【作者】 王勇；

【导师】 黄健荣；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 行政管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 流域作为公共池塘资源所具有的非排他性以及竞争性的组合特性,通常被认定为流域水资源配置使用的负外部性在当前空前涌现的基本原由。然而这一组合特性所造成的水资源消费的“拥挤效应”和“过度使用”问题并不足以提供最充分、可信的解释。实际上,流域水资源配置使用的负外部性大量衍生的现实症结乃是流域政府纷纷对辖区内微观主体负外部性行为实施了地方保护的策略选择。流域政府地方保护行为同样形成一种区域经济活动外部性。其产生的根由则在于流域政府权力产权界定不清导致了相互间正交易成本的出现。根据新制度经济学的启示,因此就须建构流域政府间横向协调机制,从而规范流域政府权力产权,减少因相互间权力产权摩擦引发的交易成本,由此即可以消解区域经济活动外部性,进而求得当下日趋严峻的流域水资源配置使用之负外部性问题的解决。在“公用地悲剧”、“囚徒困境”、“集体行动的逻辑”等理论模型看来,建构流域政府间横向协调机制似乎并无可能,然而,这些方面的诠释与支持更可以反向得出令人乐观的结论,例如“反复博弈”模型与制度主义的援证、居民退出选择与呼吁的力量、流域公共利益观念凸显及流域政府官员理性自觉的推动。建构流域政府间横向协调机制因而具备其可行性。而其主要类型的界分则同样可以从新制度经济学中汲取灵感,进而区别为科层协调机制、市场协调机制和府际治理协调机制等三种类型。根据新制度经济学相关分析,三种协调机制均会产生一定的交易成本。可以根据影响交易成本的主要因素对各自交易成本作一种理想状态的衡量,进而展开比较并选择某种交易成本最小的协调机制以实现对其它二者的替代。然而真实的世界是变动无常的,尤其在后工业社会场景之下,任何一种机制单一发挥作用均无法根本上求解流域水资源配置使用的负外部性问题。因此较为妥当也属习以为常的选择,还是有机结合三种协调机制以便相互补益发挥整体合力,而这也正体现了治理的行动逻辑。当然,特定情形下有可能实现交易成本最小化的某种协调机制仍应替代和统领其它二者,居于主导地位并发挥主要作用。科层协调机制的实现形态包括建立自主、统一的流域管理机构、完善流域法治、谨慎实施一体化行政区划、确立绿色GDP政府绩效考核制度以及加强执政党资源整合等。不可否认,科层机制借助这些实现形态确乎可以有效协调跨省级行政单位对流域水资源配置使用的负外部性合作治理。然而,由于受制于完备信息以及零监督成本的苛刻前提假设,以及各种实现形态在实施过程中表现出的不同程度的缺陷,科层协调机制存在着无法掩饰的运作困境并常常遭致失败。市场协调机制凸显了竞争机制以及产权制度的功能。策略选择有:开展水权交易、建立流域政府间生态补偿制度、实施排污收费与排污权交易、采取污水处理设施民营化战略。总体上,市场机制这几种策略选择均有助于规范流域政府职能,减少其实施地方保护的机会,从而增进流域政府间协调和对流域水资源配置使用的负外部性联合治理。不过,市场机制这些策略选择的作用也是相对的,即便在政府力量佑护之下,亦存在着明显局限。府际治理协调机制实现形式有:建构流域“公共能量场”、型塑流域政府间电子治理、缔结流域政府间联盟以及实施流域规划等。共同特征是,主要凭借协商手段来促进流域政府间对流域水资源配置使用的负外部性协作治理。优点因而在于容易实现相互理解和妥协;增进各方对流域共同体的责任意识;通过集思广益的方式矫正各自非理性观念。当然,府际治理机制亦非万能,仅仅依靠流域政府社会资本的软约束,其很有可能陷入失灵。基于文化以及制度的视界对美国、法国以及澳大利亚所进行的跨国比较研究发现,三国流域水资源配置使用的负外部性合作治理在州(省)政府间主导性横向协调机制的选择上表现出多样性特征。但趋同性的一面或许更值得关注。很有意义的方面是,三国共同强调了对科层机制、市场机制以及府际治理机制的综合运用,而这正说明了前文提出的类似主张。对我国淮河1994-2004年治污的实证研究则发现,由国务院逐级实施进而占据主导地位的科层协调机制,在其运行过程中存在很多问题;与此同时,市场协调机制以及府际治理协调机制的尝试则显得严重不足。这些均一起酿造了淮河十年治污令人震惊的败局,由此,对照前文分析对症下药,分别建构和完善此三种流域政府间协调机制即成为淮河污染和负外部性治理的下一步选择。更多还原

【Abstract】 Basin, as CPRs, has combined characteristics of non-excludability and competitiveness. So the two characteristics are often regarded as the fundamental causes of negative externality of disposing and using basin’water. But the two characteristics can’t be the reliable and enough explanation of crowding effect and over-used effect. In fact, the cause of negative externality is that the basin governments provide local protection for micro subjects’negative external behaviors in their own regions.At the same time, local protection brings externality of regional economic activities. The cause is that the obscure boundary of power between basin governments increases the transaction cost. In the light of new institutional economics, it’s necessary to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments, in order to regulate power between basin governments, decrease the transaction cost aroused by conflicts. If that, the externality of regional economic activities can be cleared up and the worsening problem of negative externality of disposing and using basin’water can also be resolved.According to the models of the Tragedy of the Commons, Prisoners’Dilemma and the Logic of Collective Action, it’s impossible to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments, but we can get reverse optimistic conclusions from the interpretation of these aspects, such as demonstration from the model of Measure for Measure and Institutionalism; impetus of citizens’exit option and appealing, highlight of common interest of basin community and advancement of government officials’self-conscious reason.So it’s possible to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments. Its main type can also be classified into bureaucratic mechanism, marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism getting inspiration from New Institutional Economics.According to the relative analysis of New Institutional Economics, all these three coordination mechanisms can cause transaction cost, so we evaluate factors which influence transaction cost, make comparisons and then choose the coordination mechanisms which cause the least transaction cost to substitute for the other two. However, the real world is so variable espaicialy in post-industrialty that single mechanism can’t resolve the problem of negative externality of disposing and using basin’water, the reasonable choice is to combine the three coordination mechanisms to get comprehensive effects on the premise that one of three should displace and lead the others standing on measuring the exchange cost.The bureaucratic mechanism is carried out in forms of constructing united and independent basin management bureau, completing the law of basin, carefully uniting administrative district, establishing the government’s performance evaluation system of green GDP and consolidating integrity of the ruling Party’s resources. Sometimes the bureau mechanism can get good effect by such forms. However, limited by the hypothesis of complete information, zero-supervision cost and various-degree defects of its forms in the practice, the bureaucratic mechanism usually faces the inevitable operation problems and often failed.The marketing mechanism highlights the competition system and property right system. The strategic choices are as follows: running water rights transition, building basin-ecological-compensation, putting pollution charge and emission trading into practice, starting privatization in wastewater treatment establishment. In general, these strategic choices of the marketing mechanism are useful to regulate the functions of basin government and resist the local protection. So it can enhance the cooperation among basin governments and the cooperative governing of negative externality. But the functions of strategic choices are comparative, even in the guard of government power.Self-government mechanism can be carried out in forms of building basin public energy field, molding intergovernmental e-governance, forming alliances between basin governments and making watershed planning. The common characteristics of these are to cooperatively govern the negative externality of disposing and using basin’water by deliberative means. So this is easy to understand and compromise mutually, enhance the responsibility sense for the basin community and correct unreasonable conception by means of absorbing all useful ideas. Of course, Self-government mechanism is fallible if only depended on the social capital.In the views of culture and institution, the author makes comparative study of America, France and Australia. The three countries have various characteristics of major horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments. It is worthwhile to pay attention to the common points that the three countries all highlight the comprehensive application of bureaucratic mechanism, marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism. Also, this confirms the suggestion stated above.Through study of water pollution govern in Huai River in 1994-2004, it can be found that the dominated bureaucratic mechanism operated by the State Department has a lot of problems in the practice. Meanwhile, the effort of trying marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism is not sufficient. These had resulted in the astonishing failure of ten-year Huai River governing. So the next choice is to construct and complete the three coordination mechanisms.更多还原