【作者】 杜晓蓉；

【导师】 李天德；

【作者基本信息】 四川大学 ， 世界经济， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 在东亚金融危机前，东亚实际上已经形成了集体钉住美元的汇率制度博弈格局。尽管钉住汇率制度在危机中曾一度中断并被许多人指责为导致这场危机的制度性原因，但大量实证检验表明危机后东亚各新兴经济体纷纷恢复了钉住美元。进入新千年，随着东亚新兴经济体对美国出现大量的经常项目盈余，全球性经济失衡使国内外的关注焦点重新集中在东亚实行了多年的事实钉住汇率制度上。东亚正面临着来自国内外的挑战：对内，由于实行事实钉住美元汇率制度而积累的巨额外汇储备已经开始制造通货膨胀压力；对外，以美国为首的发达国家将美国外部失衡乃至全球经济不平衡归咎于东亚新兴经济体以钉住制度操纵汇率。因此，探讨在后布雷顿森林体系时代，东亚新兴经济体集体钉住美元制的合意性和未来走向具有重要现实意义。本研究以东亚集体钉住美元制的内稳定机制——金融恐怖均衡为主线，从东亚钉住美元汇率制度的成因、运转机制、可持续性和退出战略等方面，对东亚钉住汇率制度进行了全方位的深入研究，得出了东亚新兴经济体必须从集体钉住美元制退出、实行区域汇率协调的结论。本研究由导论、正文和结论组成，其中正文分为七大部分。正文的第一部分回顾了国际货币制度对汇率制度选择的制约关系。理论梳理表明，不论国际汇率制度安排还是一国汇率制度选择都必须服从于某一时期特定国际货币制度的规定。第二部分总结了在后布雷顿森林体系下新兴经济体偏好钉住汇率制度的新理论。最近几年涌现了关于新兴经济体偏好钉住汇率制度的“害怕浮动论”等新理论和对事实汇率制度分类的实证检验，它们从理论上支持了东亚新兴经济体选择钉住汇率制度的合意性。第三部分剖析了布雷顿森林体系瓦解以来东亚新兴经济体形成集体钉住美元制的内在机制——美国依赖东亚资本流入来弥补巨额经常项目赤字的“金融恐怖均衡”。“金融恐怖均衡”实际上是美国同东亚新兴经济体整体、东亚新兴经济体之间两阶段非合作博弈的纳什均衡结果。作为东亚新兴经济体经济制度的重要部分，实证检验表明东亚集体钉住美元汇率制曾在东亚各经济体和东亚地区产生了积极的宏观经济绩效。第四部分比较了历史上几次典型的国际性钉住美元安排：东亚集体美元钉住制度、布雷顿森林体系下“可调整”钉住美元安排、拉美地区钉住汇率制度和美元化倾向。比较结果表明，由于所处的国际货币体系、经济发展战略和经济发展阶段发生了根本变化，东亚新兴经济体集体钉住美元制度呈现出独有的特点。第五部分探讨了东亚新兴经济体集体钉住美元制的可持续性。以下几点事实使得东亚集体钉住美元不可持续：第一，维持金融恐怖均衡的基本要素美国经常项目赤字和东亚新兴经济体经常项目盈余不可无限持续，而且二者已经成为全球经济失衡的重要威胁；第二，东亚事实钉住汇率制度逐渐从正的经济绩效变为东亚新兴经济体经济发展的桎梏；第三，主要国际货币之间汇率剧烈波动，致使东亚单一钉住美元的汇率制度极度不稳定。第六部分设计了东亚从集体钉住美元制退出的战略。建议东亚采取钉住类似货币篮子的软汇率目标区这一相对层次较低的区域汇率协调方式。具体做法是，东亚新兴经济体钉住由主要国际货币美元、欧元和日元以及本币上一期汇率构成的类似货币篮子；在各经济体货币篮子中，赋予这四种货币相同的权重。这个方案的优点在于，能根据实际经济环境的变化，既保证各参加国货币政策相当程度上的独立性，又实现了区域汇率一定程度上的协调，从而达到稳定区域汇率、摆脱“金融恐怖均衡”阴影和对美国过度依赖的目的。第七部分将落脚点放在了中国人民币汇率制度改革和东亚区域汇率协调的关系上。2005年夏季人民币汇率制度改革与东亚以区域汇率协调方式退出集体钉住美元制的改革将相互促进。东亚区域汇率协调为人民币汇率制度改革创造了稳定的大环境，人民币汇率保持稳定有助于东亚区域汇率的稳定。纵观全文，本研究试图在以下几个方面进行突破和创新：第一，摒弃大多数关于汇率制度选择问题研究单纯就汇率制度而研究汇率制度的方式，力图把东亚新兴经济体汇率制度的选择与现行国际货币体系这个大环境结合起来。鉴于当前国际货币体系的不公平性，论证了东亚新兴经济体选择钉住美元汇率制度在一定程度上具有历史合意性，在理论上也得到了国际货币体系约束下的汇率制度选择理论支持。但随着条件的变化，集体钉住美元与现行国际货币体系间的矛盾日益激化，东亚新兴经济体在全球经济不平衡中承担了过多的责任。显然，在不可能立即改革现行国际货币制度的情况下，任何一个发展中国家都无法单边解决汇率制度选择的困境。第二，尝试用博弈论分析东亚新兴经济体集体钉住美元的内稳定机制——美国经常项目赤字依靠东亚新兴经济体经常项目盈余融资的“金融恐怖均衡”。本研究将美国前财政部长萨莫斯提出的“金融恐怖均衡”这个概念分成了两个次博弈组成的两阶段博弈：第一阶段为9个东亚新兴经济体间的“囚徒困境”博弈。正是东亚新兴经济体间非合作博弈和出口导向型发展战略，导致了各经济体集体钉住美元的纳什均衡结果。第二阶段是领导者美国同跟随者东亚新兴经济体之间“斯塔克博尔格”博弈。东亚新兴经济体非合作博弈的结果——集体钉住美元，使得美国可以充分利用经常项目赤字来廉价获取东亚的自然资源、技术和资金。美国看准这一点，充当了博弈的领导者，采取先发优势，对东亚跟随者做出了可置信威胁——“金融恐怖”。这构成了美国和东亚新兴经济体之间的非合作博弈。第三，运用汇率制度特别是钉住汇率制度实证研究方面的成果，对东亚事实钉住汇率制度的判定、经济绩效和主要货币波动对东亚经济体的影响等方面进行了大量的回归计量分析。在计量分析过程，没有简单地将他人的研究模型不加区别地直接拿来使用，而是根据研究的实际情况和需要加入了新的变量因素和舍弃了一些不必要的变量因素，以期对东亚集体钉住美元的成因、运行状况和经济绩效做出更为科学的分析。第四，提出东亚新兴经济体采用以软汇率目标区为基础的区域汇率协调方案，作为短期内调整外部不平衡和打破“金融恐怖均衡”的手段。现有文献对东亚区域汇率协调方案的设计，一般都偏向于根据OCA理论建立最优货币区这样高层次的货币合作。实际上，最优货币区应该是东亚新兴经济体努力的长期目标，它无助于解决这些经济体在当前全球不平衡中的尴尬局面。以钉住由美元、欧元、日元三种主要国际货币和本币上一期汇率组成的类似货币篮子为基础的软汇率目标区属于区域汇率协调的较低级阶段。各经济体钉住类似货币篮子，体现了各经济体对外贸易格局和对外资本流动的关系，避免了中心汇率的“跃迁”以实现平滑调整，赋予了各经济体汇率政策更大的灵活性。钉住类似货币篮子也有利于东亚在当前共同钉住美元的基础上平稳过渡到区域汇率协调，并为东亚将来进行更高层次的合作打下坚实基础。当然，作者自身能力有限，因而本研究存在许多缺陷和不足之处，有待于进一步解决，具体包括：1、本研究试图从国际货币制度角度对众多汇率制度选择理论进行梳理。但考虑到国际货币制度制约性这个前提，将一些比较新的汇率选择理论省略了，因此对汇率制度选择理论的梳理就显得不完善。2、在对东亚各经济体实行钉住美元制的经济绩效进行计量分析时，只简单地分析了几个宏观经济指标，没有考察对国内各行业或企业的微观绩效。而且本研究的考察对象为9个东亚新兴经济体，因此进行实证分析时，数据收集比较庞杂，特别是有关中国台湾的个别数据残缺不全，成为本研究的一大遗憾。3、作为人为设计的区域性汇率制度安排，软汇率目标方案仍存在不少有待于解决的问题。如设计实证模型来估算货币篮子币种的选择和中心汇率的调整依据，估算各经济体放弃钉住美元制转向区域汇率协调的过渡成本等等。更多还原

【Abstract】 East Asian newly emerging countries (EANECs) had pegging collectively to US dollar before Asian Financial Crisis. Though the exchange rate regime was quit during the crisis and was criticized, a lot of empirical tests show that all economies have restored pegging after the crisis. Entering the new millenary, collectively pegging to US dollar are becoming a hot issue both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the regimes of de facto pegging to US dollar have given rise to inflation pressure. Internationally, developed countries especially US have own US external imbalance even global economic imbalance to EANECs manipulating exchange rate. To explore desirable regimes to alleviate domestic and international pressures, this paper discusses the reasons, operating system, sustainability and exiting strategies of collectively pegging to US dollar in East Asia. And a conclusion is made that EANECs should exit from collectively pegging to US dollar and turn to regional exchange rates coordination.This paper consists of introduction, the body and the conclusion. Except the introduction and the conclusion, there are 7 parts in the whole paper. Part One reviews the limitation of international currency regimes on choice of exchange rate regimes. International monetary system basically regulates international exchange rates arrangements and national exchange rate regimes choices.Part Two summarizes developing countries preference to pegging regimes under post Bretton Woods System. Recently new theories and new empirical test methods all prove the desirability of EANECs pegging to US dollar.Part Three analyzes the inner stable mechanism, namely "Balance of Financial Terror" (BFT) behind the collectively pegging to dollar. It is by BFT that US is lying in capital flow from EANECs to narrow its huge current account imbalance. BFT, in essence, is Nash equilibriums of non-cooperative gaming between USA and EANECs and among EANECs themselves. As the important parts in EANECs’ developing strategies, the collectively pegging to US dollar system is proved to generate active performance in both domestic and world levels.Part Four compares several typical cases of pegging to US dollar in the history: the adjustable pegging to dollar under Bretton Woods Systems, Latin American newly emerging countries’ pegging to dollar and EANECs’ pegging to dollar. The regimes of pegging to US dollar in EANECs under post Bretton Woods Systems have sole characteristics.Part Five explores the sustainability of collectively pegging to US dollar under BFT. The following facts illustrate that BFT is not sustainable. Firstly, US’s persistent huge current account deficits and East Asian increasing current account surpluses have menaced the global economic balance. Secondly, the positive performance of pegging system has turned to be negative and hampered further development in EANECs. And lastly, major currencies fluctuate severely, which makes the regime of pegging to US dollar in EANECs extremely instable.Part Six designs the strategies of exiting from collectively pegging to US dollar in East Asia. This paper suggests that based on theory of soft exchange rates target, regional exchange coordination mean that EANECs peg to a similar currency basket, so that this region would realize stable regional exchange rates, getting rid of the shadow of BFT and realizing advancing regional monetary co-operation in East Asia.Part Seven goes back to the relationship between China’s reforming of RMB regime and regional exchange rates coordination in East Asia. It would be mutual benefits in reforming regime of RMB in the summer, 2005 and regional exchange rates coordination in East Asia.In a word, this paper has the following breakthrough. Firstly, getting over the problem of insolating the research exchange rate regimes, this paper tries to combine the choice of exchange rate regimes in EANECs with the current international monetary system. Considering the unfairness in international monetary system, the fact that EANECs choose pegging to US dollar regime is desired at a certain degree. However as the conditions change, collectively pegging to US dollar can’t be compatible with the current international monetary system, which causes EANECs burdened overdue responsibility in global economic imbalance. Obviously, one country can’t resolve the regime choice dilemma by itself when the current international currency regime will not reform immediately.Secondly, trying to analyze the inner stable mechanism of EANECs collectively pegging to US dollar - BFT by using game theories . There are two stage games in BFT. The first is the game of Prisoner’ Dilemma among 9 EANECs. It is uncooperativeness among the 9 economies which gives rise to they peg to US dollar collectively. The other is Stackelberg competition between US and EANECs. Under the regimes of collectively pegging to US dollar which is the result of uncooperative game, US can cheaply seize enough natural resources, technology and capital via current account deficits. Taking this advantage, US initiates action firstly and makes credible menace to EANECs. This constitutes the uncooperative game between US and EANECs.Thirdly, empirical tests are used to test de facto pegging to US dollar, performance of this regime and the effect of fluctuation between major currencies in East Asian newly emerging countries (EANECs). This paper does not use the work of other economists directly. On the contrary, it adds some new factors and eliminates some existing factors according to the requirements of research, to make an scientific conclusion.Fourth, soft exchange rate target is suggested as the theoretic guide of regional exchange rate coordination in East Asia in short run. Almost all the current documents, however, prefer to senior cooperation in East Asian regional monetary cooperation which can’t help solving the dilemma faced by EANECs in the global imbalance. Regional exchange rate coordination belongs to junior stage of regional monetary cooperation so that it doesn’t require candidates scarify their domestic development to exchange convergence. As for soft exchange rates target, it sets the margins or calibrates central exchange rates flexibly which especially shows more feasibility. Concretely, the paper designs a project that every emerging economy in East Asia pegs to a similar basket consisting of US dollar, Euro, Japanese yen and home currency of the last period. Such basket shows every economy’s foreign trade and capital flow, avoiding central exchange rate overshooting. What’s more, candidate economy pegging similar basket but not common basket to endow each with some flexibility in exchange rate policy and reduce exiting risk of candidates at discretion.Of course, because of the author’s limitation in the research, there exist some drawbacks which are needed to resolve in the future. They are as follows:1. Though this paper attempts to set international currency regimes as the background to discuss the problem of exchange rate regimes choices in developing countries, some new theories such as noise theory are omitted for they do not have close relation to international currency regimes. But to do so leave some places un-complete in summarizing exchange rate regimes choices.2. When measuring the performance of pegging to US dollar in EANECs, several macro-indexes are computed but micro-indexes about domestic industries and firms are not considered.3. Being a regional exchange rates arrangement, the soft exchange rates target need to be improved. For example, more persuasive models should be built to test the construction of currency basket and calibration of central exchange rates and to estimate the transit costs of each economy transits from pegging regimes to regional exchange rates coordination.更多还原