【作者】 李鑫；

【导师】 徐向艺；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,中国经济保持快速增长,投资对经济增长发挥了主要的拉动作用。但由于受资源和消费需求等的限制,伴随着过快的投资增长,不少行业和地区不同程度地出现了“投资过热”现象,从而引发一系列问题,如能源和原材料的紧缺、产能过剩、经济结构扭曲、重复建设等。由于过度地投资,大量的资本沉淀在生产能力过剩从而盈利能力恶化的领域,同时也减弱了经济增长吸纳劳动力的能力,制约着经济、环境与社会的协调发展。企业是经济运行的主体,宏观层面的“投资过热”与微观层面的企业“过度投资”是密不可分的。所谓“过度投资”,是指企业的投资超出或偏离了自身的能力和成长机会,投资于净现值为负的非盈利项目,从而损害企业的价值。由于中国市场经济尚处于不成熟阶段,加之股权结构不合理,上市公司“过度投资”行为更为明显和严重,“过度投资”已成为制约中国上市公司质量提升和长期持续发展的主要因素。更值得注意的是,我国相当一部分企业的投资靠银行信贷支持,而投资效率过低意味着信贷回收的前景堪忧以及金融系统风险的积累。现代企业中所有权与控制权的分离、信息不对称以及监控成本的存在,使自由现金流处于经理人控制之下,经理人具有将资源投入到非盈利项目的能力;同时,经理人的报酬(包括显性报酬和隐性报酬)通常与企业规模正相关;这样,经理人既有能力也有动机将本应发放给股东的红利投入到能够给自己带来私人收益的非盈利项目,从而导致企业过度投资。另一方面,大股东控制了公司的经营决策权,为其掠夺中小股东财富提供了可能。实践中,大股东掠夺小股东获取控制权收益的一个主要方式就是投资资金的滥用以及不正当关联交易。在现代公司运作过程中,股东-经理人冲突引发的代理型治理问题、大股东-中小股东冲突引发的剥夺型治理问题以及股东-债权人冲突引发的债务型治理问题都直接影响着企业的投资决策,其中最主要的体现就是过度投资。中国的国有企业,由于所有者“虚位”,代理问题和利益冲突更加严重,当企业产生充足的现金流时,国有企业的经营者往往选择通过加大固定资产投资、发展多元化产业或兼并收购等来扩大企业规模。企业通过留存利润增加投资,不用像从金融部门获得融资那样受到严格的审核监督,而且经营者可以控制更多的资源和权力,如果投资顺利、企业规模壮大,还可以获得政府的奖励和更高的薪酬;即使投资项目失败,由于国有企业所有者“虚位”、公司治理机制虚化,也不用承担损失;而分红意味着经营者可控资源的减少和转移,所以往往出现产生高额利润的垄断企业宁愿发展根本不具竞争优势的副业、甚至投资净现值为负的非盈利项目(过度投资),也不向国家或投资者分红的现象。这也是目前出现部门利益凌驾于国家利益、投资效率较低、宏观调控效率不高的根源之一。由于中国上市公司大多由原国有企业改制而成,投资行为并没有摆脱利用财政和银行资金的“投资饥渴症”的影响,在部分投资资金来源于资本市场后,依然沿袭原国有企业的投资行为模式,在过度留存利润和公司治理机制不完善的情况下,普遍存在过度投资行为,导致企业资金配置效率低下和宏观层面的投资过热。公司治理与企业投资行为存在着不可分割的联系。有效的公司治理能通过一系列制度安排实现股东、债权人和经理人等之间的相互制衡,防范和化解股东-债权人、股东-经理人、大股东-中小股东之间的利益冲突,防范投资风险,保证企业投资决策的科学化和有效运行。正是在这个意义上,Milgorm and Roberts指出,当企业被看作是一组不完备契约时,企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权间的有效结合是提高企业投资效率和经营效率的关键。而公司治理的本质就是关于企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权分配的制度性安排。因此,公司治理在企业投资决策过程中发挥重要作用,公司治理水平直接关系到企业的投资效率。作为未来现金流量增长的基础和企业成长的主要动因,企业投资行为本应受到学术界的重视,但是由于企业投资行为本身的复杂性,其研究长期处于零散、停滞状态。可喜的是,最近20年来,企业投资—现金流分析范式日趋完善,企业投资不再是“黑箱”,为人们逐步认识和分析企业投资行为提供了理论支持。而目前关于中国企业投资行为的研究还处于起步阶段,与企业的实际投资行为脱钩,还没有对现实条件下中国企业的非效率投资行为作出令人满意的解释。本文在系统借鉴和吸收西方最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,综合运用管理学、金融学、信息经济学、计量经济学和公司治理理论,采用文献研究、理论论证、比较分析、统计数据分析、制度分析等研究方法,结合中国资本市场的实际情况,对信息不对称条件下的企业投资行为进行了深入的分析,通过实证研究检验了上市公司过度投资与自由现金流的敏感性,揭示了股权结构、公司治理、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资的真实影响,阐释了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,对如何有效控制企业“过度投资”及完善上市公司治理进行了有益的理论分析,提出了有针对性的政策建议。论文主要围绕以下问题展开:(1)上市公司存在“过度投资”的理论分析、实证证据及其形成机理。以企业投资理论为基础,结合中国国情,系统分析了上市公司“过度投资”的可能性。借鉴国内外企业投资行为研究的最新成果,建立计量模型,对中国上市公司的过度投资程度进行了衡量,论文通过实证研究证明,相当一部分中国上市公司存在比较严重的过度投资行为,而且近年来有不断加剧的倾向。(2)自由现金流对上市公司过度投资的“催化”作用及敏感性分析。自由现金流一方面可以提高企业内部融资能力,缓解企业面临的外部融资压力,降低企业因融资约束而发生投资不足的可能性:另一方面,充足的现金流增加了企业经理人的机会主义倾向,如果没有良好的内部治理机制和科学的投资决策机制为保障,自由现金流会给企业带来很严重的代理成本,将企业经营者的过度投资动机“催化”为实际行动。论文通过实证研究发现中国上市公司过度投资与自由现金流之间存在很高的敏感性,证实了“自由现金流”假说。(3)股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响。股权结构确立了股东的构成,决定了公司决策机构、执行机构和监督机构的结构以及这些机构与经理人的关系,对公司治理和企业投资决策产生深刻的影响。股权结构对公司价值的影响,是通过影响公司的治理成本、治理效率和企业行为来实现的。适当的股权安排和融资结构选择可促进公司治理、提高治理效率,而好的治理结构又能确保公司经理层得到正好为其投资所需(但又不是更多)的资金来完成净现值为正的项目,协调各利益相关者之间的冲突,实现决策科学化和企业价值最大化。论文通过实证研究分析了股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响,检验了具体哪些公司治理机制对过度投资起到了有效的抑制作用,哪些公司治理机制尚未真正发挥作用。(4)负债融资及股利政策对上市公司过度投资约束功效的实证检验。负债对企业投资决策的影响具有两面性:一方面负债带来的股东-债权人冲突催生了股东的资产替代和投资不足行为;另一方面,负债本息的固定支付有利于减少企业的闲置资金,对企业滥用自由现金流的过度投资行为起到抑制作用。利润分配也会影响企业内部资金情况,支付现金股利减少了自由现金流,从而减少了企业从事净现值为负的项目的机会,因此股利发放也可以在一定程度上减轻过度投资问题。论文通过实证研究检验了在预算软约束情况下负债融资及现金股利对上市公司过度投资的约束功能及效果。(5)上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为的预防和治理。在实证研究的基础上,论文从宏观层面的金融与投资体制改革、微观层面的企业内部控制及公司治理机制完善等角度,有针对性地提出了中国上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为治理的对策和建议。论文的创新点主要体现在:第一,结合中国的现实情况,构建了一个中国上市公司“过度投资”行为分析框架,在上市公司过度投资程度计量模型的基础上,通过实证研究揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质。以上市公司非效率投资现象为出发点,在科学衡量企业过度投资程度的基础上,从理论分析、实证研究等方面系统论证了中国上市公司确实存在“过度投资”行为,考察了自由现金流与上市公司过度投资程度的关联性,揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,以利于发现中国上市公司投资效率低下的真实原因。第二,从权利主体的制衡上升到科学决策高度探讨公司治理问题,并以公司治理视角对企业过度投资行为进行了系统研究,深化和拓展了公司治理问题的研究领域和理论体系。论文在传统的企业投资-现金流分析范式基础上引入公司治理因素,对公司治理、自由现金流和企业投资行为三者间的关联性进行全面系统分析,在借鉴和吸收最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,建立了一个由信息不对称和代理问题驱动的企业过度投资行为理论模型,并利用中国上市公司的财务数据进行了实证检验,为企业有效降低自由现金流代理成本提供了思路和依据。第三,通过实证研究,分析和检验了股权结构、各种公司治理机制、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资程度的真实影响,对上市公司过度投资行为的治理和防范提供了有针对性的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, Chinese economy keeps a fleet rate of increase. And investment plays an important role in the development of Chinese economy. But because of the restrict of resource and consume demands, "hot invest" phenomenon appears in many industry and regions accompany with the excess increase of the investment, which causes series of problems, such as tight lack of energy and original materials, the excess of productive ability, the distort of economic construction, the repetition of development etc. Because of excessive investment, a flood of capital precipitates at some realms with excess production ability and poor profit ability. Excessive investment also reduces the ability of absorbing labor force in economy increase, making difficulty in the coordination development of economy, environment and society.Business enterprises are the main participants in economy circulation. "Hot invest" of the macroscopic level and "over-investment" of the microscopic level is inseparable. Over-investment is the investment with negative net present value, which injures the value of whole business enterprise beyond the company growth opportunity or development direction. The Chinese market economy is still at its first stage; furthermore, the ownership structure of most corporate is not reasonable at all. The over-investment trend of Chinese listed company is very obvious and serious under above condition. Over-investment question has become a main hindrance to the quantity promotion and long-term development of Chinese listed company. Moreover, the investment funds of many business are mainly supported by bank, so the low investment efficiency of enterprise means the risk accumulation of financial system.Because of the separation of ownership and control, the asymmetry of information, and the existence of supervision cost, free cash flow is under the control of manager in modern company. Manager has the capability of investing corporate resource to non-profit projects; moreover, manager’s payment usually has a kind of positive correlation with corporate scale. So manager has both ability and motive to throw corporate free cash on non-profit projects that could bring himself private benefit, which leads to corporate over-investment. On the other hand, the big shareholder controls the decision power of the company, providing the possibility of violating small shareholder. The big shareholder inclines to obtain private income which small shareholder can not share. In practice, one of the methods that the big shareholder violates small shareholder is to abuse the investment funds and self transaction. Conflicts among manager, big shareholder, small shareholder and creditor all affect investment behaviors, which could lead to over-investment of enterprises.Because of the vacancy of the owner, agency problem and conflicts of benefits in Chinese state-owned enterprise become more seriously. When there are plenty of cash flow in enterprise, the manager of state-owned enterprise usually chooses to enlarge investment to extend the scale of enterprise. Through investment, the manager could control more resource and power. If investment gains success and enterprise becomes stronger, the manager could acquire the governmental reward with higher salary. Even if investment encounters failure, the manager need not undertake the loss because corporate governance of state-owned enterprise is poor. So the manager of stated-owned enterprise usually would rather invest items which net present value is under zero than give dividend to the owner. Chinese listed companies which are mostly changed from original state-owned enterprise have not got rid of "investment hunger syndrome"after gaining part of funds from capital market. Chinese listed companies with poor governance are still along the investment behavior pattern of the original state-owned enterprise. In the poor governance condition, the over-investment of listed companies with plenty of cash flow become more and more serious, which leads to low efficiency of internal fund allocation and the "hot invest" in the macroscopic level.The relation between corporate governance and enterprise investment behavior is very closely. Valid corporate governance can realize the balance among shareholders, creditors and managers etc. through series of system arrangement, dissolve the interest conflicts among stakeholders of business enterprises, and guarantee the scientific investment decision and the operation of enterprise. Exactly on this meaning, Milgorm and Roberts points out, when the firm is being viewed as a series of uncompleted contracts, the validly combination of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control is the key for increasing investment efficiency and operating efficiency. And the substance of corporate governance is series of system arrangement concerning the allocation of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control. Therefore, corporate governance plays an important role in the investment decision process. The level of corporate governance is related to the investment efficiency of the business enterprise directly.As the main cause of future cash flow increase and enterprise growth, investment behavior not only affects the financial and dividend policy directly, but also relates to the business performance strongly. Business investment behavior should be paid with more academic concerns, but because of its complexity, the research on investment behavior has been in stagnation over a long period of time. Furthermore, the research on Chinese business investment behavior is still in its start stage, which could not explain practical investment behavior.The paper synthesizes western scholar’s latest investment theories, adopts kinds of research method, analyzes the investment behavior of information asymmetry condition under the actual circumstance of the Chinese capital market, examines the sensitivity of and free cash flow, researches the true influence of ownership structure, corporate governance, debt and dividend policy to over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, explains the formation mechanism of over-investment of Chinese listed company. The empirical research provides theory foundation for the governance of over-investment and the establishment of scientific investment decision mechanism of Chinese listed company.The paper launches the discussion mainly around five questions.(1) The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on the over-investment behavior of listed company. Based on business investment theories and Chinese economy actual condition , the paper analyzes the existence possibility of over-investment of listed company. The paper also establishes a calculating model based on the latest theory to measure over-investment degree of Chinese listed company. The empirical research proves that, over-investment of listed companies exists indeed, and has become more and more serious.(2) The "catalyst" function and sensitivity analysis of free cash flow on over-investment of listed company. Enterprises obtain investment funds from internal or external financial resources. The internal finance does not need pay interest or dividends, so business investment depends on free cash flow strongly. But if there are no valid corporate governance mechanisms, free cash flow would bring the enterprise very serious agency cost, turning the over-investment motive of the business executive to action. The paper examined the sensitivity between the over-investment degree and free cash flow of Chinese listed company.(3) The true influence of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms on over-investment of listed company. The ownership structure establishes the composition of shareholders , confirming the structure of decision-making, executive and supervising organization and the relation between these organizations and manager, creating deep influence on the investment decision of enterprise. The function that ownership structure affects corporate value is realized by affecting the cost and efficiency of corporate governance. The appropriate arrangement of ownership structure can promote the efficiency level of corporate governance, moderating benefits of each stakeholder, realizing scientific decision to maximize business value. The paper examines the valid corporate governance mechanisms and the invalid corporate governance mechanisms of restraining over-investment of listed company in China through empirical study.(4) The empirical examination of the stipulation effect of debt and dividend policies on over-investment of listed company. There are two sides of the debt influence on business investment. On the one side, the shareholder-creditor conflicts could bring asset substitution and under-investment question; On the other hand, the company has to pay for the debt and interest which can decrease the business funds and over-investment behavior. The dividend policy could also affect the internal funds and free cash flow in business enterprise, reducing the chance of being engaged in negative net present value and over-investment. The paper examines the effect of debt and dividend policy of restraining over-investment of listed company in China under the soft stipulation in budget through empirical study.(5) The prevention and governance of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some suggestions of the prevention and governance of low efficient investment particularly over-investment of Chinese listed company, such as the reform of finance and investment system, the establishment and promotion of inner control system and corporate governance.The innovation of the paper mainly includes three points.First, the paper establishes the analysis frame of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, and explains the formation mechanism based on the calculating model of over-investment. The paper concerns the phenomenon of low efficiency investment for point of departure. The paper confirms the existence of over-investment of Chinese listed company from theoretical and empirical evidence, examining the sensitivity between free cash flow and over-investment degree. The theoretical and empirical researches above are both helpful to discover true causes of the descending investment efficiency.Second, the paper discusses corporate governance questions from the rights balance of stakeholders to scientific decision-making degree , studying over-investment behavior in the eye of corporate governance, which makes the realm and theories of corporate governance studies deep and perfect. The paper leads corporate governance into the traditional investment- cash flow analysis model, investigating connections among investment behavior, free cash flow and corporate governance. The paper establishes a theoretical business investment behavior model driven by information asymmetry and agent question, which is examined by empirical study of finance data of Chinese listed company. These researches provide some new valuable methods for business enterprise to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow. Third,the paper analyzes the effect of ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms, liabilities and dividend policies on the over-investment degree of listed company through empirical studies. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some valuable suggestions of the prevention and governance of over-investment of Chinese listed company.更多还原