【作者】 陈龙江；

【导师】 王卫国；

【作者基本信息】 中国政法大学 ， 民商法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 对姓名、肖像、声音等自然人的人格标志的商业利用,是现代社会中越来越普遍的经济现象。人格标志上日益凸显的经济利益需要得到相应的民法调整和民法保护。这是当代法学中活跃且富有争议的新问题。对此,在我国的立法上几乎没有规定。我国法学界近十年来就这个问题已经作了许多有价值的探讨,但是该问题的复杂性和新颖性决定了仍有深入研究的必要。在这方面,美国和德国的理论发展尤其值得我们参考和借鉴。因此,本文选取这个题目进行研究。本文除了前言和结论外,正文分为四部分。前言,提出问题和简要描述国内外的研究状况。本文研究的中心问题是姓名、肖像、声音等可藉以识别自然人的人格标志被商业利用时,人格标志上经济利益的民法调整和民法保护问题。具体而言,涉及两个主要问题:第一,就消极的民法保护而言,在其人格标志未经允许而被商业利用的情况下,个人如何获得救济?第二,就积极的民法调整而言,个人在法律上如何授权他人使用、甚至于转让对自己的人格标志的商业利用权利?正文第一部分,考察德国法对人格标志上经济利益的承认与保护,涉及德国相关法院判决的历史演进和学说上的研究情况。本部分分为四章。第一章,介绍德国学说上关于人格权和财产权关系的不同观点。传统的观点坚持人格权仅保护精神利益,认为人格权和财产权是相互对立、严格区分的。另一种观点则认为,人格权也保护经济利益,因此人格权和财产权存在重合的可能。第二章,介绍德国法上的肖像权保护。第一节指出,肖像权保护的精神利益是,以肖像的形式进行自我表现的自主决定利益。第二节描述德国法院从早期判决将肖像权作为纯粹的人格权,到逐渐承认和保护个人在肖像上的经济利益的判决发展过程。其中,德国联邦最高法院1956年的“Paul Dahlke”判决将肖像权称为“具有财产价值的排他性权”,并且主张,在未经许可将他人的肖像用于广告的情形,肖像权人可以主张损害赔偿请求权或不当得利请求权,获得数额相当于合理许可费的赔偿。该代表性判决得到德国法院许多后续判决的遵从。第三章,介绍德国法上的姓名权保护。首先,关于姓名上的精神利益,德国民法典第12条保护姓名的“同一性利益”和“个性化利益”。“同一性利益”是指,姓名必须用于指称正确的人(指称“人”),而不得用于称呼他人从而引发混淆的利益;“个性化利益”是指,姓名未经允许不得被他人用于指称企业、机构或产品(指称“物”),从而使公众误认为姓名权人和使用姓名的产品、企业或机构之间具有某种联系,即防止“归属上的混乱”的利益。关于姓名上的精神利益,一般人格权还赋予姓名权人对于在广告中使用姓名的排他性决定权,禁止未经允许在广告中使用他人的姓名。其次,关于姓名上的经济利益,和肖像权的保护类似,德国联邦最高法院的早期判决偏重于保护姓名上的精神利益,后来则逐渐承认和保护姓名权人在姓名的商业利用上享有的排他性经济利益。在这方面,法院判决转用为保护肖像上的经济利益而发展出来的法律原则。第四章,介绍在姓名、肖像等人格标志上的商业利用价值日益凸显的背景之下,对此进行保护的权利模式。德国有学者主张在人格权之外,承认一种专门保护人格标志上经济利益的财产权(如“人格利用权”或“经济人格权”),和既有的人格权相并列,即所谓的“二元论”权利模式。但是,德国的通说和联邦最高法院的许多判决则主张,将姓名、肖像等人格标志上的经济利益纳入人格权的保护范围,反对另外承认一项新的财产权,此即所谓“一元论”权利模式。在1999年的一个判决中,德国联邦最高法院明确支持“一元论”权利模式。这一判决无论是对人格权法律构造的发展,还是对人格标志上经济利益的保护,都具有里程碑式的意义。该判决还确认了人格权财产成分的可继承性。关于人格权的使用许可,德国学者主张准用著作权法关于著作权使用许可的规定,允许权利人从具有财产成分的姓名权、肖像权或一般人格权中分离出部分权能来,以设立使用权的方式,作为子权利转移给被许可人。但是,该分权利并没有完全脱离原权利,仍处于原权利的影响力之下。正文第二部分,分析美国法对人格标志上经济利益的承认与保护,涉及公开权理论的历史演进过程以及这一理论的具体内容。第一章,考察隐私权理论对人格标志上经济利益的保护。在某些隐私权的早期案例中,法院贯彻隐私权传统理论:以隐私权理论为基础,对那些因自己的人格标志未经许可被他人商业利用,而在精神上感到痛苦的原告提供法律上的救济。但是与上述的案件不同的是,在某些情形下,原告并没有感到自己的尊严受到了侵犯,他所追求的不是“免遭商业利用的独处的权利”,而是要求被告对其人格标志中所蕴含的经济价值给予赔偿。法院于此对隐私权保护范围作了一定程度上的扩张:承认原告的“隐私权”受到了侵犯,并以此为由保护原告在自己的人格标志上的商业利益,即使原告并未因此遭受任何精神上的痛苦。法院对隐私权理论理解上的分歧,引起了学者们的关注,其中较具有代表性的是学者Prosser和Bloustein对隐私权保护范围所作的解释。前者径直将对人格标志中的“经济利益”的保护归为隐私权的类型之一;后者则无视其中的“经济利益”,认为在商业利用中只存在尊严上的伤害。第二章,介绍隐私权理论在保护个人人格标志上的经济利益时存在的不足。第三章,讨论公开权理论的提出及其发展进程。指出,正是许多卓越的法官极富有智慧地区分出个人在自己姓名和肖像等人格标志上享有的不同利益——尊严上的利益和经济上的利益,并且主张为这两种不同的利益寻找适合其本质的保护方法,才引发了公开权理论的诞生。而公开权理论的发展过程,也正是法官在不同的案件中不断贯彻和推进这种区分的过程。这一饱含着许多法官不懈努力的过程增强了人们心中的确信:人格标志上的经济利益并非隐私权的保护范围;对隐私权的限制在涉及这种保护时并不适用;对人格标志上的经济利益的保护属于另外一个独立的法律领域的范畴,这就是公开权理论。第四章研究公开权理论的诸要素,其中包括主体、客体、内容以及救济方式。美国通说认为,虽然名人的人格标志上可能具有更大或更显著的商业价值,但是每个人都对自己的人格标志享有公开权。公开权的客体包括一切足以使公众识别出被指代的人的人格标志,例如姓名、肖像、声音、签名或者极具个人特征的其他物品等等。主张公开权被侵犯的原告必须证明如下事项:他是系争的公开权的权利人;被告使用了原告的人格标志以至于公众能从中识别出原告;被告的行为未经原告的许可;被告的行为有可能对原告的人格标志上的商业价值构成伤害。公开权遭侵犯时,法律所提供的救济方式主要有两种:禁令以及损害赔偿。第五章分析公开权理论中较为重要的问题——继承性的问题。法院在这一问题上的态度并不一致。有的法院认为,公开权根本具不具有可继承性——本人死亡后,人格标志上的商业价值就进入了公共领域;有的法院则在一定条件下承认公开权的可继承性,这一条件通常是本人生前曾经商业利用自己的人格标志;另外的一些法院则无需任何条件,公开权可被继承人继承。第六章是对美国法的公开权理论的简要总结,指出,与第一部分讨论的“德国法模式”不同的是,“美国法模式”在权利的区分上走得更远:人格标志上的某些精神利益是隐私权的核心保护范围,人格标志上的商业价值则属于公开权理论的范畴。正文第三部分,旨在回答的问题是:为什么个人人格标志上的经济价值应该归属于本人?为什么它不属于公共领域的范畴?即,保护人格标志上经济利益的正当化理由问题。第一章介绍伦理上的正当化理由,其中包括劳动说和不当得利说。第二章所讨论的经济上的正当化理由可以分为激励说和有效率使用说。第三章涉及的是消费者保护上的正当化理由,即,避免广告欺诈说与培养名人在广告中的责任感说。第四章指出,前述正当化理由在一定程度上都具有说服力,但是,这些主张都或多或少地存在着无法忽视的不足。本文认为,人格标志上的经济利益归属于本人,即个人是自己的人格标志上财产利益的主人,其原因就在于:只有本人才能决定是否将这些人格权的客体降格为财产权的客体;未经本人允许,任何人都无权对这些作为人格权客体的姓名、肖像等人格标志进行商业利用,否则将有损于个人的人格尊严。简而言之,只有经由个人的人格自治,姓名、肖像等人格标志才能成为财产权的客体,因此人格标志上的经济利益不属于任何其他人,而是专属于本人。这就是作为正当化理由的人格自治理论。正文第四部分,探讨人格标志上经济利益的权利保护模式。引言部分简评了德国法和美国法的权利模式。德国法上兼具精神成分和财产成分的人格权混合权模式,意识到人格标志上的精神利益对经济利益应当具有某种程度的影响和干涉;美国法上公开权完全独立于隐私权的二元论权利模式,较少关注或者说忽视了人格标志上的精神利益对经济利益究竟有何种影响。本部分分为两章。第一章,对人格权和财产权的关系作一番再思考。本文尝试着在康德哲学关于人——物的二分模式之下理解人格权。将人格权利理解为,保护人作为人的尊严不受侵犯,亦即保护每个人免遭被降格为物的权利。同时指出,出于人的自由和人格的自由发展,个人在人格权上存在一定的自治空间,只要这种自治没有达到否定人的尊严的程度。接着,以此为基础论述了人格权和财产权的区别和联系。第二章,提出人格标志上存在一种受到人格利益制约的“人格标志利用权”,以此作为保护人格标志上经济利益的权利模式。第一节提出,人格标志利用权是个人对自己的姓名、肖像、声音等人格标志排他性地进行商业利用和许可他人商业利用的权利。其性质上属于财产权,具有绝对权和支配权的性质。其作为财产权,相对独立于姓名权、肖像权等人格权。第二节指出,人格标志利用权和人格权具有紧密联系,是一种受到权利人的人格利益制约和影响的特殊财产权。第三节探讨允许他人商业利用人格标志的法律形式。具体分析了,基于人格权的被害人允诺,和对人格标志利用权的使用许可这两种法律形式。强调了在允许商业利用的过程中,应当维护被利用人的人格利益。第四节,讨论侵害人格标志利用权的民法保护,即,未经允许商业利用他人的人格标志时,对权利人在人格标志上享有的经济利益的民法保护。结论。认为个人对于自己的人格标志享有一种人格标志利用权,这种权利区别于人格权,但是受到人格利益的影响和制约,是一种特殊的、不完全独立的财产权。德国法的模式正确地认识到人格标志的商业利用同时涉及经济利益和人格利益(尊严利益),并通过撤回权等制度设计,兼顾和强调了对人的尊严的维护。就此而言,其在保护效果上要比美国法模式更合理,值得我国法律借鉴。更多还原

【Abstract】 It’s an increasingly popular economic phenomenon that a person’s name, image, voice and other persona are used in commerce. Thus the increasingly prominent economic interests of persona need protection and regulation of civil law. This has been a hot and controversial legal issue in these years. The legislation in our country has almost not dealt with such a question. In the last ten years the legal authors in our country have done much valuable research on this issue, however, the complexity and newness of this topic makes it deserve furthering research. In this respect, the theories developed in the United States and Germany are experiences of special values, from which we could learn. That’s why the issue was chosen as topic of this article.Besides the introduction and the conclusion, the main body of this article is divided into four parts.In the introduction, the topic of this article is illustrated and a brief introduction is given to part of the research situation in and outside our country. The main topic dealt by this article is that, as far as the commercial exploitation of a person’s name, image, voice and other persona by which a specific person is specified by other person is concerned, how should the economic interests of such persona be protected and regulated from the perspective of civil law. This topic should be dealt with from two perspectives. The first question is that, in the negative respect, when a person’s persona are used for commercial purpose without his permission, what kind of legal remedies could he get from the perspective of civil law? The second question is that, in the positive respect , how could a person authorize others to use his persona for the latter’s commercial purpose, and how could he go even further to assign one part or the whole of his right to commercial use of his persona according to civil law?Part I examines how the German law has recognised and protected the economic interests of a person’s persona, in which both the historical development of the relevant judgements of the Gernman courts and the relevant German legal theories are introduced. Part I contains four chapters. Chapter one, Part I shows the two competing approaches to the relation between the concepts of personality right(Pers?nlichkeitsrecht) and property right(Verm?gensrecht). One approach holds that the personality rights protect only ideal interests, so that there is a clear and comlete distinction between personality right and property right. The other approach argues that the personality rights also protect economic interests, thus it’s not strange that sometimes the two rights overlap.Chapter two , Part I examines the protection of the right to one’s image in German law. Section 1 , Chapter two points out that the ideal interest protected by the right to one’s image is a self-determination interest in self-depiction(Selbstdarstellung) by images. It’s showed in Section 2 , Chapter two that many of the older judgements regarded the right to one’s image as a pure personality right, and only gradually did the courts begin to recognise and protect the economic interest of the image. In 1956 the German Supreme Court(Bundesgerichtshof) called the right to one’s image“an exclusive right with proprietary value ( verm?genswertes Ausschliesskeitsrecht )”in the case“Paul Dahlke”, moreover, the Bundesgerichtshof holded that an unauthorised use of a person’s image could trigger an action for damages or unjust enrichment, and the person portrayed could get compensation equal to a reasonable license fee. This typical case has been confirmed on many subsequent occasions.Chapter three, Part I examines the protection of the right to one’s name in German law. Firstly,§12 of the German Civil Code(BGB) protects two kinds of ideal interests in one’s name, namely“identity interest”(Identit?tsinteresse) and“individuality interest”(individuierungsinteresse).“Identity interest”means the interest that the name must be used to call the right person and not to call the other persons. “Individuality interest”refers to the interest that without a person’s consent his name can not be used to call an enterprise, an institution or goods. The general personality right plays a supplementary role, for it confer an exklusive right to a person, which entitles him to decide whether to use his name in advertising or not. Secondly, as far as the economic interests of a person’s name are concerned, just like what has happened to the protection of the right to one’s image, the earlier judgements of the Bundesgerichtshof emphasised the protection of the ideal interests of the name, and only gradually did judgements of the court begin to recognise and protect the economic values of the name which excluxively belonged to the owner of the name. In such judgements, legal rules developed for the protection of economic interests of one’image were applied by analogy.Chapter four, Part I introduces the two different subjective right models for protection of economic interests of a person’s persona. Some German legal authors suggest that a new property right(eg.“Pers?nlichkeitsnutzungsrecht”or“wirtschaftliches Pers?nlichkeitsrecht”) which is independ from the personality rights should be recognised,ie. a dualistic model. However, the Bundesgerichtshof and the prevailing view among the legal authors represent a monistic model, which reject the recognition of such a new property right and maintain that the personality rights also protect economic interests of a person’s persona. In 1999 the Bundesgerichtshof explicitly supported the monistic model in a judgement, which is a milestone for both the concept construction of personality right and the development of protection of economic interests of persona. The judgement acknowledged for the first time that the economic aspect of personality rights were descendible. The authors who favour the licensing of personaliy rights, suggest that the license model provided by the German Copy Right could be applied by analogy, according to which a license transfers a part of the personality rights , in the form of establishment of a right of use (Nutzungsrecht), which is a dismembered right encumbering the personality rights(the‘mother right’), to the licensee. However, the dismembered right(the‘daughter right’) granted to the licensee is not entirely separated from the‘mother right’,but is under influence of the‘mother right’. Part II examines how the US law has recognised and protected the economic interests of a person’s persona, in which the historic development and the detailed content of the right of publicity are concerned.In Chapter one, Part II, the protection of economic interests of persona offered by theory of the right of privacy is discussed. In some earlier cases about the right of privacy, some courts insisted on the traditional theory of the right of privacy: The plaintiff who suffered emotional distress because of the commercial misappropriation of his persona should be protected on the base of the theory of right of privacy. However, different from the above cases, under some circumstances, the plaintiffs felt deprived of the economic interesst of his persona rather than the peace of their mind. What they pursued is not the right to be let alone, but the rewards for the commercial exploitation of his persona. The courts expanded the protection limit of the right of privacy and held that, those plaintiffs whose economic interests of persona were misappropriated by others deserved the remedy on the basis of right of privacy, even though they suffered no distress in mind. Professor Prosser and professor Bloustein gave different explanations to the theory of the right of privacy. While The former thinks that the protection of the economic interests of persona is included in the right of privacy, the latter asserts that the commercial exploitation would incur the indignity and humiliation of human being, as a result the persona has not any economic value.In Chapter two, Part II, the inadequacy of the theory of right of privacy was revealed.In Chapter three, Part II, the historical background and development of the right of publicity were introduced. The right of publicity is independent of the right of privacy. While the former protects the economic interest of persona, the latter protects the dignitary element of human being.In Chapter four, Part II, some elements of the right of publicity are discussed, including it’s subject, object, content and remedies.In Chapter five, Part II, the heritability of the right of publicity is examined, which is one of the important problems. Many judgments faced with such issue recognized the heritability of the right of publicity.In Chapter six, Part II, a concise summary of the theory of the right of publicity is provided.In Part III, the following questions would be answered: why should the economic interests of persona belong to the person? Why don’t the economic interests of persona belong to the public? It concerns the justification for the right of publicity.In Chapter one, Part III, the moral arguments are set forth, which contain“the claim of labor on the fruits of fame”and“the prevention of unjust enrichment”.In Chapter two, Part III, the economic arguments for the right of publicity are examined, including the incentives argument and allocative efficiency.In Chapter three, Part III, the consumer protection argument and the‘preventing deception in advertising and fostering accountability in advertising’argument are introduced.In Chapter four, Part III, the author indicates the limitations and drawbacks of the above arguments for the right of publicity, and set forth another justification for the right of publicity, which is the theory of personal autonomy.Part IV discusses the right model for protection of economic interests of a person’s persona.Introduction of this part offers a concise review of the US law model and the German law model. Under the German law model, the personality right is regarded as a hybrid right which has both an ideal aspect and an economic aspect. This model realizes that the ideal interests in a person’s persona should have influence on the economic interests in the persona to some degree. The US law represents a dualistic model, according to which the right of publicity is a new right completely independent of the right of privacy. This model pays little attention to or overlooks what kind of influences should the ideal interests in a person’s persona have on the economic interests in the persona. This part is devided into Chapters.Chapter one, Part IV offers a re-examination of the relationship between the personality right and the property right. This article tries to understand the personality right under a distinction model of‘person——thing’held by Kant’s philosophy. Accordingly the personality right is regarded as a right that protects the dignity of human being from being violated, that is, protects a person from being degraded to the status of a thing. At the same time it is pointend out that, taking a person’s freedom and the freedom to develop his personality into consideration, there remains autonomy to a certain degree that a person can have on the personality rights , as long as such an autonomy does not come to such a degree that the human being’s dignity is abandoned. Then there is an examination of the differences and relations between the personality right and the property right.Chapter two, Part IV proposes a“right of exploitation of persona”, which is restricted by the ideal interests in the persona, and this is the subject right model suggested by this article for protection of economic interests of a person’s persona. Section 1 proposes that a“right of exploitation of persona”means that every one is entitled to use his persona himself for commercial purpose or permit others to use his persona for commercial purpose. This right is of property character and is an absolute right. As a property right, it is relatively independent of the personality rights. Section 2 reveals that there is close relations between the“right of exploitation of persona”and the personality rights so that the“right of exploitation of persona”is a special property right subject to the influences and restrictions of the personality rights. Section 3 discusses the possible ways that the permission of commercial use of a person’s persona could be granted. In this section two kinds of permissin , ie, consent based on the personality right and license of the“right of exploitation of persona”are analysed in detail. It is emphasized that even if a permission of commercial use of a person’s persona is granted, the ideal interests of the person whose persona is used must be guaranteed. Section 4 discusses what kind of remedies according to civil law could a person resort to when his persona is commercially exploited without his permission.As a conclusion, it’s held by this article that every one has a“right of exploitation of persona”in his persona. It is a special and a not completely independent right, which is independent of the personality right on the one hand, but subject to the influences and restrictions of the personality rights on the other hand.. According to this article, the German law model has correctly realized that the commercial use of a person’s persona affects both economic and ideal (dignitary) interests, and by providing a right to revoke and other mechanisms, it also pays attention to and stresses the guarantee of huaman dignity. In this respect, this model is more reasonable than that of the US law, and this model deserves our country’s learning and following.更多还原