银行并购的政府规制研究

【作者】 林燕；

【导师】 张忠民；

【作者基本信息】 上海社会科学院 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 在世界经济一体化、金融规制放松的推动和促进下,世界性的银行并购活动在全球持续发生,众多跨国银行逐渐把并购目标转向亚洲、转向中国,处于从新兴市场经济向成熟市场经济转轨中的中国,不可避免地被融入这一全球性的并购浪潮。中国银行业的并购可以分为本国并购和外资并购两种类型。本国并购的实践主要从1995年开始,初期的银行并购多为当银行面临危机时,政府出于稳定金融秩序的目的,由政府决策、政府撮合、政府注资而促成,具有较浓厚的政府主导色彩,因而有“准并购”之称谓。中国银行业的外资并购,由于规制政策的限制(单个境外金融机构入股比例不得超过20%,多个境外金融机构入股比例合计不得超过25%),主要表现为境外金融机构对我国银行业的参股,从1996年亚洲开发银行入股光大银行算起已有12个年头。随着入世五年过渡期的全部结束,中国的银行将更多基于市场化的选择,通过并购追求规模经济和范围经济效应,通过混合并购和海外并购开拓业务领域和市场领域,提升国际竞争力;外资亦将以占有国内市场、扩大和掌握控制权为目的,更迅速全面地进入中国金融业,入股中资银行等金融机构。为此,国内金融市场、资本市场必将面临一场大幅度的变革和创新,展开新一轮的结构调整。中国银行业的并购整合势必融入世界并购浪潮中,并成为银行并购研究中不应忽视的现实内容。本文在文献综述、理论阐释的基础上,从研究分析美国、欧盟和日本三个国家(地区)对银行并购的规制制度、模式和方法入手,综合比较了三者在银行并购规制制度、模式与具体方法上的异同,为最终就中国银行并购的政府规制制度、模式与方法做出选择,做了理论和实践的研究准备。在此基础上,分析论证了中国银行业国内并购的历程和类型以及外资并购的历程和特点,探寻了中国各级政府的规制行为在银行并购中的作用,以及对银行并购的政府规制和并购行为之间的互动关系,揭示了中国对银行并购的政府规制的问题,并进一步提出了完善中国银行并购规制制度、模式和具体方法的建议。西方成熟市场经济国家对银行并购规制的经验表明,政府规制在银行并购中起到了重要的作用。合理有效的政府规制能够规范银行的并购行为,防止银行利用垄断势力危害竞争、损害消费者利益,促进银行业在自由竞争中改进效率、提高竞争能力、形成合理有效的金融市场结构,最终改善社会福利。而过度的政府行政干预和保护不利于银行业形成长期有效的产业竞争力,不利于银行在竞争中确立自身的核心竞争力,不利于金融与经济环境的长期稳定。西方成熟市场经济国家对银行并购的规制表现出以下几个特点。第一,市场经济本质上是法制经济,政府作为金融规制的供给方,通过金融法律的制定和监督执行,实施对银行并购的规制。第二,银行并购改变市场结构,具有引致垄断、危害自由竞争的可能性,因此各国对银行并购的规制均以反垄断规制为核心,通过制定以反垄断法为核心的法律法规体系,实施对银行并购的全面、系统的规范。第三,由于在社会、经济、政治、人文、历史等方面的不同发展历程和特征,对银行并购的规制在国与国之间呈现出不同的特点,即使是同一国家在不同的历史发展阶段规制的指导思想和具体的规制政策也在发生着变化。同时针对不同的微观主体,针对不同类型的并购行为,规制政策均不相同。因此对银行并购的政府规制呈现出多元化、多层次、阶段性和灵活性的总体特征。第四,随着近年来各国对政府规制的放松,以及出于应对经济全球化挑战和增强本国企业竞争力的需要,总的发展趋势是,各国对于本国银行业的并购逐步持宽松的态度;同时由于银行作为特殊的金融企业,银行并购尤其是涉及到外资的并购关乎一国金融的稳定与安全,各国对本国并购和外资并购行为实施宽严有别的规制选择,对外资并购仍实施相对严格的规制政策。中国的银行并购与西方银行并购有着不同的制度背景。当代西方的银行并购有着完整的法律法规体系,金融市场发达,银行产权制度明晰。而中国缺乏全面完善的银行并购的相关法律法规,还未形成发达的金融体制,银行产权制度有待完善。与西方市场化的并购不同,中国银行业的并购行为长期以来以政府效用为主导,政府在银行并购中起到了决定性的作用。第一,无论是国有商业银行还是城市商业银行在发展过程中都为国有企业和地方经济提供了众多便利,形成了大量历史包袱。因此在国有商业银行和城市商业银行引入国际战略投资者的过程中,中央政府、地方政府不得不为过去对商业银行的索取行为延期支付对价,在引资前期处置了大量不良贷款,以政府注资、资产置换等方式充实银行资本金、改善银行的资产质量。第二,商业银行的并购成为各级政府博弈的结果。在城市商业银行合并重组为省域股份制商业银行、引入国际战略投资者的过程中,省政府和市政府根据自身的效用函数做出是否积极支持、配合并购的策略选择,而并非完全从市场原则和银行自身效用出发。政府在并购中的行政干预和介入为日后政府干预银行日常经营行为埋下了隐患。第三,在早期问题银行处置过程中,政府为避免银行倒闭带来的金融波及效应,通过指定、建议接管收购的主体,暂时化解了金融风险,但由于对收购银行的并购整合能力和风险控制能力考虑不足,反而可能加大了收购银行的经营风险。第四,中国银行业的外资并购则显露出金融资产评估、国家经济安全等问题,对中国现行金融监管体制、法律制度、规制政策制定和执行提出了要求和挑战。银行并购本质上属于一种产权交易,政府对并购过多的直接干预可能扭曲经济效率,有悖市场原则;而对发生的任何并购行为都听之任之,没有一定的规范,也可能会形成垄断、加重金融风险、危害金融安全。一国的金融规制能力反映了政府干预经济活动的能力,以及履行政府宏观经济管理职能的能力和稳定经济、克服金融危机的能力。中国在银行并购中的政府职能的正确定位十分关键,这将涉及从行政性干预转向以法律规制为主、对国内银行并购从严格保护转向市场开放、对外资银行并购从严格限制转向制度约束、对问题银行从无原则的保护转向基于成本收益的市场化处置。放松规制与加强监管并行、政府职能转变与效率改进并行。总之,通过有效的政府规制保证市场行为的顺利完成,打击和避免垄断行为,维护中小银行和利益相关者的应有利益,确保金融安全与稳定。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the promotion of globally economical unification and deregulation of financial regulation, global bank merger and acquisition (M&A) occurs continuously. With lots of transnational banks gradually aim to buy out financial institutions in Asia and China instead of other countries and regions, China in the transition from newly-developing market economy to mature market economy is inevitably merged in the global M&A wave.The bank M&As in China can be classified into domestic M&As and foreign investors’M&As. The practice of domestic M&As has started since 1995 and most of the early practice is dominated by governments in the aim of stabilize the finance situation and M&As are acted as means of dealing with troubling financial institutions. So such M&As are called quasi-M&A. Foreign investors merging and acquiring Chinese banks is to buy a share of Chinese banks rather than acquiring the controlling rights of Chinese banks in view of the relative restriction on share ratio. It’s 12 years since Asian Developing Bank (ADB) bought a share of China Everbright Bank in 1996. With the end of transition period of entering WTO, Chinese banks will try to obtain economy of scale and economy of scope by M&As and expand business fields and markets by mixed M&As and M&As overseas on the basis of marketable choice. Foreign investors will enter into Chinese financial industry by merging and acquiring Chinese banks with the aim of occupying markets and controlling the banks. So domestic financial markets and capital markets will be surely confronted with a large scale of changes and innovations. Researches on bank M&As in China are significant.Based on the previous literature, theoretical explanation, this article explores the systems and problems in the regulation of America, European Union and Japan, and compares their similarities and differences. And then the article analyzes the types and characteristics of bank M&As in China and relations between regulation and M&As, and discusses the problems in the regulation on bank M&As. Finally the article puts forward some proposals on improvement of regulation system and means.The experience of regulation on bank M&As by west mature market economy countries shows that government regulation plays an important role in bank M&As. Rational and effective regulation can guide bank M&As and improve social welfare by avoiding those M&As with the possibility of substantial lessening of competition. Over-intervention and protection don’t help to form competitiveness of banking and long-term stability of financial and economic situations.The regulation on bank M&As of west mature market economy countries has the following characteristics. First, market economy is essentially law economy and government regulate the bank M&As by constituting law and supervising its implementation. Secondly, governments regulate bank M&As by constituting the anti-trust law and other laws. Thirdly, since each country’s situations on society, economy, politics, history and etc. is different, regulation on bank M&As differs among countries and at different periods. Fourthly, many countries has begun to deregulate domestic M&As in recent years while still implementing comparatively strict policies on foreign investors’merging and acquiring domestic banks.Chinese bank M&As have different system conditions with the west. There are integrated laws and rules, developed financial market and transparent property right system in the west while there’s not in China. Comparing to the bank M&As in mature market economy which maximizes the profit, bank M&As in China maximize the government utility instead of bank profit and government has deciding rights in bank M&As in China.First,in the past years, state-owned and urban commercial banks have provided many convenience for state-owned enterprises and local economy and thus have suffered lots of historical debts. So in the process of introducing foreign investors, central and local governments have to pay for the historical debts by coping with bad loans.Secondly, bank M&As are the results of game theory. Governments of province and city make choices to maximize their own utility instead of bank profit. Intervention of government maybe bode no good for future performance of banks. Thirdly, government appoints the bank that takes over when dealing with troubling banks, which resolves systematic risk, but perhaps enlarges the risk of operation of the acquiring bank.Fourthly, there are some problems on financial capital evaluation and national economic safety when foreign investors’merge and acquire Chinese banks, which puts forward challenges on supervisions systems, law systems, policy-making and implementation.Bank M&As are a kind of transaction of property rights in fact. Over-invention of government may distort the economic efficiency while it may also do harm to financial safety without any regulation. The regulation ability of a nation reflects the ability that government manages economic activities and the ability that government implements functions of macroeconomic management and stabilizes economy and conquers financial crisis. It’s critical that government should change from administrative invention to regulation based on laws, from total protection to open markets to the outside, from strict restriction on foreign banks to restriction by system and from unprincipled protection on troubling banks to disposition based on cost-benefit analysis. At the same of deregulation, strengthen supervision and at the same of change governmental function, improve efficiency of regulation.In conclusion, we should implement effective regulation in order to guarantee the market activities, protect stakeholders and ensure financial safety and stability.更多还原