【作者】 王静；

【导师】 应松年；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 宪法学与行政法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 《美国行政法法官制度研究》一文旨在对美国颇具特色的行政法法官制度的重要问题展开深入研究和讨论,目的是尽可能准确、全面地介绍这一制度的情况,探讨其产生和发展的历史背景和理论原因。全文共分为引言、正文五章和后记。正文包括行政法法官制度的历史发展、行政法法官主持的裁决程序、行政法法官的独立性、行政法法官集中使用制度和行政法法官制度对中国的借鉴意义。前四章按照历史发展和现状、联邦和州的顺序逐次展开对这一制度的介绍和分析,第五章在前四章的基础上对照我国的问题作出总结和建议。在第一章“行政法法法官制度的历史发展”中,按时间顺序回顾了行政法法官在独立管制机构内最初出现、通过1946年联邦行政程序法得到确立的早期历史,发现行政法法官是行政程序法制定过程中不同主张妥协的产物,即既要保留独立管制机构的存在,又要应对对其程序的批评,因此,将主持听证的官员从其供职的行政机关相对独立出来,任免、薪金待遇和考核等都由行政机关以外的其他机关负责。从理论上讲,行政法法官的设立正反映了自然正义原则和正当程序的要求。然后对20世纪40年代到70年代行政法法官发展作了简要介绍,接着较为详细地介绍了70年代以后行政法法官制度发生的一些重要变化,包括随着政府管制的放松,管制裁决呈衰落形势,行政法法官主要在福利领域兴起;替代性纠纷解决方式在行政法法官主持的正式裁决程序中得到运用;州层面,越来越多的州将行政法法官集中起来,成立行政听证办公室,行政法法官独立化运动更推进一步。在第二章“行政法法官主持的裁决程序”中,按照逻辑顺序分析了行政机关裁决权、正当程序对行政法法官所主持的正式、审判型听证程序的影响,联邦行政程序法对正式裁决程序的规定等重要问题。本文对行政法法官所行使的权力,即裁决权的性质的历史争议进行了介绍,最高法院通过判决认可将司法权授予行政机关,曾适用“公权”和“私权”标准对行政机关裁决民事纠纷持否定态度,后来摒弃了该标准,认为只要行政机关的裁决接受司法审查即不属违宪。行政法法官所主持的程序是联邦行政程序法所规定的“正式裁决”程序,本文根据“正当程序—行政程序法—裁决程序—正式裁决程序—行政法法官(—非正式裁决程序—非行政法法官)”的顺序逐层深入。首先分析涉及正当程序的重要案例,对正当程序的适用、时机和类型问题进行探讨,著名的戈德伯格诉凯利案所确立的程序是听证的最高顶点(审判型听证)也就是行政程序法中规定的正式裁决程序,而马修斯诉埃尔德里奇案不仅提出了成本效益方法,而且确立了听证的时机问题,即事前听证还是事后听证。本文认为,美国裁决程序中的听证既包括我国国内讨论行政决定作出之前的听证,如行政处罚听证,也包括行政复议中的听证。接着本文对裁决程序与法规制定程序的区别和交叉,裁决程序中正式程序与非正式程序的区别,正式裁决程序的适用范围、所解决纠纷的种类等问题进行了详细分析。同时,也简要分析了非正式裁决程序的形式、适用和程序保障。最后,对主持正式裁决程序的行政法法官和主持非正式裁决程序的名称不同的听证官(包括行政法官)进行了比较分析。在第三章“行政法法官的独立性”中,围绕这一重要命题,着重分析了内部职能分离原则、行政法法官在裁决过程中的作用和行政法法官的具体制度几个主要问题。关于内部职能分离,主要是禁止裁决、调查和追诉职能合并,而且追诉者与裁决者不能存在上下级关系,行政法法官不能向复审委员会或者行政首长以外的其他任何行政官员征询意见,不能承担不相称的职能。行政法法官在裁决中拥有类似法官的权力,包括主持宣誓和誓言、根据法律的授权签发传票、有权接受相关证据、就证据问题作出裁决、举行会议、决定程序事务、对听证过程进行控制等等,行政法法官在正式裁决中的主要作用是独立的、客观的“事实认定”,而由行政机关负责政策控制,行政程序法这一立法原意反映到正式裁决程序,就是由行政法法官作出初步裁决或者裁决建议,由行政机关做出最终裁决。如果没有对行政法法官的初步裁决向行政机关上诉,该裁决成为最终裁决。随着很多行政机关建立内部复审机构,内部复审机构根据当事人的申请或者主动对行政法法官的裁决进行审查,所作出的裁决也就是行政机关的最终裁决。本文对内部复审机构的组织形式、审查程序以及穷尽行政救济原则都进行了详尽介绍。接下来,在司法审查部分,本文分析了法院司法审查一些重要问题的原因所在,包括法院对正式裁决事实问题的审查采用“实质性证据”标准、行政法法官的初步裁决必须作为“整个案卷记录”的一部分提交法院、涉及案件可信度的争议,特别是基于证人行为举止可信度的判断,在行政机关和行政法法官意见不一致时,法院一般采信行政法法官的意见和看法等。在行政法法官具体制度部分,本文对行政法法官的选拔、免职、纪律处分、管理等逐一进行详细介绍。行政程序法规定行政法法官的监督和管理选拔由文官委员会负责,但是由于最初选拔失败,因此现在选拔由美国人事管理局负责,薪金待遇、纪律处分、免职等由功绩制保护委员会负责。行政法法官非经法定理由并经听证不得免职,从而确保行政法法官不受行政机关的控制和歪曲做出客观公正的初步裁决。行政法法官的独立性可以说是正式裁决制度有效发挥作用的关键。在第四章“行政法法官集中使用制度”中,本文在对关于行政法法官独立化进程的争议进行介绍和评析的基础上,详细介绍了各州实践行政法法官集中使用制度的经验和产生的问题,并对这一趋势在联邦和州层面的前景进行了分析。在实行行政法法官集中使用制度的州,在州政府内部设立一个统一行政听证办公室,行政法法官由该办公室任命和管理,可以为不同的机关主持听证,作出裁决建议。本文还对不少州规定的行政法法官最终裁决权的问题进行了探讨。总体来看,行政法法官集中使用制度在各州实践比较成功,并有继续扩大的趋势。在第五章“行政法法官制度对中国的启示”,本文从美国听证制度的功能开始,探讨在裁决程序中听证的作用主要包括保护公民权利、查清事实真相和预防解决行政纠纷三个方面。美国行政裁决程序可以及早介入行政纠纷的解决,行政机关是解决行政纠纷的主要力量,也为法院司法审查的有效运作奠定了基础。因此,本文认为,我国应当将行政机关自我解决行政纠纷作为构建行政纠纷解决机制的主要方向,重视听证的作用。完善行政听证制度,改革行政复议制度。应当确保行政复议机构的独立性,培养专业的行政复议官队伍,增加听证审查方式,采取分领域分地方逐步试验的做法,最终向行政法院的方向发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 The Article of Research on Administrative Law Judges of the United States (hereinafter referred to as“the Article”) aims to conduct deep study and discussion on some important questions of Administrative Law Judges (hereinafter referred to as“the ALJs”) of the United States in order to introduce the ALJs system as correct and complete as possible and analyze the historical background and academic reasons of its production and development. The Article is constituted of the foreword and the text of five chapters including the development of ALJs, the adjudication which the ALJs preside over, the independence of ALJs, the Central Panel movement of ALJs and use for reference in China. The Article arranges the contents in the order of historical development, present situations, federal and states from the first chapter to the fourth chapter; then, based on the analysis of four chapters, after discussing the problems in China, the Article makes conclusion and gives some suggestions in the last chapter.In the first Chapter of“Historical Development of the ALJs”, the Article reviews the appearance of the hearing officers in the independent regulatory agencies and its legal establishment in APA in 1946. The ALJs system is the compromise production of different arguments during the legislation process of APA. Although the independent regulatory agencies can exist, the procedure of its adjudication must be reformed. Thus the ALJs are relatively independent from the agencies. It means the separate agencies have the authority of selection, removal, compensation and evaluation of ALJs instead of the hearing agencies. From the academic perspectives, the ALJs system reflects the requirement of Natural Justice Principle and Due Process. The Article also gives a brief introduction for the development of ALJs from 1940’s to 1970’s. Then the Article illustrates some important changes since 1970’s, such as the decline of regulatory adjudication due to the deregulation, booming of the benefit adjudication, the application of ADR in ALJs’formal adjudication and the Central Panel movement in over twenty states etc.In the second chapter of“The Adjudication which the ALJs Preside over”, the Article conducts research logically on the adjudication power of the agencies, the influence of Due Process for the formal hearing which ALJs preside over, the provisions of APA for the formal adjudication and so on.The Article introduces the legal disputes on the delegation of adjudication power to the agencies. The Supreme Court once denied the delegation of adjudication power to the agencies in civil disputes using the standard of public rights and private rights. Later the Court abandoned the old standard and argued the delegation did not violate the constitution only if it accepts the judicial review.The Article mainly discusses the formal adjudication of APA. The Article conducts research in the logical order of Due Process, APA, the adjudication, the formal adjudication and the ALJs (at the same time, the informal adjudication and the Non-ALJs). The Article introduces some important cases of Due Process as well as the questions whether Due Process applies, when it applies and what type of procedure applies. The famous Goldenberg v. Kelly case is the culmination of Due Process which requires trial type hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge case not only presented the Cost-Benefit Analysis method but also discussed the timing of Due Process, which is the question of pre-decisional hearing or post-decisional hearing. So the Article found that the hearing in American adjudication includes, in China, the hearing before making administrative decisions, such as administrative penalty, and the hearing procedure in Administrative Reconsideration. Then the Article introduces the distinction between the adjudication and the rulemaking, the difference between the formal adjudication and the informal adjudication, the application of formal adjudication and the types of disputes in the formal adjudication. Meanwhile, the Article also briefly introduces the procedure and the application of the informal adjudication. At last, the Article compares the ALJs with other hearing officers including Administrative Judges (AJ) who preside over the informal adjudication.In the third chapter of“The Independence of ALJs”, the Article introduces the principle of separation of function, the role of ALJs in the process of the adjudication and the concrete system of ALJs.Concerning the separation of function, the Article mainly involves the questions that the consolidation of the function of adjudication, investigation and prosecution in the administrative agencies is prohibited, the prosecutor and the adjudicator can not have the relationship of supervision, the ALJs shall not get advice from other officers except the appeal board or the agency head and also shall not perform the inconsistent duties etc.As to the role of the ALJs in the process of the formal adjudication, the Article discusses their concrete power in the adjudication, the relationship with the appeal board and some related questions about judicial review. The ALJs have the similar power as the judges in the court including administering oaths and affirmations, issuing subpoenas authorized by law, taking depositions of proof and receiving relevant evidence, holding conference, making decision for procedure affairs and controlling the whole hearing process etc. The main function of the ALJs in the formal adjudication is to make independent and objective fact-finding and the agency takes charge of policy control. So the ALJs make the initial decision or recommended decision after the hearing and the agency makes the final decision. If not be applealed, the initial decision is the final dicision of the agency. For many agencies established the appeal review offices, the appeal boards review the ALJs’decision under the request of the regulated person or determine to review the ALJs’decision with its discretion and make the final decision which is just the final decision of the agency. The Article also introduces the organization structure of the appeal board, the review procedure and the principle of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.In the judicial review part, the Article analyzes the reasons of some important questions including the court applies the standard of substantial evidence when reviewing the facts, the initial decision of ALJs shall be submitted as the part of the whole record to the court, and when the agency and the ALJs have different opinions on the credibility of the witness, the court ordinarily adopts the ALJs’judgment.At last, the Article introduces the concrete system of ALJs including the selection, removal, discipline and management etc. According to the APA, Civil Service Commission had the authority of supervision and management of selection of ALJs. But due to the failure of the initial selection of ALJs, at present, Office of Personal Management (OPM) takes charge of the selection of ALJs and Merit Systems Protection Board (hereinafter referred to as“MSPB”) take charge of the compensation, discipline and removal. An ALJ may be removed only for good cause after opportunity of hearing before the MSPB in order to safeguard the ALJs make initial decision without control of the agency, which can be regarded as the key of the formal adjudication.In the fourth chapter of“The Central Panel Movement of the ALJs”, the Article introduces the debates about the independence movement of ALJs, the experience of the central panel at the state level and related problems, and the future of the central panel movement in the federal government and the states. In those states that adopt central panel, there is an administrative hearing office. The ALJs are appointed and managed by the hearing office, but serve for different agencies, presiding over the hearing and making recommended decision. The Article also involves the argument of ALJs finality. Central Panel movement is successful, so it will possibly continue to enlarge its application at the state level. In the fifth chapter of“Use for Reference in China”, the Article begins the conclusion from the function of hearing in the adjudication including protection of citizens’rights, clarification of the facts and prevention and solution of administrative disputes. The Article concludes that in the adjudication procedure of the United States the government actually interferes with the administrative disputes as early as possible, so the administrative agencies are the major force to solve the administrative disputes, which also lay a good foundation for the judicial review. Finally the Article suggests that China should take the self-solution of administrative disputes by the agencies as the direction of improving administrative disputes resolution mechanism, pay more attention to the function of hearing in the decision making, strengthen the Administrative Hearing mechanism and reform the Administrative Reconsideration mechanism. As to the Administrative Reconsideration, it is necessary to safeguard the independence of reconsideration offices, cultivate the professional administrative reconsideration officers, add hearing procedure in Administrative Reconsideration, gradually conduct experiments in different areas and local governments and make efforts to realize the administrative courts in the future.更多还原