选择战争：基于规避损失的战争决策理论

【作者】 林民旺；

【导师】 朱立群；

【作者基本信息】 外交学院 ， 国际关系， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本论文研究的问题是:为什么两个原本没有战争意图的国家最后却走向战争,以至于实力较弱的国家主动选择战争?过去的战争研究强调国际体系结构的原因。认知主义学派则将这种战争的原因归结为决策者的错误认知。前一种解释缺乏微观的理论基础,而后一种解释则明显过于重视决策者个人的能动性,否定了结构的限制作用。基于已有理论的不足,本项研究借鉴前景理论和观众成本理论,构建了基于规避损失的战争决策理论。这一理论认为,战争是国家间互动的结果。从本质上看,国家间互动就是行为体就利益分配问题所进行的讨价还价过程。战争爆发则是讨价还价的失败,是由于它们无法找到谈判区间所致。之所以导致这一结果,原因有二:一方面是由于决策者的机会主义动机,为了在讨价还价过程中增加谈判实力可能采取欺诈行为,这样就导致了国际政治中传递的信号可信度很低,国际承诺不可信。另一方面,同样是为了增加讨价还价过程中的谈判实力,国家领导人常常需要动员国内公众,向国际社会表达其决心和意志,这样的行为无形中也导致了高昂的观众成本和沉没成本,进而丧失了谈判的灵活性。谈判失败的后果就是,其中一方常常越过另一方的决策参考点,进而导致另一方基于规避损失的动机,不得不主动选择战争。这一理论改变了过去战争研究的视角,主要从信息的角度来研究战争原因。同时,这一理论将决策者的动机区分为争取获益和规避损失,认为不同的动机导致了决策中的不同风险倾向。论文选择朝鲜战争作为案例进行验证。朝鲜战争是一场非本意的战争,中美双方原本都没有意图要在朝鲜半岛上进行一番较量。由于战争形势的好转,美国逐步修正原来的目标,最终在中国的明确警告下越过三八线,跨越中国领导人的决策底线,迫使中国不得不出兵朝鲜。毛泽东之所以最终决定出兵朝鲜,一方面由于美国的安抚承诺不可信,另一方面则由于高昂的国内、国际观众成本。为了规避绝对损失,最终不得不选择战争。更多还原

【Abstract】 Why do two states results in war despite they do not intent to war against each other at the beginning of conflict? Why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate war against a relatively strong state? This dissertation addresses these puzzles. Systems level theories hold that war is caused by international structure. Decision level theories focus on decision-maker’s misperceptions. These theories are all in great trouble with the questions we raised. The former lacks micro-foundation explanation for war decision, and the latter ignores the constraints imposed by international system. In view of this deficiency, the author builds a model which combines prospect theory and audience cost theory to provide appropriate answers. It is named a loss-aversion theory of war decision.This theory assumes that war is the outcome of international interaction, In essence, international interaction likes bargaining process concerning resource distribution. War comes out of bargaining failure as the actors can not find their bargaining spaces. Why do they loss bargaining spaces? The reasons as follows: firstly, out of opportunistic incentives, decision-makers may take deceptive actions to gain bargaining power. It will result in incredible signaling and unreliable commitment in international interaction. Secondly, decision-makers often try to mobilize the public in order to increase bargaining power, which causes high audience cost for them. It will result in inflexibility in bargaining. Bargaining failure often induces one side to get across reference point of the other side. So, the other side had to choose to war for loss-aversion motivation. To be brief, Loss-aversion theory of war decision turns to information to look for causes of war. It distinguishes decision-maker’s gain motivation from loss-aversion motivation, and these different motivations will lead to different risk-orientation.The author selects the Korean War as a case to test the theory. It was an unintended war because two sides do not want to fight against each other. The United States gradually revised war goal. At last, American army crossed the 38th line in despite of clear signals form Chinese side. The action triggered Chinese to enter the war against American because 38th line is the reference point for top leaders in Beijing. Mao Zedong chose to war because of incredible reassures and high audience cost.更多还原