【作者】 马斌；

【导师】 陈剩勇；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治学理论， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文以地方治理理论为分析工具,从分析中国的权力结构和变迁轨迹入手,指出,中国的地方治理是一个政府权力调整与职能重新界定的过程,即治理权威在市场、政府和第三部门之间的分化和扩散,以及在政府体系内部通过行政权力和责任的下放来增进地方(下级)政府的积极性、灵活性、回应性,其实质是治理权从国家单中心主义向多中心化和多层次化的变迁过程。因此,地方治理是一种实践、一套规则体系,也是一种理念,其不仅要求在国家与公民社会之间确立起合作主义的政治框架,而且也应将上下级政府间关系纳入协商与合作的关系模式之中,走向府际治理。本文将研究对象聚焦于省市县政府间纵向关系,通过分析政府间权力配置与职能履行情况,指出当前地方政府职能转变面临困境的根源在于没有触动计划经济时代遗留下来的行政管理体制,即没有调整和改革传统的权力结构,层级政府间权力配置滞后于各级政府职能转变的要求,政府间责权利不匹配,使得各级地方政府面临着政府治理任务日益繁重和治理能力不足的困境。在分析改革开放以来,政府间权力结构的变迁与政府角色的转变以及省市县政府间的权力配置模式、职能定位与治理工具的基础上,深入探讨了省市县政府间的治理机制,指出,在省市县政府间既有财政管理、项目审批、干部管理、绩效考核、信息沟通等一整套正式的制度安排,同时由于政府间正式制度的供给不足和低效率,使得政府间治理的非制度化现象十分严重。在研究案例的选择上,以浙江省、市、县三级政府间关系为主要案例,考察自上世纪90年代以来,浙江省先后于1992年、1997年和2002年以及2006年,在全国率先开展的经济强县扩权改革的制度背景和运作模式,分析浙江省管县体制的经济基础、财政管理体制、“强县扩权”政策体系、省管县体制的绩效和制度条件。同时,以2006年启动的浙江义乌市扩权改革试点为典型案例,深入分析了扩权过程中政府间的利益博弈、角色差异和制度效应,探讨了省管县体制改革的制度困境,即中国现行的行政层级体制和资源配置模式已经将地级市政府的权力结构和利益结构制度化甚至法律化了,地方政府推进省管县体制改革面临着动力不足、权限不足甚至是合法性不足的多重困境。本文认为,优化省、市、县政府间关系必须从根本上调整权力在上下级政府间、政府与市场、政府与社会之间的配置,构建多中心治理的格局,在政府间治理结构中更多地嵌入合作、沟通、协商机制,形成府际治理,改变命令—控制的单一行政模式,实现地方治理。在具体的路径选择上,首先,政府间关系的重塑必须跳出行政权力在政府层级间纵向配置的传统思维,将权力配置放到政府—市场-社会的大格局中,进一步转变政府职能,合理规约政府的治理边界,改变以政府为主导的单中心治理格局,改革资源行政化的配置模式,在政府、市场与社会的良性互动中实现地方治理。其次,要在改革行政层级体制,实行市县分治的基础上,合理划分政府间职责,确立以县为主体的地方公共服务供给责任体系,完善责权利相统一的政府间公共服务供给体制,包括政府间公共服务的财权配置机制、监管机制和评价机制。最后,还应优化区域发展的空间布局,调整省级行政建制,缩小省域行政范围;积极培育大城市,实施都市经济圈发展战略;加快乡镇体制改革,理顺县乡关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the analysis tools of local governance theory, from the analysis of China’s power structure and transitional paths, the dissertation points out that China’s local governance is on the process of adjusting the Government power and redefining its functions. That is the differentiation and proliferation of governance authority in the market, the Government and the Third Sector, as well as in the internal system of government through administrative decentralization of authority and responsibility to enhance the local (lower level) Government’s enthusiasm, flexibility, responsiveness, and its essence is the evolution of the governance power from the national’s single center to the multi-centers and multi-levels. Therefore, local governance is a practice, a set of rules system and an idea. This requires the national and civil society not only to establish a political framework of cooperation, but also to put the intergovernmental vertical relations into the consultation and cooperation models, and to reach the intergovernmental relations governance.This dissertation focuses on the intergovernmental vertical relations of provinces, cities and county, through analyzing the power allocation and government functioning. In the process of local governments’ function transforming, they faced with the predicaments. These predicaments are the source that they have not changed the administrative system from the planned economy era and the traditional power structure, and the power allocation intergovernmental behind the government function transform of the request, the mismatch between responsibility, power and profits. All of these results in the local governments facing increasing workload and shortage of capacity for governance. This dissertation analyses the intergovernmental transition of power structure, the role, the power allocation ,the positioning of function and governance tools between provinces since reform and opening up. It points out that there is a set of the formal institutional arrangements such as financial management, project permission, the cadre management, performance evaluation and information communication system in provinces, cities and county of intergovernmental, at the same time because of the inadequate and low efficiency in formal institutional, it makes the intergovernmental governance seriously non-institutionalized.This dissertation regards Zhejiang’s intergovernmental relations of province, cities and county as the main cases ,and it investigates the institutional background and operation mode of the Strong county expand power firstly around the country in 1992, 1997 and 2002 as well as 2006 since the 1990s. Then, it analyses Zhejiang Province’s economic system, the financial management system, the policy system of Strong county expanding power, the management of the provincial County system performance and system conditions. As a typical Case Study of Yiwu City in 2006, this dissertation analyses the intergovernmental interests gaming, the difference between the roles ,and System Performance ,then discusses the System predicaments in the reform of counties directly under the jurisdiction of provinces. That is to say, our country’s existing administrative system and resource allocation model have been institutionalized and even legalized the power structure and interest structure of city government, and the local governments promote the reform of counties directly under the jurisdiction of provinces facing a power shortage, lack of competence, and even lack of legitimacy multiple difficulties.The dissertation holds that the optimization of intergovernmental relations of the provincial, city and county government must be fundamentally adjusted the intergovernmental power, government and market, government and society , building the multi-center governance structure, embedding more cooperation, more communication and more consultation mechanism to realize the intergovernmental governance. In the specific path choice, it must firstly further transformation of government functions, reform the resources allocation of administrative patterns, and achieve the local governance in the interaction between government, market and society. Secondly, we must reform the administrative levels in the system, divide intergovernmental responsibilities on the independent basis between the city and county , establish the county as the main responsibility for the supply of local public service system, and improve public service supply system of the unity of government responsibility, power and profit, including financial allocation mechanism, supervision and evaluation mechanisms. Finally, it should also be optimized space layout of the regional development, adjustment of provincial administrative units, and narrow the scope of the province, cultivate large cities actively, develop the urban economic circle, speed up township system reform, rationalize the relationship between the county and township.更多还原