【作者】 孙利；

【导师】 王春峰；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本文以国内外管理层收购的现有研究成果为基础,运用新制度经济学分析框架和现代金融学分析工具,以解释和指导我国管理层收购的具体实践为目的,进行了以剩余索取权为中心概念的管理层收购理论与实证研究。全文从以下五个方面剖析了我国管理层收购的剩余索取权特征。1、本文将企业看成是各要素提供者之间的契约集,把管理层收购看成是拥有企业剩余控制权的管理者获取企业剩余索取权的契约行为。这一契约行为实现了企业的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的紧密结合,实现了企业的剩余索取权与企业风险的紧密结合,实现了企业剩余索取权与大量债务融资的紧密结合。收购较好地解决了企业制度要解决好的两个问题,即经营者激励问题和经营者选择问题。2、本文以企业管理者自然地拥有对企业的剩余控制权和所有者自然地拥有对企业的剩余索取权为前提,分析了剩余索取权的不同分享安排对参与企业的要素提供者的不同激励,而管理层收购作为一种典型的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的结合方式是有效调动管理者努力工作积极性的重要制度安排。这种制度安排在非对称信息条件下所有者不能有效实施对经营者的监督时,有利于降低代理成本,有利于防止经营者的机会主义行为。3、根据我国上市公司管理层收购后公司不下市的特点,运用对公司收购效应研究所普遍使用的事件研究法,以较为长期的股价变动趋势为依据,创造性地进行了长期财富效应分析,这在对管理层收购问题的研究中尚属首次。长期财富效应研究的结论是持有实施了管理层收购公司股票的流通股股东获取了超常收益。这一结论呼应了国外管理层收购的短期财富效应,同时也验证了本文的理论研究结论。4、管理层收购的关键性评价是能否带来经济效率。本文以4个指标组成财务绩效,以3个指标组成管理绩效,并进行了比较分析。结论是企业绩效得到提高。企业绩效提高连接了剩余索取权的激励作用与长期财富效应,成为二者之间的桥梁和纽带。绩效的提高一方面是剩余索取权对管理者激励的结果,另一方面是长期财富效应的“信息”来源。5、本文构建的以剩余索取权为中心概念和本质特征的对管理层收购问题进行理论和实证研究的框架,研究的假设、论证和结论是自洽的。其中的长期财富效应研究不仅具有创新性,而且因为是市场的选择凸显了剩余索取权对管理层激励的积极作用,形成了市场对管理层收购的肯定评价。更多还原

【Abstract】 On the basis of new-institution economics and in the framework of technique of modern finance, and with the aim of explaining and instructing the MBO in China, this dissertation studies a theoretical and empirical research on management-buyout based on gaining residual claim right. The main contents are as following:1、The enterprise is regarded as a set of covenants among different factor-owners in this dissertation and MBO is regarded as a new covenant between the managers with residual control right and the owners with residual claim right. The new contract makes the Claim to firm’s residue combined firmly with the claim to firm’s residual control, firm’s risk and firm’s large amounts of debt. MBO resolves preferably the two issues inside the firm: the one is how to incentive the manager, the other is how to select the manager.2、Based on the presuppositions of the manager holding naturally firm’s residual control and the shareholder having naturally the residual claim right, different incentives of different distribution arrangements of return between different participants(factor-owners) is analyzed.To be a typical combination of the claim to firm’s residue and the claim to firm’s residual control, MBO is an important institution arrangement which could make the managers work harder than the past. The result of this new arrangement is good for reducing agency cost and preventing opportunism while the shareholder cannot monitor the manager in condition of asymmetry information.3、The shares of companies listed in China are still exchanged after buyouts. This characteristic makes it possible to research long-term wealthy effect based on the changing prices. The novel contribution of this dissertation is to use prevalent case study to explore long-term wealthy effect in China. This result of existing long term abnormal return not only reflects the short-term wealthy effect in western countries, but also validates the theoretic conclusion in this dissertation.4、A critical policy issue concerning MBO is whether they enhance economic efficiency. The purpose of this study is to extend economic efficiency in two important ways. First, we analyze financial performance with the aid of the comparatively analyzing technique. Second, we analyze management performance of this kind of companies. Our results suggest that MBO may be a useful mechanism for reducing agency costs and enhancing economic efficiency. This evidence can be the outcome of gaining firm’s residual claim by the manager and the source of“new information”which causes long-term wealthy effect.5、We build up a research frame about the study on MBO based on gaining residual claim right in this dissertation. The hypothesis, the argumentation and the conclusion of the research are unanimous. Especially, the research of long-term wealthy effect not only draws a novel conclusion, but also gives MBO an affirmative evaluation.更多还原