然法、进而证成了国家的至上性和逻辑先在性,在某种程度上完成了古典自然法与现代自然权利论的调和,或者说,在古典城邦自由与现代主体自由之间达成了和解;借助重建的自然法也就是自由的法权哲学,黑格尔在尊重现代主体自由的前提下回归了人性和城邦的古典认识,国家并非私法拟制的结果,也不是保护私利的工具,它本身就是目的,是个体的本质,在以精神为本体的哲学视角来看,国家是精神为自己创造的世界,伦理生活是自由精神的理念,因而是人的本质、形式和目的,国家是伦理生活的最高阶段、自由精神的最充分、最饱满的表达,个体通过向着整体生存而成为真正的人、其内在本质和形式得以充分实现的人;宪制作为国家肌体或政治共同体的组织及根本生活方式要保持有效性必须与民族统一体的伦理生活相一致,在精神外化和自我认识的过程中,国家的本性——普遍性和特殊性相互中介而实现的具体自由——必然会在好的宪制中得到体现。本文分为三章并引言、结语共五个部分。引言交待三个问题。首先从黑格尔体系的独特困难入手说明本文的意图和主要内容,顺带综述黑格尔研究的主要动向。由于黑格尔文本特有术语以及体系的综合性和辩证性,黑格尔成为“抗译性”很强的研究和阐释对象,这种特别明显的“抗译性”造成了黑格尔学述中观点抵牾、对立解释并存、甚至常因飞离原文而误解重重的局面,要想像黑格尔理解自己那样理解黑格尔的思想主旨,亟待回归文本,因此,本文是在法权和政治问题领域内挑战黑格尔的“抗译性”、疏通文义、探寻意图的一次尝试。引言第二个部分勾勒黑格尔所处的时代背景和理论背景,相比希腊城邦的古典世界而言,现代哲学引导着现代世界陷入了脱离实体、丧失本质、与整体相疏离的碎片化的分裂状态。引言第三部分概括黑格尔体系的主旨:重建人类生命的完整性,解决古典和现代之间的理论对立,特别从黑格尔平生第一篇正式发表的哲学论文《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差异》挖掘和佐证这一意图。第一章追踪黑格尔早期宗教研究中对国家相关问题的思考,宗教特征和发展史中涉及到的与政治共同体有关的要素有:城邦自由也即公民的政治自由是个体生活的目的、习俗风尚对个体的塑造、体现在共同体中的民族精神、个体主观自由与律法和外在制度的实定性、自由的主观性与客观性等。古希腊民众宗教反映了古典城邦的整全生活,民众宗教是共同体生活与私人生活、主观宗教与客观宗教的统一,表现了自由民族的精神特质,由此刺激了黑格尔对日耳曼民族精神的追问。民众宗教或古典城邦的衰落,导致了个体、政治共同体、宗教共同体的分离,在研究犹太-基督教的研究时,黑格尔先是以实践理性作为批判的武器,探究了追求道德自由的宗教为何会变成外在的、压迫性的律法和制度,这种分析集中于对与自由相对立的“实定性”的探讨,实践理性追求自由的的内在要求一旦实定化,则道德不再是精神的事情,而是沦为律法、教义、仪式、制度的外在规定,城邦由此分化为政治国家和精神国家,于是公民与国家分离,国家没有精神,精神之国没有自由,惟有律法的专制和奴役;黑格尔进而发现批判的武器本身也具有批判对象的实定性,实践理性的道德法则是理性对性情、欲望的奴役和压迫,自律的主观自由并非真正的自由,道德法则的准实定性的必然会推论出原子聚合的外在国家与个体的对立和分离。宗教研究的末期黑格尔曾认为实定性与自由、道德主体与外在世界的和解将在神秘的“爱”和“命运”中、特别是耶稣爱的宗教中得到实现,但是他对这个暂时的结论充满怀疑。第二章从黑格尔同时期的两部文本入手,阐述黑格尔如何在政治和公法实际状况中得出主权国家的必要性,同时如何在理论上通过关于伦理生活的哲学重新论证国家合法性。黑格尔采取“现实的理性主义”的方法,即从现存的东西中寻找合理性的必然性和本质,认识到德意志宪制的私法化反映出德意志已经不再是一个统一的国家,私法化、契约化的帝国宪制与民族伦理生活的总体性相分离而成为了实际上的分裂力量,黑格尔进一步追溯了宪制私法化或者帝国“合法律的无政府状态”起源于古日耳曼人的自由性情,这种主观、任性的自由曾经促进了欧洲封建采邑制、进而代议制的形成,但是德意志人拒绝像欧洲其他国家比如法国那样,从采邑制-代议制原则发展出统一的政治权力。黑格尔揭示了战争如何暴露了固守主观自由或私人法权的后果,意图是要说明私法背后必须要有更高的目的和本质支撑,才能保证主观自由和私人法权的实现。对德意志宪制和政治实存的考察,或者说,对德意志命运的洞察,迫使黑格尔必须在理论上重新审视现代国家的基础及其理论依据,在新的起点上重新论证国家合法性和至上性,因为自然权利为基础的契约化论证模式,无非是把国家当作私法拟制的结果,这种理论进路与德意志帝国宪制的现状有暗合之处。《论探讨自然法的诸种科学方式》是黑格尔《法权哲学原理》的雏形,是构造伦理哲学的最初尝试。黑格尔首先清算了现代自然法的两种探讨方式,经验主义和形式主义。黑格尔捕捉到经验主义方法中存在的逻辑扭结:一方面,自然状态与法权状态是互为前提的循环论证,另一方面,即使自然状态与法权状态的论证是可行的,自然状态向法权状态的过渡依然存在逻辑断裂。形式主义的方法克服了经验主义分解、抽象的任意性,转而诉诸意志的普遍性,但是却把纯粹理性的抽象性推向了极端,形式主义方法以空洞的道德律令告终,黑格尔揭穿了实践理性将行为准则普遍化过程中的逻辑破绽:一方面,严格的普遍化惟有毫无内容的“重言式”才能完成,另一方面,由于极端的形式化在实践行为中的不可实现,所以形式主义的普遍立法的结果就是任意的内容均可以成为法则,从而无法避免道德相对主义的困境。而黑格尔对现代自然法的重建体现在,“绝对伦理生活”这一理性直观的肯定性溶解了所有现代自然法及契约论的个体主义或原子化的出发点,从而凸现了作为“伦理个体性”之体现的国家对于民族历史以及人类历史而言的必然性和必要性。黑格尔详细论证了伦理生活的民族性、伦理生活的普遍性与经济领域(实在体系)中的特殊性的关系、伦理生活与主体道德的关系、伦理生活的哲学与法权的实定科学(部门法)的关系。第三章以对《法权哲学原理》的解析将前述问题体系化和明确化。《法权哲学原理》是《理想国》的完成,伦理生活的普遍性与主体自由原则在法权哲学所认识到的国家中通过相互中介而和解共存。在展示和分析了黑格尔审慎的“理实合一”的“现实的理性主义”立场后,本章详细探析了“自由”、“法权”、“伦理生活”这三个核心术语的含义,认为“自由”、“伦理生活”以及广义的“法权”,可以被视为是内涵等同的术语,它们表征了同一个内容,即精神的属性:自由精神的发展在各个阶段上都有其正当性,可以称为是各种法权;伦理生活更强调属人世界、共同体生活中的自由的本质。因而,黑格尔所重建的“自然法”就是关于伦理生活的哲学,也就是自由的哲学或法权哲学,其根本的意图在于说明国家的本性。国家是伦理生活的最高形态,国家法权高于抽象法权,它支持和吸纳了抽象法权,是抽象法权的基础和本质。作为伦理实体的分裂和差异的环节,市民社会不能替代国家、私法关系不能僭越国家的宪制关系,合理性的国家是主观自由与客观自由的统一,在合理性的国家中个体的自由得到具件址实现,因而法权和义务是内容上具体的同一、而不是抽象的、对等的同一。黑格尔在古典“politeia”——也即“政体”和生活方式——的意义上理解“宪制”,由于将主观自由融入了普遍性、把整体性的伦理生活视为国家构造的基础,黑格尔所说的宪制——不完全指成文宪法——实现了生活方式的古今和解,古典的公民政治生活与现代的市民经济生活在现代合理性国家中充分实现并达成和解。黑格尔沿袭古典认识,坚持好的宪制是最好的学校,符合自由原则的宪制培育具有爱国情感和政治性情的好公民,而与古典世界不同的是,黑格尔认为好的宪制是自由精神发展的必然结果。结语有两个任务。第一,总结全文思路,得出结论,认为黑格尔用“伦理生活”或“自由的理念”消解了现代自然法理论个体本位的自然权利的绝对性,借助重建的自然法也即伦理生活的哲学或自由的法权哲学,证成国家的逻辑先在性和至上性,从而宪制并非私法权的汇总或契约化的拟制而是民族伦理生活的表现。第二,简要论述黑格尔所设置的国家本性与世界历史的关系,探寻黑格尔构造世界历史以及整个哲学体系背后的民族情结,结尾处以一位最坚定的黑格尔主义者所推论的、与黑格尔主旨恰相反对的观点,提出“世界历史的必然是主权国家的共存,还是法治秩序的普遍化”这一开放性的问题,进一步说明黑格尔思想的意义:黑格尔也许穷尽了人类的可能,因为过去的价值和未来的走向取决于今天对黑格尔的解释。更多还原

【Abstract】 Hegel is acknowledged as an abstruse literator, so that his works therefore need particularly an honest and serious reading. Hegel’s philosophy of rechts presents a distinct way to demonstrate the legitimacy of the state, and makes a great intellectual effort to reconstruct the natural law, especially the modern natural right. This dissertation aims to trace and elucidate Hegel’s substance and purport of his conception of the state. Basing on an elaborate reading according literally to the texts, the dissertation will unfold how and why Hegel has connected the state and the fundamental structure, i.e. the constitution, with ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and national spirit (Volksgeist), and how he has reconciled the modern freedom of Subject with the university of the state by his comprehension of the recht and freedom.The reading put forward by this dissertation is retrospective, accordingly, as for the choice of texts, not only the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, a systemized mature work covering almost all of the issues on the politics and law, is regarded, which is a lecture outline published for the audience and in which the Objective Spirit is developed fully and the nature of the state is demonstrated completely, but also the two important texts of Hegel’s Jena period which are seldom discussed among the academi--The German Constitution and On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, which were written by Hegel at about 1802, both aiming the same purport but presenting different stresses, the former deriving the necessity of the sovereign state from the status quo and the deficiency of the state and its constitution, especially the impairment incurred by the identity of the constitution with certain contract and private law, the latter critiquing from the perspective of philosophy--especially the philosophy of ethical life--the theory of modern natural right and its dependence on the contractual mode to justify the state and laying a new foundation for the state’s legitimacy, are treated deeply and thoroughly for the fist time; besides, in order to comprehend and represent a panorama of Hegel’s thinking, the dissertation will retrospect the early manuscripts on religion written during the beginning of Hegel’s intellectual life, especially the ones which are titled by "National Religion and Christianity", "Life of Jesus", "The positivity of The Christian Religion" and "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate", aiming at searching the early clue for Hegel’s thinking about the state.Through perusing the typical texts, the dissertation holds that it was the admiration and craving for the classical world, as well as the worry and refection about the constitutional crisis of German Empire which meant there only remained a semblance of the state without the substance of the state, that encouraged Hegel to critique and revise the theoretical source of the legitimacy of the modern state, and to overturn ultimately the demonstrative mode of justifying the state in terms of contract; that having removed the individualist or atomist starting point of the modern theory of natural right and its notion of social contract, Hegel superseded, or in anther word, reconstructed the natural law by the philosophy of ethical life, i.e. the rechtsphilosophie of freedom, therefore justified the sovereign supremacy and logical priority of the state, and reached to some extent the reconciliation between the classical and the modern notion with respect to natural right; and that by the aid of the reconstructed natural law, i.e. the rechtsphilosophie of freedom, Hegel could appreciate the modern freedom of subject on one hand, and on the other hand revert to the classical understanding of the human nature and the city. Neither is the sate a fiction of private law, nor an instrument whose end is simply to protect private interests; on the contrary, the state is the end itself, and the state constitutes the essence of the individual.This dissertation consists of five parts: three chapters, introduction and conclusion.The introduction involves three points. Firstly, the distinct difficulty of Hegel’s system is shown in order that the primary purpose and the main content of this dissertation can be introduced, and incidentally, the major trends in Hegelian scholarship are outlined. Due to the particular terms in Hegel’s texts and dialectical nature of his system, Hegel is found to be characterized by "anti-being-translated" for study and reading. Hegel’s apparent peculiarity of "anti-being-translated" leads to such a situation that opposite interpretations always contradict each other, and misreadings and conflicts often result from disregard of the original texts. Thus, it is needed to return to the Hegel’s texts, and to understand Hegel as close as possible exactly as Hegel expressed himself. This dissertation is an attempt to challenge Hegel’s peculiarity of "anti-being-translated", to clarify the meaning of texts, and to examine his purport hidden in the texts in Chinese. Secondly, the introduction briefs Hegel’s time and the theoretical background. Compared with the classical world of Greek cites, modern world has been thrown into a fragmented separation by the modern philosophy, divorcing from the substance, losing the essence and alienating from the whole. The third part of the introduction generalizes the purport of Hegel’s system especially by the aid of reading Hegel’s first published philosophical essay "The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy", that is to reestablish the totality of human life and resolve the theoretical antithesis between the ancients and the moderns.The first chapter traces Hegel’s initial thinking relevant to the issue of state in his early research of religion. There are some elements relating to the state in the character and history of the religion: the freedom of the city which has been the end of the individual life, customs and the way of life which shapes the individual, national spirit embodied in the community, subjective freedom and the positivity of the laws, the subjectivity and the objectivity of the freedom. The folk religion of the ancient Greek reflected the total life of the classical city. It was the unification of the public life and the private life--which contained the unification of the subjective religion and the objective religion, representing the spiritual particularity of a free people--that stimulated Hegel to seek the Germanic spirit of his own nation. The decline of the folk religion or the classical cities resulted in the separation of the individual, the political community and the religious community. During the research of the Jewish-Christian religion, using the practical reason as the weapon for critiquing, Hegel examined why the religion originally pursuing the moral freedom had transformed into an external institution or an oppressive system of laws. This examination focused on the "positivity" which was opposed to the freedom. Once the practical reason’s inner demand for pursuing freedom had become positivised, the morality was no longer the affair of the spirit, but reduced to external regulations such as laws, doctrines, rituals, and institutions, and consequently the city divided into the political state and the spiritual state, which meant that citizens separated from the state, the political state was deprived of spirit, and the spiritual state was given no freedom but enslavement of the laws. In addition, Hegel found that the weapon itself for critiquing was also as positive as the object of critique to the extent that the moral laws of the practical reason implied the enslavement imposed on the inclination and desire by the reason. The subjective freedom attained by self-ruling was not the real freedom, and the quasi-positivity of the moral laws inferred necessarily the separation and the opposition between the individual and the external state aggregated by atoms. At the end of period of researching on the religion, Hegel has hoped that the reconciliation between the positivity and the freedom, between the moral subject and the external world, would be realized in the "love" and "fate", which were mysterious more or less, especially in the Jesus’ religion of love, however, he was doubtful of this provisional conclusion.Dealing with Hegel’s two texts, chapter two elucidates how Hegel derived the necessity of sovereign state from the factual situation of the politics and the constitution at that time, and how he theoretically justified afresh the legitimacy of the state in terms of the philosophy of ethical life. Taking the approach of actual rationalism, that is, to seek the necessity and essence from the present, Hegel pointed out that since the German Constitution had reduced to some private laws, Germany was no longer a state. The Constitution of the Empire identified with private laws and contracts was so divorced from the totality of the national ethical life that it became actually a disintegrating power. Furthermore, Hegel retrospected the free disposition of the ancient German from which originated the "legal anarchy" of the Empire or the present privatized Constitution. This subjective and capricious freedom had promoted the rising of the European feudalism, and hence the representation, but Germany refused to develop a unifying political power from the principle of the feudalism-representation as the other nations of the Europe, e.g. the French people, had done. As he revealed that wars had exposed the consequence brought by fastening on the subjective freedom or private rights, Hegel intended to illuminate that private laws must be supported by a higher end and essence, so that the subject freedom and private rights could be assured to realize. It was the examination of the German Constitution and the political existence, or in other words, his insight of the German fate, that compelled Hegel to review the foundation of the modern state and its theoretical sources, and farther to demonstrate the legitimacy and the supremacy of the state in a new way, because in the last analysis the theoretical approach of social contract based on natural right treated the state as no more than a fiction according to private laws, an approach coincident with the present political situation of the German Empire. On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law as the embryo of Elements of the Philosophy of Right was the primary attempt to construct the philosophy of ethical life. In the first place, Hegel critiqued two modern ways of treating natural law, namely, the empiricist and formalist ways. Hegel took notice of the logical knot in the empiricist way: on one hand, there was a vicious circle to the extent that the natural state and the state of law (des Rechtszustandes) were regarded reciprocally as the premise for one another, and on the other hand, even though the argument on the division of the natural state and the state of law was valid, in the transition of the natural state to the state of law still exited a logical break. While the formalist way overcame the arbitrariness of empiricism in resolving and abstracting, it pushed the abstraction of pure reason to extremes, and ended in the empty moral imperative. Hegel penetrated the logical flaw in the process of practical reason to universalize a maxim of action: on one hand, only through the tautology excluding any content could realize the strict universalizing, and on the other hand, since the most extreme formalizing could not be attained in the practical deeds, the universal legislation of formalism was so doomed to allow ultimately any discretional contents to be accepted as laws that it had to confront the puzzle of moral relativism. Hegel’s reconstruction of modern natural law lay in that "absolute ethical life" as the positivity of rational institution dissolved the individualism or the atomism from which all the modern theories of natural law and social contract started, by virtue of which Hegel could indicate the necessity and significance of the state as ethical individuality for the national history as well as human history. Hegel expounded the nationality of ethical life, the relation of the universality of ethical life to the particularity in the economic field (i.e. the system of reality), the relation of ethical life to the subjective morality, and the relation of the philosophy of ethical life to the positive sciences of right (i.e. science of departmental law).The third chapter construes Elements of the Philosophy of Right in order to make the foregoing argument systemized and clarified. To the extent that the universality of ethical life and the principle of subjective freedom are reconciled by mediating each other and coexist in the state comprehended by the rechtsphilosophie, Elements of the Philosophy of Right can be considered as the completion of Plato’s Republic. After unfolding Hegel’s prudent position of actual rationalism which claims the unification of reason and actuality, this chapter analyses detailedly the meaning of three core term--"freedom", "recht" (right), "ethical life", and views that "right" in its broad sense, "freedom", and "ethical life" can be regarded as terms with equivalent connotation which signify the same thing, that is, the property of the spirit: every stage in the development of the free spirit enjoys its rightness, it can be said, therefore, that every stage has its "right", whereas "ethical life" pertains more to the freedom as the essence of the human world, the political community of man. Thus, the natural law reconstructed by Hegel is the philosophy of ethical life, i.e. philosophy of freedom, or the rechtsphilosophie, which aims at demonstrating the nature of the state. State is the highest shape of ethical life; hence, the right of the state is superior to the abstract right and it absorbs and supports the abstract right, being the basis and essence of the latter. As the separating and different moment of ethical substance, civil society can not supersede the state, which implies that the relation of private law can not invade the constitutional relation of state. Since rational state realizes the unification of the subjective freedom and the objective freedom, correspondingly, individual freedom is realized concretely in the rational state, which means right and duty is a concrete identity in content, no longer an abstract and equivalent identity. It is in accord with the classical meaning of "politeia" that Hegel applies the term "constitution". Considering that Hegel infuses subjective freedom into the universal, and regard the total ethical life as the ground of the organization of the state, he makes the "constitution" he has said--not simply a written constitution~the realization of the reconciliation between the ancient way of life and the modern way of life, that is, in the modern rational state realize completely the classical citizen’s political life as well as the modern bourgeois’s economic life both of which thereby reach a reconciliation. Following the classical views, Hegel maintains that good constitution is the best school inasmuch constitution coincident with the principle of freedom cultivates good citizens having patriotic feelings and political disposition. But different from the ancients, Hegel believes that the good constitution is the inevitable product of the free spirit in its development.The conclusion displays two points. Firstly, to sum up the whole dissertation and conclude that by resorting to "ethical life" or "the idea of freedom", Hegel demolishes the absoluteness of individual-based natural right in the modern theory of natural law, and takes advantage of his own natural law reconstructed, i.e., the philosophy of ethical life or the rechtsphilosophie of freedom, to justify the logical priority and the supremacy of state, and to manifest that constitution is neither a compilation of private rights nor some contractual fiction, but exactly the embodiment of ethical life. Secondly, to discuss briefly the relation between the nature of the state and world history posited by Hegel, and try to explore Hegel’s national complex which may drive him to construct the world history as well as his whole philosophical system. At the end of the dissertation presents a viewpoint which a firm Hegelianist has inferred contrary properly to Hegel’s own purport. Accordingly such an open question whether the inevitable consequence of the world history will be the coexistence of sovereign states or the universalization of judicial order can be raised that the significance of Hegel’s thought is illuminated further, that is, Hegel may have indeed exhausted the possibility of human beings, for both of the meaning of the past and the direction of the future depend on the present interpretation of Hegel.更多还原