当代不对称冲突研究

【作者】 杨少华；

【导师】 李少军；

【作者基本信息】 中国社会科学院研究生院 ， 国际关系， 2008， 博士

【副题名】一项以战略为视角的考察（1945-2007）

【摘要】 本文的研究问题是:为什么在实力悬殊的不对称冲突中弱者能够战胜强者?本文以二战以来(1945-2007)的不对称冲突为研究对象,并针对目前最为重要的四种理论解释将“利益对称性”、“政体”、“外援”和“战略类型”设定为考察变量。通过对期间的36场不对称冲突进行实证检验,结果表明,行为体采取的战略类型与“以弱胜强”结局存在着相关性。因此,本文的分析主要是围绕着战略的视角来进行。规律是发现的,理论是发明的。尽管数据显示,采用“不对称战略”的弱者经常能够战胜采用“对称战略”的强者,但二者之间的因果关系仍然需要进行分析和论证。为了奠定一个基本的知识前提,本文首先阐释了“对称战略”与“不对称战略”的概念缘起、历史脉络以及当代形态,接着对托夫特的“战略互动论”进行了辩析。总体上看,托夫特的“战略互动论”比较新颖且有相当的解释力,因此也构成了本研究的重要起点,但它也还是给我们留下了几点重要的疑问:首先,托夫特关于四种战略类型划分过于牵强;其次,在其理论模型中,托夫特有意地回避了战略选择的问题;再次,关于“时间有利于弱者而不利于强者”的逻辑解释也并不能令人信服。本文认为,仅仅满足于“时间有利于弱者而不利于强者”的解释是不够的,我们还必须引入“成本”的概念,并回答好:为什么弱者采用的不对称战略能够剥夺强者的战争意志,从而导致其对战争的放弃?为此,本文首先回顾了战争历史上暴力有限化和无限化的双重趋势及其逻辑,接着立足于不对称冲突双方目的与手段之间的不对称结构特征,并围绕规则、成本、博弈、适应性等几个重要概念对冲突双方的“成本控制”情况进行了详细的分析。本文认为,暴力无限化正是弱者取胜的力量源泉。一方面,不对称冲突双方在利益上的不对称导致了他们对于暴力手段的不同态度,从而赋予了弱者使用不对称战略的必要性;另一方面,弱势一方日益非国家化、网络化的特征加上当代全球化以及科学技术的发展,这也使得弱者具备了以不对称战略取胜的可能性。从总体上看,在当代的不对称冲突中,弱者相比于强者在冲突的成本控制方面具有一定优势,而且体现出更为灵活的适应性。正是由于这些原因,当代不对称冲突才越来越成为霸权国家的“心头大患”。为了更好地说明其中的内在逻辑,本文还就“苏阿战争”(1978-1989)和“美伊战争”(2003-2007)两个案例作了进一步的论证。通过对“以弱胜强”原因的战略考察,我们发现当代不对称冲突很大程度上是“共存逻辑”与“偕亡逻辑”之间的博弈。这种逻辑对于我们反对强权政治与霸权主义是有启示意义的,不过,我们也应该对不对称战略内在的暴力无限化趋势持警惕态度。事实上,当代不断蔓延的“新战争”现象已经为国际社会敲响了警钟,学术界有必要对此作进一步的深入研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation intends to tackle this question: despite the great power disparity between the actors in asymmetric conflicts, why do the strong lose to the weak?The research object of the dissertation is asymmetrical conflict since World War Two (1945-2007), and it considers the four types of theories (the“interests of symmetry,”“regime,”“foreign aid”and“strategic type”) as the reference variables. Through the verification of 36 asymmetric conflicts, the research shows that there is a correlation between the strategy type adopted and the outcome of“defeating a strong enemy”. Therefore, the analysis is mainly holding a strategic perspective.Law is found, and the theory is invented. Although the data show that the weak uses“asymmetric strategy”to defeat the strong, but the causal relationship between the two still need verification. In order to provide a basic framework, I first of all explain the origin, historical context and contemporary patterns of“asymmetric strategy”, and then analyzed Toft’s“strategic interaction”conception. Generally, Toft’s“strategic interaction”is relatively new and explanative. Being an important starting point for this research, Toft’s“strategic interaction”perspective still leaves us with some questions: Firstly, Toft’s analysis on the four types of strategy is too far-fetched; Secondly, Toft deliberately evades the question of a strategic choice in his theoretical model; thirdly, the argument“time is conducive to the weak rather than the strong side”is not convincing.This dissertation holds that the explanation“time is conducive to the weak rather than the strong side”is not enough. We must introduce a“cost”concept and answer: why the asymmetric strategies adopted by the weak can deprive the strong of the war inclination, and ultimately resulting in its abandonment of the war? The dissertation reviewed the dual trends and their logic of limited and unlimited violence in the history of the war. And then based on asymmetric structural characteristics of the involved parties’purposes and means, clarifying several important concepts of rules, cost, game and adaptation, there is a detailed analysis on“cost control”carried out by the both sides. This dissertation argues that the unlimited violence is the reason for the weak winning. On the one hand, the asymmetry in the interests of both parties leads to their different attitudes towards violence means, which propels the weak to use asymmetric strategies; On the other hand, the increasingly internet-based and globalizing features of non-State party and the development of science and technology endow asymmetry strategy with the possibility of winning. In general, compared to the strong, the weak has a certain advantage in cost control, and has a flexible adaptability. It is for this reason that contemporary asymmetrical conflict has become a serious trouble to the hegemonic power. In order to illustrate the inherent logic, this dissertation uses the“Afghan war”(1978-1989) and the“Iraq war”(2003-2007) for proof.Through studying the phenomenon of“defeating a strong enemy”, we found that the asymmetry of the conflict to a large extent is the result of the tradeoff between the“coexistence logic”and“common-death logic”. This conclusion is heuristic to our understanding of power politics and hegemonism, and yet we should also have a vigilant attitude toward the inherent violence of strategic asymmetry. In fact, the spread of the“new war”in the international society has alarmed the international society, and the academia need further study in this field.更多还原