我国证券公司风险处置中的重组模式选择

【作者】 孙明明；

【导师】 刘红忠；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 金融学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 根据中国证监会统计资料,截止2007年9月,我国在历时三年的证券公司风险处置过程中,共处置高风险证券公司31家。其中,27家实施了重组,使得中国证券公司总体上达到了持续经营标准。基于证券经营行业的高风险特征,此次集中风险处置并非一劳永逸,及时分析我国证券公司风险成因,总结我国证券公司风险处置中存在的问题,研究并完善证券公司风险处置的模式,建立证券公司风险处置目标与评价体系,对于防范和更好地化解证券公司风险,同时为金融业其他金融机构的风险处置提供借鉴,具有重要理论和现实意义。本文研究的逻辑脉络如下:首先,给出证券公司风险处置的一般模式,即政府救助、重组、破产清算、行政处罚和接管等;其次,建立经济学模型,论证了我国国情下采用重组方式进行证券公司风险处置的必要性;再次,实证研究了三种具体的重组模式(收购重组、政策性重组、股东或实际控制人重组),对每种模式进行比较深入全面的剖析,为得出本文结论与政策建议奠定基础;最后,本文通过建立评价体系对不同的重组模式进行集中比较分析,进而得出我国证券公司风险处置的目标取向与政策建议,为降低风险处置成本、提高风险处置效率、实现证券公司行业整合提供政策建议。本文在研究过程中大量采用了实证分析的方法,通过对实际案例的剖析、比对,从中提炼共性因素,为整个论文的展开奠定基础。而对于“为什么要把重组作为证券公司风险处置的主要方式进行研究”这一首先必须回答的问题,本文在第二章建立了经济学模型,通过数理分析得出结论,这在目前国内有关研究中尚属首次。本文研究表明,各国(地区)采取何种证券公司风险处置方式,一般是根据证券公司的风险程度及其对市场和社会的影响状况而确定的。无论采取何种风险处置方式,监管部门的目的都是尽量保护投资者的权益,尽可能降低处置成本,同时维护社会公众对证券市场的信心。由于我国社会主义市场经济体制和公有制经济占控制性地位的特征,高风险证券公司倒闭对于我国金融体系和宏观经济的稳定具有巨大的政治成本,这种政治成本使得监管当局只能对高风险证券公司采取过度宽容的监管态度,推动其重组而不是大量关闭,其决策临界点远远偏离于社会最优值。我国证券公司重组模式主要包括收购重组、政策性重组和股东或实际控制人重组等。对于如何选择具体的重组模式,本文在第三、四、五章分别对三种重组模式进行了实证研究。其中,第三章集中探讨了历年来我国证券公司收购重组的基本模式:政府为主导的模式和以市场为主导的模式。政府主导型重组对于迅速处理掉风险券商的不良资产,解决债务问题,稳定公众信心起到了积极的作用,在证券公司发展初期是很有必要的,但是随着我国证券市场市场化程度的提高,政府行为在券商重组问题上的弊端和局限性也将逐步显现。政府主导不能从根本上解决券商在委托代理、授权经营、风险防范等方面内在的矛盾,未来我国证券公司的并购重组工作还有赖于市场化手段的运用。第四章对汇金和中建投公司参与的政策性重组进行了详细分析。汇金公司、中国建投参与证券公司重组是一项政策性任务,尽管初期社会舆论争议较大,但随着重组进程的不断推进,事实证明汇金公司参与证券公司的重组工作对资本市场的发展起到了重要作用。另外,汇金公司、中国建投注资和参与重组,对于所选择的证券公司具有明确的政府支持信号,有很强示范效应,可以引致其他资金投入证券公司股本中,对于化解和防范证券公司的系统风险发挥了积极作用。第五章围绕着证券公司股东或实际控制人重组模式展开。由于我国特殊的历史原因,国企自身存在的多种优势和参与券商重组而存在的多重收益,决定了国企是未来券商重组过程中的一支主力军。国企参与券商重组模式,相对于汇金、建银模式来说更加市场化,而且可以抓住当前的政策机遇和有利环境,利用公共资金为重组券商解决一部分债务的支付问题,以减少进入证券行业所需支付的代价。第六章对上述重组模式作出总结和对比,提出了我国证券公司重组的政策目标取向,建立了证券公司风险处置评价体系,确立了我国证券公司风险处置模式选择的主要考察指标。最后,在第七章对我国证券公司风险处置中的重组模式选择提出政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The risk disposition of China’s securities companies which lasted three years has almost finished by the end of September 2007. According to the statistics of CSRC, 31 security companies have been disposed including 27 security companies which reach the operating standard after restructure. Now the securities companies’ problem of liquidity gap and beyond-account operations has been resolved. The historical risk accumulated from the illegal operations such as use of clients’ transaction settlement funds for other purposes, illegal assets management, misappropriating clients’ securities or shareholder’s funds, excessive share holding is disposed across the whole industry. Through the risk disposition of the securities companies, the common sense of the acknowledgement of the risks of the securities companies has been reached among the several parts, and a series of rules has set up. Analyze the causes of the securities companies, sum up the problems during the process the risk disposition, and study and improve the disposition method and mechanism, all have import theoretical and realistic significance to prevent and handle the risks of the securities companies, and at the same time provide lessons to other financial fields such as the circles of the futures and insurance. Those are the purposes of this paper.This paper is organized as following; firstly, we summarize several kinds of methods used in the security companies’ risk disposition based on the analysis of the domestic and foreign real cases, including M&A, bankrupt, administrative punishment and overtake. Then we analyze the necessity of high-risk securities company restructure, based on a simple economic model. Further, we discuss three basic modes of China’s securities company restructure over the years (M&A, the government-lead restructure and the shareholder-lead restructure), and make a deep analysis for every mode which will be a good support to this paper’s policy implication. At last, we carry out a comparative analysis of the reorganization mode about the risk disposal of China’s securities companies, which provides reference for decreasing risk disposal costs, improving risk disposal efficiency and integrating securities industry resource.Many empirical methods are used in this paper. Based on the comparable study, we find some common factors which are the key issues for this paper. A quantitative economic model is formulated to answer the question that why restructure should be the major way to dispose the securities companies’ risk. This is a innovation compared with the domestic related researches. The research results imply that each country’s decision on the choice of disposition methods depends on the risk level of the securities companies and the impacts on the markets and society. The supervisors tend to reduce the disposition cost and protect the investor’s interest whatever disposition method is adopted, which can maintain the confidence of the market. In views of the dominant position of state-owned economy, the collapse of high-risk securities companies has enormous political costs of the stability of national financial system and macroeconomic, for which regulatory authorities can only take an over-tolerance attitude to the supervision of high-risk securities, promoting its reorganization rather than massive closure, with decision-making critical point far from the optimal value.The basic modes of China’s securities company restructure over the years, which can be divided into three types: M&A, the government-lead restructure and the shareholder-lead restructure. Chapter 3 focuses on basic modes of China’s securities company reorganization over the years, which can be divided into two types: the government-led mode and the market-oriented mode. The results show that the government-led reorganization has played a positive role in the expansion of the size of companies and reducing risk, and this is necessary in the early development of securities companies. However, along with the continuous evolution of China’s economic development stage and improvement of the marketization degree of securities market, the drawbacks and limitations of government acts on the reorganization of securities companies will gradually become apparent. Although government forces conduce to disposing of non-performing assets rapidly, solving debt problems and stabilizing public confidence in the short term, good corporate governance can not be established fundamentally by administrative means and the inner contradictions, such as principal-agent, authorized management and risk prevention, can not be solved fundamentally by government-led modes. If an improper-treatment follows up, we will easily be trapped in an odd circle, ’risk accumulation-governance-up to standard-risk accumulation again-governance again’. In the future, the M&A and reorganization of China’s securities companies will depend on market-oriented means. Chapter 4 carries out a detailed analysis of the political reorganization in which Central SAFE Investments Ltd and CJIC participated, and discuss separately the reorganization process of Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co., Ltd, Guotai Junan Securities Co., Ltd and China Southern Securities Ltd. The results indicate: Central SAFE Investments Ltd and CJIC participate in the reorganization of securities companies as a political assignment. Although public opinions are controversial early, it has been proved that the participation of Central SAFE Investments Ltd in the reorganization of securities companies played an important role in the improvement of the capital market, along with the continuous evolution of reorganization process. Besides, the injection of funds and participation in reorganization of Central SAFE Investments Ltd and CJIC, has an definite signal of government support and strong demonstration effect, which can lead to more injection of funds to securities companies. The fact shows that the participation of Central SAFE Investments Ltd and CJIC in reorganization of securities companies has played a positive role in resolving and preventing systemic risks of securities companies. Chapter 5 focuses on the securities company shareholders and actual controllers. As a result of China’s special history, the state-owned enterprises have a variety of advantages and multiple benefits if reorganized, which determines that they are the main force in the process of reorganization. The SOE-participation mode, compared with the participation mode of Central SAFE Investments Ltd and CJIC, is more market-oriented. In addition, it can seize current policy opportunities and favorable environments, as well as resolve the issue of payment of the debt by public funds to reduce the entrance costs of the securities industry.Chapter 6 carries out a comparative analysis of the reorganization mode about the risk disposal of China’s securities companies, sets up the valuation system on the disposition of the securities’ risk, and gives the main indicators used in the choice of disposition methods. Based on the object of China’s restructure of securities companies, we give the policy implication of establishing the choosing mechanism of the restructure modes during the disposition of risks.更多还原