【作者】 闫杰；

【导师】 袁守启；

【作者基本信息】 中国海洋大学 ， 环境规划与管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 中国正面临异常严峻的环境污染,污染物排放总量远超过环境容量,重大污染事故频发。环境污染在类型、结构和区域等各方面都发生了深刻变化。在经济较低发展阶段就集中出现了明显“复合型”的环境污染问题,已经危及国家可持续发展的基础。日益严重的环境污染问题要求改进环境政策,一个重要的方面就是随着市场经济体制的不断完善,要同步完善突出激励的环境规制,健全污染防治的激励机制和政策体系。本文坚持问题导向,基于规制理论视角,围绕三个方面的内容着重探讨环境污染规制中的激励问题,即“为什么要完善环境污染规制中的激励机制与政策体系?这一机制与政策体系包括哪些具体内容?中国完善环境污染规制应该建立什么样的激励机制与政策体系?”在规制者和被规制者的信息结构、约束条件和可行工具下,分析双方的行为和最优权衡,对环境污染规制中的激励问题从本源上内生地加以分析。本文试图从理论与实践的结合上,构建一个适应现代市场经济要求的环境污染规制激励政策的完整框架,为积极应对和解决中国日益严重的环境污染问题,探求前瞻而又可行的思路和办法。基于上述思路,论文共分为四部分,由八章组成。第一部分包括第一、二和三章,是理论综述和理论拓展部分。第一章导论,阐述了选题的原因和研究意义,对国内外相关研究进行了综述,介绍了论文的主要内容、结构框架及创新之处。第二章规制与环境污染规制。综述了规制、环境与环境污染的内涵界定及相关理论,通过论述环境污染的负外部性、环境具有的公共财产属性,阐明了将规制理论运用于环境污染防治,是弥补市场失灵,完善市场经济体制的内在需要。在此基础上,本章还结合着对中国环境污染主要特征的分析,论述了激励性规制理论对解决中国明显“复合型”环境污染问题具有更强的适用性。第三章环境污染规制中的激励理论述略。重点从环境产权、非对称信息、有效率的污染水平与总成本有效配置、污染者付费原则及其扩展等方面,论述了环境污染规制中激励理论的基本原理和主要内容,厘清了贯穿其中的逻辑关系。环境污染规制中的激励理论是基于环境产权的、为解决规制中普遍存在的信息不对称,而在有效率的污染水平上实现环境效率原则的一整套机制和方法。激励机制能够更有效率地实现污染外部性的内部化。污染者付费原则及其扩展是体现规制中激励理论的环境政策制定原则。本章通过分析“公害健康损害补偿制度——日本的经验”和“日本特有的PPP论”等案例,进一步验证了上述结论。第二部分包括第四、五和六章,是理论运用和实践验证部分。第四章价格规制中的激励理论与政策。排污收费、环境税和环境补贴是价格规制激励的主要内容。价格规制激励理论的实质是为了反映环境资源的稀缺程度,通过向污染者就其产生的外部性收取相应的费用或给予内部化奖励,而将环境资源价值纳入产品的价格中,以有效率地使用越来越稀缺的环境资源。本章通过分析“美国州政府使用的促进资源综合利用的补贴方法”和“中国的排污收费制度及其改革”等案例,对排污收费、环境税和环境补贴等价格规制激励政策在国内和国外的实际应用情况进行了总结和初步的实证分析。第五章排放许可证交易规制中的激励理论与政策。重点分析了交易规则与许可证制度的设计、不完全竞争的许可证市场和拍卖等内容,从要素、优势和局限性等方面论述了排放许可证交易制度的特征及其适用条件。排放许可证交易是“科斯定理”在环境污染规制中的具体应用,它是基于环境产权的,具备产权激励的所有效率特征,通过改变环境资源的产权制度基础来实现环境容量资源的有效率利用,为污染控制成本较低的经济主体提供了减少污染排放的较强激励。排放许可证交易规制激励适用于大量排放的均匀混合污染物和非均匀混合污染物。本章通过分析“美国二氧化硫排放权的第一次年度拍卖”、“中国大气排放许可交易试点”、“黄浦江上游水污染许可证交易”和“美国的二氧化硫排放许可证交易”等案例对排放许可证交易规制激励政策在国内外的应用情况进行了总结和初步的实证分析。第六章责任规制中的激励理论与政策。分别阐述了履约保证、押金返还和环境信息公开的规制经济学意义及其内容和适用范围。责任规制趋向于将私人成本和社会成本统一起来,同时引入了一个防止对第三者造成损害的激励机制。其中,履约保证提供了减少责任逃避的激励,适用于露天采矿等很有可能较大规模集中破坏环境且难以治理恢复的情况;押金返还奖励那些有利于环境的行为,对任何固体废弃物来说都是一种低成本的环境污染规制激励政策。环境信息作为一种准公共产品被政府强制公开或免费提供,低成本地克服了环境污染规制中普遍存在的信息不对称问题,激励公众参与,促使污染者改善行为。本章通过分析“辽宁实施矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度”和“美国瓶装法案”等案例,对责任规制激励政策在国内外的应用情况进行了总结和初步的实证分析。第三部分包括第七章,是中国环境污染规制中激励政策应用的实证总结部分。第七章回顾了中国环境污染规制的变迁,分析了当前在激励政策应用中存在的问题和不足,总结了完善激励机制和政策体系面对的形势和任务。本章的实证分析是基于中国环境污染规制整体的,力求在已有经验的基础上适当展现当前与激励有关政策的全貌,得出了突出激励的环境污染规制阶段已经到来的基本结论。当前中国,基于规制理论的环境污染防治激励政策有很大的应用空间,需要适应进一步完善市场经济体制的内在要求,尽快形成整体效应最大的完整体系。第四部分包括第八章,是政策含义部分。第八章提出在健全制度基础、完善政策手段和强化保障措施“三位一体”的总框架下,满足参与约束与激励相容约束,将价格规制、排放许可规制和责任规制的激励机制与政策结合起来,使之相互补充,形成完整体系,发挥整体效应。其中,健全制度基础主要是完善环境污染规制法规、环境污染排放(控制)标准以及相关基本制度。完善政策主要是改进价格规制激励政策,包括继续改革排污收费制度、健全与排污收费相联系的环境税收政策、加快改革环境补贴政策等;推行排放许可证交易规制政策,主要包括建立排放许可有偿取得与排污交易工作平台、加强必要的能力建设和观念培训、选择适当范围进行试点、加强污染源的排放监测等;强化责任规制政策,主要包括在矿山和土地等重大资源使用中完善履约保证政策、对具有潜在污染性或可回收利用的固体废弃物实行押金返还政策、全面推行环境信息公开等。强化保障措施主要是完善环境与发展综合决策机制,深化绿色国民经济核算制度试点,理顺资源的价格体系,在政绩考核中贯彻环境友好原则等。为了体现问题导向的总体原则,本文运用定量分析与定性分析相结合、规范分析与实证分析相结合、文献梳理与案例分析相结合的方法以及比较分析的方法,展开研究。论文的创新之处主要体现在以下四个方面:第一,尝试从规制视角研究环境污染防治问题。基于规制理论并将规制中的激励理论运用于环境污染防治研究,阐明了强化激励机制,是在市场经济条件下完善环境规制和防治日益严重环境污染的可能思路和有效措施,尝试在理论上扩展环境经济学研究视野,具有较强的创新性。第二,综合运用交叉研究的方法。综合运用规制经济学、信息与激励经济学、环境与资源经济学相关理论,并在此基础上将案例研究贯穿全文,进行交叉研究,通过案例分析进行实践总结和政策应用的实证分析,使理论和实践更为紧密得结合起来。特别是案例分析,有针对性地验证规制中激励理论的实际应用,确认激励政策的适用条件,评估激励机制和政策的实践效果,体现了应用研究的问题导向原则。第三,系统阐述和提出了激励政策。在健全污染防治的制度基础、政策手段和保障措施“三位一体”的总框架下,将改进价格规制激励政策、推行排放许可交易规制激励政策和强化责任规制激励政策结合起来,使基于环境污染规制的激励机制和政策形成完整体系,具有较强的实践指导作用。第四,提供可能的理论借鉴。在环境污染规制的激励理论与政策主题下,建议将政府微观干预和市场机制调节结合起来,发挥各自的优势来解决环境规制中的信息节省和激励相容问题,为有效率地防治环境污染提供了理论依据。基于内在的理论联系,这一思路对完善中国包括环境质量在内的公共物品市场供给体制和推进包括环境保护在内的行政管理体制改革同样具有借鉴意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 China is facing unusual severe environmental pollution, which has undergone profound changes in type, structure and region, with a total amount of pollutants exceeding the capacity of environment and constant occurrence of major cases of pollution. The concentration of obvious“complex”problems of environmental pollution in the lower stage of economic growth has endangered the foundation of the sustainable national development. The current essay, starting from the perspective of regulation theory and with the emphasis on the incentive of regulations of environmental pollution, focuses on three aspects: why is it necessary to reinforce the incentive mechanism and policy system for the perfection of regulation of environmental pollution? What are the specific contents? And what type is suitable to China? With the information structure, restrictive terms and feasible tools of regulators and regulation targets, the behavior and optimum consideration of both sides are analyzed, and the incentive for environmental pollution regulations is researched genetically. The paper, consisting of four parts and eight chapters, based on which a complete framework is composed on the basis of the combination of theory and practice to actively cope with and settle the serious problem of environmental pollution.Part I is composed of three chapters, focuses on theoretical survey and development. The first chapter, the Introduction, demonstrates the reason for and meaning of this research, states relevant researches both at home and abroad, and introduces the main contents, structural framework and novelty of the paper. Chapter 2 states regulation, the intentional definition and relevant theories of environment and environmental pollution. It demonstrated through the negative externalities of environmental pollutions and the public property nature of environment that the application of regulation theory to the prevention of environmental pollutions is the internal needs for the perfection of market economic system. Chapter 3 is a brief demonstration of the incentive theory and its application, focusing on property ownership, asymmetric information, efficient level of pollution, and the effective arrangement of overall cost, PPP and its extensions, demonstrating the basic principles and main contents of the incentive theory, and ascertaining the logical relationship therein. The incentive theory of environmental pollution regulations is a whole set of mechanisms and approaches relevant to environmental property rights and for the purpose of settling the asymmetric information prevalent in the regulations by realizing environmental effectiveness principle on the efficient level of pollution. The incentive function may bring in more efficient internalization of the negative externalities of pollutions. Polluter pays principle and its extensions are the basic principles reflecting the making of environmental policies in the incentive theory. The chapter also analyzed cases of“the Japanese experience of compensation for social effects of pollution”and“the PPP theory of Japan.”Part II is made up of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, validating the combination of theory with practice. Chapter 4 deals with the incentive theory and policy in price regulations consisting of pollution charges, environmental taxation and environmental subsidy. In nature the theory is to introduce the price of environmental resources into the pricing system by charging the polluters for their negative or positive externalities so as to efficiently utilize the ever shorter resources. This chapter uses the cases of“subsidy plans of American state governments to promote the comprehensive exploitation of resources”and“pollution charge system and reform in China”to analyze the practice of pollution charges and its process of reformation. Chapter 5 analyzes the design of trading rules and allowance system, and non-complete competitive allowance market and auctioning, demonstrates the features of this system from the perspective of elements, advantages and limitations and reviews its practice in China. The trading of discharge permit is based on environmental property rights and is the concrete application of Coase Theorem in regulating environmental pollutions. It bears all efficient features of property right incentive. By altering the system foundation of property rights, environmental resources may be efficiently used and stronger incentive is formed for economic main bodies to reduce pollution discharge. The regulation incentive for the trading of discharge permit is applicable to large quantity discharge of homogeneous and heterogeneous pollutants. The chapter analyzes the cases of“the first annual auctioning of sulfur dioxide discharging right in America”,“experimental cities of atmospheric discharge allowance in China”,“allowance trading of water pollution in the upper stream of Huangpu River”and“the allowance trading of sulfur dioxide in America.”Chapter 6 expounds the economic significance, contents, and scope of application of the regulation of environmental performance bonds, deposit return and publication of environmental information. Responsibility regulation tends to unite private and social costs and introduces an incentive function against any harm to the third party. Performance bonds offer incentive to reduce the possibility of avoiding responsibilities, which is applicable to open mines and other similar cases with large scale destruction and hardly recoverable environments. Deposit refund encourages behaviors favorable to the environment, and is a low cost incentive policy for solid wastes. Environmental information, as quasi public product, is provided compulsorily or charge-free by governments settles the problem of asymmetric information prevalent in the regulation of environmental pollutions, encourages participation and helps polluters correct their behaviors. It analyzes the cases of“security system of mine environment renewal in Liaoning,”“the American bottling bill”,which serves as a summary and positive analysis of the practice both home and abroad.Chapter 7 comprises Part III. It summarizes the application of the incentive policy in the regulation of environmental pollution in China. It recalls the regulatory changes in this country, analyzes the problems of insufficiencies in its practice makes a generalization and overall evaluation of the incentive mechanism and policy status in this respect, and concludes by stressing the arrival of comprehensive regulation of environmental pollution in time. It is necessary for China now to meet the internal requirements of market economic system and form a complete system soon with maximum overall efficiency.Part VI is composed of Chapter 8. It focuses on the implication of policies, suggesting that the incentive mechanism and policy of cost regulation, discharge permit trading and responsibility regulation be combined to complement each other under the“trinity”framework of a sound system foundation, policy measure perfection, and guarantee reinforcement and bring about participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Strengthening system foundation is mainly to perfect regulation rules and discharging standards of environmental pollution and relevant systems. Perfecting policies refers chiefly to the improvement of price regulation incentive policy, including further reformation of pollution charges, establishment of environmental taxation, and reformation of environmental subsidy policy. Discharge allowance regulations involve mainly setting up paid permit of discharge and discharge trading platform, reinforcing necessary competency construction and ideological training, selecting suitable scope of experiment, and strengthening discharge monitoring. Strengthening responsibility regulations mainly include the perfection of contract guarantee policy in the exploitation of mines, land, and other major resources, the deposit refund system for potential pollutants or reclaimable solid refuse, and overall publication of environmental information. Reinforcing relevant system of security and support mainly refers to the improvement of environment and development of comprehensive decision, deepening the experiment of green national economic system of computation, sorting out the price system of resources, and carrying out the principle of environment friendliness in achievement assessment system.In order to reflect the overall principle of orientation, the current article combines quantitative with qualitative analyses, standard with empirical analyses, and literature arrangement with case studies, and comparison and contrast. It displays its novelty in the following ways:Firstly, the research is attempted from the fresh perspective of regulations. On the basis of regulation theory and the application of the incentive theory of regulations to the environmental pollution prevention, reinforced incentive mechanism is shown to be possible routes and effective measures for the perfection of environmental regulation and the prevention of the worsening environmental pollution under the conditions of market economy.Secondly, the comprehensive use of cross-disciplinary research method. Regulation economics, information and incentive economics, environment and resource economics are combined, complemented with case studies to make positive demonstration of practice summary and policy application so that theory and practice are closely united.Thirdly, systematic incentive policy is demonstrated and put forward. Under the overall framework of reinforcing system foundation for pollution prevention and control, policy means and protective measures, the improvement of incentive policy regulation, discharge allowance trading regulation policy, and reinforced responsibility regulation incentive policy are integrated into a complete system. Fourthly, possible extension of theoretical reference is provided. With the incentive theory and policy of environmental pollution regulations as the background, the essay insists on the coordination of microscopic governmental intervention and market mechanism to fully play their advantages and provide theoretical foundation for efficiently control environmental pollution. Based on internal theoretical associations, it is of similar meaning of reference for the perfection of public product market supply system in China including environmental quality and for the promotion of administrative reform including environmental protection.更多还原