【作者】 申明浩；

【导师】 隋广军；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 基于近年逐渐增多的控制性家族通过关联交易挖掘隧道剥削小股东的现实，本文选取截至2004年底全部沪深两市的民营家族上市公司280家作为研究对象，在合谋理论的支撑下，构建了家族主义、控制形式和信任格局的三维度框架，分析控制性家族股东与经理合谋对上市公司进行隧道行为的动机和影响因素。研究区分了“资本家控制型”(CFB)和“企业家控制型”(EFB)两种不同样本，发现资本家控制的上市公司金字塔结构层级、控制权与现金流权偏离系数均高于企业家控制的公司，因而其隧道行为倾向也较EFB明显，但企业价值却低于EFB。理论模型分析发现：健全的法律环境和完善的公司治理机制可以减少家族掏空上市公司的隧道挖掘行为，家族控股股东的持股比例的增加与隧道行为强度呈现先上升后下降的倒U型关系，而家族的隧道行为强度直接关系到其能够从资本市场上获得的资金规模大小。实证研究结果显示：资本家家族的隧道行为动机和强度远远高于企业家家族，企业家家族有大股东的监督倾向。资本家家族倾向于通过构建多层控制链实施隧道行为；企业家家族成员在上市公司任职有利于形成合谋挖掘隧道转移资源；控股股东以企业集团方式存在的公司遭受了更加严重的掏空；家族控制的上市公司中独立董事没有发挥有效的监督作用；总经理持股比例与隧道行为强度呈现U型关系，存在“监管激励效应”及“合谋掏空效应”。在理论、实证研究及监管博弈分析的基础上，提出本文的政策建议：在中国未来的证券市场改革过程中，要避免中小股东利益被侵害现象的发生，就应当在各级证券监管机构实行领导问责制，增加其在监管过程中失职失误给自己带来的损失；同时健全市场监管机制和外部治理机制，实施上市公司的分类分级管理，把有限的监管资源集中用在那些隧道行为动机强的公司；加大家族违规的成本和惩处力度，增加其违规从事隧道行为的潜在成本，压制其投机心理，规范控制权市场，增强股权制衡度：进一步完善上市公司稽查制度，使民营家族上市公司在公开、公正、有序的市场环境中健康成长。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, with the increase of family-controlled holding companies, some cases emerge frequently, in which the interests of small shareholders are deprived because of assets transferring. These family-controlled holding companies aim to gather fortune by means of digging tunnel through affiliated transactions. In the paper; we choose the whole body of 280 private listed companies by the end of 2004 as research subjects. Under the support of collusion theory, we establish a three-dimensional framework which includes familism, control form and trust pattern, and then analyse the motives and factors of the tunneling behavior to the listed companies by the controlled family shareholders in collusion with the managers. The research, which distinguishes Capitalists-controlled (CFB) from Entrepreneurs -controlled (EFB), finds out that the levels of the pyramid structure, Control and Cash flow coefficient of deviation of Capitalists-controlled listed companies are higher than those controlled by entrepreneurs. Therefore Capitalists-controlled listed companies have more obvious tendency towards tunneling behavior than EFB. But the enterprise values of the former are lower than the latter.The results of regression analysis on family occupying of listed companies’ capital show: capitalist-families incline to conduct tunnel behavior by the means of establishing multi-layer control chain; members of the entrepreneur-families working in listed company is conducive to the formation of collusion, digging tunnel and transferring resources; companies whose controlling shareholders exist in the form of enterprise groups suffer from being emptied more seriously; in family-controlled listed companies, independent directors have not played an effective supervisory role; the equity ratio of general manager and intensity of the tunneling behavior show U-shaped relationship, "the incentive effects of regulation" and "collusion draining effect" existing.The policy recommendations of the paper are based on the analysis of the game model: a sound legal environment and a good corporate governance mechanism could decrease the possibility that families empty listed companies through tunneling behavior. The increase of the family controlling shareholder equity ratio and the intensity of the tunneling behavior show inverted-U relationship first decreased and then increased. The regulatory strategy of securities regulatory authorities and family irregularities cost show reverse relations, and so do the family irregularities strategy and the reputation of securities regulatory authorities. Therefore, in the prospective process of reforming China’s stock market, if we want to avoid undermining the interests of small shareholders, we should implement leadership accountability system on securities regulatory authorities at all levels, in case of loss. At the same time, we must perfect market regulation mechanism and external mechanisms of corporate governance while enhancing the cost and intensity of penalty of family irregularities. And we should also increase potential costs of tunneling behavior so as to suppress their speculation. Efforts must be made to standardize control of the market and build up equity degrees. Furthermore, listed companies inspection system need to be perfected. Thus, private listed companies could grow healthily in an open, fair, and orderly market environment.更多还原