【作者】 于庆军；

【导师】 杜纲；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 电信业是一个特殊的行业,随着电信技术的不断升级和市场需求的扩大,对产业发展的理论支撑需求也在不断提升,而相关的理论研究显得要滞后一些,尤其是在产业组织研究方面,对现有电信业市场的研究,较多地集中在简单的竞争手段研究。随着电信业进入产业组织理论的研究范围,以及产业组织理论的发展,对电信业研究的重点已经从结构主义的SCP分析框架逐渐转向对市场竞争和策略性行为的研究,同时研究的范围也开始深入产业组织内部。究竟什么是有效的市场竞争,如何从理论方面支撑电信业的规制,竞争条件下的电信企业该如何博弈,这些都成为研究的方向,本文就是从这个思路开展的分析,主要工作和创新点如下:(1)以产业组织的电信竞争理论为研究思路,本文对电信业的现状和电信产业组织研究现状作了描述,对产业组织及相关概念进行了系统阐述,注重电信业的特殊性和个性化,对电信业的主要市场竞争行为和理论进行了系统的分析,相对于以往的SCP结构主义分析框架,本文更加注重市场竞争行为的研究。(2)从理论上论证了电信市场寡头垄断的有效性,尤其是考察了电信组织内在因素对市场竞争状态的影响,并对寡头垄断有效性进行了分析。(3)拓展了电信市场竞争行为的研究及模型,对电信市场上的主要战略行为进行了深入的分析,并把转网成本引入到电信市场行为的研究中,分析了电信网络的价格竞争。(4)考虑到数量竞争和价格竞争在电信业受到严格管制的情况下,很大程度上并不能成为电信业竞争的有力手段,本文建立了服务质量竞争的理论模型,分析了电信服务质量竞争的影响因素。(5)本文系统地分析了管理规制理论,对规制理论对电信市场竞争的必要性和主要方式作了阐述,并说明电信竞争行为的复杂化、电信组织结构的大型化经营成为影响和推动电信规制政策和规制模式变革的重要因素。(6)通过大量的调研和数据分析,针对中国电信市场竞争尤其是移动通信市场进行了实证研究。在中国移动通信市场价格规制模式下,本文通过呼出方付费原则下的博弈模型分析了规制的效应,在存在网间价格歧视情况下,在呼出方付费原则下,非对称价格下限规制下的均衡价格低于不存在规制时的均衡价格,且如果需求价格弹性较高时,这样的规制一定会损害社会福利。更多还原

【Abstract】 Telecom is a special industry. With the incessant upgrading of telecom technology and the broadening of the market, the need of theoretical supports to the development of telecom industry is increasing as well. However, the correlative theoretical researches seem to be somewhat laggard, especially on the aspect of the industry organization research, in which the research on existing telecom industry market mostly focuses on the simple research on the contesting methods. As the telecom industry’s coming into the researching area of industry organization theory and the industry organization theory’s developments, the emphasis of the research on telecom has turned from the structuralist SCP analysis frame to the research on the market contesting and strategic behavior. At the same time, the research goes deeper and deeper in to the inner industry organization. What on earth is the effective market contest, how to support the rules and systems on theory, and what should telecom enterprises should do in the contesting conditions, all above mentioned have become the directions of research. Based on the analyses above, this paper mainly concerned about this points as follows:(1)This paper describes the actuality of telecom industry and the researches on telecom industry organization and expatiates the industry organization and correlative concepts. Focused on the particularity of telecom industry, the paper theoretically analyses the main market contest behavior and makes theoretical researches on the individual industry organization.(2)The validity of oligarchic monopoly in telecom market has been testified theoretically in the paper. In particular, the paper reviews the influence of the inner organization factors of the telecom organization on the state of market contest, and a model analysis is given to the validity of oligarchic monopoly.(3)Main strategic behaviors in telecom market have been analyzed deeply. What’s more, the switch cost is used in the research on telecom market behaviors, with which the price contest of telecom networks is analyzed and the service quality contesting model has established.(4)Considering that the quantity and price contests is strictly controlled in telecom industry and can not become the powerful means, therefore, the contest of service quality has been paid popular attention to. This paper analyses the influence factors of service quality contest in telecom industry with established model.(5)In the telecom market with the character of oligarchic monopoly, the complication of telecom contest behaviors and the large-scaled management of telecom organization structure have become the significant factors to influence and promote the transformation of the bylaw policies and modes of telecom.(6) From the point of management bylaw, the paper demonstrates and analyzes many problems about the bylaw management theory and the market contest and bylaws in nowadays Chinese telecom industry. In the mode of price bylaw of Chinese mobile communication market, the paper exploits the domino effect of the bylaw with model under the principle of caller paying.更多还原