【作者】 许诺；

【导师】 文福拴； 黄民翔； 颜汉荣；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 电力系统及其自动化， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 电力工业市场化改革的主要特点就是将电力系统的发、输、配、售电分离，分别对其采取不同的管理方式。在输、配电环节，由于其自然垄断的特点仍然需要管制，但随着对传统投资回报率管制模式弊端认识的逐步加深和管制经济学理论的发展，一种被称为基于绩效的管制模式(Performance Based Regulation，简写为PBR)已被引入到电力工业的管制，并在很多国家逐步得到广泛应用。在配电公司中采用基于绩效的管制可以刺激其提高运营效率和降低电价。然而，如果PBR机制设计不当则有可能会对供电可靠性产生负面影响，为此，在针对配电公司设计PBR机制时，需要计及对供电可靠性的要求。因此如何设置适当的PBR奖惩机制既能有效降低电网公司的服务成本，又能保证电网公司的供电可靠性是一个值得研究的问题。另一方面，在引入市场自由竞争的发电环节，为了限制发电公司滥用市场势力和降低输电公司的财政风险，在国际和国内目前运行的电力市场中，特别在那些单一购买者模式的市场中，大都设置了允许的发电公司报价上限。但如何设置一个合理的报价上限目前仍没有系统的理论和方法。也有不少人反对设置报价上限，认为设置报价上限会打击发电投资，最终导致发电容量不足，影响电力系统的供电稳定性。那么，报价上限究竟会对发电投资产生什么样的影响呢?本论文针对上述几个方面的问题进行了研究，取得了一定的研究成果。(1)分析了应用于配电公司的带奖惩机制的PBR管制模式；并以在配电系统中实施具有奖惩机制的PBR管制模式相关的成本最小为目标，所要求的可靠性水平为约束，建立了这种管制模式最优参数设置问题的数学模型，并采用了遗传算法求解。(2)对在零售电价固定的单一购买者模式的电力市场中，如何设置允许的发电公司的报价上限问题做了些初步的研究工作。从监管机构的立场出发，以保证电网公司的收支平衡为目标，基于事后分析法，以历史数据为基础，提出了确定报价上限的一种启发式方法。(3)在假定投资者进行发电投资时所面对的不确定性因素主要来自于负荷增长的前提下，针对采用单一能量市场的电力市场以及包含能量市场和装机容量市场的电力市场这两种模式，研究了价格上限对投资基荷机组和峰荷机组的影响。并用算例说明了所提出方法的基本特征。(4)基于期权博弈理论，构造了电力市场环境下发电投资决策的一种新的方法框架。在假定发电投资者进行投资决策时所面对的不确定性因素主要来自于负荷增长同时考虑了其他发电投资者投资行为的情况下，发展了基于期权博弈理论的发电投资的数学模型和求解方法。在此基础上，分析了允许的发电公司报价上限对发电投资决策的影响。最后对论文中所作的研究工作进行了简要总结，并指出了在这一领域有待进一步深入研究的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Power industry restructuring divided the traditional vertically integrated power industry into four sectors, namely generation, transmission, distribution and retail. In different sectors. different regulation methods could be employed. Distribution/transmission networks, still being natural monopoly, will continue being regulated. However, with the development of regulation economics and the wide recognition of inherent drawbacks of the traditional rate-of-return (ROR) regulation or cost-of-service (COS) regulation. new regulation regimes called performance-based regulation (PBR) has been applied widely into the power industry. The employment of PBR in distribution systems could provide some incentives for improving operating efficiency and reducing electricity prices. However, if the PBR mechanism is not properly designed, the enforcement of the PBR may have a negative effect on the supply reliability. Thus, when designing PBR mechanisms for distribution systems, the effects on supply reliability should be considered. The method of setting proper reward/penalty structures for PBR to reduce the service cost of distribution companies efficiently as well as to guarantee the supply reliability is still a valuable problem for research. On the other hand, the price cap is widely enforced in many operating electricity markets worldwide, especially in those markets employing the well-known single-buyer model with retail electricity prices fixed, in order to limit the exercising of market power by generation companies and also to reduce the financial risks of transmission companies. On the other hand, the specification of the price cap is opposed by many scholars worldwide as it is thought that the price cap could provide negative effect on inducing generation investment. and result in generation capacity insufficiency and unreliable power supply. Up to now. there are only a few publications regarding the setting up of the rational price cap for the generation side. Detailed quantitative analysis on the effect of the price cap on the generation investment is still very demanding. In this thesis, the above mentioned problems are investigated and some significant results obtained.The pattern of PBR with reward/penalty structures is first analyzed and a mathematical model for optimally setting the parameters of the PBR with a reward/penalty structure presented, with the minimization of the costs associated with the enforcement of the PBR as the objective and the required reliability level for the distribution system operation as the constraint. The well-known genetic algorithm is employed for solving the optimization problem.Secondly, the problem of determining an adequate price-cap for generation companies in the single-buyer market with retail electricity prices fixed is investigated. From the standpoint of the regulatory organization, a heuristic method is proposed following the ex post approach.Thirdly, upon the assumption that the load growth is the major source of uncertainty, the effects of the price-caps on the base-load unit investment and peak-load unit investment are examined, for the energy-only electricity market and the one which includes the energy market and installed capacity market. A sample example is served for demonstrating the essential features of the presented approach.Fourthly, upon the assumption that load growth is the major source of uncertainty, a new methodological framework for generation investment decision-making is presented based on the option-game approach, with competition for generation investment from other investors taken into account. A mathematical model is built and a solving approach developed for this problem. A sample example is served for demonstrating the essential features of the presented model and approach, and the effects of price-cap on generation investment then examined in a quantitative manner.Lastly, conclusions are made based on the research outcomes, and directions for future research indicated.更多还原