【作者】 李森；

【导师】 赵梦涵；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 财政学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,基层财政困境成为财政实际工作亟待解决的难题,也是理论界研究的热点。很多学者侧重从财政体制角度探讨基层财政困境的成因和出路,但却没有解释为什么不合理的体制会长期存在而难以得到修正;也有的学者从基层政府财政自身探讨困境的成因和出路,认为基层政府机构臃肿、人浮于事,支出效率低下,二、三产业不发达,财源有限等因素导致了基层财政困境。显然,他们所指出的原因本身就是亟待解决的现实问题,如果这些问题不能解决,基层财政自然也就难以解困,而要解决这些导致基层财政困境问题的问题,从逻辑上讲,就是要探讨基层财政困境成因的成因,即要寻找基层财政困境问题的症结,要对导致基层财政困境的多种原因追本溯源,找出它们共同的根源。本文认为,基层财政困境从根本上讲,是市场经济条件下我国规定高层政府与基层政府间权力分配关系的特定制度结构扭曲的必然结果。从应然的角度分析,政府财政是人们为了降低公共产品供给过程中的交易成本而创设的一种特殊的制度安排。目前的多级政府是从最初的单一层次的“小政府”发展演化过来的。由于受交易成本的制约,最初能够出现的政府必然是涉及人数少、涵盖范围有限的“小政府”。“小政府”为了降低受益范围超出各自辖区的公共产品供给的交易成本,就成立了高一层次的政府,其权力来自“小政府”的授予,其可以协调、管理“小政府”的行为,提供超出“小政府”辖区范围的公共产品,于是单一层次的政府就为二层制政府所取代。以此类推,多个高一层次的政府为降低受益范围超出各自辖区的公共产品供给的交易成本会成立更高层次的政府,政府级次化的程度会由此而不断加深,但不会一直持续下去。因为高一层次的政府通过其与低层次政府之间的纵向交易替代低层次政府之间的横向交易,虽然可以降低公共产品供给的交易成本,但随着政府级次的增加,边际横向交易成本递减而边际纵向交易成本递增,当二者相等时政府级次就会实现均衡。这种公共产品供给交易成本的政府层级降低机制表明,基层政府首先具有存在的必然性、合理性,(本文称之为“逻辑先在性”)。因此,要构建财政管理体制就需要遵循“自下而上”授权的思路。在政府级次化的条件下,基层政府财政职能的实现,就不能不受高层政府的影响。由于二者本质上都是降低公共产品供给过程中的交易成本的手段和方式,因此,界定基层政府财政的职能就需要发挥二者的比较优势。由于基层财政在提供基层公共产品方面具有比较优势,可以很好地体现公平和效率原则,因此,基层财政职能的集中体现就是提供基层公共产品,这意味着与该类公共产品供给所对应的支出就必须由基层政府安排,高层政府不能“越俎代庖”,这构成基层财政的职能范围。但是,在收入筹集方面,高层政府更具有比较优势,按照政府间分税的原则,用来提供基层公共产品的收入相当部分需要高层政府筹集,这意味着基层财政在收入筹集方面对高层政府存在一定的依赖性,需要依靠高层政府的转移支付,由此就产生了一种风险,即如果高层政府“自利”,其筹集了收入却不安排足够的转移支付,就会使基层财政职能的实现遇到障碍。不过如果政府间权力关系的划分采取“自下而上”授权的思路,这种风险就仅仅体现为一种可能性。从实然的角度分析,我国的基层政府处于双重委托代理链条中,一是横向的委托代理,即基层政府要对基层人大负责;一是纵向的委托代理,即基层政府还要对高层政府负责。在现实中,横向的委托代理链条是“虚”的,而纵向的委托代理链条是“实”的。这意味着我国基层政府对高层政府存在明显的依附关系,集中体现为高层政府可以在很大程度上决定基层政府领导人的任免,于是基层政府就主要体现为对高层政府负责。我国基层政府所处的这种“自上而下”的纵向委托代理链条存在很大局限。首先,这一委托代理链条过长,以致初始委托人难以对基层政府的行为进行有效监督,从实现初始委托人利益目标的角度看,基层政府的努力程度就会降低。其次,委托权的归属也有问题。由于高层政府相对基层政府其行为更容易监督,基层政府在公共产品供给方面的地位更为重要,因此委托权应掌握在基层政府手中,但我国“自上而下”的委托代理链条却扭曲了高层政府和基层政府的关系并导致二者之间严重的信息不对称。在政府的公务人员都是“经济人”而政府又“自利”的前提下,由此必然导致严重的财政机会主义行为。首先,高层政府处于“自利”会凭借自己相对基层政府的优势地位上收财权、下放事权,这造成基层财政职责扭曲、功能弱化;其次,基层政府相对高层政府虽然处于弱势地位,只能在高层政府确定的制度框架下安排自己的财政活动,但是,基层政府并不是完全被动的,其毕竟具有明显的信息优势,基层政府决策者会利用这种信息优势通过机会主义行为来攫取私利,这同样会使基层财政职责扭曲、功能弱化,最终在外部因素(高层政府的挤压)和内部因素(基层政府行为的异化)的共同作用下,基层财政的功能与职责产生严重的对立和冲突,从而最终导致基层财政陷入困境。我国自建国以来,基层政府对高层政府一直存在依附关系。建国初期的统收统支体制和作为统收统支体制变型的1952—1979年的“以支定收、一年一变”体制虽然弱化了基层财政的地位,但并未导致严重的基层财政困难。1980—1993年的“以收定支,一定几年不变”的包干体制,是中央在经济压力下进行的分权改革,这项改革具有更多的分级管理色彩,但中央仍然牢牢地掌握着体制制定权,在中央发现地方利用信息优势挖挤自己的收入后,中央就推行了具有明显集权色彩的分税制。分税制推行十几年来总体看呈财权不断上收、事权不断下划格局,基层财政处于被挤压的境地,由于其没有下级财政可以下放事权、集中财权,所以一度只能从其管理服务的主要对象农民身上集中收入,但在农业税取消后,基层财政回旋余地变小,而基层政府所处的特殊地位又使之无法调整与高层政府的财政分配关系,于是基层财政陷入困境也就带有了必然性。与国有企业改革进行的较为彻底有所不同的是,我国的财政分权改革重新走上了集权道路。这是因为非国有经济的发展对国有企业所形成的强力竞争迫使政府进行了彻底的国企改革,而高层政府主导的财政分权改革却一直不存在“异己”力量。在国有企业改革取得成功、经济绩效明显提高、高层政府承受的经济压力大大减轻从而使当初分权的动因不复存在的条件下,高层政府利用自己对基层政府的控制权重新走了集权道路。高层政府的“收放”循环虽然可以使基层财政困境暂时缓解,但在目前的制度框架下,基层财政解困会陷入困境。高层政府凭借相对基层政府的优势地位使基层财政陷入困境状态,会抑制基层政府的积极性,这反过来会影响高层政府自身利益,于是高层政府面向基层政府推行了“晋升锦标赛”制度,以GDP增长率等指标考核基层政府决策者的政绩以提高其积极性,但高层政府的地位使其考核基层政府天然处于信息上的劣势,由此导致基层政府严重的机会主义行为,具体体现为政府竞争、投资、筹资及机构设置和用人行为的异化。基层政府的机会主义行为大大加深了基层财政困境的程度。既然基层财政困境根源于形成高层政府与基层政府特殊关系的制度安排,那么要实现基层财政解困就需要通过制度的变迁来实现,由“自上而下”分权转向“自下而上”授权,但要在我国实现这样的制度变迁目前还存在明显的“路径依赖”。无论考察客观因素还是主观因素;无论考察高层政府还是基层政府;无论分析民众行为还是政府决策者的行为,都难以在短时间内实现这样的制度变迁,但制度变迁短时间内难以实现并不意味着目前不合理的制度可以永远处于“锁定”状态。长期来看,其会通过两种可能的途径实现变迁:一是被动的变迁。在基层政府的机会主义行为导致的财政风险累积到一定程度从而成为社会性风险以致要威胁到高层政府自身利益的时候,高层政府将被迫放弃“自上而下”的纵向委托代理链条,发挥具有比较优势的同级权力机关对基层政府的监督作用进而走向“自下而上”授权的制度安排;二是主动的变迁,即高层政府特别是中央政府在通过知识的积累认识到“自上而下”委托代理链条存在难以克服的缺陷,认识到实现上述制度变迁是不可违背的客观规律,并且认识到实现这样的变迁从根本上讲也有利于其自身利益最大化的时候,高层政府特别是中央政府会支持和推动这样的制度变迁。我国基层社区供给公共产品所形成的内部规则在不断加深民众对制度变迁必要性的理解并产生推动制度变迁的愿望和要求,而私人产权规模的扩张将最终促使推动制度变迁的第一集团的出现。高层政府特别是中央政府则会充当支持制度变迁的第二集团,二者结合起来会最终促使制度由“自上而下”分权转向“自下而上”授权。这样以来,导致基层财政困境的制度性原因将得以消解,基层财政就可以从“治本”的意义上解困。需要指出的是,这样的制度变迁不但不违背“统一领导、分级管理”的原则,而且将使该原则得以真正实现。更多还原

【Abstract】 For the past few years, the predicament of basic level public finances has become the difficult problem which is necessary to be resolved and has been the hotspot which the theory circles are studying. Many scholars place extra emphasis on the angle of fiscal system to investigate the causes of formation and outlets of the predicament of basic level public finances, but not explain why the unreasonable system can exist for a long time and is difficult to be revised; There are some scholars who investigate the causes of formation and outlets of the predicament from basic level public finances themselves and think that overstaffed organizations, low efficiency of public expenditures, the undeveloped second and third industry, limited financial resources, etc. lead to the predicament of basic level public finances. Obviously, the causes themselves which they point out are the problems that are necessary to be resolved. If these problems cannot be resolved, basic level public finances of course cannot break away from the predicament. If we want to resolve the problems which cause the problems of the predicament of basic level public finances, speaking according to logic, we should investigate the causes of the causes of the predicament of basic level public finances, i.e. we should seek the crux of the problems of the predicament of basic level public finances, should trace to the source for many kinds of causes of the predicament of public finances, find the common root. This article points out that radically speaking the predicament of basic level public finances is the inevitable result of the particular system structure which stipulates the power allocation relationship and is morphed under the condition of market economy.Analyzed from the angle of "it should be", the government public finance is a kind of special system arrangement which is devised by the people to decrease the transaction cost during the course of the supply of public goods. Current multilevel governments evolved and developed from the original single level "little government". Controlled by the transaction cost, the government which can appear must be the "little government" which involves a few people and has limited coverage range. "Little governments" in order to decrease the transaction cost of public goods whichbenefit range beyond the respective popedom, set up a higher level government whichpower is awarded by "little governments" and which can coordinate and manage theconduct of "little governments", provide the public goods which beyond the popedomof "little governments", then the single level government may be displaced by the twolevels government. By parity of reasoning, for decreasing the transaction cost ofpublic goods which benefit range beyond respective popedom, many high levelgovernments may set up a higher level government, the degree of governmenthierarchy will be deepened for this, but can’t continue for ever. Because a highergovernment displace the horizontal transaction among lower governments by thevertical transaction between itself and lower level governments, although maydecrease the transaction cost of public goods’ supply, by the increase of governmentslevels, the marginal horizontal transaction cost decreases and the marginal verticaltransaction cost increases, when both are equal, the government level will realizeequilibrium. This kind of mechanism of the decrease of transaction cost of publicgoods’ supply of government levels indicates that basic level governments firstlyoccupy the necessity and rationality of existing (this article names it " logicalpreexisting "). Therefore, the thought of awarding power "from bottom to top" mustbe followed when fiscal management system is constructed. Under the condition ofthe government hierarchy, the realization of the fiscal function of basic levelgovernments, cannot avoid the influence of high level governments. Because both ofthem are methods and ways to decrease the transaction cost during the course ofpublic goods supply in the sense of essence, both comparative advantages need to bebrought into play when the fiscal function of basic level governments is defined.There are comparative advantages for basic level public finances to provide basiclevel public goods, the principles of both fairness and efficiency may be well reflected,therefore, providing public goods is the centralizing embody of the function of basiclevel public finances, this indicates that expenditures match along with these kinds ofpublic goods must be arranged by basic level governments and can’t be replaced byhigh level governments. This constitutes the function ranges of basic level governments. However, high level governments have more comparative advantages for raising revenue. According to the principle of dividing taxes among governments, considerable parts of the revenue for providing basic level public goods need to be collected by high level governments, which implies that basic level governments depends on high level governments for raising revenue and rely on the transfer of high level governments, therefore a kind of risk comes into being. i.e. if high level governments benefit themselves, they raise revenue but not arrange enough transfer, which can make the realization of the function of basic level public finances run into obstacles. But if the awarding power thought "from bottom to top" is adopted for dividing the power relationship among governments, this kind of risk is merely reflected into a kind of possibility.Analyzed from the angle of "being", basic level governments of our country locates in double chains of trust agency, one is horizontal trust agency, i.e. basic level governments are responsible for basic level national people’s congresses; the other is vertical trust agency, i.e. basic level governments are still responsible for high level governments. In reality, the horizontal trust agency chain is void, but the vertical trust agency chain is solid, which indicates basic level governments of our country obviously depend on high level governments, which is centralizing embodied that high level governments may decide the appoint and dismiss of basic level governments’ officials to a degree, then basic level governments are mainly embodied to be responsible for high level governments. There exist great limits for the vertical trust agency chain "from top to bottom" in which basic level governments state. At first, for the initial principal, the trust agency chain is too long to supervise the behavior of basic level governments. Investigation from the angle of realizing the interest aim of the initial principal, the striving degree of basic level governments will decrease. Secondly, there are problems for the belonging of trust power. For high level governments’ behaviors are supervised more easily than those of basic level governments’, the status of providing public goods is more important for basic level governments, so trust power should be grasped by basic level governments. But the trust agency chain "from top to bottom" distorts the relationship and leads to information asymmetry between high level governments and basic level governments. Under the precondition that public servants of governments are "economic men" and governments benefit themselves, serious opportunism behaviors can be created by this. Firstly, high level governments in order to benefit themselves may concentrate revenue power and demote expenditure power, which makes basic level governments’ duty distorted and function weak; Secondly, although basic level governments are in a weak status comparing with high governments and only can arrange their activities of public finance under the framework which is decided by high level governments. But basic level governments are not passive completely, after all they occupy obvious information advantages, decision makers of basic level governments may make use of this kind of information advantages and snatch private interest by opportunism behaviors, which equally can make the duty of basic level governments distorted and function weak. Finally, by the common role of external factors (the extrusion of high level governments) and internal factors (the dissimilation of behaviors of basic level governments), serious contrasts and conflicts come into being between the function and the duty of basic level public finances, then at last which makes basic level public finances sink into the predicament.Since our country was set up, the relationship which basic level governments rely on high level governments has been remained. Although the system of collection and allocation of funds by the central government at the period of just setting up the country and the system of "deciding revenue by expenditure, changing every year" from 1952 to 1979 which is a version of the former weakened the status of basic level public finance, both of them didn’t lead to serious difficulties of basic level public finances. The contract system of "deciding expenditure by revenue, unchanging for a few years" from 1980 to 1993 is the dividing power reform which was carried out by the central government suffering the economic pressure. This kind of reform has more color of classification management, but the central government still grasps the power of formulating systems. After the central government finds that local governments excavate its revenue, then the central government carries out the dividing taxes system which has obvious color of concentrating power. Since the dividing taxes system was carried out ten years or so ago, the pattern that the power of raising revenue has been concentrated and the power of expenditure has been dispersed appears investigated totally. Basic level governments are in a state of being extruded. Because they have no low level governments to disperse the expenditure power and concentrate the revenue power, for a time they only can concentrate revenue from peasants who are main objects they manage and serve. But after the agriculture tax is cancelled, the convolution space of basic level public finances becomes small, and the special status in which basic level public finances situate make them have no way to adjust the fiscal allocation relationship with high level governments. Then it is inevitable that basic level public finances sink into the predicament It is different with the reform of state-owned enterprises which is relatively carried out entirely, the reform of fiscal dividing power of our country walks up the road of concentrating power once more. This is because the mighty competition which non-state-owned enterprises bring to state-owned enterprises forces governments carry out the entire reform of state-owned enterprises. However there is still no dissident force for the reform of fiscal dividing power which is predominant by high level governments. Under the condition that successes have been achieved for the reform of state-owned enterprises, economic performances have been promoted obviously, economic pressures suffered by high level governments alleviate greatly and the original motive of dividing power has vanished, high level governments walk up the road of concentrating power making use of the power of controlling basic level governments. Although the circulation of "taking back and offloading" can relieve the predicament of basic level governments temporarily, under the system fracture nowadays, resolving the predicament of basic level public finances may sink into the predicament.High level governments make basic level public finances sink into the predicament by using of the status comparing with basic level governments, which may restrain the enthusiasm of basic level governments, while which may restrain high level governments’ own benefits. Then high level governments carry out the "promotion championship contest" for basic level governments, examine the achievements of policy makers of basic level governments by the index of the growth rate of GDP, etc. to improve their enthusiasm. But the status of high level governments make them have information weakness naturally to test basic level governments, which leads to serious opportunism behaviors of basic level governments, which are reflected in behavior dissimilation of competitions, investment, raising funds, setting up organizations and employing people of governments. Opportunism behaviors of basic level governments deepen the predicament degree of basic level public finances.Since the predicament of basic level governments roots in the institution arrangement which formulates the special relationship between high and basic level governments, then the realization of resolving the predicament of basic level public finances needs to be realized by the transition of institutions, transforming from dividing power "from top to bottom" to awarding power "from bottom to top", but there exists obvious "path dependence" for realizing this kind of institution transition in our country. Investigating no matter objective factors or subjective factors, high level governments or basic level governments, behaviors of masses or policy makers of governments, we find that it is difficult to realize this kind of institution transition in a short period of time, however the impossibility of realizing the institution transition in a short period of time doesn’t indicate the unreasonable institution may keep in the state of "locking" for ever. Investigated for a long time, the transition may be realized by two kinds of ways: one is passive transition. When fiscal risks caused by opportunism behaviors of basic level governments accumulate to specific degree to become social risks and threaten the benefit of high level governments’ own, high level governments will be compelled to give up the vertical trust agency chain "from top to bottom", developing the supervising role to basic level governments of the sister power organizations that occupy the comparative advantages and transform to the institution of awarding power "from bottom to top". The second is active transition, i.e. when high level governments especially the central government realizes that there are shortcomings which are difficult to overcome for the trust agency chain "from top to bottom" by the accumulation of knowledge, realizes that it is objective rule which must be obedient to realize above-mentioned institution transition, and realizes that fundamentally speaking it is also advantageous for maximizing its own benefit to realize this kind of institution transition, high level governments especially the central government may support and improve this kind of institution transition. Internal regulations formulated during the course of supplying public goods in basic level communities of our country frequently deepen the comprehension of the people for the necessities about the institution transition and make the people bring about desires and requests to promote the transition of institutions. The extension of the scale of private property rights will eventually make the first group which promotes the institution transition come into being. High level governments especially the central government may serve as the second group which supports the institution transition, the combination of both of them can eventually promote the institution from dividing power "from top to bottom" to awarding power "from bottom to top". Since then, the institutional reasons which cause the predicament of basic level public finances will disappear, the predicament of basic level public finances may be resolved in the sense of effecting a permanent cure. It is necessary to point out, this kind of institution transition not only isn’t to be contrary to the principle of "unified leading and classification management", but also can make the principle be realized really.更多还原