【作者】 陈星德；

【导师】 徐杰；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 证券投资基金作为一种利益共享、风险共担的集合投资方式,自产生以来发展迅速,已成为各国金融市场不可或缺的投资工具,对证券市场的发展发挥着越来越重要的作用。然而,证券投资基金行业自成立以来,如何有效保护基金投资者的问题就一直为人们所关注。我国2000发生的基金黑幕、2003美国基金丑闻等等事件,促使着理论界、实践界进行着深入的反思。损害基金投资者利益的行为无一不和利益冲突有关,利益的不一致性是这些事件产生的根源,而法律是解决利益矛盾和利益冲突的工具。因此,研究基金各方当事人利益和相互之间的利益关系,探讨如何针对基金利益冲突的特点设计有效的法律制度,防范不正当的利益冲突行为,为基金利益冲突的解决提供一个良好的法制框架,既是十分值得研究的法学理论问题,又是很好的实践性问题。本文即是对上述问题进行系统的理论分析,专题研究了证券投资基金的利益冲突和法律规制。本文共有八个部分,结构安排和主要内容摘要如下:引言。阐述了本文选题的背景和意义,国内外对证券投资基金研究的情况,文章采用的研究方法以及研究的主要问题。第一章,证券投资基金基本法律问题分析。由于各国发展历史、法制环境等方面的不同,证券投资基金在各国的名称、概念、组织模式、运作方式等各方面也有差别,从形式上看,证券投资基金普遍具有集合投资方式、专业管理人管理和以证券投资为主要业务等特征。以科斯所创立的交易费用和企业理论分析,证券投资基金属于“中间性组织”的制度安排形式,是一种通过企业与市场两种资源配置机制相互渗透而形成的规制结构,是市场主体之间建立在信用基础上的,以合作为目的的相对稳定的契约安排。而依托于衡平法的信托制度经过长期发展,以其财产“集束”、“标准合同条款”提供等独特功能,适应了“中间性组织”的制度结构需要,在资本市场和财产管理中起到降低交易成本的作用,成为证券投资基金的法律制度依托。证券投资基金活动当事人主要有三方,即基金管理人、基金托管人和基金份额持有人,三方当事人之间形成什么样的法律关系,因采取公司型基金形式和信托型基金形式的不同有所差别,而各国对信托型基金的结构设计又有差异。第二章,证券投资基金利益冲突的基本问题分析。本章对基金利益冲突的概念、特征、主体、产生原因和主要表现形式等基本问题进行了分析。利益冲突是利益主体基于利益差别和利益矛盾而产生的利益纠纷和利益争夺。制度经济学认为,追求自身利益或效用的最大化是个人行为的基本动机,在众多目标发生冲突时,个人会本能地根据对成本和收益的计算,作出最优选择。利益冲突又是英美衡平法中的一个重要概念,它与信托法律制度的关系十分密切。在基金法律关系中,个人利益的存在可能使当事人处在相冲突的地位,使基金份额持有人利益受到损害,其中最主要的是基金管理人与基金持有人之间的利益冲突。基金利益冲突具有多样性、复杂性和隐蔽性的特征。利益冲突的主体是利益关联人,一般以是否存在“控制”因素或“重大影响”作为判断的标准。在基金法律关系中,投资人、基金管理人、托管人、代销机构以及关联自然人之间通过信托、持有、代理、雇佣等法律关系直接间接的发生关联,这些关联关系使利益冲突成为可能,也成为利益输送的渠道。对关联方的界定是一个比较复杂和困难的工作,反映了各国法律对基金利益冲突规制的广度和深度。我国法律法规对关联人的界定尚不十分明确,不利于基金持有人利益的保护。利益冲突为何产生?新制度经济学理论为证券投资基金利益冲突的产生提供了比较有力的理论解释:委托-代理问题是利益冲突产生的根本原因;基金合同“长期契约”和“不完备合同”的性质是利益冲突产生的必要条件;而剩余控制权和剩余索取权的分离为利益冲突提供了充分条件。基金利益冲突的表现形式和具体形态十分丰富,可以分为三大类:1、在利益关系主体之间转移剩余收入而产生的利益冲突;2、基金管理人创造收入的激励不足而产生的利益冲突;3、基金管理人降低剩余收入的质量而产生的利益冲突。第三章,基金利益冲突法律规制的理论分析。本章以法律经济学等方法对基金利益冲突法律规制进行了理论分析,重点是信赖义务的确立与基金利益冲突的规制。科斯定理为我们明确了法律规制要达到的基本目标和路径,根据科斯定理,对利益冲突法律规制的意义在于如何寻找交易费用最小的制度和机制安排并以法律的形式固定下来。卡尔多-希克斯标准可以替代帕雷托效率作为衡量利益冲突规制方式优劣的标准,波斯纳定理、外部性与外部成本收益内部化、博弈分析模型、“路径依赖”理论等法经济学分析方法为我们提供了有益的帮助。信赖义务发源于衡平法,强调受益人的利益至上性,对利益冲突的解决具有较大的作用。信赖义务在衡平法的土壤中发展了丰富的内容,包括忠实义务和注意义务两大类,作为现代商事信托的基金法律制度对传统的信赖义务要求既有继承又有突破。传统的大陆法系民法中并无信赖义务的概念,最能与信赖义务相对应的是诚信原则,由于近代民法阶段致力于包罗万象的法典的制定,法官的自由裁量权被剥夺,诚信原则没有发展出类似信赖义务的丰富内容,大陆法系国家在信托法、基金法中逐步引进了信赖义务概念。我国没有衡平法和判例法传统,缺少受托人信赖义务的法理基础、制度架构以及规则体系,失去衡平法支持的信托业和基金业的存在不少问题,当务之急是借鉴英美国家已经普遍采用的忠实义务和谨慎投资人标准,尽快出台相关的受托人信赖义务的行为标准,真正地建立起令人信赖的基金管理体制。第四章,基金治理结构安排与利益冲突的规制。本章具体分析了基金内部治理模式的机制安排对利益冲突的规制作用。基金治理结构安排就是要通过建立一套既分权又能相互制衡的制度来对基金当事人的行为进行必要的激励和约束,降低代理成本和代理风险,防范利益的背离。以基金治理结构规制利益冲突的优点在于外部性内部化,使当事人能在内部博弈中达到卡尔多-希克斯标准,既减少管制成本,有可避免第三方干涉可能产生的错误。基金法律组织形式和运作方式的不同对规制有较大的影响,开放式基金投资者的退出权对遏制利益冲突行为的发生具有很好的作用。基金托管制度是基金的一种独具特色的制度安排,通过托管人的监督和制衡,可以有效抑制利益冲突风险的发生。基金份额持有人大会这一集体行动的机制更符合信托法理,然而成本高昂造成“理性冷漠”、“搭便车”心理以及“用脚投票”对“用手投票”的替代作用使其并未成为利益冲突规制的主要手段。公司型基金设有董事会和独立董事来维护基金份额持有人权益,尽管信托型基金的传统结构中不存在董事会,但许多国家也在试图移植董事会和独立董事的做法强化制衡和监督。基金托管人、基金份额持有人大会、董事会及独立董事等规制方式有其各自的优点,但也有缺陷,需要改进和完善。第五章,基金利益冲突的外部规制-国家干预。本章主要分析了基金利益冲突的外部规制的几种方式。由于证券投资基金投资者和管理人之间典型的强代理与弱委托的关系,用国家这一“有形之手”减少基金投资者与管理人之间的信息不对称,对利益冲突行为进行必要干预是十分必要的,基金治理结构安排也需要外部强制力的支持。禁止利益冲突是消除利益冲突影响的最简单方式,也是最严厉的措施,但法律不可能禁止一切利益冲突的发生。各国法律并不禁止一切利益冲突,但对一些利害冲突较大,总体上看危害大于利益的利益冲突给予绝对禁止,更多的是将利益冲突的法律禁止与行政手段相结合,法律禁止为一般原则,行政豁免为特例。由于利益冲突的复杂性、隐蔽性以及证券市场的多变特征,对基金管理人履行信赖义务的行为可观察、可衡量的需要催生了内部控制的程序性监管,内部控制的程序性监管要求基金管理人建立一套防止和解决基金利益冲突问题的程序,并监督其履行。政府监管机制有很多弊端,对金融市场放松政府管制的呼声渐涨,强化自律监管,将自律监管与政府监管有机结合,成为近年来各国证券市场监管新的发展方向。我国具有“大政府、小社会”的传统,行政管制手段单一,缺乏灵活性,自律监管薄弱,作用难以发挥,应当进行制度上的完善和体制方面的改革。强制信息披露在证券市场投资者保护中具有重要的地位,政府通过法律强行要求基金管理层披露可能产生利害冲突交易的信息,投资人可以由此判断管理层是否有违反信赖义务的行为。与美国等发达市场国家相比,我国基金利益冲突信息披露制度不够完善,需要加以强化。司法救济对利益冲突的侵害行为也有很强的威慑力,我国尚未出现由于基金利益冲突行为进行民事诉讼的案例,美国的民事诉讼机制比较发达,诉讼案例较多,美国SEC的证据支持、“法院之友”以及替代诉讼等有特色的诉讼制度为我国完善基金诉讼机制提供了有益借鉴。第六章,基金利益冲突主要表现分析及其法律规制。本章主要将实践中存在的一些典型利益冲突表现进行分析,加强对基金利益冲突及其规制的理解和认识。包括:公平对待产生的利益冲突、利益冲突交易、基金投资中的利益冲突行为、基金管理人代理投票权的利益冲突、报酬费用的利益冲突、个人交易的利益冲突等方面。结论。本章对全文的主要观点和内容做了总结。本文在以下方面进行了一定的探索和创新研究:1、以新制度经济学中的交易费用和企业理论对基金“中间性组织”的组织形态以及信托的制度性功能进行探讨。2、以委托-代理、“长期契约”和“不完备合同”、剩余控制权和剩余索取权等理论对证券投资基金利益冲突的产生进行解释,并分析了基金利益冲突的概念、特征主体、表现形式等要素。3、结合法律经济学理论对利益冲突法律规制的目标、途径、方式方法等问题进行分析,详细探讨了信赖义务对利益冲突的规制功能和作用。4、具体分析了基金利益冲突的各类规制方法以及它们的优缺点,并对我国基金行业如何完善利益冲突规制提出了见解。5、紧密结合基金行业出现的利益冲突实例,力求从理论结合实践角度深入分析利益冲突规制的安排。但是,囿于作者的理论素养、知识水平及实践经验,本文还存在一些不足之处,例如,对制度经济学、法律经济学的分析工具掌握需进一步加强,文中一些问题还可以做更为深入的分析研究;还可以做更多资料积累,实证分析内容值得进一步完善。更多还原

【Abstract】 The growth of securities investment fund, as an aggregated investment of such a mechanism based upon sharing of interest and risk, has made it an indispensable investment tool for financial markets, domestically and internationally, and has found itself playing an ever-growing role in the securities markets. Nevertheless, there is much concern about how to effectively protect the interest of fund investors ever since the birth of securities invested fund. Such scandals related to securities investment fund in China of 2000 and such in the United States in 2003 have triggered more thoughts on the protection of investors by theorists and practitioners. Behaviors causing or resulting in damage to the interest of fund investors are always found related to conflict of interest and the inconsistency of interest are generally the warm-bed of the above-mentioned events. Therefore, the interest of parties related to fund, the relationship between such parties and how the interest conflict with each other will be such issues, an in-depth research of which may lead to how to resolve the conflict of interest in connection with fund more effectively from legal perspective. Law is a tool to solve the inconsistency and conflict of interests. It is an either theoretical or practical legal issue to scheme out effective legal mechanisms based on the characteristics of conflict of interest in fund market to prevent unfair behaviors of conflict of interest and to provide a working legal framework for the resolution of conflict of interest among parties related to securities investment fund. This article attempts to analyze the above issues systematically from a theoretical perspective and to study the conflict of interest related to securities investment fund and regulation by laws. This article is composed of eight parts, and its structure and main contents are as follows:Introductory Notes: briefly introduce the background and significance of the topics of this article, research of securities investment fund domestically and internationally and the methodology adopted in the article, and summarize the contents of this article.Chapter 1: Fundamental Legal Analysis of Securities Invested Fund. The term of reference, concepts, forms and organizations and mechanism of securities investment funds vary in different countries for the difference between history and legal environments. From a formal perspective, a securities investment fund generally takes a form of aggregated investment and is managed by professionals with its main business as securities investment. From the perspective of Transaction Cost and Enterprises Theory of Ronald Coase, securities investment funds is a systematic arrangement of“inter-firm organization”, a regulatory structure established upon the mutual-penetration of two market allocation mechanisms: enterprise and market, and a relatively static credit-based contractual arrangement established among market subjects for the purpose of cooperation. The system of trust, with its history of development and based upon the equity law, has become a fundamental legal system of securities investment funds, for its unique function of property aggregation and standard clauses, its conforming with the systematical needs of“inter-firm organization”, and its function of reducing transaction cost in the capital markets and property management. There are mainly three parties to securities invested fund: the manager, the custodian and the fund holder. The legal relationships among such three parties may vary under the corporate fund and the trust fund, and for trust fund, different countries may have different structures.Chapter 2: The Fundamental Analysis of Conflict of Interest of Securities Investment Funds. This part analyzes the concepts, characteristics, subjects, generalization and major forms of conflict of interest of funds. Conflict of interest is the dispute and contest of interest among interested parties for difference of interests. Institutional Ecumenists propose that optimization of self-interest or self-utility is a fundamental motive of individuals, and an individual will, by its light of nature, optimize its choice according to its calculation of cost and benefit, where various goals conflict with each other. Conflict of interest is also an important concept under the Anglo-American equity law, and is closely connected with the trust law system. Among the legal relationship of securities investment funds, the existence of individual interest may place the individuals in such positions that their interests conflict with each other, and may harm the interest of the fund holders. The conflict of interest in securities investment funds are generally found diversified, complicated and concealed. The major conflict is between the fund management company and the fund holders, which is the essential issue to solve other conflicts. The parties to conflict of interest are interested parties, and the factors of“control”or“material influence”are the standards for deciding whether a party is an interest party. In the legal relationships of securities investment funds, investors, managers, custodians, commission agents and related natural persons are associated with each other, directly or indirectly through trust, ownership, agency, employment and etc. Such associated relationships lead to the possibility of conflict of interest, and are, by themselves, channels of transfer of interest. It is a complicated and difficult job to identify interested parties, and thereby the identification of interested parties reflects the scope and depth of regulation of conflict of interest in securities investment funds of a country. Why conflicts of interest come into being? The Neo-Institutional Economics provides some strong theoretical support to the existence of conflict of interest in securities investment funds: entrustment-agent relationship is the root of conflict of interest; the“long-term”and“imperfection”of fund contracts are the prerequisite of conflict of interest, while the break-away of residual right of control and residual claim provides sufficient condition. There are plentiful forms of conflict of interest in securities investment funds, which may be categorized into three types: a. conflict of interest resulting from transfer of residual revenue among interested parties; b. conflict of interest arising from insufficient incentive of managers to generate revenue; c. conflict of interest caused by decrease of quality of residual revenue by managers.Chapter 3: Theoretical Analysis of Legal Regulation of Conflict of Interest of Funds. This part makes theoretical analysis of legal regulation of conflict of interest of funds from the law-economics approach, the focus of which is upon the establishment of fiduciary duty and the regulation of conflict of interest in securities investment funds. The Coase Theory has provided us a fundamental objective and path of legal regulation, according to which the significance of legal regulation in such respect is how to find and stabilize in legal form a systematic arrangement and mechanism to minimize the transaction cost. Kaldor-Hicks Principles may replace Pareto Efficiency as the standard to measure the regulatory methods of conflict of interest, and such law-economic approach as Posner Theorem, Externality and Internalization of External Cost and Benefit, Game Theory Analysis Model and Path Dependence Theory are also of assistance in such analysis. The duty of fiduciary, which includes the duty of faithfulness and the duty of care, has its root in the equity law which focuses on the utmost interest of beneficiaries, and enables to solve the maze of entrustment-agency and conflict of interest (such as imperfection of contracts and information asymmetry). One may not find the concept of fiduciary duty in the continental legal system, however, the most corresponding concept therein is the principle of good faith. As most efforts being made on the build-up of the all-embracing tower of code in the modern civil law system and the judges being deprived of their right of discretion, the principle of good faith has never grown into a florid garden as the duty of fiduciary, and thus the civil law countries has, by degrees, introduced the concept of fiduciary duty into their system of trust law and funds law. There is lack of equity and case law tradition in China, and the absence of legal fundamental, structure and rules of fiduciary duty of trustees has led to various problems in such industry of trust and funds management without the support of equity law. The current necessity is to adopt the obligation of faithfulness and the standard of prudent investors which have been widely used in England and the United States, to set up behavior standards of the duty of fiduciary of trustees, and to establish a credible system of funds management.Chapter 4: Arrangement of Funds Governance Structure and Regulation of Conflict of Interest. This part analyzes, in details, the structural arrangement of internal governance of funds. Arrangement of funds governance structure is to set up a check-and-balance system to provide necessary incentives for and constrains over the behaviors of the parties to the funds, to reduce the cost and risks of agency and to prevent the deviation of interest. The pros of regulation of funds governance is that it may internalize the externality and make the parties reach the Kaldor-Hicks Standard during the internal game. It may further reduce the regulatory cost and prevent inaccuracy caused by interference from third parties. The difference of the legal forms and operation of funds will make significant effect upon the result of regulation. The right of redemption of investors of open-end funds may positively prevent the behaviors of conflict of interest. The funds trusteeship is a unique structural arrangement for funds, which may effectively avoid the risks of conflict of interest through checking and balancing by trustees. The assembly of fund holders has not turned into a commonly adopted tool to regulate conflict of interest for its cost which resulting in“ration apathy”,“free-riders”and the replacement of“vote by hand”by“vote by feet”, though it may play such a role of administering the fiduciary duty of fund managers and is, to some extent, more conforming with the principles of trust law. The board of directors and independent director in a corporate fund represent the interest of fund holders and protect their rights, thus many countries are attempting to introduce the system of board of directors and independent directors to enhance the check and balance, though the traditional structure of trust funds do not have boards of directors. Such regulatory methods of fund trustees, assembly of trust holders, board of directors and independent director each has its own pros and cons, and requires further improvement.Chapter 5: State Interference-The External Regulation of Conflict of Interest of Funds. This part mainly analyzes certain methods of external regulation of conflict of interest of funds. As the typical entrustment-agency relationship between the investors and managers of securities investment funds makes the investors in a weaker position, it is essential to soften the information asymmetry between the investors and fund managers by the state, which plays as a“visible hand”, and to place necessary regulation over the behaviors of fund managers. Fund governance also requires support from external power. The simplest way to prevent the adverse effect of conflict of interest is to bar conflict of interest, which is also the most severe one. However, law may not bar the occurrence of all conflicts of interest. Laws of different countries do not forbid every form of conflict of interest, but will inhibit certain severe conflict of interest the harm of which exceeds the benefit, and will, in most case, combine the legal and administrative tools together, with the ban by law as general principles and administrative exemption as exception. Because of the complexity and invisibleness of conflict of interest and the polytropy of the securities markets, the needs to observe and measure the performance of fiduciary duties by fund manager give birth to procedural administration of internal control. The procedural administration of internal control requires fund managers to establish procedures preventing and resolving the problems of conflict of interest in funds, and to administer its execution. However, there are many detriments of the administration mechanism, and there has been increasing calls for deregulation of the financial markets and enhancement of self-regulation. The combination of government administration and self-regulation has become the recent trend of securities markets administration of various countries. China has the tradition of“a strong government and a weak public”, with its unitary and mechanical administration regulation and weak self-regulation system. Self-regulation in China does not work effectively and it is necessary to carry out the institutional improvement and the systematic reform. Information disclosure is of importance in protecting the interests of investors of the securities markets, and the government may require compulsory disclosure of information that may cause trading of conflict of interest by management of funds by law, so that the investors may thereby determine wither the management has engaged in behaviors violating the duty of fiduciary. The information disclosure of conflict of interest of funds of China is not as mature as those developed countries such as the United States, and requires further improvement. A sound system of judicial remedy would be enough of a threat to the injurious acts of conflict of interest, however, there has not been any case in China on the ground of conflict of interest in funds. The well-developed civil procedure system of the United States has led to numerous cases in this respect, and such system as the evidence support of SEC, aillicus curiae and the alternative dispute resolution may be models for China to improve its funds litigation system.Chapter 6: The Analysis of Forms of Conflict of Interest in Funds and Its Legal Regulation. This part analyzes some typical forms of conflict of interest in real practice so as to add our understanding of the conflict of interest in funds and its regulation. This part includes: treating the conflict of interest occurred fairly, conflict of interest trading, conflict of interest acts in fund investment, conflict of interest of proxy rights of fund managers, conflict of interest of compensation, conflict of interest in individual trading.Conclusion: This part summarizes the article’s key points and main contents. The article is primarily dedicated to following exploring researches:(1) Discussing the forms of securities investment fund’s“inter-firm organization”and the institutional functions of trust by using the transaction cost and enterprise theory of Neo-Institutional Economics, to support the legal natures of trust fund.(2) Explaining the generation of securities investment fund’s conflict of interest by using“entrustment-agent”,“long-term contract”,“imperfect contract”,“the breakaway of residual right of control and residual claim”and other Neo-Institutional Economics theories, analyzing factors such as the concept, the subject characteristics, and the forms of the securities investment fund’s conflict of interest.(3) Systematically analyzing and explaining the objectives and approaches of legal regulation on securities investment fund’s conflict of interest from the perspective of Law-Economics theory, discussing the functions and effects of fiduciary duty in details.(4) Analyzing various legal regulations on securities investment fund’s conflict of interest, and their cons/pros internally and externally, proposing own views of how the securities investment fund industry of China may make use of and further improve such methods.(5) Analyzing typical forms of conflict of interest in real practice based on the above theoretical analysis.However, due to the limits of the author’s theoretical accomplishment and experience, there must be the limitations in this article. For example, the combination of methodologies of general legal research and economic-law research is insufficient, more modern Law-Economics analyzing tools could be used in the article; Information collection and preparation could be more sufficient, Empirical analysis could be more affluent.更多还原