【作者】 王俊韡；

【导师】 徐向艺；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 自20世纪50年代MM定理以来,资本结构理论沿着三个方向而展开,公司资本结构是否影响公司价值;最优资本结构是否存在;影响资本结构的因素是什么。实质上,这三个方向的根本出发点都是资本结构是否影响公司价值或者说公司价值是否与资本结构有关,其中,前两个属于理论研究的问题,第三个则属于实证研究的问题。在MM之后到20世纪60年代,掀起了一场“公司价值是否与资本结构有关”的大论战,传统资本结构理论学派和现代资本结构理论学派激烈争辩,水火不容。在这场大论战之后,相继出现了资本结构的委托代理理论、信号传递理论和控制权理论等,虽然这些理论研究的视角不同,但关于资本结构影响公司价值的观点已成定论。随着资本结构理论的发展,人们逐渐发现,资本结构不仅仅是一个静态的现金流分配问题,背后还隐藏着控制权的拥有和执行问题。构成资本结构的股本和债务不仅仅是企业重要的融资工具,也是非常重要的控制权基础和治理工具,两者之间特定的比例及构成,就会形成特定的控制权结构和公司治理机制。如果公司的资本结构不合理,就会影响公司的控制权安排和治理效率,引起公司价值下降,公司价值的下降将会直接导致资本结构的动态变化——公司控制权的转移,控制权转移的结果将通过重新配置资本结构和控制权,从而对公司价值产生影响。本文将资本结构与公司价值研究作为主题,主要解决一个重要问题:静态资本结构与动态资本结构对公司价值产生的影响是怎样的?国内学者对资本结构研究的较多,多数注重狭义和静态的资本结构研究,本文则从广义的资本结构入手,将股权结构、债务结构以及两者的共同作用对公司价值的影响纳入一个统一的的分析框架,先从静态分析股权结构、债务结构以及两者的共同作用对公司价值的影响机理,接着选取中国上市公司数据实证检验静态的资本结构对公司价值的影响结果,然后借助资本结构的动态概念,从控制权转移角度分析资本结构动态变化对公司价值的影响机理,之后又选取中国上市公司数据实证检验动态的资本结构对公司价值的影响结果。通过静态的资本结构与公司价值的理论分析发现,不同的股权持有主体和不同的股权集中度、不同的债务结构和债务期限对公司价值的影响不同;机构持股和管理者股权对公司价值的影响存在多种效应;与股权高度集中和高度分散相比,适度集中的股权结构可能更有利于公司价值的提高;银行负债比公司债券的监督约束能力更强,短期负债主要通过监督效应增加公司价值,长期负债主要通过避税效应增加公司价值;股权结构与债务结构共同作用对公司价值影响的决策模型显示两者存在互补作用,集中的股权结构与集中的债务结构相联系,分散的股权结构与分散的债务结构相联系,强的股权约束与强的债务约束相联系。在静态的资本结构影响公司价值的理论分析之后,论文选取中国上市公司2003-2006年的全样本数据来检验静态资本结构对公司价值的影响。结果发现:目前的国有股比例过高,不利于公司价值的提升;适度集中的法人股比例有利于公司价值的提升;流通股对公司价值的作用并不显著;管理者股权存在利益趋同效应和防御效应,目前的管理者持股比例过低,离有效激励的管理者股权比例相差甚远;第一大股东持股比例与公司价值之间存在显著的区间效应,适度集中的股权结构有利于公司价值的提高;资产负债率与公司价值呈现显著的非线性关系,存在转折点;长期负债与短期负债相比,在发挥监督约束管理者、提高公司价值方面更加有利:公司债务与股权集中度显著负相关,两者之间不存在互补作用;负债与国有股的共同作用对公司价值的影响为负,负债与流通股的共同作用对公司价值的影响为正;公司规模对公司价值有正的影响,资本成本对公司价值有负的影响。动态的资本结构与公司价值的理论分析以上市公司控制权转移为例,得出控制权转移后公司价值得到明显改善,有偿转让的控制权转移方式在改善公司价值方面优于无偿划拨方式,而控制权部分转移在改善公司价值方面与全部转移无显著差异,新控股方为不同股权性质(国有股和法人股)在改善公司价值方面也没有显著差异。在动态的资本结构影响公司价值的理论分析之后,论文选取中国上市公司2004-2006年发生控制权转移的样本数据来检验动态资本结构对公司价值的影响。结果发现:在控制权转移后公司的主营业务能力有了明显提高,控制权有偿转让和全部转移更加有利于公司净资产收益率的提高:整个控制权转移过程显示,上市公司的净资产收益率(ROE)变化最为敏感,托宾Q存在很大的不稳定性,而主营业务资产收益率(CROA)表现比较稳定,是一个不错的衡量指标。论文在理论分析和实证分析之后,结合我国的实际情况,提出应该构建合理的股权结构和债务结构,降低国有股比例,加快股票全流通,构建适度集中的法人股控股的股权结构,完善信贷市场,充分发挥负债的杠杆作用,提高公司的资产负债率转折点,加强股权治理和债务治理共同作用,合理促进资本结构的动态优化,对公司价值较低、经营效率低下的企业进行并购重组或者退市,并购中应更多的使用控制权有偿转让和全部转让方式,提高上市公司的主营业务能力和净资产收益率。更多还原

【Abstract】 From theory MM, papers about capital structure are always focused on three questions, one of which is the effect of capital structure on enterprise Value, one of which is whether there is optimal capital structure, and another of which is the factors influencing capital structure. In fact, the essential start of three questions is whether enterprise value is relative to capital structure. From MM to 1960s, the existence of optimal structure has been approved from various angles in western capital structure theories and a great deal of empirical study supports different views, including principal-agent theory, signaling theory, and control-based theory. Further more, the conclusion of capital structure affecting enterprise value is affirmatory.Along with the development of capital theory, people realised capital structure is not only the static basis of cash distribution, but also hides corporate control rights. The ratio of equity and debt will decide the corporate control rights, which are the decision-making rights. Capital structure and control rights will be changed through control transfer if they are not matched efficiently. So, the control transfer can restrict capital structure and improve enterprise value.This paper will make a detailed research on the relationship of capital structure and enterprise value, aiming to settle an important problem "how does static and dynamic capital structure affect on enterprise value" .There are many papers on capital structure, but most of them focus on narrow-sense and static capital structure. This paper will proceed with broad-sense, and put equity and debt into a unitive frame, analysing the influence of static equity, debt, and the interaction of them on enterprise value. Then by selecting domestic listed samples, this paper makes a positive study to testify the effect of static capital structure on enterprise value. By virtue of dynamic capital structure, this paper analyses how control transfer influences enterprise value. Following theory analysis, this paper selects control transfer samples, making an empirical study to testify the effect of dynamic capital structure on enterprise value. Through the analysis of relationship between static capital structure and enterprise value, we find that different equity holders, different equity concentration, different debt structure and different debt maturity have different effect on enterprise value. In contrast with high and low equity concentration, moderate equity concentration may be more advantaged to improve enterprise value. Bank debt has more powerful restriction than corporate debts, short-maturity debt improves enterprise value mainly by supervise effect, and long-maturity debt improves enterprise value mainly by tax shields. The interaction of equity and debt influences enterprise value inter-complementary which means that concentrated equity is relative to concentrated debt, dispersive equity is relative to dispersive debt, and powerful restriction of equity is relative to powerful restriction of debt.After the analysis of mechanism that static capital structure affects enterprise value, the fourth chapter carries out a positive study to testify the effect of static capital structure on enterprise value, and draws some important conclusions. At present, state-owned equity is too high, which has negative effect on enterprise value; moderate concentrated corporate-owned equity is advantageous to improve enterprise value, while circulating equity is inapparent to improve enterprise value; managerial equity has positive and negative effect on enterprise value, which is too low and noneffective now. The relation of largest holder’s equity and enterprise value is cubic, so moderate eqity concentration is better. The relation of leverage and enterprise value is quadratic, and long-maturity debt is more advantaged to supervise manager to improve enterprise value in contrast with short-maturity debt, which is opposite to theoretic conclusion. In additon, concentrated equity is coexistent with dispersive debt, which means that equity and debt is not inter-complementary. The interaction of debt and state-owned equity has negative effect on enterprise value, while the interaction of debt and circulating equity has positive effect on enterprise value. Corporate size has positive effect on enterprise value, while capital cost has negative effect on enterprise value.Taking control transfer for exaqmple, this paper analyses dynamic capital structure influences enterprise value, and find that enterprise value is improved distinctly after control transfer. In additon, there is much difference between payed transfer and nopayed transfer, there is no difference between partly transfer and total transfer, and there is no difference to affect EV when new large-holder’ s nature is defferent.Following theory analysis of dynamic capital structure affecting enterprise value, this paper selects control transfer samples, making an empirical study to testify the effect of dynamic capital structure on enterprise value, and draws some important conclusions. Firstly, CROA is improved distinctly after control transfer, and other indexes haven’t showed this character. Secondly, payed transfer and total transfer can improve corporate ROE more efficiently. The last and the most important, the index ROE is the most sensitive to control transfer, the index TQ is not regular, and the index CROA is the most moderate.Finally, on the basis of theory and empirical study, this paper gives some suggestions. We should build reasonable equity and debt structure, by reducing state-owned equity, by speeding up circulation of stock. We should open the door to capital market, increase corporate leverage, strengthen the interaction of equity and debt, and optimize dynamic capital structure. We should adopt more market control transfer to improve enterprise value.更多还原