【作者】 秦旋；

【导师】 钟登华；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 目前,关于招标投标的研究成果大部分都集中在决策理论方面。本文以招标投标与拍卖理论中的对策理论模型为基础,从博弈论的角度系统研究了基于对策理论模型的投标人的投标策略和招标人的招标机制。本论文主要研究工作和研究成果如下:(1)以标准IPVM模型为基础,把影响招标投标的几个重要因素,如投标人的风险态度、投标人的类型、以及投标人在投标过程中可能存在合谋行为等因素引进了基本的拍卖模型IPVM中,分别进行了相应的拓展研究。这些拓展研究在一定程度上解决了基本的拍卖模型过于理想化的局限性,使模型更加符合现实的经济环境。(2)重点研究了招标投标过程中的合谋行为,从有效性和激励相容性的角度对常见的三种合谋机制进行了分析,探讨了不同招标机制下投标人可能采用的合谋机制,建立了此时合谋集团的投标策略模型。同时针对投标人的合谋行为,提出了招标人对付投标人合谋行为的两种策略,这两种策略均能够有效地使投标人的合谋行为难以维持。(3)在最优机制定理基础上,拓展研究了影响招标结果的几个重要因素,得出在不同情形下招标人的最优招标机制是不同的;在此基础上对密封第二价格招标方式进行了深入分析,得出该机制是比密封第一价格招标更有效率的方式,提出该机制是一种有效且可行的机制,并对其运做模式进行了探讨。(4)对于最优施工合同的选择,突破了传统的激励合同的思路,提出了考虑履行合同过程中可能发生工程变更等超出合同的事件,而导致事后双方在不对称信息下谈判所引起低效率损失等履行成本,建立了基于履行成本的全过程总成本最低的最优合同模型,并定性和定量地研究了此时的最优合同,为招标人在招标阶段选择合同类型时提供了有价值的参考。(5)对我国工程界正在推行的最低价中标法,建立了基于最低价中标法的报价模型和均衡策略;以及针对目前我国工程界招标广泛采用设置复合标底的方式,建立了基于复合标底方式的报价模型。这些报价模型可以为投标人提供科学地、理性地报价策略。更多还原

【Abstract】 The present about main achievement of bidding is concentrated on the decided theory. Based on game model in bidding and auction theory, this paper from game theory deeply researches the bidder’s strategy and bidding mechanisms for the employer in a systematic way. The main contents and achievement of the dissertation are summarized as follows:(1)Based on the model of the Independent Private Value Model(IPVM) ,the model is extended to take account of the following cases: bidder are risk averse,bidder are asymmetric, the influence of collusion among bidders may occur probably during bidding, then both qualitative and quantitative conclusions are obtained. The problem that lend to the limit of auction model can be solved effectively and these discussion can further the auction model to conform to reality in some degree.(2) The primary work of this paper focuses on the bidding behavior when there is collusion among bidders. From effectiveness and incentive compatibility point of view, three cartel mechanisms are analyzed, then it discusses the cartel mechanism and advances a theoretical model of cartel bidding behavior in case of difference the sealed auction; At mean time, the two strategies are presented when the employer face the bidder’s collusive behavior, the two strategies can deal with collusion effectively.(3) Research on the important factor which will influence auction mechanisms is conducted based on the optimal mechanism theorem, the best auction mechanisms has changed under these different circumstances; By this base, the sealed second-bid auction is deeply discussed, then the conclude is advanced: this auction mechanisms is more effective than the sealed first-bid auction, this mechanism is an effective and practical mechanism. Lastly how to carry out in practice has been studied.(4) About the optimal construction contract of this paper breaks through a traditional incentive contract. Best construction contract is presented by based on change order in implement stage because change order can result in increase of implement costs and loss of ex post inefficient renegotiation under asymmetric information,Considering the transaction cost during the procedure of contract implementation, the employer’s optimal contract model with the minimum total cost for whole procedure is founded quantitatively and qualitatively, It can help the employer to choose the contract at bidding stage.(5) The bidding games model and Nash equilibrium strategy are established based on the lowest price in bid. And in china compound reservation price is generally offered in project construction, the bidder’s strategy is also studied in such a situation. Bidder’s bidding strategies under these models are drawn; this can help the bidder make their decision more scientifically and rationally.更多还原