【作者】 卢建祥；

【导师】 周汉民；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文写作的目的在于分析和评价WTO裁决执行中的强制问题,指出WTO只有受到严格限制的执行强制措施,而没有强制执行机制;并结合国际法一般执行中“四种力量”,为构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制提出思路:向国内法院和国际协定下转化执行。本文综合各种对国际法包括WTO法的执行/不执行的理论和实践的研究,认为是四种基本的力量主导着有关规则和裁决的执行/不执行,即国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)。这四种力量相互作用共同影响,尤其是强制力、执行拉力和基础力量之间的相互作用,在很大程度上决定着国际法是否能够得到执行。从而在考虑对WTO裁决的强制执行机制的设计和运用时,也必须时时刻刻考虑各种力量的“和谐”运用。但在具体完善WTO的强制执行措施或机制时必须看到,在当前的WTO法制中,只有执行强制措施而没有真正强制执行机制的事实。有关强制执行机制核心要素的缺失、定位的失调,使得这种理应可以发挥更大作用的推力,非常难以产生应有的作用,并在一定程度上甚至影响了人们对WTO法制实际作用的信心。而目前的各种学界研究,以及各种关于强制执行的改进建议,存在诸多偏颇和狭隘之处,亟待廓清并予以纠正,并在此基础上构建适合当前WTO法制发展阶段又能够比较有效的解决WTO争端的强制执行机制。截止到目前,几乎所有的学者和WTO成员,都在漠视WTO法制中根本没有所谓的“强制执行”的情况下讨论“强制”执行——在现有的语境下,执行中的一些“强制”措施被默认为了对DSB裁决和建议“强制执行”的机制。实际上,现有WTO法制中没有强制执行,只有对“引导执行”的临时强制措施,且这些临时强制措施还受到了诸多程序和实体的约束。尤其是对“补偿”形式和性质的规定,几乎将WTO中的一些敏感案件和重大案件,直接推向了不执行的边缘。在报复的水平、形式和程序规定上的诸多缺失和限制,也让进入这一阶段的案件执行的回旋余地大为缩减。有学者甚至认为,WTO虽然形式上给予授权,但是实际上不是授予权利,而是对被授予报复的权利的限制。另外,权利与义务的平衡在WTO语境下甚至出现多次的“交换”,而不是内在“平衡”。甚至有学者认为,在整个WTO法制中,被规定的其实根本就不是权利,而是义务。实践显示,WTO强制执行机制的欠缺至少在部分上导致了严重后果:解决争端的强制措施难以操作、执行强制的实际效率低下、实现贸易自由化的效果较差、难以实现国际社会间的公平和正义价值,凸显了强烈的“实力悖论”(power paradoxes):一方面,WTO体制摒弃了GATT时代以实力为基的做法;另一方面,WTO又仰赖成员自身的经济实力来执行或强制执行裁决。但是,WTO本身其实缺乏适当的强制机制,也缺乏执行强制的权力和实力;相反,WTO体制刻意依赖其成员,特别是争端各方,动用自身实力和影响实现执行。可以认为,在WTO成员最需要WTO给予强力支持的时候,WTO组织和法制却将烫手的山芋直接塞回给了已经胜诉并渴望获得救济的受害方。迄今为止,WTO实际授予报复的几个案件,即欧共体香蕉案、欧共体荷尔蒙案、巴西飞机补贴案、美国FSC案以及加拿大飞机补贴案等,构成了研究WTO裁决执行问题的重要案例。这些案件均涉及较大的案值,具有强烈的政治敏感性,案件处理旷日持久,争端解决的效果尤其不理想。这对广大的WTO成员,特别是最不发达成员(LDCs)可能造成了更大的不利影响,它们面临实力不济有心无力的窘境,即便被授予报复也无法真正实施,甚至只好放弃(如欧共体香蕉案中的厄瓜多尔)。本文认为,改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首要的任务是确定需要执行的内容和方法。根据当前WTO的规定,DSB建议和裁决的核心内容只有“建议有关成员将违规措施与WTO涵盖协定相一致”。这种对救济的规定,是受到了乌拉圭回合谈判时,WTO法制特定发展水平的限制。当前的《国家责任法》草案以及一些国际法实践,都比较明确的规定了对违反国际法行为的“补偿(reparation)”。WTO是以促进国际贸易自由化为己任的专门国际组织,经济意义远比一般的国际组织为强,理应更加重视对受害方的赔偿。这既是对国际法的正义的追求,也是对具体受害方的公平救济。在规定补偿时,必须区别不同的性质,并给予长期不执行和变相不执行时期的新增损失,予以补偿。其次,在改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须明确撤销违规措施、补偿和报复之间的关系。只要存在违规措施,补偿就应该同时进行;如果既不纠正违规措施,又不提供补偿,则应该授权报复,而且应该考虑增强在此种情形下报复的效果。在对撤销有关措施、补偿和报复作具体规定时,WTO法制应该授权和要求发挥专家组的“建议(suggestion)”的作用。具体而言,在专家组报告中,应该首先明确建议可选的或供示范的纠正办法;并在报告发布之后,无论败诉方是否作出纠正措施,继续计算抵消或减损的水平,并以此为基础计算补偿的经济数额和可能的报复水平。当然,在设计、改进和实践WTO裁决的强制执行机制时,必须考虑到国际法本身不同于国内法所带来的局限性,从而WTO法制中的强制执行必须有别于通常国内法上的意义。从一般意义上讲,对国际法规则和司法(含“准司法”)裁决的执行情况的衡量,实际上是对国际合作承诺得以践行,包括国际裁决得以强制执行的“程度”的考察。影响国际法执行程度的主要因素是国际法的正当性(拉力)、国家整体利益和国内利益集团的影响(基础力量)、国际法制的强制力(推力)、国家名誉与道德感(辅助力)等。国际法不执行和国际法裁决的不执行,往往是因为上述因素的否定性综合而形成的。过于强调国际法和国际法裁决的绝对执行或不执行,或过于强调其中一方的因素对执行或不执行的影响,是造成目前“国际法执行”领域各种不同甚至冲突的结论的主要原因。从而,切实促进国际法裁决的执行和应对国际法裁决,包括WTO司法裁决,的不执行,也必须从上述方面着手。在WTO内部难以解决的强制问题,还可能通过其他的特定国际组织提供组织框架、监督和舆论压力,协助和共同解决。还可能通过转移到国内来执行以突破国际法本身的诸多不足,并发动国内私人利益集团的参与,从而将国际法与国内法的司法救济和司法执行机制相联系和转化。这就需要首先解决国际法,包括国际裁决,在国内的直接效力。当然,鉴于国际法和国际裁决在国内的直接效力事关国家的主权,并可能深刻影响到国内的宪政体系,并不可能奢望所有的国际法成员同时全部接受这样的国际法演进。但如果部分条件、要求和理念类似的成员,愿意达成类似保护国际投资的《华盛顿公约》的国际协议,创设与“国际投资争端解决中心”类似的国际组织,将为实现国际法治创造新的途径。最后,或许极其重要的是,必须考虑到国际法规则和裁决本身的内在正当性——只有国际法本身具有公平、公正性且得到国际社会,包括败诉成员的认可,强制机制才可能实现对国际法治的促进,并在具体争端的解决和裁决的执行中起到事半功倍的效果。本文正是基于上述认识,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制所存在的问题及可能的改进,在新的思路下进行了全面的考虑。本文认为,对WTO裁决执行中的强制机制的建设和改进,必须与裁决本身的决策程序的改进密切结合;强制执行必须与调动败诉成员内部的政治和经济利益集团相结合。由此,有关裁决能够获得内在的正当性,提供执行裁决的“软实力”(soft power);有关裁决能够置败诉成员于国内政治和经济压力下,并改变私人利益在WTO下被隔绝的状况;当前的执行强制还应该得到国际多边体制的更大的组织上的支持。本文为此分为了如下五个部分。第一章WTO裁决执行的强制主要结合案例,简要分析其效率问题、正当性和公平问题。这也是几乎所有的司法执行都会遇到的难题。第二章改进WTO裁决执行强制的建议这一部分主要分析和评价了当前主要的改进议案和建议,包括集体报复、拍卖报复权、轮候报复、缴纳强制保证金等。这些建议中,有些是长期得不到有效支持但不断被人提起的,如集体报复。集体报复的威摄力似乎很强,但是在多边合作的框架下,如果得不到大部分甚至所有成员的有效支持,则根本没有付诸实际的可能性。第三章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(一)本章提出建设和改革WTO裁决的强制执行机制中必须贯彻的一些重要原则和程序。要改进WTO裁决的强制执行机制,首先应该注意保持足够的慎重,突出表现在避免给现有的体制造成伤害,但同时应该坚定的“向前看”——在规则为基的指引下,推进WTO争端解决机制的完善。在避免过度政治化或过度法制化的基础上,增强WTO裁决强制的法律正当性和可操作性,即在裁决中适当增加建议(suggestion),特别是如何执行裁决的建议,以便利WTO裁决的执行和迅速解决争端;在审理中应增加审理的透明度,利用现代便捷的各种沟通手段,通过各种形式让各利益相关方,包括有关成员和有关的利益集团,能够了解审理过程并发表意见,WTO专家组和上诉机构并应合理听取各方意见。第四章构建WTO裁决的强制执行机制(二)本章具体提出改革建议和思路。本文提出,应对执行措施设置“预审”,由同一争端解决小组快速审议其拟执行的措施,以避免变相拖延和不执行。完善和强化补偿规定,还应补偿胜诉方在执行期间遭受的额外损失。借鉴欧盟香蕉案的“教训”,鼓励各成员签订双边和多边协议共同承认WTO在域内的直接效力,并结合私人利益集团的诉讼,充分调动域内的各利益实体的参与,并合理体现和保护其利益。第五章结语和展望本部分结合对WTO体制的局限性和有关改革,提出中国在面对执行难题时,应降低执行预期,尽量和解,并应注重调动对方国内利益集团,特别是进出口利益集团参与裁决的执行;当面临执行的义务时,中国应积极应对执行,充分利益WTO的规则,在不违反WTO规则的前提下积极维护国内利益。当然,作为一个正在崛起并负责任的大国,中国更应该积极参与到有关的法制建设中去。WTO体系是外交(政治)、贸易和法律要素的结合,是一种“三位一体”。在这个体系中,经济、政治外部性(political externalities)和法律框架共同作用。近年来,西方一些国际法学者越来越多的运用国际关系理论来研究国际法的运行,类似的,国际经济学家和国际政治学家也试图整合国际政治经济学(International Political Economics,IPE)。在国际贸易和经济关系中,政治常常是决策的基础,经济学是决策的依据,而法律常常同时扮演两个角色:一方面,法律提供运行框架;另一方面,法律又是重要的工具。因此,跨学科的综合经济、政治和国际法的研究方法,对研究WTO体系的实际运行几乎是必不可少的工具。本文结合具体案例,并综合运用国际法、国际关系、政治经济学等知识和理论,试图对WTO裁决的强制执行问题进行全面的思考,并在国际法有关知识和理论的基础上借鉴和融合多学科知识,提出了新的解决方案建议。如能促进对WTO裁决的执行,增进WTO体系的安全性和可预见性,而又不从根本上动摇WTO以“规则为基”的这座大厦,那也就算是本文的一点小小贡献吧。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation aims to analyze and review the enforcement of WTO DSB rulings and recommendations,and using the theory of "four forces in international law compliance",put forth some proposals for creating the enforcement mechanism for the WTO judicial decisions.By studying the theory and practice of compliance and non-compliance of international law,including the WTO law,this dissertation finds thc underlying four forces for implementation of the international rules and judicial decisions,namely, the legitimacy as the pulling force,the national interests and domestic interest group interests as the basic force,the enforcement force as the pushing force,and the national reputation and sense of morality as the subordinate force.The above four forces interact with each other and together decide whether the international legal rules and judicial decisions could be implemented.Therefore,to design and apply the enforcement mechanism,one should always jointly consider the harmonious operation of the four forces.However,it must be understood that the current WTO legal system does not yet have an enforcement mechanism—what’s there is just some scant enforcement measures.The absence of the key factors of an enforcement mechanism and the bad positioning of the enforcement measures make enforcement just a remote possibility,which in turn hurts people’s confidence in the WTO legal system.The current academic research papers and various official proposals,which intend to make a difference,are mostly narrow-minded or short-sighted.The topic of enforcement of judicial decisions has never been something novel. Various international legal scholars,government officials,enterprise practitioners and lawyers have produced a lot of rich and conflicting ideas on improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO.WTO’s officials have also made proposals for improving the mechanism of enforcing DSB rulings and recommendations after the launch of Doha Round,but consensus has never been around the corner.One sheer fact is that all of them have overlooked one thing—there is simply no such enforcement mechanism in the WTO while they are talking so much on it—most of them simply talk about enforcement measures for the enforcement mechanism.Even the scant enforcement measures that are currently available to the prevailing party who seeks retaliation authorization are strictly restricted under WTO,thanks to the historical constraints of international and domestic politics, economic development and legal evolution,and thus cannot deliver the intended result.Some scholars go so far as to claim that what are authorized by WTO are not rights but obligations.Practice demonstrates that the deficiency of the enforcement mechanism of WTO judicial decisions has at least in part contributed to the few cases of enforcement application,the low efficacy of enforcement measures,the poor performance for liberalizing international trade,and the failure to deliver justice and equity to the world.What stands out is the power paradox:on one hand,the WTO has evolved from the power-based GATT,but on the other hand,the most forceful measures of WTO for enforcing WTO’s judicial decisions fundamentally depend on power of WTO members.WTO has long been hailed as the only international legal system that most effectively solves international disputes,but the WTO in itself does not have a proper enforcement mechanism,or the authorization,power and mechanism to enforce anything.Instead,the WTO just turns the burning potatoes back to the party who has turned eagerly and hopefully to WTO.The several cases for which enforcement measures are authorized,such as the EC-banana regime case, the EC-ban on hormone case,Brazil-aircraft case,US-FSC case,and Canada-aircraft cases,are all sensitive cases involving large values but lasting a long long time yet achieving no or very limited compliance,which may be particularly damaging to the LDCs.The LDCs,say Ecuador in EC-Banana Regime case,are normally powerless even when they aspire to enforce the WTO judicial decisions,and have no way out but to abort any such aspiration.In designing,improving and applying the enforcement mechanism of WTO, one must take into consideration the fact that international law is much different from the municipal law,and therefore the enforcement mechanism under WTO law should also be radically different from that under the municipal law.Normally, measurement of the compliance with international rules and judicial decisions(quasi judicial decisions) shows varied degrees among cases.Such degrees vary and are caused by the legitimacy of international law,the national interest and the domestic interest group interests,the enforcement of international law and national reputation and sense of morality.Over stress on the absolute compliance or noncompliance with the international rules and judicial decisions,or over stress on one of the factors that contribute to a certain degree,may be the cause for different observations.As a result,to improve the compliance wit the international judicial decision,including WTO judicial decisions,should also start from the above.Some WTO members have raised some reform proposals on the enforcement of WTO judicial decisions,mainly focusing on enhancing the enforcement,including the collective retaliation or carousel retaliation.Some scholars,such as Steve Chamovitz,Petros Mavroidis,Robert Lawrence and Joost Pauwelyn,etc,also raised some proposals and suggestions.But both the officials who put forth the official proposals and the scholars are confined to how to directly enhance the enforcement and therefore its efficiency.The WTO DSU has been widely recognized as the teeth of WTO,with the enforcement measure as the last resort for the WTO DSU, therefore it is truly desirable to improve the enforcement measures.But any such reform should also be ground on the fact that the current development status of the international law should be respected,and the reform should aim to maintain and strengthen the WTO multilateral cooperation as well as considering international political status,the nature of international law and the development stage of the international lawThe enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under WTO,may be jointly or cooperatively settled by other international forums through transferring the case from WTO to other international forums.Although international organizations do not have the legislative branch just as a state has,international organizations bind states’ behavior through treaty creating;although similarly international organizations do no have the administrative and judicial enforcement branches just as a state has,international organizations have something else that equally binds the international society member into abiding by international law rules,principles and systems.It is a viable option to transfer the WTO enforcement case to other international organization or third party,provided that the WTO has made clear provisions or legal decisions.The enforcement issue,which may be difficult to deal with under the WTO, may be transferred to domestic courts and hence mobilizing the private forces.Such a transfer would require as a precondition the direct effect of the international law rules and the judicial decisions.Given the profound impact of direct effect on the sovereignty of WTO members,it should be understood that such a transfer would deeply affect the domestic constitutional system and hence not every WTO member would accept the doctrine of direct effect.Still,those members sympathetic with the doctrine of direct effect may be encouraged to sign a certain treaty enabling the direct effect of the WTO rules and judicial decisions,just as under the ICSID.Last but not the least,one must take into consideration the inherent legitimacy of international law rules and judicial decisions—only when the international law rules as per as fair,equitable and commanding respect of the WTO members including the prevailed ones can the enforcement mechanism help promote international rule of law,and resolve international dispute and judicial enforcement issue.It is based on the above findings that this dissertation overhauls all existing problems of the current enforcement measures under WTO and the possible improvement on them,and conducts a brand-new and all-around thinking.It is the conclusion of this dissertation that creation and improvement of the enforcement mechanism under WTO must be done hand in hand with reforming the decision-making process of the judicial decisions;by mobilizing and tuning with the domestic interest groups within the prevailed member;and by gaining more institutional support from WTO and other international organizations.Then,the enforcement mechanism may be able to acquire the inherent legitimacy and generate soft power,to put the prevailed member under domestic political and economic pressures and change over the condition where the private interests were isolated from WTO.This dissertation consists of the following five chapters:Chapter 1 provides an overview of the WTO enforcement by analyzing the efficiency,legitimacy and equity issues in light of the relevant cases.Sure, enforcement has been,is now and will still be an issue for all judicial decisions.Chapter 2 deals with the existing proposals for improving the enforcement mechanism of WTO by analyzing and reviewing the various proposals such as collective retaliation,auction of retaliation right,carousel retaliation,security bond, etc.Among them,some have been raised repeatedly although not yet popularly supported,such as the collective retaliation.The deterrence of collective retaliation sounds very powerful,but within the multilateral framework,if it could not garner full support from at least most WTO members,it stands virtually no chance of success.Chapter 3 deals with some principles and processes that must be followed in building the WTO enforcement mechanism.First among them is discretion,that is, do no harm to the WTO.At the same time,one should look forward,that is,push forward the mission of improving WTO dispute settlement process on the basis of rules.Over legalization or over politicization should both be avoided,and the legitimacy and accessibility of WTO enforcement mechanism should be enhanced by making suggestions that are also binding just as the recommendations with a view to prompt settlement of WTO disputes.Transparency in judicial decision should also be enhanced through the convenient communication vehicles so that all stake holders including the WTO member and their domestic interest groups may directly or indirectly get involved into the process.Chapter 4 puts forth new solutions to the enforcement puzzle.This dissertation believes the pre-hearing should be conducted for the measures taken to comply so as to avoid possible default.The extra loss suffered by the prevailing party during the period of default should also be covered.Drawing from the lessons of EC-Banana Regime case,WTO should encourage members to set up a certain multilateral organization in the image of ICSID by producing clear cut provisions and judicial obligations so that domestic forces can be effectively mobilized.Chapter 5 deals with China’s viable strategies for compliance and enforcement. Drawing on the analysis of WTO’s limitation,this dissertation proposes that when faced with the enforcement issue,China should be realistic and grasp all opportunities to settle the case.Also the domestic forces should all be mobilized into exerting uniform pressure to the counterparts of the prevailed member.When faced with the obligation to comply,it will be a wise strategy to respond proactively and make full use of China’s due process rights and substantive rights to produce as much as benefit to the national interests while preserving the principles of WTO. But as a rising and responsible power,China should be more active in getting involved in the building of the WTO rule of law.WTO is a unification of three in one:politics,trade and law where three factors work jointly.In recent years,western scholars tend to apply more and more international relationship theories in studying operations of international legal systems.Similarly international economists and international political scientists intend to forge a new area for studying international issues such as enforcement of international judicial decisions:international political economics,or IPE.In international trade and economic relationship,politics is always the basis for decision making,economics the rationale,and law the framework and vehicle.Thus an interdisciplinary approach would be inevitable for studying enforcement issue under WTO.This dissertation turns widely to international law,international relationship and IPE theories and knowledge and attempts to conduct brand-new and all-around thinking on the enforcement issue under WTO.If the humble analysis and proposed solution might do something good to enhance the security and predictability of WTO and enforce the judicial decisions whilst not undermining the huge rule-based edifice,I will be honored ands satisfied.更多还原