【作者】 张鹂羽；

【导师】 徐杰；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本论文试图从经济法、包括金融法及其经济分析的角度探讨中国银行与企业的法律关系以及法律对中国银企关系的规制。对各种模式的银企关系的理论基础进行了对比分析，进行了应然性的推论并引用了相关事实，确定了中国的银企关系模式属于政府主导型的银企关系，然后对中国政府主导型的银企关系的产生和法律规制进行了更深入分析，同时也分析了美国的结构性银企法律关系，最后还探索性地讨论了一些与银企关系相关、但还未见有人研究过的问题。笔者的结论是，中国的政府主导型银企关系是一种符合中国国情和行之有效的制度。银企关系的不同模式是由各国不同的国情、包括社会、政治、历史、经济和金融体系的历史和现状决定的，同时又有不同的经济学和金融学理论对这些不同模式进行合理性的解释、优缺点的讨论和理论上的指导；而这些理论无论怎样千变万化，都离不开当今世界的两大思潮：自由主义和国家干预主义。这些基本理念的不同决定了经济学和金融学对银企关系的解释和指导不同，从而决定了对特定的银企关系模式的评价不同。本文总结出了银企关系的一些规律，将银企关系分成了三大类，即结构性的银企关系、互动性的银企关系以及系统性的银企关系，而这三大类底下又归纳出十二个小类，即十二种具体关系。为继续深入探讨银企关系的本质提供了一个比较合理的框架。同时，发现了政企关系直接向银企关系传导或通过政银关系向银企关系传导、以及政银关系直接向银企关系传导的机制，进而对影响银企关系的一些因素进行了分析，并且论证了中国政府主导型的银企法律关系与政府在政企法律关系和政银法律关系中的主导地位有着密切的联系。对银企关系本身，分析了银企法律关系的基本概念，对引起政府主导型银企关系的各种原因、包括中国的宏观调控法对银企关系的影响进行了具体分析。笔者还发现，美国没有银企关系这个术语，其与中国银企关系相似的概念称为银商关系，与其相关的一个课题叫银商分离。除了少数例外情况，美国结构性的银企关系制度长期实行银商分离的政策。就是放开了混业经营的1999年《金融服务现代化法》也没有突破这个规定。本文然后还着重对与银行不良资产有直接关系的信贷风险进行了法律分析，较为系统地提出了信贷风险的法律防范和处理办法。最后，对本人在对银企法律研究中遇到的几个问题提出了自己看法或建议，这些问题在查到的文献范围内尚未见有人涉及。在结论部分，对中国的政府主导型银企关系进行了总结性的评价，就当前中国银企关系的法律制度优化提出了建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation is written in an attempt to probe into the legal relationship between banks and enterprises and the regulation of the bank-enterprise relationship in China from the perspective of economic law, including financial law, and economic analysis. A comparative analysis of basic theories for various models of bank-enterprise relationship is carried out, a normative reasoning advanced, and a relevant empirical analysis made, so that the bank-enterprise relationship is confirmed to be a government-leading one. A further analysis is then given to the emergence, causing, and legal regulation of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship in China. A discussion is then engaged in the structural bank-enterprise legal relationship in the U.S.A., which is termed relationship between banking and commerce in that country. Finally, some issues are explored, which are related to the bank-enterprise relationship, but yet to be studied by others. We conclude that the Chinese government-leading bank-enterprise relationship is an effective institution in line with China’s actual conditions.The different models of bank-enterprise relationship are determined by different countries’ actual conditions, including the history and current situation of those countries’ society, politics, culture, economy and financial system. And various economic and financial theories are developed to construe the reasonableness for each of these models, argue their pros and cons, and give directions and recommendations for adopting a specific model. But however different these theories are, they can be categorized into two broad trends of thought: liberalism and state interventionism. The difference of the two basic ideas determines the difference in economic and financial constructions and directions towards bank-enterprise relationship, and in turn determines the difference in evaluation of a specific bank-enterprise relationship model. This article also draws certain regularities of bank-enterprise relationship, and divides it into three categories, i.e., structural bank-enterprise relationship, interactive bank-enterprise relationship, and systematic bank-enterprise relationship, which are composed of twelve subcategories, that is, twelve specific relationships. This supplies a relatively reasonable framework for future approach of the nature of bank-enterprise relationship.Meanwhile, mechanisms have been discovered for conduction of the government-enterprise relationship directly to bank-enterprise relationship or conduction of government- enterprise relationship to the bank-enterprise relationship through the government-bank relationship, as well as conduction of government-bank relationship directly to the bank-enterprise relationship. Furthermore, an analysis is conducted about factors influencing bank-enterprise relationship. Then, a close relationship between the government-leading bank-enterprise legal relationship in China and the controlling position of the government in the government-enterprise and government-bank legal relationships is argued. As for the bank-enterprise legal relationship per se, basic concepts of this relationship are introduced, and the causes of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship, including influence of China’s macro-control law on the bank-enterprise relationship, are closely examined. It is discovered that a concept called relationship between banking and commerce in the U.S.A. is similar to the bank-enterprise relationship in China, while there is not such a term as the bank-enterprise relationship in the U.S.A. A related topic called separation of banking and commerce is found and, with a few exceptions, a policy of separation of banking and commerce has long been pursued in the institution of the structural bank-enterprise relationship in the U.S.A. Even the 1999 Financial Service Modernization Act, which has lifted the prohibition of mixed operations, does not break this rule. Then a legal analysis is stressed on the loan risk directly related to banks’ bad assets, and systematic legal measures for prevention and treatment of the loan risks are suggested. Also, opinions and suggestions on a few topics are lodged, which were not found to have been studied in the available materials during our legal research on banks and enterprises. In the Conclusion, a conclusive evaluation of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship in China is attempted, and suggestions are offered for optimization of the legal institution for the current Chinese bank-enterprise relationship.更多还原