【作者】 张红岩；

【导师】 张文杰；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 电力行业是一个关系到国计民生的基础行业。为了确保正常的建设和运营，电力企业每年都需花费大量的资金采购电力设备和材料。近年来，电力行业的骨干企业——国家电网公司对大型电力设备和材料实施了集中招标，统一采购。这种电力行业的集中招标采购无论是从采购规模上看，还是从运作方式上都是前所未有的，其中出现了很多新问题、新情况。为了确保成功实施集中招标采购，探索新的招标采购模式，为其他各行业实施的集中招标采购提供成功的经验，本文借助博弈论，从招标人角度出发，针对招标代理人、评标人和投标人分别设计了激励、约束和监督机制，从而开展了集中招标采购机制研究。本文的部分研究成果已经应用到国家电网公司的招标采购活动中，并得到有效验证。首先，本文回顾了博弈论及其在招标采购中应用情况，委托代理关系理论、机制设计理论和声誉机制等内容，通过回顾这些理论以及当前电力行业招标采购的研究内容，可以从中发现集中招标采购机制的研究可以从招标人、招标代理人、评标人和投标人之间的委托代理关系着手，从建立招标人针对其他三者的激励、约束和监督机制角度开展集中招标采购机制研究。由于相对于分散招标采购而言，集中招标采购的规模大得多，必须依赖专业的招标代理人组织运作，有必要建立针对招标代理人的激励、约束和监督机制。通过广泛采用电子商务技术和规范流程能够降低招标代理服务的成本，从而激励招标代理人积极参与集中招标采购；通过招标人与招标代理人签署长期的代理合同，并采用“冷酷战略”，能够约束招标代理人的机会主义行为；为了使约束机制有效，招标人还应建立标的物总成本模型作为对招标代理人的监督机制。评标人是决定评标结果的关键所在，一个科学的集中招标采购机制应该通过对评标人建立合理的激励、监督及约束机制从而确保评标结果的公平、公正与合理。通过建立评标人的动态分级系统从而将声誉引入集中招标采购活动中，形成了基于声誉的评标人激励和约束机制；通过将网络分析法引入评标，建立集中招标采购的评标人监督机制，从而使基于声誉的评标人激励约束机制能够充分发挥作用。集中招标采购可以通过增大采购规模，规范采购流程降低投标人的生产成本和交易成本，从而激励投标人积极参加集中招标采购。集中招标采购通过增加投标人数目，从而约束合法投标人报出不合理高价。而如果长期聘请律师和相关评审人员参与具体的招标活动，公示串谋判别准则，一旦发现串通投标的现象，立即诉诸法律等行动，就可以约束有串谋企图投标人报出违法高价。如果使投标人的激励约束机制发挥效用，还必须依赖建立标的物总成本模型作为对投标人的监督机制。本文还通过在国家电网公司的集中招标采购活动中采用本文的研究成果，进行了实证分析，证明了研究成果的有效性。本文最后指出了未来的研究方向：对于投标人科技创新的激励约束机制研究，对于特殊专业领域评标人的激励约束机制研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 Electric power industry is an infrastructure one of importantance in China. Electric power enterprises procure a large mount of equipment and material each year for construction and operation of power grid. In recent years, State Grid Corporation of China(SGCC) implemented concentrated procurement by means of public tendering as to electric power equipments and material of 330kV and the above voltage. The one of such scale and operational mode is first adopted in electric power industry and many new problems remain to be resolved. To search after new tendering mode, set other industries a good example and make it, from the tender’s point of view, this paper is devoted to designing the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on tender agents, bid-evaluators and bidders respectively by means of game theory. This paper’s some research are applied to the corresponding activities of SGCC and demonstrated to be effective to some extent.Firstly, reviewing game theory ,its application in the purchasing by invitation to bid ,principal-agent theory, mechanism-designing theory, prestige mechanism theory and contemporary research tendering procurement on in electric power industry, this paper find the study on the mechanism of concentrated procurement by means of public tendering can start from the principal-agent relationships among tenderers,tender agents, bid-evaluators and bidders, and establish the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on the latter three from the tender’s point of view.As much larger scale of concentrated procurement than decentralized one, tenderer need lie on professional tender agent and it is necessary that establishing the the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on him. By adopting E-business technology and standard process, the cost of tender agency service can be reduced and it will motivate tender agent to take active part in the concentrated procurement. Signing long term agent contract between tender and tender agent following grim strategy can regulate tender agent’s opportunism action. To take regulation mechanism effective, tender need to establishing the cost model of subject matter as supervision mechanism.A scientific concentrated procurement mechanism need establish the incentive, regulation and supervision mechanism on bid-evaluators so that make the result of bid evaluation fair, just and reasonable. The incentive and regulation mechanism can be established by means of establishing bid-evaluators’ dynamic classification system by introducing the prestige mechanism. This paper introduces the analytic network process into the bid evaluation and establishs the supervision mechanism on bid-evaluators.By enlarging the scale of procurement and standardizing the process, mass purchasing through public bidding can reduce production cost and tranction cost so that motivate the bidder to take active part in it. It can regulate the legal bidder by increasing the number of bidders. By employing lawyer and specialist, publicizing the criteria of collusion and resorting to law in case of collusion, it can regulate the bidder with the attempt of collusion. To take regulation mechanism effective, tender need to establishing the cost model of subject matter as supervision mechanism similarly.The above researches are demonstrated to be effective by the concentrated tendering procurement activities in SGCC.Finally, this paper gives the futue research area, that is , how to motivate bidder to innovate on scicence and technology, motivate and regulate the bid-evaluators in some specific fields in mass purchasing through public bidding.更多还原