【作者】 朱磊；

【导师】 潘爱玲；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 财务管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 融资与投资是企业的两项基本财务活动,它们既相互独立,又休戚相关,是企业资金运动中不可分割的两个方面。以新古典经济学为基础的传统公司金融理论认为在完美资本市场上,技术偏好和产出是投资的决定因素,投资与金融因素无关,也就是说投资独立于融资。20世纪六七十年代以来,学者们开始把融资决策和投资决策有机地联系起来,整体地进行思考,考察各项融资行为对投资决策的影响,而负债融资无疑是企业极其重要的融资方式,它对企业投资行为的影响成为财务理论界研究的热点。关于负债对企业投资行为的影响,在西方已经有了相当丰富的文献积累,从表面上看,留给我们的研究余地似乎不多了。但事实上,中国资本市场和上市公司制度背景的特殊性使得我国上市公司负债对投资行为的影响与西方国家有很大不同。一方面,我国上市公司的银行借款,多来自于国有银行,银行的国有性质使得我国上市公司股东(及经理)与债权人利益冲突的具体特征不同于西方国家;我国上市公司债券融资较少,而商业信用负债融资比例则甚高,意味着债权人角色结构与西方不尽相同;另一方面,随着我国资本市场的发展,我国上市公司出现了盲目投资,资金严重闲置,大量资金被用于高风险的证券投资,资金被大股东占用,投资方向改变等问题。这些问题严重影响了上市公司的生产经营能力和各利益相关者的利益。因此,在中国特有背景下,研究负债融资对企业投资行为的影响,不仅具有理论意义,而且具有重要的实践意义。基于转型时期的特定背景,本文在我国上市公司特有的股权结构和控制权配置格局下,以负债在股东-经理人-债权人利益冲突中所起的作用作为研究的切入点,以委托代理理论、信息不对称理论以及信号传递理论等作为展开分析的依据,同时将企业成长机会和预算软约束对负债融资与投资关系的影响纳入分析框架,在对中国制造业上市公司的负债和投资现状进行充分分析的基础上,综合运用了规范研究与实证研究相结合、截面的静态研究与时间序列的动态研究相结合的方法以及比较分析的方法,深入探讨不同期限及不同类型的负债对上市公司投资支出及其效率的影响。本文首先在文献梳理和理论分析的基础上构建负债影响企业投资行为的理论分析框架:其次,对中国制造业上市公司的负债和投资的制度背景及现状进行详细论述,初步对负债影响企业投资行为作描述性统计;最后以2000-2006年333家制造业上市公司面板数据为基础,分别对负债规模、负债期限结构和负债类型结构对企业投资支出的影响进行实证检验,为了进一步判断负债对企业投资影响的作用机理,分别按投资增长机会和内部现金流量进行分组检验,同时,把上述样本继续按国有股权比例进行分组检验预算软约束对这一问题的影响。主要得出以下四个研究结论。一是就全样本而言,企业滞后一期的资产负债率越高,当期投资越少,而在低成长性高现金流量的样本企业中负债与企业投资呈负相关关系,但并没有通过显著性检验,说明负债并没有起到抑制企业过度投资的作用,而在高成长性的企业里,负债与企业投资支出显著负相关,说明负债可能导致了企业的投资不足行为;二是基于我国上市公司负债期限结构的实证结果没有发现与西方文献一致的结论,即虽然短期负债融资在我国上市公司中得到广泛使用,但这并没有减少企业的投资歪曲行为。原因是我国上市公司普遍存在“借新债、还旧债”、“短期负债长期占用”的情况。就负债类型结构而言,由于我国债券市场不发达,本文仅就银行借款和商业信用对企业投资支出的影响进行了研究,实证结果表明,样本公司存在着挪用商业信用资金于长期投资的现象;三是将上述样本继续按国有股持股比例进行分组,实证结果表明,低投资增长机会高内部现金流量样本组的企业中,非国有企业的负债与投资呈显著负相关关系,而随着国有股比例的增加负债与投资的负相关关系变得不再显著,而当国有股的比例达到50%以上时,负债与投资则呈显著正相关关系。这表明在非国有企业里负债能够抑制企业的过度投资行为,而随着国有股比例的上升,负债不仅不能抑制企业的过度投资行为,反而会引起企业的过度投资行为。高投资增长机会低内部现金流量样本组无论国有股比例如何变化,其负债与企业投资均呈显著负相关关系;四是在稳健性检验里,用投资模型的正负残差来分别衡量企业的过度投资和投资不足,同样验证了上述结论,同时还得出以下附带结论:独立董事比例增加并不能抑制企业的非效率投资行为,高管持股比例与高管薪酬与企业非效率投资呈负相关关系,但没有通过显著性检验,大股东占款与过度投资呈显著负相关关系,说明大股东占款减少了企业的投资额。本文主要有以下四方面的创新:首先,在借鉴西方研究文献及理论的基础上结合中国资本市场和上市公司的特殊制度背景把负债对企业投资行为的影响置于一个利益相关者冲突的框架里进行探讨,同时考虑负债的非同质性,分别从负债规模与企业投资行为、负债期限结构与企业投资行为以及负债类型结构与企业投资行为等三个方面进行深入探讨,构建负债影响企业投资行为的理论分析框架。其次,作为一种尝试,本文选取2000-2006年的333家制造业上市公司(共计2331时间-公司)组成的平行面板数据,建立回归模型检验负债融资对企业投资行为的影响,对于投资增长机会的计量采用以市场价值为基础、以投资为基础和以增长率为基础的3类共7个指标(托宾Q、资本性支出与资产市价比、资本性支出与资产账面比、固定资产占资产账面比、固定资产占资产市值比、主营业务收入增长率以及总资产增长率)做主成分分析,利用其因子得分值来进行衡量,实证结果表明其与投资支出的正相关系数远高于托宾Q。再次,在实证分析中,用投资模型的残差来对企业的非效率投资进行计量,考虑到我国的实际情况,将残差分成三等分,前三分之一用来衡量过度投资,后三分之一用来衡量投资不足,同时将公司治理结构因素纳入非效率投资计量模型中,进一步检验负债对企业投资行为的影响。最后,根据实证研究结果得出负债对企业投资行为的影响是“状态相依”的,即在不同类型的企业中,债务融资的作用机理有所不同,因此提出在制定宏观政策时,有必要区别不同企业针对其负债对投资决策的作用机制制定相关政策,具体而言,就低成长性企业其问题的关键在于负债并没有真正发挥治理功能和监督作用,因此宏观政策应着重在如何使债权人的约束机制硬化和加强债权人对企业投资监控上下功夫。负债融资约束是制约高成长性企业发展的瓶颈,对于这种类型的企业,应该着力通过债券市场的建设,培育新的企业融资工具,拓展它们的融资渠道,减少它们对单一型银行金融机构的间接融资体系的依赖,满足其投资资金的需求。更多还原

【Abstract】 According to traditional financial theory, in complete capital markets, a firm’s financial policy has no bearing on its investment decisions. Ever since the 70s and 80s of the 20^th century, the research of the new institutional economics such as information economics, principal-agent theory and contract theory promote the development of modern financial theory. In a world with incomplete markets, however, agency problems inherent in interactions between shareholders, debt holders, and management, give rise to underinvestment or overinvestment incentives. A firm’s financial policy may have a significant effect on its investment. Debt financing is a very important financing pattern, so the relationship between debt financing and investment decisions has become a heated topic.As to the relationship between debt financing and investment decisions, the westerns have accumulated rich literatures, but in fact China has different institutional background, For example, China’s listed companies are mostly state-holding listed companies, the ownership concentration is very high, and the directors （except the independent directors） are mostly appointed by the large shareholders etc. So the above problem is not the same as that of the west. When it comes to debt financing and investment decisions in China, on one hand, loans are mainly from the state-owned bank, which means the conflicts between shareholders （and management） and debt holders are special, the bond financing is low but the trade credit is high, which means the structure of the debt holders is different from the west. On the other hand, with the development of China’s capital markets, tremendous raised capital remains intact or entrusted for investment; these problems severely affect the interests of stakeholders.On the basis of Chinese particular situation, the paper examines interactions between firm’s debt financing and investment decisions. It develops a framework that focuses on the role of debt financing in dealing conflicts among shareholders, managers and creditors, uses the newly research achievements of corporate governance theory through the theoretical and empirical methods. There are four conclusions. Firstly, the paper finds that debt financing has a significant negative effect on investment in the whole samples. In the high growth low CFO sub-group debt financing has a significant negative effect on investment but in the low growth high CFO sub-group it doesn’t have. In a word debt doesn’t inhibit the inefficiency of investment. Secondly, although short debt is widely used in China’s listed companies it doesn’t inhibit the inefficiency of investment. Because short debt is used for a long time. There are some restrictive factors in the domestic company bond market so the paper only discusses the relationship between the loan, trade credit and investment. Results show that the sensitivity between trade credit and investment is bigger than that of loan and investment. Thirdly, results show that there is a negative relationship between investment and leverage, but not for the absolute state-controlling firms whose corporate investment is insensitive to debt leverage under the framework of duplicate soft budget constraint among the government, banks and the firms. Furthermore, the sensitivity of investment to leverage decreases as the proportion of state ownership increases. Fourthly, in the testing procedure the paper also gets the similar results just the same as the above by using the residuals of the investment model to evaluate over-investment and under-investment. It also shows that there is no significant correlation between independent directors’ proportion, the senior managers’ ownership proportion, the compensation of the senior managers and the inefficiency investment. It also reveals that big shareholder’s capital engross has significantly negative effect on corporate over-investment.The paper holds that the divergence of business forms may directly influence the pertinence of debt financing and investment. Therefore, only the policy made according to the correlation between debt financing and investment of different business forms is of realistic significance. As for the low growth companies, debt financing can’t play its governance and supervision function. So the policy should focus on strengthening the restraint mechanism of debt financing. In terms of high growth companies debt financing constraints are the key problem disturbing these companies’ development. Therefore, the paper suggests that they should foster new financing instruments; expand the financing channel by quickening the construction of coporate bond market and then satisfy the fund demand of investment.The main innovations are just as follows:Firstly, the research tries to develop a framework that pays attention to the role of debt financing in dealing conflicts among stakeholders. In order to study different debt’s effect on investment decisions, it tries to explore the influence of the level of debt, the maturity structure and the category structure of the debt on investment decisions.Secondly, the paper has sampled 333 manufacturing listed companies from 2000-2006 to constitute balanced data based on which a model of simultaneous equations are applied in accordance with the trade-off theory and agency theory. This is the first attempt to study the interaction among capital structure, investment and corporate performance within a systemic framework based on past research. Our empirical results show that debt financing has a significant negative impact on investment.Lastly, in empirical analysis, the paper uses principal components methods to evaluate the investment opportunity by choosing 7 indexes based on market valuation, investment and growth rate. The paper uses the residuals of the investment model to evaluate the non-efficiency investment. Considering the situation of our country I list the residuals into three parts, the first part to evaluate over-investment and the last part to evaluate the under-investment. I also put the corporate governance factor into the inefficiency investment model to test the relationship between debt financing and investment decisions.更多还原