【作者】 彭程；

【导师】 刘星；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 企业投融资活动是企业资金运动过程中不可分割的两个方面,融资活动解决的是企业发展中的资金来源问题,投资决策则思考的是企业资源如何配置的问题,两者之间存在相互影响、共生互动的关系。在过去相当长的一段时期内,不管是在实践中还是理论上,两种决策在更多情形下是被单独处理的。虽然,后来众多学者通过多方面的反思与探讨,业已对投融资相互影响的关系有了初步的直觉,但人们更多关注的是在某些摩擦因素作用下负债融资对投资决策的单信道影响。本文以税收利益和破产成本为切入点,对企业投融资决策双向作用的理论关系进行了研究,在具有普适性意义的理论结果的指导下,对我国上市公司的投融资决策进行了实证分析,以此检验上市公司投融资决策的合理性,并在此基础上提出了促进企业投融资融合、提高投融资决策效率的对策措施。本文的主要内容如下:第一,在实物期权方法下分析了投融资决策因税收利益与破产成本产生的互动关系。以税收利益和破产成本为切入点,首先分析了同时期投融资决策间的静态的协同关系,认为随着负债的增加,负债融资会对投资支出形成先增后减的作用关系,而投资支出则会对负债融资产生促进作用。由于负债代理冲突下股东会更加注重负债的税收利益因而会产生过度投资问题,相应地,这种过度投资问题会减少投资对负债融资的促进作用。其次,由于折旧税盾对负债税盾的替代作用,折旧会刺激企业投资并对负债融资产生抑制作用,并且,折旧税盾会缓解股东的过度投资问题。再次,由于存量资产和负债会改变企业存量的税收利益和破产成本状况,进一步分析了在存量税收利益和破产成本的联结下,历史投融资决策对当前投融资决策产生的动态作用关系。结果发现历史投资会通过收入效应减少当前破产风险,提高负债税收利益净值,因而对负债融资产生促进作用;存量负债会通过破产风险和税收利益分别对投资决策产生负向和正向的作用关系。比较股东与企业价值最大化情形的差别发现:如果存量破产风险为零,随着负债融资的增加,股东会由过度投资转为投资不足;如果存量破产风险不为零,随着负债融资的增加,股东会由投资不足转为过度投资;投资不足会降低融资成本从而对负债融资产生促进作用,而过度投资则会减少负债融资。第二,在理论分析的基础上,对同一时期投融资决策的静态协同关系进行了实证检验。实证结果表明:一方面,受税收利益的作用,负债融资会显著地增加企业的投资支出,这种正向作用即使在高负债水平下依然存在;另一方面,为了利用负债利息税盾的价值促进作用,投资会增加企业的负债融资,但是受高负债水平下高破产成本以及高折旧下折旧税盾替代效应的影响,这种促进作用会有所下降。进一步通过比较股权集中与股权分散企业投融资决策的差别,近似地考察了负债代理冲突下投融资决策协同关系的异化。结果发现:在破产风险上升的情形下,股权集中企业负债融资对投资支出的促进效应比股权分散企业更加强烈,说明股东确实存在过度投资的现象,但对于这种过度投资,折旧并没有产生相应的抑制作用;在破产风险下降的情形下,股权集中企业负债融资对投资支出的促进效应比股权分散企业更弱,说明股东存在投资不足的现象。由于破产风险上升情形下的过度投资问题,股权分散企业会在较低显著性水平上减少负债融资,但是对于过度投资问题更为严重的股权集中企业而言,负债融资不仅没有减少反而会随投资支出显著增加;由于破产风险下降时的投资不足问题,股权分散企业会通过减少存量负债水平的方式予以应对,但在投资不足问题更为严重的股权集中企业里这种应对措施相对较少。第三,实证检验了负债融资与投资支出在税收利益与破产成本的联结下所产生的动态影响机理。结果发现:①负债融资会显著地降低企业的有效税率水平并因此对投资决策产生促进。②负债融资会显著地提高企业的破产风险,在总体样本下,破产风险会对企业投资产生约束作用。然而,由于低成长情形下股东会随存量破产风险产生过度投资问题,所以破产风险抑制投资支出的程度会下降,由于高成长情形下股东并没有因为存量破产风险而出表现投资不足的现象,所以破产风险并没有对投资支出产生更强的抑制作用。③投资支出会提高企业的有效税率,从而增加负债税盾的价值,但是负债税盾价值的增加只会对低财务约束企业的负债融资形成促进作用,而在高财务约束企业里反而会产生抑制作用。④投资支出会提高企业的破产风险,从而会对负债融资产生约束作用。虽然,在高成长情形下,股东并不存在显著的投资不足问题,但投资支出的风险抑制作用并没有得以体现,并且在低成长情形下,由于股东过度投资问题以及经理决策技术偏误等原因,企业投资的风险促进作用更加强烈。第四,针对我国上市公司投融资决策行为发生的割裂现象,本文提出了通过“引进”和“改进”两条途径进行治理机制完善的思路:其一,加速引入人格化的投资主体,强化资本市场的公司治理机制;其二,完善高管人员的遴选机制,构建高效的决策主体;其三,改善银行的经营环境,加强银行对上市公司的治理效力。本文的主要创新之处在于:①通过建立企业投融资决策实物期权模型,对投融资决策因税收利益与破产成本而产生的互动关系进行了研究。发现投融资决策不仅会因新增税收利益和破产成本而存在静态协同的关系,而且在存量税收利益和破产成本的联结下会产生动态的作用关系。通过对照股东与企业价值最大化的投融资差别发现,负债代理冲突下股东会产生过度投资和投资不足的问题,这些投资决策的非效率会相应地改变企业的融资行为,并因此导致企业投融资决策相互关系的异化。②实证检验了我国上市公司同时期投融资决策的静态协同关系,并认为上市公司投融资决策会因税收利益和破产成本而产生相互促进的协同关系。在负债代理冲突的作用下,股东投融资决策的协同关系会发生变化:在风险上升时,股东会产生过度投资,而这种过度投资并不会减少企业的负债融资;在风险下降情形下股东会投资不足,作为对策股东会减少存量负债水平,但是投资不足问题更为严重的股权集中企业采取应对措施的动力相对较小。③实证检验了我国上市公司投融资决策因存量税收利益和破产成本而产生动态作用关系,结果发现:负债融资会通过存量税收利益和破产成本对投资决策分别产生促进和约束的作用,但是由于低成长企业过度投资的影响,负债通过破产成本产生的投资约束作用会减弱;投资不仅会提高负债融资的税收利益价值而且会增加企业的破产风险,并因此在存量税收利益和破产成本的联结下会对负债融资分别产生促进和抑制的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Investment and financing are two aspects of funds flow, financing is the source of the funds, and investment involves the allocating of the funds, so they influence each other. In the long time of past, however, they are tackled separately not only in theoretic or practical activities. Although, many people have realized this problem after second thoughts in many views, but what attracting scholars attentions is the one way influence of financing on investment under some friction factors. In the perspective of tax benefits and bankruptcy costs, this paper analyzes the tow way influence between investment and financing by the means of theoretic analysis. Under the guide of the generalized theoretic results, studies the relations of investment and financing empirically with the sample of listed companies in China, and figures out the unreasonable factors in the decisions of investment and financing of the listed firms, which helps us put forward the countermeasures. The contents are listed below:(1) It analyses the interrelations of investment and financing decisions theoretically, in the respective of tax benefit and bankruptcy cost. Firstly, it analyses the interrelations of investment and financing decisions in a simple model of project investment and financing. And it finds out that, debt financing will increase investment because of tax benefit, but bankruptcy cost will prevent otherwise, at the same time, investment would also increase debt financing because of interest tax shields. Therefore, there exists a static harmonizing relation between investment and financing decisions. This relation still holds even in the firms aiming at equity maximizing, but the relation between investment and financing will change little because the equity holder would over-investment due to their behavior of tax benefit over-pursuing, which will increase the risk premium of debt financing and hence decrease debt financing accordingly. Secondly, for the reason of tax substitute effect of depreciation, the model further introduce the harmonizing relation between investment and financing when there is depreciations, and it reveals that depreciation will increase investment but decrease debt financing, and it will control the over-investment problem of stockholders. Thirdly, for the reason that the cumulative assets and debt would change the status of the existed tax benefit and bankruptcy, it develops the former model by introducing cumulative assets and debt, and emphasizing on the analysis of dynamic relation between investment and financing decisions. The results reveal that the past investment will decrease the existed bankruptcy risk and increase net tax benefit of debt financing, which will help to increase debt financing. On the other hand, cumulative debt would also boost and control investment by tax benefit and bankruptcy risk respectively. At the same time, after comparing circumstances of equity maximizing and value maximizing, it finds that, equity holder would shift from over-investment to under-investment along with debt financing when there is no bankruptcy risk before investment, and otherwise if there is bankruptcy risk before investment, accordingly, over-investment will decrease debt financing and under-investment will increase debt financing.(2) It examines the static harmonizing relation between investment and financing empirically with the information of Chinese listed firms, under the guide of the theoretic results summarized formerly. The results reveal that, on the one hand, debt financing would increase investment level due to tax benefit of debt, and even on the high level of debt the positive relation still unchanged, on the other hand, in order to exploit tax benefit, the firm will raise investment funds partially from debt, and thus the positive effect of investment on debt financing, but it will become not significant when the debt level or the depreciation level is high. Further more, after comparing the circumstances with debt agency conflicts, if bankruptcy risk increasing after investment, due to much severer over-investment problem in equity concentrated firms, the positive effect of debt financing on investment will be stronger than firms with dispersed equity. And it also shows that depreciation can control the over-investment problem in firms with dispersed equity, but otherwise in firms with concentrated equity. On the other hand, if risk decreasing after investment, due to much severe under-investment problem in equity concentrated firms, the positive effect of debt financing on investment will be offset to some extent. Due to the problem of over-investment, firms with dispersed ownership will lessen debt financing in the low significant degree, but firms with concentrated ownership, which have severer over-investment problem, will significantly add debt financing. Due to the problem of under-investment, the firm will reduce the existing debt as the countermeasure, but the firms with concentrated ownership will reduce less while they encounter severer under-investment problem.(3) It examines the dynamic relation between investment and financing because of the link of tax benefit and bankruptcy. The results reveal that: 1) Investment would increase effective tax rate, which means the value of debt tax shield. But debt tax shield value would prompt debt financing in firms with low financial constraint, and would restrain debt financing in those with high financial constraint. 2) Investment would increase bankruptcy risk and thus restriction effect on debt financing. Although high growth firms might decrease risk level after investment, but the evidence does not support it. In low growth firms, because of over-investment problem in equity concentrated firms and the bias of decision technique in equity dispersed firms, investment does not decrease risk but increases it. 3) Debt financing would decrease effective tax rate, and tax rate will exert budget constraints, so debt financing prompt corporate investment for the link of tax factors. 4) Debt financing would increase bankruptcy risk, and in the whole, bankruptcy risk will restrict investment. But with low growth opportunity, firms with concentrated ownership would over-investment with cumulative bankruptcy risk, therefore the negative effect of risk on investment will decline, but this is not true in firms with dispersed ownership because of the non significant under-investment. Besides, because firms with high growth would not under investment, so the negative effects of risk on investment would not be strengthened.(4) It puts forward the relative countermeasures for the distorted behavior of investment and financing: firstly, to foster and develop institutional investors, and to set up and perfect the bond market, in order to introduce personalized equity holders and bond holders; secondly, to perfect selection mechanism of executives, as to foster decision-makers with high efficiency; thirdly, to improve operation circumstances of bank, release the governance power of banks.The new point of this paper includes:(1) Based on the models of investment and financing, it analyses not only the static harmonizing relation but also the dynamic relation between investment and financing, for the reason of tax benefit and bankruptcy risk. At the same time, it compares the relation in the circumstances of equity maximizing and that of value maximizing, and reveals the alienation of the relation between investment and financing when existing debt agency problems.(2) It proves the static harmonizing relation due to tax benefit and bankruptcy cost in our country. And it finds out that, equity holder in firms with risk rising would over-investment, which would not decrease debt financing however. Equity holder in firms with risk declining would under-investment, and comparing firms with dispersed equity, that with concentrated equity would adopt fewer countermeasures.(3) It examines the dynamic relation due to tax benefit and bankruptcy cost. It finds out that debt financing would lessen tax burden and thus promotion for investment, and it would at the same time increase bankruptcy and thus restriction on investment on the whole. But for the reason of over-investment in low growth firms, risk restriction on investment would be rebated. Investment would increase tax rate, and thus gain in value of debt tax shields, so investment would increase debt financing. Investment would promote bankruptcy risk, and thus investment would exert negative effects on debt financing.更多还原